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In May 1919, following the Al1ie' victory in the Grea'
War, the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference was
deliberating in Paris. With ample prompting from the Greek
side and in order to avert a similar Italian move, the Council
soon decided to request the landing of Greek troops in Asia
Minor, to establish law and order and to protect the Christian
minorities from excesses on behalf of the Turks. This
landing, was followed by the establishment of the Greek High
Commission of Smyrna, whose task was to supervise the Turkish
administration of the territory occupied by the Greek army
u til the peace treaty with Turkey was signed. Further,the
'gh Commission was to be the mediator Iet.ween the occupying
forces and the Ottoman civil authorities. After the signature
of the Treaty of Sèvres which provided for a substantial part
of Asia Minor to be administered by Greece for an initial
five-year period, the High Commission assumed the
administration of the Greek zone, together with that of the
zone occupied de facto by the Greek forces but not included, in
the Treaty, and was renamed Greek Administration of Smyrna.
The object of this thesis is to examine the conditions
under which Greece was called to supervise the Turkish
administration, from which she was subsequently to take over,
the administrative work carried out during the 1919-1922
period and the inherent contradictions present in Greece's
Anatolian venture, which has been described as "the worst
day's work for his country which Venizelos ever did". Further,
in the light of the archival material examined, an attempt is
made to evaluate the feasibility of a Greek Asia Minor based
on the principle of peaceful coexistence between Greeks and
Turks. On the basis of the extensive primary sources
consulted, the thesis also attempts to examine the external
forces opposing the scheme and hampering any chances of
success it ever had.
On the Greek side, the name which stands out throughout
the period under examination is that of Aristidis Stergiadis,
the controversial High Commissioner of Sinyrna and its
omnipotent ruler until the 1922 catastrophe. The thesis
examines the Stergiadis administration and attempts to
evaluate the work carried out, as well as the outcry that
followed the High Commissioner during his long self-exile from






A Note on References to Documentation
For abbreviation purposes, primary material from the
Greek archives appears in references and footnotes as follows:
MOFA 22a tel. no. 10346/22.1.20, Stergiadis to Venizelos
In this example, telegram number 10346 was addressed by
Stergiadis to Venizelos on 22 January 1920. The abbreviation
MOFA corresponds to the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, while number 22 is an abbreviation for the full, title
of the file, as it appears in the Bibliography at the end of
this thesis and corresponds to the sequence with which files
were made available to me during the course of my research. In
this particular example, the full title of MOFA 22 is A
Politiki, Smyrni, documents numbered 10,001-end, 1920 (1st
Political Directorate, Smyrna, 1920]. The letter a denotes
that this particular telegram was the first document
photocopied from file MOFA 22, and appears here to facilitate
access to the card inaex on the documents used for the
purposes of this thesis.
The same system applies to documents deposited with the
General Archives of the State [Genika Archeia tou Kratous -
GAK) and the Venizelos' Archive at the Benaki Museum [Archeio
Venizelou - AV]. For example,
GAK 13k document no. 3361/13.4.22, Gounarakis to MOFA
denotes that this document, addressed by the Secretary General
of the High Commission to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was
the tenth document photocopied and the original is filed in
the file YAS Diefthynsis Esoterikon, 1920-1922 (SHC Department
of Internal Affairs, 1920-1922]. In turn, this file was the
thirteenth file consulted in the General Archives of the
State, while
AV 13 letter, n.n./22.4.20, Venizelos to Paraskevopoulos
denotes reference to a letter addressed on 22 April 1920 by
Venizelos to Paraskevopoulos. It did not bear a document
number (n.n. = not numbered], notes were taken but it was not
photocopied (no letter follows AV 13), and its original can be
found in file 24, Episima Ypourgiou Exoterikon, 1919, xii
(Official. Documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1919
xvii).
Italian primary material, the majority of which was
located in the Historical Archives of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (ASMAE), is referred to in the following form:
ASMAE Turchia 1644/7738/1467/27.4.19, Sonnino to Ravel
This denotes that telegram number 1467 was addressed by
Sonnino to Admiral di Ravel on 27 April 1919, and was located
in the collection of documents pertaining to Turkey [Turchia),
in Packet [Pacco) number 1644 (1919), File [Busta] 7738,
Occupazioni greche in Asia Minore (Greek occupations in Asia
Minor]. Again, a list of the main files consulted at the ASMAE
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can be found in the Bibliography.
References to documents published in the various volumes
of the Documents of British Foreign Policy series (DBFP],
appear either as
DBFP IV no. 577
denoting document number 577 in the fourth volume of the first
series, whenever reference to the document as a whole is
implied, or as
DBFP VII p. 98
when a particular part of a longer document is referred to.
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List of Abbreviations
AR	 Foreign Office, Annual Report
ARG	 Foreign Office, Annual Report for Greece
ART	 Foreign Office, Annual Report for Turkey
ASMAE Historical Archives of the Italian Foreign Ministry
AV	 Venizelos Archive
CAB	 Cabinet Papers, London
CH	 Current History, USA
CHC	 Greek High Commission in Constantinople
DBFP Documents on British Foreign Policy, First Series
DICP Italian Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference
DIFP Documents on Italian Foreign Policy
DKMS Journal of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies, Athens
DPA	 Diotnidis-Paraskevopoulos Archive
FO	 Foreign Office Papers, London
GAK	 General Archives of the State, Athens
GAS	 Greek Administration of Smyrna
GGG	 Greek Government Gazette
GGS	 Greek General Staff
HC	 House of Commons, London
Id	 International Commission of Inquiry
lEE	 Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous
KMS	 Centre for Asia Minor Studies, Athens
MAE	 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome
MANTOUX Les Dèlibèrations du Conseil des Quatre
MOFA	 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens (Also Archives
of...)
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"The story carried us back to classic times. It is true
Greek tragedy, with Chance as the ever-ready handmaid of
Fate...The interplay between Greek love of party politics and
the influence exercised over them by Venizelos constitutes the
action of the piece. The scene and the lighting are the Great
War; and the theme 'How Greece gained the Empire of her dreams
in spite of herself, and threw it away when she awoke' " 1/.
Although not complete as it avoids any mention of the role
entrusted to Greece's Allies in the play, this is a more or
less accurate picture of the period to be discussed in this
study. The particular diplomatic and military manoeuvres to be
examined seem to have been but an episode in one of the
longest-running problems in world history: In 1919, at the
wake of the Great War, Greece accepted the Allied offer of
substantial territory in Asia Minor, enshrined in the abortive
Treaty of Sévres, and she thereby came to occupy much the same
area as Agesilaos had done in 396-394 b.C., with as little
prospect of success 2/.
The Treaty of S&vres was the last of five peace
treaties concluded at various stages after the armistice
between the Allies and each of the Central Powers. Most of
these treaties were characterized by a blatant disregard of
the principles of self-determination and protection of
minorities which the Allies had professed to honour. The
frontiers drawn as a result, were motivated by strategic
rather than ethnic considerations and the Treaty of S&vres was
no exception. It incorporated most of the provisions of the
four secret treaties concluded among the Allies during the
War, which, in turn, constituted a glaring contradiction of
the Wilsonian fourteen points adopted by the Peace Conference
as a basis for discussion, because they provided for the
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire a priori. According to
the Wilsonian declarations, exclusively Turkish territory was
to remain independent and the non-Turkish parts of the Ottoman
Empire were assured "an absolutely unmolested opportunity of
autonomous development". The Treaty of Sévres provided for
important concessions for Greece, which were to have far
reaching consequences not only for the Ottoman Greek minority,
but for the Balkan peninsula in general 3/. As t happened,
this treaty proved to be the only one that could not be
enforced. Its revision was being discussed in earnest before
it was even signed and, by the time of its signature, the
position of the Greek army which was called to enforce it, was
patently untenable.
In the end, among the Central Powers, Turkey alone was
able to repudiate the terms imposed on her by the victorious
Allies, to the largest part unwillingly. Not only she defeated
the Greek army and defied Allied authority, but, what was
probably more important, she succeeded in transforming herself
from the rump of a universal empire into a national state,
within the short space of three years. As Smyrna burned, the
Greeks of Asia Minor fled to the mainland in their hundreds of
thousands, together with the remaining destitute Christian
communities of the area.	 The problem of the Christian
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minorities in Turkey seemed to have been solved, since they
had ceased to exist.
This study focuses on the administration of the areas
occupied by Greece in Asia Minor as a result of post-war
considerations in conjunction with her own determination -or
that of her leaders- to implement the Megali Idea. The
prospects for the realization of this centuries-old dream
within the framework of Greek participation in the Allied war
effort were mainly responsible for hopelessly dividing the
country during the preceding five years and for pushing it to
the brink of civil strife.
In the process of this research, it became clear that
the activities of the Greek administration could in no way be
studied and evaluated without being placed within the context
of post-war Allied relations, the plight of the Christian
minorities in Turkey and the upsurgence of the Turkish
nationalist movement, the delicate situation at home and the
developments both at the military front and at the table of
diplomatic negotiations. These factors greately determined the
outcome of Greece's administrative efforts in Asia Minor and,
in view of their interaction, their assessment was deemed
essential. As a result, a substantial part of this study
considers the odds against which the Greek authorities in Asia
Minor had to fight in order to create an effective
administrative structure. This effort, in effect, was based on
the grave misunderstanding that Greece had been called to
govern Western Anatolia, while the truth of the matter was
that the Allies had simply entrusted to the Greek forces the
policing of the area for a limited period of time.
The material examined here was divided into five
chapters, while the introductorynotes attempt to set the
background in Anatolia through a survey of the period 1913 -
1918. Chapter One examines the diplomatic considerations which
compelled the Allies to request the landing of the Greek
forces in Smyrna, in defiance of the gloomy forecasts of their
military advisers. The disastrous execution of this landing
and the ugly episodes that followed, together with the
interallied inquiry into these episodes, also form part of
this chapter, as this series of events illustrated the
realities against which the Greek administration would have to
work during its short-lived existence.
The Greek strife to secure the successful conclusion of
the peace treaty against all odds and the interaction of the
intricate development of Allied relations, are examined in
Chapter Two, in so far as they had a direct bearing on the
decision to impose the Treaty of Sévres on Turkey. The
chapter also examines Allied efforts -or lack of- to bring
about a lasting settlement by reversing the Treaty on Sevres
on the pretext of the return of King Constantine to the
He].lenic throne. Reference is made to the abortive Greek
threat on Constantinople and the manifest Allied discord
which, in the event, enmeshed Greece in a diplomatic tangle
from which she proved unable to extricate herself. Further, a
brief survey of the military situation prevailing in Asia
Minor throughout the period under consideration is attempted.
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On the basis of Chapters One and Two, Chapter Three
sets out to examine the direct bearing of the above factors on
the day to day running of the administration and to evaluate
the few positive aspects of its course. This topic is taken
over to Chapter Four, where the personality and efforts of
Aristidis Stergiadis, the Smyrna High Commissioner, are
studied, in an attempt to clear the controversy surrounding
his name and to analyze the origins of the fury it raises
among refugee circles even today. The Chapter also examines
the internal problems and contradictions faced by his
administration, and incorporates a section on the
establishment of the illusory Asia Minor Defence, a belated
reaction to the Turkish nationalist movement on the part of
the local Greeks. Chapter Five zefers to the last days of the
Greek administration and the end of Smyrna and incorporates
the conclusions derived from this research.
In view of the regulations delimiting the length of
this study, several important aspects that have determined
this or the other course of action taken by the Greek
administration, have been omitted or not examined in detail.
Among them, the development, complexities and hindrances of
the Turkish nationalist movement and its juxtaposition with
the development of the Megali Idea and the Hellenic perception
of the Ethniko Kentro [National Centre]; the Armenian,
Circassian and Kurdish strife for independence and the active
encouragement they received by the Greeks; the alternative
option of Eastern Thrace and events in the province during the
period under consideration; the attempt to create an
autonomous state in Pontus; the Treaty of Neuilly with
Bulgaria and the cession of Western Thrace to Greece, to name
but the most important. To complete the extensive and
intricate list of forces adversing all efforts to secure a
viable administration under conditions of full-scale war and
martial law, one would also have to examine in detail the
stance of France, Italy and international finance vis-á-vis
Greece in Asia Minor and to refer to the separate agreements
concluded with the nationalists as part of the Franco-Italian
quest for concessions and preponderance in the Near East. This
aspect is essential in view of the pressure brought to bear at
the negotiating table by factors which had little to do with
the professed allegiance of the Peace Conference to the
principle of self-determination.
Also, on the whole, I have refrained from examining in
detail the course of internal Greek and Turkish politics and
that of the nationalist movement, and I only referred to them
briefly in so far as they were essential for the continuity of
the narration. Similarly, I have not examined the issue of
population statistics which is covered in a number of works
included in the bibliography. This is mainly due to the fact
that, during the course of the research, it became clear that
there was little connection between decisions taken in Europe
and the true state of affairs in Asia Minor. Therefore, a
detailed examination and comparison of the available
statistics seemed to fall outside the scope of this study.
Nonetheless, the questions referred to above have not escaped
the efforts of this research and the intricate issues they
involve	 were taken into consideration when I came to
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conclusions at the end of this detailed and in parts painful
survey.
On the basis of these conclusions, it is clear that the
study of the Asia Minor Question outside the scope of folklore
is long overdue, no matter how painful the results hiay prove
to be. A careful study of events and personalities
sthe ira et studio, may serve the interests of Greece, and,
foremost, those of the refugees, in that there is many a
lesson to be derived from the tragedy that befell them in
1922. Although at the outset of this research the intention
was to provide a blue-print of every day life in Asia Minor
under the Greek administration, the understanding that in the
mind of the High Commissioner the futility of this exercise
was crystal clear, compelled me to stray.
Through the course of this study, many individuals
encouraged, supported and tolerated me. Among them,
	
P. N.
Diamandouros, P. K. Kitromilidis, P. Hidiroglou, Th.
Veremis, S.V. Papacosma, A. Alexandris L. Tsoukalis and D.
Hardy were most helpful in pointing out to me considerations
and sources that0,had escaped my attention. My thanks are also
due to M. Liewlyn Smith and N. Petsalis-Diomidis for their
comprehensive studies of subjects closely connected with my
thesis, as they furnished me with invaluable material and,
through their work, encouraged me to sustain a number of
arguments contained in this thesis. I should also like to
acknowledge the guidance and help provided by Ambassador Ch.
Zamarias, private secretary of A. Stergiadis, and that of Mrs.
P. Gounarakis, who was kind enough to let me consult her late
husband's unpublished papers. In one of the letters contained
in this collection we read:
"After the Asia Minor catastrophe t', he wrote to the
then Minister of Foreign Affairs on 16 March 1968, "the
undersigned handed the confidential archive of the
Smyrna High Commission to the Ministry of Justice,
following orders by the then Minister of Interior.
Later, I was informed that this archive was handed over
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I visited A.
Michalakopoulos, who was Minister at the time, and I
ventured to suggest that this confidential archive be
put in order and that those who served with the High
Commission should provide explanatory notes on the
documents with reference to the events. I added that
this work should start immediately because those who
had served with the High Commission would gradually
leave this world, leaving behind an archive with no
beginning and no end, an archive without any
explanations which would be difficult to be studied by
a historian researching the period from May 1919 to
September 1922...The then Minister of Foreign Affairs
replied that my proposal was excellent but that we were
too near the events...and that it would be preferable
to let time heal the wounds before undertaking such a
task...A substantial amount of years has now gone by
and, consequently, the discussion of the Asia Minor
question today cannot but have historical character and
not the character it would have had before forty
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years...With this in mind, I wish to repeat my proposal
to help put the archive in order.The issue of the Greek
occupation of Asia Minor can be studied under three
different headings: a. political (national and
international), b. military, c. administrative. A lot
has been written by Greek and foreign writers on the
political and military aspects of the issue but nothing
on the activities of the Greek civil administration of
Smyrna...The researcher of this most important aspect
can find a lot of material in the confidential archive,
in the general archive of the High Commission whose
whereabouts escape me (General Archives of the State],
and from the memory of those who served in Smyrna".
It is very unfortunate that Gounarakis did not receive
a reply to his offer and, as a result, neither the
confidential nor the general archive of the Smyrna High
Commission were arranged on the basis of explanations by those
who composed most of the documents contained therein. As one
among the first students of the period to have been allowed
access after the lapse of the fifty year rule, my task was
made easier through the kind assistance of Effi Allamani and
Christa Panayiotopoulou, who were at the time in charge of the
Archives Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Most
valuable help was also provided by the late FiFi Anastasiadi
and Valentini Tselika of the Benaki Museum Archives, to whom I
am grateful.
It is customary for PhD candidates to express their
thanks to their supervisors for advice and guidance rendered
through the course of their study. In this case, the
expression of gratitude is, I think, in order, as Mr. R.R.M.
Clogg gave me not only support and guidance, but also the
opportunity without which the completion of this thesis would
not have been possible.
This work is dedicated to my Uncles Christos S.
Solomonidis and Dimitri G. Papamichalopoulos. The first
inspired me since an early age through his books and
narrations about tthe glory that was Smyrna" and his
determination to preserve for posterity what was left of it:
its history, customs and traditions. The second, a staunch
Venizelist M.P.., gave me unimpaired guidance through his
first-hand knowledge of the events and supported me strongly
in my effort to come to a better understanding of the issues
at hand and to attempt to challenge their conventional
version on the basis of unpublished primary material.
17 Churchill, W. The World Crisis, The Aftermath. London 1929,
p. 309.
2/ Smith, D.M. Sparta and Persia. Oxford, 1970. p. 156
3/ Stavrianos, L. S. The Balkans since 1453. Illinois, 1958,
p. 581.
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I N T R 0 D U C T I 0 N:
Aja Minor, 913 - 1919
"And now, we must turn our
eyes to the East".
E. K. Venizelos *
* Vendiris, G.I Ellas ton 1910-1920 (Greece in 1910-1920).
p.263
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After the si gnature of the Treaty of Bucharest which
concluded the Ealkan Wars of 1912-1913, euphoria reigned in
Greece and VenizeicF was "turning hiE ves to the East". In
the meantime, the pcsition of the Ottoman Greeks in Asia Minor
became more precarious day by day. After their defeat in the
Balkan Wars, the Yc.ung Turks came to believe that the local
Greek population	 cld bc a 4 riorar e ri their effort to
consolidate what was ft of tne Ottorri Empire and took
active measures in order to rrdlnta-r, their hold over the
remainina territories and especially over Ar.atolia, the cradle
of Turkish nationalism if. In this context, it was thought
that the recent Greek acquisition of Lesvos, Chios and Samos
constituted a danger to Turkish sovereignty because of the
islands' strategic position at the entrance of the Dardanelles
and their consequent domination of naval communications
between Constantinople and Smyrna 2/.
As a result, with the ordeal of the Balkan Wars scarcely
over, a new wave of persecutions against the Christian
populations began in the districts of Edirne and Kirk-Kilisse
in Thrace and soon spread to Western Anatolia 3/. Together
with the promotion of Turkish nationalism, the anti-Greek
persecutions also served as a means of exercising pressure on
the Athens oovernment over the issue of the Aegean islands. In
contrast to the persecutions in Thrace which were engendered
by the nationalist fervour of the Young Turk revolt of 1908,
this new wave was a systematic effort to rid the Asia Minor
littoral of its Greek inhabitants. As early as January 1914,
the Greek Charge d' Affaires in Constantinople called the
attention of his government to the grave repercussions of this
policy which seemed to be dictated by the fear that the Greek
populations might prevent quick mobilization of Turkish troops
and hinder their speedy movement in the event of a new war 4/.
Parallel to the military considerations which seemed to
dictate the expulsion of the Greek populations, the partial
uprooting of Muslim communities from Macedonia and Western
Thrace at the end of the Balkan Wars led to reprisals against
the Anatolian Christians. These reprisals reflected not only
the Turkish wish for revenge, but also the realization that
1/ For the development of the Turkish national movement and
nationalist ideology see, i.a., Kushner, D. The Rise of
Turkish Nationalism, 1876-1908. London 1977. Mardin, serif.
The Genesis of Young Ottoman Tnought. Princeton 1962. Landau,
3. M. Pan-Turkism in Turkey.	 London	 1981.	 GBkalp, Ziya.
"The Ideal of	 Nationalism" in Nationalism in Asia and
Africa. Kedourie, E. 	 ed. London 1970.
2/ Kohier, F..Der neue Dreibund,ein politisches Arbeitsprogramni
fUr das deutsche yolk und seine Freunde. Munich 1915.
3/ Petsalis-Diomidis, N.Greece at the Paris Peace Conference,
1919.	 Thessaloniki 1978. p. 30. MOFA 	 145 Report no.
3552/19.6.15, CHC to MOFA.
4/ Vendiris, G. op.cit., p. 192.
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in the home of every deported Christian family, a Muslim
refugee householâ couid be resettled. As a result of the
collaboration betweer the irregular (chette) bands and the
Ottoman authorities in this program, a great many of the Greek
communities of the Asia Minor littoral were uprooted 5/. One
observer noted that "the procedure bore evidence of being
s ystematic. The terror attacked one district after another and
was carried on by the chette bands enlisted among the Rumeli
Muslim refugees, as well as from the local population, and
nominally attached as reinforcements to the regular Ottoman
gendarmerie" 6/.
As a means of forcing the Ottoman Greeks to leave Turkey
of their own will, a commercial boycott was introduced as
early as 1910. Control of the boycott was entrusted to a
special committee residing in Constantinople, while its
implementation was placed in the hands of Turco-Cretan chette
bands 7/. These bands roamed the country and forced the Muslim
population to sever all connection with the Greeks to the
extend of leavi'ng their debts unsettled. As a result, Greek
commerce in Anatolia almost came to a standstill 8/. When the
boycott reached its climax at the beginning of 1914, the
Patriarch protested against the economic persecution of the
r'ttoman Greeks with a takrir addressed to the Minister of
Public, Justice and Worship: "The economic boycott against the
Orthodox Greeks is now applied throughout Turkey and is
endorsed by the open assistance of government officials.
Commercial transactions with the Greeks are practically non-
existent while those Muslims who wish to continue contacts
with them, face threats on their lives. In addition, and as a
result of diverse means of pressure, the Orthodox Greeks of
certain regions are being forced to migrate and are
immediately replaced by Muslim migrants" 9/. The Patriarch
went on to accuse the Sublime Porte of responsibility for "a
merciless persecution, aimed at the total annihilation of the
Greek element". In his reply, the Minister assured the
Patriarch	 that the Imperial Government was taking all
appropriate measures to improve the situation 10/.
This, however, did not seem to be the case. In May 1915,
5/ MOFA 145, Report no. 2068/20.7.15, CHC to MOFA. Smith,
M. L.	 The Toniari Vision. London, 1973. pp. 30-31.
6/ Toynbee, A.	 The Western Question in Greece and Turkey.
1924. p. 140.
7/ MOFA 146, Despatch no. 12316/6.11.15,
	
MOFA to Greek
Embassies in Berlin and Vienna. Pinnon, R. L' Europe et la
leune Turguie. Paris, 1911.
8/ Greek Patriarchate. Persecutions of Greeks in Turkey,
1914-1918. Constantinople, 1919. pp. 92-93.
9/ ibid, pp. 180-81.
10/ ibid, pp.188-89. The same reply was given to the numerous
demarches of the Greek government. See MOFA 145, Note no.
3301/3.7.15, MOFA to Sublime Porte. Note 69728/22a/3.8.15,
Sublime Porte to MOFA.
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an official circular addressed to the Vali of Smyrna by Talaat
and Au Riza accused the local Greeks of "working day and
night for the realization of the Great Idea" and stated that
the propagation of such revolutionary ideas within the Ottoman
State was unacceptable. Therefore, the Greeks should be forced
to evacuate their villages alonc the coast and move to the
dstri-ts of Erzerurn or Chidea. f t' refused to comply,
the )ocal Muslims should be rstruted "to commit excesses of
all kinds" in order to force their ex patriation. In all cases,
the local authorities were jnstructed to obtain a certificate
signed by those migrating, stating that they were leaving on
their own initiative 11/.
In the period between the end of the Balkan Wars and the
beginning of the Great War, about 130,000 Ottoman Greek
refugees were settled in Macedonia, 70,000 in the Aegean
islands and some 30,000 in Old Greece 12/. During the same
period, Turkey received 122,665 Muslim refugees 13/. Thus,
while the strategic security of the Asia Minor littoral was
being ensured and a refuge for the Muslims who had left, or
were forced to leave Macedonia and Thrace after the Balkan
Wars was found, a considerable number of Greeks was forced to
migrate. Only the two big centres of Hellenism, Constantinople
and Smyrna, were spared, primarily because of the density of
the Greek population. "The number of Greeks there, [in Smyrna
and Constantinople] was too great for all of them to be
exterminated" 14/.
At the same time, the build-up of an ethnic Turkish
population in areas of strategic significance had become an
issue of exceptional importance for Constantinople. To this
end, in April 1914, the Ottoman government proposed to Athens
the exchange of the Greek population of the Asia Minor
littoral with the Muslim inhabitants of Macedonia 15/. This
Turkish proposal has been commented upon both as the most
constructive scheme that has yet been tried in the Near and
Middle East for the solution of a minority problem" as well as
"the origin of the 1923 population exchange: a case of extreme
necessity imposed on Greece" 16/. In the number involved in
this proposal, the Porte included among the population of the
Asia Minor littoral the Greeks of the Aegean islands. This
argument was later taken up by Venizelos during the Paris
Peace Conference, to prove the Greek preponderance in the
11/ Circular dated 14 May 1914. It was subsequently published
in Le Ternps, on 26 July 1916.
12/ Piaux, A. La deportation et le repatriement des Grecs en
Turguie. Paris, 1919. Pallis, A.A. 'acia1 migration in
the Balkans during the years 1912-1924" in Geographical
Journal, 66/4 (1925). pp. 315-31. Petsalis, op.cit., p. 30.
Morning Post 11 .12.18.
13/ Toynbee. op.cit., p. 138.
14/ Morning Post, 11.12.18.
15/ Kohier, op.cit., p. 121. Toynbee, op.cit., p. 70.
16/ Toynbee, op.cit., p. 141.
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area.
Venizelos did not favour this pr000sal in view of the
strained Greek-Turkish relations at the time, over the issue
of the Aegean islands. However, he initially accepted the
formation of a mixed comrrission to 1-ok into it as he believed
that if the proposal .as rjectec cut of hand, the Asia Minor
Greeks would be forced to irigrate. It was also thought that
through such an exchange, atrocities would be avoided and the
eventual economic disaster would assume smaller proportions.
Before accepting the proposal, Venizelos sought royal
approval. King Constantine did riot obect because he seemed
convinced that the Asia Minor Greeks would eventually be
forced to leave their homeland 17/. The agreement to proceed
with the appointment of the commission was also seen as a
preventive measure to improve inter-state relations at a time
when the dispute over Lesvos, Chios and Samos had created a
state of undeclared war between the two countries and the
outbreak of the Great War could not but worsen the situation
18/. The commission-convened in Constantinople and Smyrna from
May to at least the end of December 1914. All secondary
sources referring to its meetings suggest that the commission
interrupted its sessions with Turkey's entry to the War in
November 1914. However, documents in the relevant file of the
Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicate that they continued
after that date 19/. Even so, no agreement was reached in view
of Turkish intransigence over the issue of properties to be
exchanged and indemnities to be given to the Greeks, an
intransigence intensified by Turkey's entry into the War on
the side of the Central Powers.
After the project on the exchange of populations was
abandoned, anti-Greek persecutions intensified to the point of
threatening the very existence of Hellenisrn in Asia Minor. One
of the first measures taken upon Turkey's entry to the War was
a special decree which modified the law regarding the
conscription of Christians to the Turkish army. The existing
law, passed soon after the restauration of the constitution in
1908, stipulated that all Christians up to the age of 31 were
liable for military service while those above this age limit
were exempted since they had already paid the military tax.
The new decree increased the age limit to 48 and provided that
those belonging to the reserve classes could obtain exemption
on payment of 45 liras. The Greeks, not accustomed to military
service, naturally preferred to pay the high tax. However,
those who did not have the means, either had to sell their
possessions to raise the sum or else flee the country and
become deserters. The frequent desertions gave the Ottoman
authorities yet another excuse for hard measures. The property
17/ Vendiris, op. cit., p. 192.




of all deserters was duly seized arid their families were
deported to the interior of Anatolia. No distinction was made
between deserters and those already deported by the Ottoman
authorities but not removed frorr the roll: their families were
treated in the same way 201. On 21 October 1915, the
Constantinople Recruitment Office issued a regulation
providing for the deportaton of tre f.miiies of the deserters
to the interior of Anatolia. in tne district of Xerassounda
alone there had been 300 desertions; as a result, 88 villages
were burnt to the ground in the course of three months. Some
30,000 inhabitants of these villages were obliged to walk to
Ankara in mid-winter, a quarter of them perishing on the way
21/.
The Greeks enlisted in the Turkish army were not given
combatant status. This was out of the question as they were
suspected of furnishing British submarines in the area with
supplies, of conducting espionage on behalf of the Allies and
of looking forward to the day when Greece would encompass the
Asia Minor littoral -a charge unquestionably true. In short,
the Ottoman Greeks could not be trusted to take part in the
military operations as an integral part of the Ottoman army
22/. As a result, they were made to serve in the labour
battalions (emele taburu) and were mainly sent to the interior
of Anatolia to work on road construction, on the excavation of
the Taurus tunnel and other infrastructure projects. The Greek
Consul at Konia reported on the subject: "The new peril
facing the Ottoman Greeks is the formation of the labour
battalions which are exclusively composed of conscripted
Christians. These poor souls are sent to the interior of
Ariatolia to construct tunnels for the Baghdad railway. Until a
few months ago, those who could afford to buy off their
military service were able to escape but since the end of 1914
and Turkey's entry to the War this is no longer possible" 23/.
As the deportations of Christians to the interior of Anatolia
had been legalized by a special law in 1913, in all parts of
Turkey, the Greeks were gathered in groups and were
transported to the interior, mostly on foot. The total number
of those that perished during the War is not known; estimates
vary from two hundred thousand to one million 24/.
Clearly, for the Asia Minor Greeks, Turkish participation
in the War merely signified the continuation of persecutions
accompanied by excesses of nationalist and religious
20/ MOFA 145, Report no. 1438/31.3.15, Greek Consul in Smyrna
to CHC.
21/ Puaux, R. and Alaux, A. Les persecutions antihe].leniques
en Turgule,	 Résumè des rapports off iciels des agents
diplomatiques et	 consulaires.	 Lausanne,	 1918.	 Report
319/11536, Greek Vice Consul in Vourla to MOFA.
22/ ibid.
23/ CHC	 Report no. 3500/6557/14.6.13 in Alaux et Puaux,
op. cit.
24/ Morgenthau, H. Secrets of the Bosphorus. p. 31.
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fanaticism 25/.
	 A significant difference,
	 however, was
observed in the change of the motto prompting these
persecutions from "Ottomanism" to "Turkey for the Turks" , an
aim to be partly accomplished ny the deportation of the
remaining Ottoman Greeks. Rebellions against such treatment
evidently resulted in occasiona'.. massacres, an example of
which is Old Phocea where inor€ rar. SC,000 Greeks perished
after their town was attacked b y
 chette bands 26/.
"There is no doubt whatsoever", an eyewitness wrote,
"that the plundering of this town was an organized plan aimed
at the expulsion of the rayas from the seacoast. It is not
possible that the invading brigands could have possessed so
many firearms if they had not been distributed to them
beforehand...We now read in the newspapers that order has been
established and that in the region of Phocea no one need have
any apprehension as to one's life and fortune. As a matter of
fact, order exists because there is not a single inhabitant
left; there is no danger to property either, it all being
safely in the hands of the brigands 1' 27/.
At the beginning of 1915, the economic boycott assumed
greater proportions. It was now applied against Greeks arid
Jews alike. The local authorities demanded that all foreign
business firms in Smyrna dismiss their Greek employees and
replace them with Muslims. "Talaat explained his national
policy...These different blocs in the Turkish Empire, he said,
had always conspired against Turkey. Because of the hostility
of these native populations, Turkey had lost province after
province and had dwindled to the vanishing point. If what was
left of Turkey was to survive, he added, she must get rid of
these alien peoples" 28/. In fact, the rule of Talaat, Enver
and cema]. Pashas was characterized by a ruthless policy of
repression, applied throughout the Empire and providing the
context for the anti-Greek persecutions 29/.
It has been argued that as the Greeks were the most
intransigent of all these "alien peoples" and the warmest
advocates of the grandeur of their nation, there could be no
room for them in a Turkified Turkey. At the same time,
wholesale massacre would have caused such a reaction in Greece
that even the most pro-German king would have been unable to
keep the country out of the War. It was therefore rather a
25/ Petsalis, op.cit., p. 35.
26/ Horton, G. The Blight of Asia. Indianapolis, 1923. p. 46.
Morgenthau, op.cit., p. 32.
27/ Greek Patriarchate, op.cit., pp. 72-3. Sartiaux, M. "Le
sac de Phocée et 1' expulsion des Grecs Ottomans d' Asie
Mineure" in Revue des deux Mondes, 15.12.14. Shortly after
these events, the city of Marseilles sent 20,000 francs for
the relief of Phocea, its ancient Metropolis.
28/ Morgenthau, op. cit., p.32.




matter of state policy that saved the Ottoman Greeks "from the
horrors that befell the Armenians" 30/.
After a short interval, a new wave of deportations
started in the spring of 1916, lasting until October 1918. It
was once again implemented as a measure of military precaution
nd affected mainly the areas facino he Aeoean islands, at
the time occupied by the Allied forces. "At Kinik, Bergarna,
A...vali and Dikeli I can state from personal observation that
Greek communal buildings -churches, schools, hospitals, baths-
were wantonly desecrated and defaced and mercylessly
ransacked, even beams and window frames being removed, and
that private houses were thoroughly plundered and then
occupied by Muslims. The destruction seemed to have been most
savage at Aivali probably because it was a self-contained
Greek community which might have had some personal link,
however little, with the deportees. Aivali was made over,
after 27 March 1917, to the Rumeli Muslim refugees embittered
by years of misfortune and the damage they did was
proportionately great" 31/.
As a result of the critical situation in Anatolia, a
large number of Greeks resorted to Srnyrna in the hope of
saving their lives and what little had been left of their
properties 32/. Conditions in Smyrna, however, were no better.
Rahrni Bey, the Vali, was particularly scrupulous in the
implementation of orders received from Constantinople. His
zeal led to a systematic application of the boycott, the
expulsion and persecution of individuals, and the violation of
regulations pertaining to the communities together with the
century-old privileges enjoyed by the Rum milleti 33/. At
Rahmi's instigation, a ministerial decree was presented to the
Patriarchate on 15 June 1914, demanding that Chrysostom, the
Metropolitan of Smyrna, should be recalled to Constantinople.
His presence in Smyrna, it was stated, was undesirable as he
encouraged the Christians to emigrate and facilitated the
departure of Ottoman Greeks who sought refuge in Smyrna from
the neighbouring areas.
The Patriarchate duly called the attention of the Ottoman
government to the falsity of this accusation but to no avail.
The explanations furnished by the Metropolitan himself to the
Vali did not alter the situation in any way. On 21 August
30/ Morgenthau, op.cit., p. 214. Turkification succeededOttomanism as the dominant ideology after 1912 and was
directly opposite to the Greek Megali Idea.
31/ Toynbee, op.cit., pp.142-43. A detailed description of the
events in the Diocese of Aivali can be found in Greek
Patriarchate, op.cit., pp. 64-66.32/ Greek Patriarchate, op.cit., p. 64.33/ ibid, pp. 76-77. For the Rum Milleti see Clogg, R.R.M.
"The Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire" in Brandt, B. and
Lewis, B. eds. Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire.
/
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gendarTnes went to the Bishopric, took the Metropolitan by
force and put him on board an Italian ship bound for
Constantinople. Despite the Patriarch's repeated demarches to
the Porte, Chrysostom's return to Smyrna was strictly
prohibited and he was not allowed to return to his diocese
until after the Armistice. His prolonged exile only increased
his nationalist and partisan fervour and helped build up the
image of a priest-cum-fighter-cum-national hero among the
Smyrniots. Chrysostom was to live arid to die up to this image
34/.
The Metropolitan of Smyrna was by no means alone in
assuming the duties of a secular national leader in addition
to his religious ones. The Greek Metropolitans of Western
Anatolia, mindful of what they considered to be their duty,
worked ceaselessly to protect their flock from persecution. To
this end, on 12 June 1914, they addressed a collective
memorandum to the chief dragomans of the Great Powers in
Constantinople, when they visited Smyrna to examine and report
on the situation:
"The acts of persecution and oppression
committed against the Christian element (in
Turkey) date from old and are by no means
isolated cases. It seems as if this phase is
the one before the last, perhaps the last in
the form of a general massacre, still in store
for us. The hatred and fanaticism of the
Muslims is brought to a pitch of violence by
the exhortations of the Turkish press which
constantly preaches the extermination of thE
Christians. This phase includes the commercial
boycott	 and	 isolated massacres,	 daily
increasing in violence and inspiring panic" 35/
Though representative, this memorandum was by no means
unique. In view of the aggravated situation following the
Balkan Wars, the Patriarchate had made repeated demarches to
the Imperial government, invariably receiving in reply
promises of immediate supression of the evil. As the situation
worsened and persecutions spread to the whole of Asia Minor,
the Patriarchate had no alternative but to suspend church
services and school classes, an obvious luxury for a
population whose extinction seemed imminent. In token of
general mourning, schools and churches closed on 25 May 1914.
They reopened two months later following a personal request of
the Grand Vizier and promises of the Ottoman government that
every possible measure would be taken to satisfy the
Patriarchate.
341 Solomonidis,	 Ch. 0 Smyrnis Chrysostomos (Chrysostom the
Metropolitan of Smyrna]. Athens, 1971.
35/ Greek Patriarchate, op.cit., pp. 90-91.
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In his tezkere to the Patriarch, the Grand Vizier wrote:
"The Imperial government is already proceeding to examine the
causes of emigration of several Ottoman Greeks and the
measures to be adopted in order to remedy a situation
prejudicial to the concord and tranquility of the inhabitants"
36/. In the months that followed however, no measures were
taken to ameliorate the situation. Instead, deportations
en masse were decided upon by the Turkish government at the
beginning of 1915.
In this process of Turkification, the Ottoman state was
helped and prompted by Germany. In the twenty years before the
young Turk revolution, German influence in Turkey had
increased. After 1908, a clear shift towards Britain occured,
but was short lived. After the disastrous defeat of the Balkan
Wars, Turkey turned to Germany for help and advice. In the
meantime, the German government itself had adopted an anti-
Greek stance. Several considerations led to this attitude:
Hellenism in Asia Minor formed a barrier to Pan-German
aspirations; as long as the Anatolian littoral retained its
predominantly Greek character, it would form a natural
obstacle to Germany's road to the Persian Gulf. At the same
time, Greece proper obstructed a possible German outlet to the
Aegean and, crucially positioned on the road to India, she was
a constant menace de flanc for the communication line between
Berlin and Baghdad. On the other hand, since an important part
of commerce in Asia Minor was conducted through Greek hands,
the Ottoman Greeks could only be a hindrance to German
commercial expansion in Turkey after the War. Consequently,
Pan-Germanism could not but treat the Ottoman Greeks as
enemies while successfully evoking "military necessity" to
prompt their deportation 37/. The complicity of General Liman
von Sanders, Commander of the Yildirim Army Group, is apparent
in a telegram he addressed to the Grand Vizier when asked to
account for the deportations of Ottoman Greeks from the
vilayet of Aidin. He claimed that if these deportations
ceased, he could not guarantee the security of the Turkish
army and stressed that military necessities in time of war
out-weighed political motives. He also stated that the German
General Staff approved entirely of his activities concerning
the expulsion of Greeks from the Aivali district 38/. On 13
December 1918, the Greek members of the Ottoman parliament
36/ ibid, pp. 129,131,139,140,142. Extracts from the official
correspondence exchanged between the Patriarchate and the
Sublime Porte.
37/ This view is expressed in Kohler, F.op.cit., published by
the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
38/ Morning Post,	 5.12.18. On Liman von Sanders' role,
Ambassador Kallergis' despatch to MOFA, no. 2338/28.3.17, in
Maccas, L. L' Hellenisme de 1' Asie Mineure. 	 Paris,	 1919.
p . l 45.
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presented a memorandum to the Chamber, naming Liman von
Sanders as the instiaator of the Aivali massacres 39/.
In the summer of 1915, King Constantine had protested to
the German government against Liman von Sanders' activit.ies
and, in repeated demarches to the German Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Greek Ambassador TlieotoLis requested the mediation of
the German authorities for an end to the persecutions. On one
occasion, together with the vaaue promises of support, he was
told that the Ottoman Greeks were "obsessed by a unique
determination to betray Turkey to her enemies". Greek
diplomatic despatches from Vienna and Berlin expressed the
futility of Greek demarches to Germany and confidential
memoranda from Constantinople stated that the Ottoman
authorities proceeded with the deportations only after the
German High Command had given its consent. Foreign Minister
von ragow unsuccessfully attempted to convince the Greek
government that von Sanders was acting on his own initiative
and, in order to prove German good intentions towards the
Ottoman Greeks, the German Embassy in Constantinople sent one
of its members to examine the situation in Aivali. Although
his report emphasized the gravity of the situation, no direct
measures were taken 40/. On the contrary, German activities
went now as far as direct involvement in the economic boycott.
In 1915, the German controlled Pal.stina Bank circulated a
memorandum recommending the rupture of all commercial
relations with the Greeks. Meanwhile, heavy requisitioning was
added to the financial measures against the Ottoman Greeks,
allegedly to supply uniforms for the troops and cover certain
naval expenses, but in reality, it seemed, to accelerate their
economic downfall 41/.
This was the situation in Asia Minor when the Great War
came to its end. After the Bulgarian defeat, Talaat and his
ministers resigned on 7 October 1918 and were succeeded by a
new governmentunder Izzet Bey. His first move was to send
General Townshe4-a prisoner of war captured after the Turkish
victory at Kut-el-Amara- to propose to the British government
peace under certain conditions, the foremost of which was that
Constantinople would not be occupied by Allied forces unless
the Turkish government failed to maintain order. Although the
British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon seemed in favour of such
an occupation,	 the Turkish condition was accepted, the
39/ Text of Memorandum in Emmanouilidis, E. Ta Teleftaia Eti
tis Othomanikis Aftokratorias [The Last Years of the Ottoman
Empire]. Athens, 1924. pp. 339-75 and 376-91.
40/ MOFA 148, tel. nos 12076/30.10.15, 11895/20.10.15 and
1559/13.9.15 of Ambassadors Tsamados, Theotokis and Gryparis
respectively. MOFA 145, Report 2684/12.3.15, Greek Embassy in
Berlin to MOFA and Despatch 4745/13.8.15, CHC to MOFA. MOFA
149, Despatch no. 12316/6.11.15, MOFA to Greek Embassies in
Berlin and Vienna.
41/	 Report 6853/39904,	 CHC to MOFA,	 in	 Persecutions
Antihellenigues en Turguie. Lausanne, 1918.
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armistice was signed at Moudros on 30 October 1918 and, in
accordance with its first article, the Allies only occupied
the forts of Bosphorus and the Dardanelles while an inter-
allied mission of military conirol took up duties in
Constantinople 42/.
The news of the arnistice was ieceive3 coolly in Athens.
ifl view of the vital Greek interests in the area, Greece had
formally requested to be consulted before the Aiies reached
ar. agreement with Turkey. This request, however, was ignored
and when the terms of the armistice became known, Greek public
opinion considered them very lenient towards Turkey,
particularly as they included no reference to the Ottoman
Greeks 43/.
In Smyrna, on the contrary, the Greek population greeted
the conclusion of the armistice with enthusiasm. Greek and
Allied flags were unfurled and rejoicing groups demonstrated
in the streets of the city. A few days later, the arrival of
the first Allied vessel bringing Commodore Dixon, Commander-.
in-Chief of the Allied naval forces to Smyrna, gave rise to
new demonstrations; the local Greeks were celebrating what
they thought was their liberation from Ottoman rule. Since
this was definitely not the case, the boisterous
demonstrations were strongly criticized by Nuredin Pasha, the
Vali, who, with an official circular, banned all
manifestations and prohibited the flying of flags. In the
meantime, Commodore Dixon issued a proclamation warning the
Greek populace to suppress their enthusiasm as no peace
treaty had been signed yet 44/.
While the Greeks were rejoicing and celebrating, the Turks
organized the Smyrna Society for the Defence of Ottoman Rights
[Izmir Mtldafayi Hukuku Osmaniye Cemiyeti), only seven days
after the conclusion of the armistice. This society was among
the first similar organizations for the Defence of Ottoman
Rights which sprung up all over the country with the aim to
preserve Turkish independence 45/.
As a result of Dixon's proclamation, demonstrations
42/	 FO	 371/3160-190858/2.11.18,	 Politis to	 Granville.
Petsalis, op.cit., p. 68.
43/ CAB 23/14-WC 494A/31.10.18. Dyer, C. "The Turkish
Armistice of 1918" in Middle Eastern Studies, 872 and 873
(1972). pp. 143-178 and 313-348. Also Athenian newspapers of
that week.
44/ Rodas, M. I Ellas eis tin Mikra Asia [Greece in Asia
Minor). Athens, 1953. p. 39. Morning Post, 4.12.18. Kitsikis,
D. Propagande et pressions en politigue internationale: la
Gréce et ses revendications a la Conference de la Paix. Paris,
1962. p. 52.
45/ Morali, N. MUtarekede Izmir Olaylari [The Smyrna Episodes
during the Armistice). Ankara, 1972. pp. 6-8.
stopped for a few days, only to be repeated with the arrival
of the first French vessel and the reopening of the French
Consulate in the city. Dixon issued yet another proclamation
prohibiting demonstrations, this time arousing suspicions
among the local Greeks as to his real feelings towards Turkey.
Though unfounded, these suspicions were strengthened by the
fact that, at the instigation of Rahrni Bey,the ex-Vali, the
Turkish authorities rapidly took precautions against any
excessive display of exuberance by the Greeks. Armed bands of
bashibazuks patrolled the strets openly terrorizing the
Christians, the Muslim population was provided with weapons
while large depots of arms were established in various
locations in the city, and Rahmi Bey instructed the Turkish
notables to hold themselves in readiness for all
eventualities.
Dixon was not the only one to worry about the
repercussions of the Greek celebrations on the already shaky
state of law and order in the Aivali district and the
precarious situation prevailing in Smyrna itself. Venizelos
ordered Captain Papazafiropoulos, naval commander of Chios, to
visit the Greek primates of Smyrna and report on the situation
46/. Papazafiropoulos arrived on 21 November 1918 and during
his meeting with the dimogerontes, advised them to restrain
the population from any nationalist manifestations that might
harm the negotiating effort of Greece at the forthcoming Peace
Conference 47/. This, indeed, was a very difficult task and
was to prove beyond the capability of the primates, both at
that time and later, during the Greek occupation of Smyrna and
its hinterland. The local Greeks, embittered by endless years
of persecution, could not and would not understand the
reasoning behind the Venizelist policy of appeasement and
leniency towards the Turks, a policy essentially meant to
convince the Allies that Greece was capable to rule over ex-
enemies, forgetting and forgiving.
On the other hand, the defeatist atmosphere and the
relatively accommodating attitude towards the Ottoman non-
Moslems prevalent in Turkish circles before the conclusion of
the armistice, at a time when even the will to independent
survival seemed to have failed and political discussion
centred on the form which Turkish subjection was to take, gave
way to an intransigent and provocative attitude as soon as the
lenient armistice terms became known in Asia Minor . This
attitude was reinforced by the predesposition of the Allied
authorities, reluctant to intervene on the Greek side for fear
of hurting Turkish pride 48/. In a special circular to the
46/ MOFA 150, tel. no. 11068/27.11.18, Politis to Romanos and
tel. no. 11198/30.11.18 Politis to Simopoulos. Petsalis,
op.cit., p.107.
47/ Rodas, op.cit., p. 34.
48/ Lewis, op.cit., p.241. Petsalis, op.cit., pp. 94-95
Alexandris, A. "The Constantinopolitan Greek factor during the
Greco	 Turkish	 Confrontation	 of	 1919-1922"	 in
Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, vol . 8, 1982/83.
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Turkish population, the Vali stressed that the armistice terms
were favourable to Turkey while Colonel Katechakis, Greek
representative at the Allied Military Mission in
Constantinople, reported to his government that the Committee
of Union and Progress (CUP), although officially dissolved,
had preserved its organization intact and was arming the
Turkish population. The chasm between Greeks and Turks, he
concluded, was such that there could be no hope for
reconciliation and therefore measures should be taken for the
protection of the Greek populations, for the repatriation of
the Greeks deported to the interior and for the occupation of
the main towns of Asia Minor by Allied or Greek troops 49/.
After the conclusion of the armistice, the Anatolian
Greeks who had sought refuge in Greece during the ar started
heading for their homelands. Most of them arrived in
Constantinople penniless and, as their immediate repatriation
was impossible, they lived on generous donations from the
Patriarchate, the Greek government and the local Greeks. In
November 1918, a Central Committee for the Relief of Refugees
was formed by the Patriarchate and the Athens government
contributed ten million drachmas towards its expenses. But
with local Greek resources damaged by the financial boycott,
relief was of a temporary and insufficient character. As a
result, the frustrated groups of refugees, eager but unable to
return to their homes, became a source of trouble and unrest
in the Capital. According to the Sublime Porte, 12,300 Greeks
had returned to the Aivali district up till March 1919 50/.
At this point, Admiral Kakoulidis reported from
Constantinople that Hellenisrn in Anatolia was in grave danger
and suggested that the Turks be informed that if any Greeks
were harmed, Greece would be allowed to continue the war
alone, with the Allies remaining neutral 51/. The pronounced
threat to Hellenisrn in Asia Minor was also reflected in
Papazafiropoulos' report which stated clearly that, despite
	
the Turkish defeat,	 anti-Greek persecutions continued.
However, the Ottoman Greeks now started retaliating whenever
49/ Katechakis to Politis Despatch no. 8/5.12.18, quoted in
Petsalis, op.cit., p. 99. Morning Post, 5.12.18.
Rodas,op .cit., p. 38.50/ ASMAE, Turchia, 1644/7738, Sublime Porte to MAE, n.y.
14213/6.3.19. For the issue of the repatriation of refugees,
Puaux, R. Les Grecs en Turquie. Paris, 1919. p. 18, andLa deportation et le repatriement des Grecs en Turguie. Paris,
1919. Also, Kalvokoressis, A. Patriarchiki Kentriki Epitropi
yper Metatopisthenton Ellinikon Plythisrnon	 [Central
Patriarchal Committee in Aid of the Displaced Greek
Populations). Constantinople, 1921. Morning Post, 5.12.18.




attacked and demanded the restoration of Greek property
confiscated during previous years and the repatriation of
those exiled, deported or recruited in the labour battalions.
A Turkish newspaper commented: "We believe that we will not be
punished for the crimes we have committed during the past five
years but the Greeks who were chased from their homeland will
return and all the products of looting will have to he
returned"	 52/.
Realizing the gravity of the situation, Athens instructed
the Greek Ambassador to Paris A. Romanos to present a note to
the French government requesting urgent measures in view of
the dramatic events in Asia Minor 53/. Earlier Greek
demarches in Allied circles had produced no direct results
since the opinion prevailing in these circles was that "Greek
misbehaviour provoked Turkish action" 	 54/. This was an early
indication of the future stance of the French and the British.
At the same time, the negative Italian position vis-á-vis
Greek aspirations in Asia Minor had been clear from the
beginning of the War. Italian plans, activities and propaganda
regarding Asia Minor were communicated to Athens through
detailed reports of the Greek embassies in western Europe and
the Greek consulates in Turkey and the Greek government knew,
or should have known, what to expect from that quarter 55/.
At this point, the Italian warship Piedmonte entered the
port of Smyrna to join the Allied squadron. Among the Allies,
only Greece was absent and, under the circumstances, this
absence filled the local Greeks with anxiety. The Italian
presence in the port of Smyrna prompted the Greek government
'to request Vice-Admiral Caithorpe, successor to Commodore
Dixon, that a Greek ship be allowed to join the Allied
squadron. This request was not granted at first because,
during the armistice negotiations, the Turks had insisted that
no Greek ships should go to Sniyrna. Moreover, upon intimation
from the Italians that they felt strongly against Greek forces
being allowed to land in Asia Minor, the British government
decided that it was not "advisable" to permit an official
Greek presence in Smyrna 56/. Caithorpe also felt that the
arrival of a Greek man-of-war there might provoke militant
action on the part of the local Greeks. However, following a
52/Sabah, 24.11.18, quoted in Les Temps. Also Reports of
Alexandropoulos and Chonaios quoted in Petsalis, op.cit., p.
98.
53/ MOFA 150, n. y ., n.n./7.12.18, Romanos to Pichon.
54/ Petsalis, op.cit., p. '107, quotes note of Alexandropoulos,
Greek representative in Constantinople, to British and French
High Commissioners in the city.	 - -
55/ MOFA, A/5/1915, Italikai Drastiriotites
ke meta tin Eisodon tis Italias eis ton Pol
activities and disposition before andaf
the War], MOFA 152.







meeting with Captain Mavroudis of the Greek Royal Navy and
assurances from Athens to the contrary, he was able to secure
French and Italian approval for the c3espatch of the destroyer
Leon which, under Mavroudis, arrived in Smyrna on 23 December
1918	 57/.
Once again, the Creek Eiuyiniots troK to the streets
rejoicing. Leon became a place of pilgrimage, a herald of the
freedom soon to come. The following day tne Greek flag was
raised at the Consulate and a few days later Metropolitan
Chrysostomos was allowed to return to Smyrna from his exile.
Captain E. Mavroudis was accompanied by P. Zarnarios, a former
MP for Cyclades who acted as his political adviser, and they
were soon joined by a number of well-trained civil employees,
including P. Skeferis from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In the meantime, all the Turkish parties, organizations
and societies in the district of Smyrna were incorporated into
a single bypartizan organization, the Committee for
Consultation [Heyeti Istiare]. Turkish circles in the city
believed that "the insolence of the local Greeks, manifested
by the covering of Smyrna in Greek flags [upon the arrival of
the Leon) would act as a catalyst in stimulating the emergence
of Turkish nationalism and bring about the liberation of the
Turks" 58/. What the Greeks seemed to have forgotten, were the
events in Crete some years earlier. The Turks then held the
coastal towns and the Greeks the hinterland and the mountains.
Subsequenti.y, the Ottoman Empire had lost Crete. Now, with the
Turks dominant in the Anatolian hinterland, the Greeks would
eventually have to abandon the coastal strip they were said to
have been promised by the Allies 59/.
The teon was followed by Amphitriti which carried a Red
Cross mission under Dr. P. Tsounoukas. In the course of the
next two years the Greek Red Cross treated 224,750 Greeks,
47,425 Turks and approximately 25,000 patients of various
other nationalities. It organized hospitals and infirmaries in
several towns and was officially congratulated by the Vali of
Smyrna for the services it rendered the Muslim population. The
Italians disapproved strongly of its presence and activities
and accused the Greek government of using it as a cover • for
smuggling weapons and soldiers to Srnyrna. As Red Cross
activities contributed favourably to Greek propaganda aims,
significant Italian measures were taken to counteract its
effectiveness, including a campaign against the Vali who was
57/ Rodas, op.cit., p. 40. GAS 1, Despatch no. 2/n.d.,
Mavroudis to Ministry of Marine.
58/ Morali, op.cit., p. 42.
59/ ibid, pp. 43-44.
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accused of being "on the British payroll" 	 60/.
Gradually, during the first weeks of 1919, "a united
front of Greek action" was formed. The local Greeks were
overwhelmed by what seemed to them a unique opportunity for
the realization of the Megali Idea. However, Mavroudis tried
to moderate the dynamic expression of their enthusiasm since,
as it had become apparent from the very first days of official
Greek presence in Smyrna, their attitude constituted a major
obstacle to the amelioration of community relations in the
area, a factor of utmost importance if the policy for the
realization of the Megali Idea were to succeed.
The objectives of the Mavroudis' Mission, as the group
caine to be known, were, on the one hand to collect all the
information necessary to support Greek claims over Asia Minor
at the Peace Conference and, on the other, to work for the
improvement of community relations so that the local
population would eventually be able to live peacefully
together under Greek rule. The first objective was soon
accomplished due to the hard work put in by the members of the
Mission. Statistics were compiled, reports written and maps
drawn up. These soon found their way to Paris, where the Greek
delegation was working to promote "vital national interests".
The task of achieving the second objective, however, was
impeded by several factors which militated against Asia Minor
ever becoming part of Greece.
The local Turks, emboldened by the negative attitude
displayed by the Allied representatives in Smyrna towards
Greek interests, set up committees and associations for the
defence of Turkish rights and organized a conference of
representatives from the major towns of the vilayet of Aidin,
the resolutions of which were communicated to the Allied
authorities: "We the representatives of the Aidin vilayet, and
the delegates of Mentee and Karesi, appeal to you on behalf
of the Turkish nation which forms the great majority of the
population of the area. We hear with great regret that some
small nations, enemies of our race, endeavour to take
advantage of our painful situation and dominate us. This
province that they want to occupy is an inseparable part of
our existence. We appeal to the Peace Conference to protect
our basic rights and preserve world peace by respecting our
demand"	 61/. Local Turkish officials procured arms to the
60/ ASMAE Turchia, 1644/7738, Report no. 73/12/3.4.19,
Biancheri to Sonnino. 1646/7746, Report 543/t13.19, Italian
Legation in Paris to MAE. AV 9, tel. no. 1312/22.5.19,
Mavroudis to Venizelos.
61/ MOFA 96, Report no. 494/11.3.19, Mavroudis to MOFA. TUrk
Yordu, Smyrne Turgue. Smyrne, 1919. p. 11: "Memoire par le
congress representant le vilayet d' Aidin pour les
representants de les grandes puissances a Istanbul", 17.3.19.
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Muslim population and, to sum up the situation in Mavroudis'
words, "the remains of Hellenism in Asia Minor is sitting on
an active volcano...not a day passes without one or more
innocent Greeks being killed. Daily, Christians are arrested
without cause, they are beaten up, made to walk through the
streets handcuffed and are finally thrown In prison unable to
defend themselves" 62/. During the same period, freedom of
travelling, commerce and fishery was denied to the Greeks.
Greek newspapers of the time appeared with most of their
articles supressed by censorship at a time when the Turkish
press was free to accuse and reproach all things Greek. What
little merchandise was imported from Greece almost disappeared
from the market 63/. Meanwhile, Venizelos' directives
concerning the Greek response to these provocations were clear
cut. The Anatolian Greeks should not only proclaim their wish
for enosis but also prove to the Allied observers that they
could co-exist, if not fraternize with the Turks. Any action
contrary to this policy of peaceful coexistence could prove
detrimental to the realization of the Megali Idea 64/.
However, the reports of his representative on the spot,
confirmed that the prevailing conditions were none too rosy.
According to Mavroudis, the bleak situation was largely
due to the attitude of the Allied representatives who were
"obsessed with the idea" that Greek Smyrniots were the source
of all evil, always seeking to provoke the Turks. This opinion
was partly the result of continuous efforts of the Levantines
who eagerly offered their services in the field of
"information" to the Allied representatives. "The Levantines
were overjoyed with the Allied victory because, as a result,
Germany would move out of the Near East where she was dominant
before 1914 and this would give them a good opportunity for
profiteering" 65/. But who were these Levantines? "A
Levantine is really a foreigner whose forefathers settled in
the Near East one or more generations ago, who has become
thoroughly versed in oriental dealings, who speaks the
languages and some of whose ancestors may have intermarried
with Greeks or Arrnenians...These people generally cling to
their original nationality. Protected by the Capitulations,
they have been able to amass great fortunes" 66/.
"In one word", continued Mavroudis, "the Italian
representative Consul Manfredi...continuously declared himself
in favour of and worked for and collaborated with the Turks
62/ MOFA 96, Report no. 494/11.3.19, Mavroudis to MOFA.
63/ Arnaithia, February and March 1919.
64/ NOFA 96, Report no. 494/11.3.19, Mavroudis to MOFA. AV 1,
Report no. 637/18.1.19, Politis to Diomidis.
65/ Rodas, op.cit, p. 51. For the detrimeitital role of the
Levantines as far as the Greek cause was concerned, MOFA 9,
Report no. 2278/14.3.19, Mavroudis to MOFA. Also, MOFA 96,
Report no. 494/11.3.19, Mavroudis to MOFA.
66/ Horton, op.cit., p. 103.
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against us. The French representative Captain
Docteur...suggested in his recent reports to Paris that Greek
rule would prove disastrous and the British representative,
when he is not furious with us, he is cold and indifferent
towards our interests and does not even reprimand	 the
activities of certain members of his staff whose objective is
Turkish autonom y "	 67/.
Italian activities in the area were not so much pro-
Turkish as anti-Greek. In principle, Italy was opposed to any
territorial aggrandizement of Greece and to any possible
reinforcement of Greek power. This policy came as a direct
result of the realization that Greece was Italy's direct rival
in the Adriatic and Aegean seas and, as a consequence, a cold
war atmosphere developed in relations between the two
countries. To forestall any such Greek or Allied move, and
despite warnings by British officials, the Italians landed
troops in Makri and Marmaris, sent forces to Adalia, Egridir
and Konia and increased their naval strength in the port of
Smyrna 68/. From these areas, Italian missions were sent to
the interior of Anatolia with the object of creating incidents
between Greeks and Turks and of subsequently accusing the
former of being incapable of ruling the area 69/. To
counteract Italian moves and fclowing Caithorpe's approval,
the Averof was sent to Smyrna, transporting a small landing
force to reinforce the Greek presence in the port 70/.
After the Italian landing at Adalia, Count Sf orza
communicated to the Italian delegation in Paris that the Grand
Vizier was pleased with this Italian move which was seen as a
response to Greek provocations. "We thus conclude", Sforza
wrote, "that he is asking to a certain extent for an Italian
occupation...(I have given instructions to our agents in
Adalia] to maintain appearances at all costs with regard to
the Turkish authorities of the area"	 71/.
However, the nationalists seemed to defer in their
understanding of the Italian efforts to placate Turkey:
"The Italians, who were opposed to the Greek landing, appeared
671 MOFA 96, Report no. 494/11.3.19, p. 5, Mavroudis to MOFA.
68/ FO 608/103-8079, no. 536/2.4.19, Curzon to Balfour. FO
608/102, Reports from Adalia and Makri, 22-23.4.19. FO 608/93-
9071, no. 609/2.5.19, Curzon to Balfour. Mantoux, P.
Les dliberations du Conseil des Quatre. Paris, 1955. I,XLVII.
p. 355.
69/ Kitsikis, op.cit., p. 53, quoting a telegram by Politis to
the Greek Embassy in London, 3.5.19. Also MOFA 9, tel. no.
2295/14.3.19, Politis to Venizelos: "No doubt, it is the
Italians who entice the Turks to act against us". MOFA 140,
tel. no. 3970/29.4.19, Mavroudis to MOFA.
70/ GAS 1, Press release, 5.4.19.
71/ ASMAE Turchia, 1646/7746, no. 852/30.3.19, Sforza to DIPC.
to support the Turkish cause, but in fact all they wanted was
to replace the Greeks and place Srnyrna under Italian
rule...One day I was invited to the Italian Embassy. The
Italian Ambassador [Count Sforza] informed me that the Greek
landing in Smyrria was a matter of days. He then suggested that
we should prepare ourselves to resist the Greeks. Instead of
the Greeks, Count Sfcrza advised, we should advocate the
establishment of the progressive, civilized and friendly rule
of the Italians in Smyrna. But while I politely declined his
suggestion by saying 'neither they nor you', I asked the Count
to collaborate with us in our struggle to frustrate the
realization of the British plan for Western Anatolia...
Realizing that his best option was to help us, the Count
informed me that the Italian torpedo boat Bronzetti would
transport our delegation from Smyrna to France, where it was
to appear before the Peace Conference" 72/.
In his reports to Athens, Mavroudis spoke harshly of
these Italian activities. "This unheard of stance of the
Italian government towards an Allied state has proved the
greatest obstacle in the successful completion of the already
arduous task entrusted to this Mission. What little had been
left standing after the successful collaboration between Turks
and Germans against the Ottoman Greeks has now been entrusted
for demolition to the Italians. (To make matters worse,] they
have found eager help in their strife against us from the
Levantines and the few Greek catholics won over by the Italian
propaganda	 73/.
To counteract Italian moves, the Mavroudis' Mission
resorted to intensive propaganda through the local press,
Greek and Turkish alike, as well as through agents sent to
various parts of the vilayet. "However, neither our efforts
through the press nor our other activities have produced
satisfactory results. Turkish fanaticism is intensified while
Levaritine efforts to denigrate us in the eyes of the Allies
increase daily...We have not yet managed to convince the Turks
that it is to their advantage to review their intransigence
towards Greece and the Greeks, in order to secure their
interests in the event of Asia Minor coming under Greek rule
and, if not so, to serve the interests of the Turks living in
Greece...The Turks do not believe that our regime is liberal
and just. They are not allowed to by the Italians who have
undertaken to complete the anti-Greek campaign left unfinished
by the German officers" 	 74/. Italian assistance to the
72/ Morali, op.cit., pp. 51-52. The author was a member of the
Turkish Delegation to the Peace Conference.
73/ GAS . 1, Report no. 864/11.4.19, p. 2, Mavroudis to MOFA.
MOFA 9 Report no. 2475/11.3.19, Mavroudis to Greek Legation in
Paris. On Italian espionage activities in Smyrna, ASMAE
Grecia, 1214/4910, Despatch no. 9724/16.4.19.
74/ MOFA 9, Report no. 2475/11.3.19, p. 4, Mavroudis to Greek
Legation in Paris.
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nationalists went as far as transmitting telegrams of the
Turkish delegation in Paris to the Sublime Porte through Rome.
The funds required by the Turkish delegation were transported
through the Italian High Commission in Constantinople 75/.
Meanwhile, the Committee for Consultation succeeded in
organizing an unprecedented event in Smyrna. On 19 March 1919,
all notables of Western Anatolia participated in a congress
which resolved that the Turks had to "fight the danger facing
their country by the force of arms", and concluded its
proceedings by effecting the smuggling of arms to Anatolia
76/. In Smyrna, it was no secret that the Committee enjoyed
the assistance of a number of prominent members of the French
community 77/.
On the other hand, the passive at best and more often
negative attitude displayed towards the Greeks by the Allied
representatives was coupled with an "obvious tendency to
placate the Turks". The Society for the Defence of Ottoman
Rights appears to have contributed significantly to this end.
Among others, it approached Commander Roland, correspondent of
Les Temps in Constantinople, who was sympathetic to the
Turkish cause and it was him "who influenced General d'
Espérey to change his initial position of Turcophobe into a
Turcophile" 78/. There was not much Mavroudis could do to
alter the situation as "the friendly Allied authorities are
caught in the spell of a pro-Turkish attitude, successfully
promoted by our adversaries" 79/.The only way to improve the
situation would be by directives from their respective
governments. As this was not to be expected, the Greek Foreign
Minister expressed fears that the Turks would "resort to
massacres and stifle all nationalist manifestations on the
part of the Greeks, in order to prove that Greek national
consciousness is non-existent among the Ottoman Greeks" 	 80/.
Where Mavroudis' Mission did meet with success was in the
promotion of relations with the Armenian and Jewish
communities. The Mission was in constant contact with the
Armenian primates, informing them of the steps taken by the
Greek government in favour of the establishment of an Armenian
state. This pro-Armenian stance of Greece, together with the
close collaboration between the two Metropolitans on one hand
and Mavroudis and the Armenian primates on the other, resulted
in "a brotherly solidarity" between the two communities 81/.
The effort to convince the Jews that it was in their interest





78/ ibid, pp. 17-18.
79/ MOFA 9, tel. no.
5/ ibid.
1641/7732, Despatch no. 7468/3.4.19, Turkish
to Sublime Porte.
pp.12-13, 16.
2295/14.3.19, Diomidis to Venizelos.
b1/ NUFA 9, tel. no. 2475/11.3.19, p.2, Mavroudis to Greek
Legation in Paris.
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a somewhat lesser extent. "It was important to enlighten the
Jews about the favourable position of their co-nationals in
Greece in order to make them realize that it would be to their
advantage to favour Greek claims in Asia Minor so that when
the time comes they will be the first t p profit from the
riches of the land" 82/. Mavroudis' efforts may have
succeeded in convincing Jewish and Armenian community leaders
of the advantages of Greek rul.e. However, a major part of the
Jewish and European population of the area strongly believed
that their interests lay with the preservation of the old rule
and the regime of capitulations, and did not hesitate to defy
the guideliness given by their community leaders 83/. For
them Greek rule signified grave financial losses as it was
certain to favour the expansion of Greek capital in the area
84/.
Yet, the Mavroudis' Mission was not a failure, as has
been claimed 85/. Its multiple tasks were carried out for
the most part successfully. Vital, on-the-spot information was
transmitted to Paris, the rights of the local Greek population
were protected as far as possible, a propaganda network was
established and essential preparatory work was carried out to
ease the task of a potential Greek regime. Opposing forces
were evaluated and detailed reports covering their activities,
conducted mostly underground, gave a clear indication to the
Greek government of what to expect. Careful propaganda
succeeded in winning over a considerable portion of the local
population. However, it was not humanly possible to oppose
with complete success either the Italian and Levaritine
propaganda or the rising wave of Turkish nationalism. This
must have been known to the Greek government which, under the
circumstances, could not have expected any Mission to win over
the whole population of the area. Thus, the role entrusted to
Mavroudis and his colleagues was essentially exploratory and,
in that sense, it met with success.
By late March 1919, the uncertainty surrounding the
future of western Asia Minor, in conjunction with the secret
war between the prospective rulers of the area, had caused
tensions to mount. Rumours kept the populace in suspense and
created a tense atmosphere in the city. The local Greeks,
tired of trying to prove their cultural superiority to the
Allies as dictated by venizelist directives, were ready to
attack the Turks if provoked. On the other hand, it was clear
that the latter were bound to resist should western Anatolia
come under Greek rule, as it had proved impossible to convince










react violently to a Greek landing" 86/. Italian and
Levantine circles were confident that the Supreme Council of
the Peace Conference would present a mandate over western Asia
Minor to Italy and that the Italian fleet would soon enter the
port of Srnyrna which by mid-April was host to.thirty Allied
and Greek warships 87/. At the same time, several secret
treaties concluded during the War seemed to have sealed the
fate of the Ottoman Empire. The most important among them
were:
a. The agreement of 3 March 1915 between Britain, France and
Russia. It stipulated that in case of Allied victory, Russia
would receive Constantinople with its hinterland on both sides
of the Straits.
b. The Treaty of London, 26 April 1915, between Italy and the
Allies. Italy was to receive Valona, the Dodecanese and Adalia
with its hinterland if she contributed substantially to the
Allied war effort. Italian gains in the rest of Asia Minor
were not precisely defined.
c. The agreement of 16 May 1916 between France and Britain,
known by the names of its authors, Sykes and Picot and signed
by Russia later. This agreement recognized the right of the
signatories to annex parts of the Ottoman Empire and to
exercise "exclusive influence" over specified areas after the
conclusion of peace.
d. The Treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne, signed on 19 April
1917 as a result of a conference between the Prime Ministers
of Britain, France and Italy. It aimed at calming Italian
resentment of the Sykes-Picot agreement by including Srriyrna
and its hinterland in the Italian sphere of influence 88/.
What seemed to escape the notice of the French and the
British was the fact that if the Wilsonian concept of the
self-determination of nations to which they had explicitly
adhered on 7 November 1919, was ultimately followed, most of
these secret agreements would be surely overthrown. At the
86/ ASMAE, Turchia, 1644/7738, Report no. 456/19.3.19, Naval
General Staff to MAE. FO 608/103-10927/7.4.19, Smyrna Area
Control Officer Lt. Colonel Smith to Admiral Calthorpe. FO
608/89-9322, minute, unsigned. MOFA 9, Report no. 864/24.4.19,
Mavroudis to Diomidis. Rodas, op.cit., p. 52. Petsalis,
qp.cit., p. 200. Turkish arguments as to why Smyrna should
remain Turkish in Societe de Defence des Droits Ottomans,
Srnyrne Turgue. Smyrne, 1919 and Turk Yordu, Smyrne au point de
vue qeographigue, economigue, de 1' instruction publigue, eth-
noraphigue, historigue et politigue. Lausanne, 1919.
87/ MOFA 141, Report no. 4016/30.4.19, Mavroudis to Venizelos.
Rodas, op.cit., pp. 50-51.
88/ On the	 treaties of direct relevance to Italy:
Documents of British Foreign Policy tDBFP], 1919-1939. First
Series.	 London,	 1952.	 IV,	 pp.	 241-54	 and	 640-41.
British Parliamentary Papers.	 CMD	 671.	 Misc	 7,	 1920.
Morgenthau, H. I was sent to Athens. New York, 1929. pp. 67-
75.	 Psomiadis,	 H.	 The Eastern Question-The Last Phase.
Thessaloniki, 1968. pp. 24-27.
same time, and unlike the rest of the Allies, the United
States had never been at war with Turkey and, therefore, could
assume a role in Near Eastern Affairs only on the basis of her
League of Nations' membership. Any contribution made on these
grounds would have as a prerequisite the application of the
wi:sonian points and prncip1es on self-determination, which
were supposed to fc-rm the corner stone of the League of
Nations. To complicate matters further, Britain and France had
been commercial and imperial rivals in the Near East for
centuries. Britain, therefore, was quite unlikely to sacrifice
its supremacy in the Near East because of war time commitments
to France 89/.
Against this background, the Supreme Council was to
decide on a landing of Greek troops in Smyrna. Community
relations had been damaged beyond repair by a decade of
continuous persecution of the Greeks which contributed to a
growing desire for revenge and enosis. On the other hand, the
defeat of the Ottoman Empire together with the turkification
had contributed to the rise of Turkish nationalism
which, with ample prompting from the forces opposing Greek
expansion in Asia Minor , assumed great proportions by May
1919. Although well known to the Greek decision makers, these
facts were not enough to curb venizelist optimism as to the
chances for the success of a Greek "Anatoliari Venture".
89/ Helmreich, P. C. From Paris to Sevres. Ohio, 1974.
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CHAPTER ONE:
I. The Paris Peace Conference
"They all sit around the
map. The appearance of a
pie about to be eaten is
thus enhanced".
Harold Nicolson *
* Nicolson, H. Peacemaking, 1919. London 1933, pp. 272-73. The
quotation refers to the meeting of the Big Four on 13 May
1919, to regulate the question of the mandates and spheres of
influence in Asia Minor.
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Greek diplomatic activities to secure the realization of
the Anatolian Venture had started even before the signature of
the Moudros Armistice which officially ended the hostilities
between Turkey and the Allies. In September 1918, a Greek
communication to the British government listed Greece's
territorial claims for the proposed Peace Conference and
explicitly stated that in the event of total or partial
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, Greece would claim the
annexation of those districts in which the majority of the
population was Greek or, alternatively, local autonomy for the
areas in question, the return of the Greeks forced to leave
Asia Minor during the War and the restoration of their
confiscated properties 1/. Venizelos' postwar diplomatic
camoaign to secure western Asia Minor for Greece was launched
or: 30 December 1918. Following President Wilson's advice from
an earlier meeting, the Greek Premier submitted a memorandum
to the Allied Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions
Relating to Greece 2/. According to this memorandum , Greek
claims included part of the vilayet of Brusa and the vilayet
of idin with the exception of the sancak of Denizli where the
population was exclusively Turkish. Statistical tables
submitted with the memorandum raised the Greek population of
Asia Minor to 1,013,195, of which 812,210 lived within the
claimed area. For the Ottoman Greeks living in other parts of
Turkey an exchange with the Muslims residing in the claimed
area was proposed	 3/. The accuracy of these statistics was
strongly contested by Turkey mainly because they lumped Greeks
of Greek citizenship among Ottoman Greeks 	 4/.
In fact, the absence of reliable population statistics
complicated the issue further. It was generally accepted that
Turkish persecution of the Greeks during the War had altered
the balance of population in many former Greek areas. However,
Allied acceptance of these alterations would seem to condone
the Turkish atrocities while failure to recognize them would
make it difficult to achieve a realistic and workable solution
for the future of the area. With the opening of the Paris
Peace Conference on 18 January 1919, a set of politically
realistic questions were seeking practical answers: "How were
Wilson's various declarations of purpose to be reconciled with
the secret agreements of the war years? How could one
determine the wishes of the peoples of the Near East, and, if
they could be determined at all, were their aims economically
and politically feasible?.,.How could the sizeable capital
1/ FO 371/3147-153245, Ambassador Caclamanos to FO, note,
unsigned/i 0.9.18.
2/ This Committee was usually referred to as the Committee on
Greek Affairs or Greek Committee.
3/ Lloyd George, D. Memoirs of the Peace Conference. Yale,
1939. p. 792. Frangoulis, A. La Gréce et la crise mondiale.
Paris, 1926. II, p. 21. Markezinis, S. Politiki Istoria tis
Ellados (Political History of Modern Greece]. Athens, 1968.
IV, Pp. 227-28.
4/ Societe de Defence des Droits Ottomans, op.cit.,
p. 7. Ttlrk Yordu, op.cit., p. 33 ff.
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investment of European nations in the Ottoman Empire be
safeguarded, and what provision would be made in regard to the
enormous Ottoman debt?" 5/.
Apparently oblivious of these questions, Venizelos
presented the Greek case before the Committee on Greek
affairs, shortly after the official opening of the Peace
Conference	 6/. Its report submitted to the Sup'eme Council
a month later reflected the differences of opinion prevailing
mong the Allies with regard to Greek claims: British and
French experts agreed to a Greek landing over a limited area
of Asia Minor while the Americans were opposed to such a
o..smemberment of the Ottoman Empire and suggested a
"sponsorship" of the new Turkish state by one of the Great
Powers. The Italians put forward two reasons for refusing even
to discuss Greek claims; the part of Asia Minor claimed by
Greece had not only been the object of international
agreements concluded during the War but, at the same time, it
could not be separated from the rest of Anatolia for
political, financial and ethnic reasons 7/. The
contradiction inherent in the above arguments -how could these
international agreements come in force without dismembering
the Ottoman Empire?- reflected Italian policy on Asia Minor
to proceed with the realization of Italian claims through
landings on the coast of Western Asia Minor unauthorized by
the Allies while at the same time keeping up the appearance of
Ottoman rule in the occupied areas and thereby placating the
Turks	 8/.
Italian claims over western Asia Minor and Smyrna in
particular were well-known to the Greek government. As early
as the winter of 1914-15, Italy had made clear that she
regarded the vilayet of Aidin as falling within her legitimate
sphere of influence since it was situated opposite the Italian
occupied Dodecanese. The Greek Ambassador in Rome warned
Athens: "The Italians will do all they can to ensure that we
inherit as little as possible in Asia Minor" 9/. In support
of their claims at the Peace conference, the Italians put
forward the secret treaties concluded by the Allies during the
War according to which the region was ceded to Italy. Under
the 1915 Treaty of London, Italy was to receive unspecified
territories in the area "in the event of total or partial
partition of Turkey in Asia", while the Treaty of St. Jean de
5/ Heilmreich, op.cit., p. 24.
6/ Full text in Miller, D.H. My Diary at the Peace Conference
of Paris. New York, 1928. XVI, p. 187 ff.
7/ Conference de la Paix, 1919-1920. Requeil des actes
de la Conference. Partie IV, Commission chargée d' etudier les
questions territoriales interessant la Grèce. Paris, 1922. pp.
39-70.
8/ ASMAE, Turchia, 1646/7746, Tel. n.n./30.3..19, Sforza to
DICP.
9/ D. Koromilas, Greek Ambassador in Rome to MOFA, report
n.n./27.12.14, quoted in Vendiris,op.cit., I, p. 265.
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Maurienne specified that the agreement was subject to Russian
approval which, as a result of the October Revolution and the
subsequent renunciation of all secret treaties by the Soviet
regime, was not forthcoming 10/. In retrospect, it seems that
the withdrawal of Russia from.the war had removed the corner
stone on which much of the subsequent network of agreements
had been built 11/. Since no partition of Turkey had taken
place and since Russia had never approved the St. Jean de
Maurienne Treaty, Italian claims were groundless and, what was
more, clashed with the Wilsonian fourteen points and four
principles already adopted by the Peace Conference. On the
other hand, the conditions under which Britain had originally
offered Greece substantial but unspecified concessions in Asia
Minor had not been fulfilled owing to the opposition of King
Constantine and his General Staff to a Greek entanglement in
the War and the subsequent resignation of Venizelos 12/. On
the other hand, since the Moudros Armistice laid down no
conditions for the negotiation of the Peace Treaty, the
Turkish surrender seemed at this stage unconditional.
Nonetheless, the considerations described above dictated that
the whole problem of Turkey had to be considered afresh by the
Peace Conference	 13/.
Among the Supreme Council members, only Lloyd George
supported Greek aspirations from the outset despite the
opposition of both the India and War Offices 14/. In fact, so
great was this opposition, that R. Vansittart of the Foreign
Office noted on 8 April 1919 that he had not seen the name of
anyone well acquainted with the Near East who thought that
"Smyrna should go to Greece" 15/. As it happened, the minority
view was to prevail, championed chiefly by Harold Nicolson,
Sir Eyre Crowe and above all Lloyd George. Some months later,
10/ Psomiadis, op.cit., p. 24.
11/ Heluireich, op.cit., p. 4.
12/ FO 371/2242, Grey to Elliot, 23.1.15: "If Mr. Venizelos
wishes for a definitive promise, I believe there will be no
difficulty in obtaining it". On the same subject: Vendiris,
çp.cit., pp. 369-386. Pallis, A.A. Greece's Anatolian Venture
arid After. London, 1937. pp. 20-28. Smith, op.cit., pp. 35-44.
Leon, G. B. Greece and the Great Powers 194-1917. Thessaloniki
1974. ch. Il-V. For antivenizelist reaction to the scheme:
Streit, G. Imerologio-Archeio [Diary-Archive). Athens, 1964-
66. hA. Metaxas, J. Imerologio [Diary]. II. Athens, 1952.
Also, Lloyd George, op.cit., p. 781.
13/ FO 800/214, Turkey in Europe and Asia, memorandum by W.
Tyrell. 20.10.17.
141 Churchill,	 W. The World Crisis-The Aftermath. London,
1929. pp. 365-69.
15/ FO 608/102/378-3-2/6884, Ryan to Mallet, 16.3.19, Vansittart
minute, 8.4.19. FO 608/103/383-1-1. FO 608/103/383-1-3/4400,
4523, 4940, 4943, March 1919. FO 608/103/383-1-5/6102, Toynbee
minute, 3.4.19. P0 406/41/37, Curzon Memorandum, 18.4.19. Cab.
29/11, WCP 427, Memorandum India delegation, 1.4.19. WCP 459,
Montagu memorandum, 3.4.19. Cab 29/28, Minutes, British Empire
delegation, 3.4.19. Nicolson, Curzon, The Last Phase, p. 94.
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however, and although he remained firm in his pro-Greek
stance, Nicolson noted on the question of Asia Minor: "It is
immoral and impractiab1e...The Greeks are getting too much"
16/. The exception taken by the India Office was concretely
based on the fact that the Moslems in India constituted the
single strongest group that supported the British and opposed
independence. In fact, a few months later, a pan-Indian
conference with the participation of the Hindu Swarajists led
by Mohandas Gandhi, joined the Moslems in calling for the
preservation of the Ottoman Empire 17/.
On the American side, President Wilson's role in the
Anatolian debate was complex and contradictory. At this,
first, stage, he soon came to believe that a Greek mandate
over western Asia Minor would be the lesser of two evils as an
Italian fait accompli in the area of Smyrna would have far
worse consequences than a Greek landing under Allied auspices,
supervision and guidance. For his part, Clêmenceau declared
that France would give warm support to a solution of the
Sniyrna question in favour of Greece only after the latter's
decision to participate in the Ukraine expedition was
announced. This declaration had been preceded by a joint
Anglo-French declaration on 7 November 1918, according to
which the two countries aimed at "the complete emancipation of
people so long oppressed by the Turks" 18/.
Italy alone remained recalcitrant and her consent for the
Greek landing in Smyrna was only obtained proforrna after she
chose to force events by presenting the Supreme Council with
an accomplished fact: on 28 March 1919, Italian troops landed
at Adalia, south of Smyrna, without Allied authorization. This
move apparently was dictated by the French occupation of
Mersina and the British unwillingness to permit similar
Italian action in Asia Minor. By early May, news reached the
Conference that the Italians had occupied Makri and Marmaris
even though their Chargé d' Affaires in London had been
advised by Lord Curzon that future Italian landings were
likely to provoke decisive Greek action in the Smyrna district
19/. However, no warnings could be effective at this stage.
Following the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, Italy was anxious
to preserve "the Mediterranean Equilibrium" and nothing would
endanger this equilibrium in the Eastern Mediterranean as much
as	 the	 extension	 of	 Greek	 control	 to	 the
16/ Nicolson, Peacemakinq, p.335.
17/ FO 608/112/385-1-14/16727 a and b, Despatches from Indian
Moslems, 29.8.19-12.12.19. FO 608/273/63, Moslem deputations
on future of Constantinople. FO 608/272/25/32, Aga Khan to
Montagu, 8.1.20. DBFP, iv, p. 847, Curzon to Crowe, 30.10.19.
Superintendent of Government Printing, India in 1919, pp. 23,
47. Aclkisson, L. M. Great Britain and the Kemalist Movement
for Turkish Independence. Michigan, 1958, pp. 260-61.
18/ Markezinis, op.cit., IV, p. 281. Parliamentary Debates
5th Series, House of Commons. p. 146, col. 36.
19/ FO 421/2017/53320, Despatch 194/5.4.19, Curzon to Redd.
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Asia Minor Aegean littoral 20/. Tittoni could not have
expressed this position more clearly when he declared in the
Italian Senate that "if others have nothing, we will demand
nothing. This is not an imperialistic criterion, it is only
the criterion of distributive justice" 21/. In fact, the
Italians were ready to start landing forces in western Asia
inor as early as the beciiinina o January 1919 hut they
postponed the move following British pressure 	 22/.
Nonetheless, starting in mid-March 1919, Italian troops
landed periodically at Adalia for the purpose of "maintaining
order", but always reembarked promptly. These spot landings
ard withdrawals continued throughout April and by 5 May, the
Italians had troops on a more or less permanent basis at both
Adalia and Marmaris. Obviously, the Italians were on the verge
of occupying the territory they regarded as being rightfully
theirs 23/. In Paris, Venizelos complained constantly that the
Italians were subsidizing the Turkish press and that they were
encouraging the Turks in Smyrna to oppose a Greek occupation
by force of arms 24/. Although the Turks subsequently
protested mildly against the Italian occupations, they also
sought military and diplomatic help from the Italians in order
to oppose Greek territorial ambitions 251.
On 24 Apri,, the Italian delegation withdrew from the
proceedings of the Conference following a rupture with
President Wilson over the question of Fiume and his
20/ Sonnino Papers, Reel 17, no. 2966, Imperiali to Rome,
4.11.17. Reel 42, no. 970, Sonnino to Paris and London,
29.6.18. Reel 20, no. 1441, Imperiali to Rome, 16.7.18. no
2341, Cellere to Rome, 4.11.18. DIFP i, p.97, Imperiali to
Orlando, 16.11.18. p. 267, Sonnino to Imperiali, 7.12.18. p.447, Elia to Sonnino, 10.1.19.
21/ Tittoni to Italian Senate, 14.12.18. Quoted by Pichon, J.
Sur la route des Indes. Paris 1932, p. 166.221 On directions for and subsequent postponement of the
Italian landing at Adalia: ASMAE Turchia, 1646/7746, tel. nos.
98/5.1.19, Sonnino to [Italian) War Office. 911/5.1.19,
General Elia to War Office. 00911/4.1.19, General Elia to War
Office. 414/5.1.19, Sonnino to Ambassador Rodd.59/5.1.19,
Sonnino to General Staff. 75/7.1.19, Chief of General Staff to
Sonriino. FO 406/41/6861, Despatch no. 10/7.1.19, Rodd to
Baif our.
23/ FO 608/83/342-8-3/5104, "Conversation between British and
Italian Delegates Regarding the future of Asia Minor",
21.3.19. Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 283. Sonnino Papers, Reel26, no. 954, Biancheri to Sonnino, 11.4.19. no. 1150, Sonnirxo
to DIPC, 2.5.19. Times, 4.4.19.
24/ FO 608/103/383-1-5/8158, Venizelos to Peace Conference,
22.4.19. Lloyd George, op.cit., pp. 1246-48.25/	 Sonnino Papers, Reel 25, no. 1774, Indelli to Sonnino,
15.5.19. Reel 26, Sforza to Sonnino, 19.5.19. Reel 46, no.
524, Sonnino to Italian mission in Adalia, 14.5.19. Adivar, H.
E. The Turkish Ordeal. Conn. 1930, p.46.
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publication of a manifesto regarding the future of this area
26/. During the Italian absence, the Supreme Council received
yet more disquieting information from the Smyrna district to
the effect that the Turks, stimulated by Italy, were
continuing their policy of oppression and massacre. The
Italian High Commissioner in Constantinople Count Sf orza
accepted later that he persorally played an important role in
the promotion of the Turkish nationalist movement in a way
that aparently scandalized the other High Commissioners in
Constantinople and the Allied ministers in Paris. Apparently,
through journalists and other intermediaries, he encouraged
from the outset Kemal's plans for a militant nationalist
movement and offered material as well as moral support 271.
Vernal's biographer quotes him as having said to the
nationalist leader that "if you are in trouble, this Embassy
is at your disposal" 28/.In the meantime, Venizelos had
informed Clemenceau of the deterioration of the situation in
the vilayet of Aidin where, with Allied tolerance, the moslems
were committing excesses against the Greek population under
the orders of the Vali, Nouredin Pasha The British were
being kept well informed by their intelligence officers in the
area, whose reports underlined both the Italian complicity in
the deterioration of law and order and the indifference of
local Allied representatives 29/. It was also known that
Italian naval strength in the port of Smyrna had increased
considerably, although subsequently the Italians denied the
accusations 30/. At this point, Venizelos reported further
Italo-Turkish co-operation to the Supreme Council and
requested that Allied vessels should be sent to Smyrna, a
request which the Big Three decided to accept 31/. However,
this decision was not carried out. On 5 May, the Three
discussed news of Italian anti-Orthodox repression in Rhodes
on Easter Sunday and Lloyd George expressed the view that this
was but a part of Italy's general plan of action in the
Eastern Mediterranean. With their successive landings in Asia
Minor, he concluded, the Italians would come to occupy half of
Anatolia. Indeed, the Italian General Staff was pressing the
government "to take advantage of the favourable situation by
swift action and to set foot in Asia Minor as soon as
26/ Mantoux, op.cit., I, XLVII, p. 35. Lloyd George, op.cit.,
pp. 546-52.
27/ Sforza, Count Construttori e Distruttori, Roma, 1945,
p. 372.
28/ Kinross, Lord. Atattirk The Rebirth of a Nation, London
1964, p.	 167.
29/ Aidrovandi-Marescotti, L. Guerra Diplomatica, 	 ricordi e
framenti di diario (1914-1919). Milano, 1937. pp. 328-29.
30/ FO 608/94-6634, Memorandum by Military Intelligence,
talian Activities in Smyrna, November 1918 - March 1919". FO
608/103-4932, tel. no. 542/13.3.19, Calthrope to Curzon. On
the Italian naval force in Smyrna, i.a., Lloyd George,
op.cit., pp. 560-61.
31/ Mantoux, op.cit., I, LVIII, pp. 455-56 and LIV, p. 422.
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possible, thereby preventing a similar Greek move" 32/. The
only way for the Council to forestall such an outcome would be
by regulating the whole question of mandates over Turkey. As
this would entail long negotiations among the Allies, Lloyd
George concluded: "We must let the Greeks occupy Smyrna. A
massacre is taking place over there and there is nobody to
protect the Greek population"	 33/.
It was by now obv5ous that the Italians and the Greeks
were each striving to be the first to land a garrison in
Smyrna. The additional complication of the successive Italian
landings and the rapidly deteriorating situation in Asia Minor
made the question of determining the zones of Allied
occupation in Turkey a matter of top priority. At Lloyd
George's suggestion, the Three sought to decide the issue
before the Italians returned to the Conference. At the Supreme
Council of 6 May, his proposal to send Greek troops to Smyrna
immediately in order to forestall similar action by the
Italians was approved without delay and the outcome of this
race was eventually determined by the intervention of the
Three.	 The dialogue	 that	 sealed	 this	 decision	 is
characteristic:
"Lloyd George: My opinion is that we must ask Mr.
Venizelos to send troops to Smyrna. President
Wilson: Why not ask the Greeks to disembark
immediately? Do you have any objections? Lloyd
George: None.. Clèmenceau: I do not have any either
but should we not inform the Italians? Lloyd
George: I do not think so" 34/.
Wilson later commented "...the attitude of Italy is
undoubtedly aggressive. She is creating a menace of peace,
even in the middle of a conference of Peace" 35/. Expressing
the anti-Italian feelings prevailing among the Three, which
had by then reached fever-pitch, Lloyd George wrote: "Prompt
action taken by Wilson, Clémenceau and myself, enabled
Venizelos to get a Greek force into the town whilst the
Italians were hesitating"	 36/.
Venizelos was officially informed of this decision on 7
May, during a Supreme Council meeting. This was followed by a
conference of the Committee on Greek Affairs which discussed
the details of the operation. According to the conclusions of
this conference, the Allied advisers were not sure whether
32/ ASMAE Grecia, 1214/4918/37/2/11.1.19, Romano Avezzana to
Sonnino.
33/ Mantoux, op.cit., I, LXII, pp . 485-86.
34/ Mantoux, op.cit., I, LXIII, p. 492 and 499.
35/ Mantoux, op.cit., I, p. 455, 2.5.19.
36/ Lloyd George, op.cit., p. 806.
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such action was covered by the armistice terms 37/. Moreover,
the British adviser Field Marshal Wilson had repeatedly
expressed his opposition to such a landing and the War Office
insisted that Greece's Anatolian claims were "ethnologically
indefensible"	 38/.	 This view was shared by the Allied
representatives	 supervising	 the implementation of	 the
armistice on the spot, who had made emphatic comments and
forecasts as to the re .percussions of such a decision 39/.
However, the armistice reserved for the dlies the rightto
occupy any strategic points in Turkey) in the event of any
action threatening the security of the Allied countries";
Greece happened to be one of the Allied countries 	 40/.
The details regarding the military side of the operation
were discussed during the afternoon session of 10 May, in the
presence of the Allied military advisers Generals Wilson and
Bliss, but in the absence of the Italian delegates who had by
this time returned to the Conference. During this meeting,
Venizelos proposed that it would be preferable if Admiral
Calthorpe informed the Italians from Constantinople at a
suitable moment, but the military advisers expressed
opposition to such a course 41/ . Meanwhile, the Italians
were kept well informed by their diplomatic representatives in
Athens and Constantinople. They had also succeeded in
intercepting despatches to the Greek Embassy in Rome,
including top secret telegrams from the Greek legation in
Paris and confidential reports from the Embassy in Rome to
Athens and Paris 42/ . On 7 May 1919, • the Italian Ambassador
in Athens informed his legation in Paris that preparations
were continuing at top speed while Count Sforza telegraphed
from. Constantinople that his "English colleague" had informed
him of the Supreme Council's decision 43/ . At the same time,
the Italian government was considering a landing in Scalanova
37/ FO 608/90-16700, Memorandum "Conclusions of a Conference
Held in Hotel Astoria, Paris".
38/ Lloyd George,	 op.cit.,	 p. 1234, quoting War Office
memorandum, 16.1.19.
39/ Toynbee, op.cit., p. 79. Caiwell, Sir E. C. F.M. Sir H.
Wilson, His Life and Diaries. London, 1927. II, p. 190.
Petsalis, op.cit., p. 203. Venizelos, E. Idiografo Imerologio
[Diary). Chanea, 1979. pp. 49-52. Kitsikis, D. op.cit., p.
362. Frangoulis, A. La Gréce, son statut international,son
histoire diplomatigue. Paris, 1934. II, pp. 62-63. NOFA 141,
tel. no. 3822/6.5.19, Venizelos to Repoulis.
40/ Mantoux, op.cit., II, LXXII, p. 51.
41/ Mantoux, op.cit., II, LXXII, pp. 32-33.
42/	 ASMAE	 Grecia,	 1214/4978-909/16.3.79,	 .Politis	 to
Simopoulos, 1214/4918-3470/3.4.19, Simopoulos to MOFA.
43/ ASMAE Turchia, 1644/7738-1202/7.5.19, Roinano to DICP and
1644/7738-1194/8.5.19, Sforza to MAE. According to Romano, the
preparations for the expeditionary force to land in Asia Minor
had already started in early April: ASMAE Turchia, 1644/7738-
1096/3.4.19.
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to coincide with the Greek one in Smyrna 44/
During the next meeting of the Supreme Council, on
Clèmenceau's initiative and in an effort to preserve Allied
unity, the departure of the Greek troops for Smyrna was
delayed for 48 hours so that the Italian legation could be
officially informed 45/ . When Italian Prime Minister Orlando
was notified on 12 May, he was not in a position to raise
objections since, during the same meeting, his aovernment was
strongly criticized for ordering Italian landings in south
west Asia Minor without the previous consent of the Council.
His subsequent proposal for an iriterallied occupation of
Smyrna was rejected while the Italian army was asked to
participate in the Allied landing to occupy the city forts
before handing them over to the Greeks. At this point,
Clmenceau told Orlando that the decision was taken at Greek
request. However, he was interrupted by Wilson who pointed out
that the initial proposition had been put forward by the
Three: "Wilson: It was we who pointed out to the Greeks that
they should land in order to forestall any further massacres.
Clèmenceau: Yes, this is the truth" 46/. Further, Orlando was
assured that "the landing was without prejudic& to the
ultimate disposal of Smyrna in the Treaty of Peace" 47/. Under
the circumstances, the Italian delegates were obliged to give
their consent thereby making the approval for the Greek
landing in Smyrna unanimous.
Before this decision is interpreted as an indication of
Allied support for Greek irredentism in Asia Minor , account
must be taken both of relations among the Big Four and of
their foreign policy considerations. The Italian position
regarding Greek claims was well known; Greek expansionist aims
could not be accepted as long as they conflicted with the
Italian expansion forseen in the secret treaties concluded
during the War. French foreign policy at the time was oriented
towards the settlement of the Rhineland question and the issue
of German reparations. France had left the question of Turkey
in the hands of Britain, anticipating her support on the
aforementioned issue in the short run and collaboration in the
exploitation of the Mosul oil fields in the long run. Despite
Clémenceau's promise to support Greece on the Smyrna question,
France soon declared that the Greek occupation was temporary
and would not determine the final settlement of the issue.
America's consent was somewhat unexpected. President Wilson's
refusal to accept any further dismemberment of the Ottoman
Empire was overcome mainly by his resentment of the successive
44/ ASMAE Turchia, 1644/7738-1647/27.4.19, Sonnino to Naval
General Staff. 1644/7738-1804/3.5.19, Sforza to MAE.
45/ Mantoux, op.cit., II, LXXV, p. 48.46/ Aidrovandi-Marescotti, L. Nuovi Ricordi e Framenti di
Diario. Verona, 1938. pp. 328-29.47/ Crespi, S. Alla Difesa d' Italia in Guerra e a Versailles
Diario, 1917-1919.	 Milan 1937, p.532, entry for 7.5.19.
Sonnino Papers, Reel 26, no. 1202, Romario to Sonriino, 7.5.19.
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C. What Really Happened
41.
London, 1938. pp. 567-68.
op.cit., II, pp. 189-90.
Italian landings. It is significant that Wilson gave his
consent for the operation without informing the American
experts in the Committee on Greek Affairs: "Under a secrecy
which kept knowledge of this decision absolutely from the
office of the American advisers...tVenizelos) gained
permission to occupy Smyrna with Greek troops" 48/
The British Prime Mi n ister and the Foreign Office were
the main supporters of he ç-an to send Greek troops to Smyrna
"to restore public order and forestall the massacres" 49/. In
his memoirs, however, Lloyd George stresses that it was the
unauthorized Italian landings which dictated the decision and
does not mention the massacres of Christians as a determining
factor 50/. ritish foreign policy makers could not ignore the
urgent needs of the post war period, the political crisis
facing the Lloyd George coalition government or the anti-
militarism prevailing in the press and public opinion. Any
prolongation of military operations in the Near East by Brtain
was out of the question particularly because vital British
interests in Egypt and India were threatened by the likelihood
of a violent Moslem backlash against a deposition of the
Turkish Sultan Calif. It was clear that Pan-Islamism continued
to serve as an ideological argument against the dismemberment
of the Ottoman Empire. To prove the point, two days after the
Greek landing, a Moslem delegation from India appeared before
the Supreme Council and protested against the dismemberment of
the Ottoman Empire 51/. Moreover, War Office circles
considered that a Greek landing in Asia Minor would entangle
Britain in a new and protracted war 52/. These views were
represented mainly by Field Marshal Wilson, Chief of the
Imperial General Staff, and Admiral John de Robeck, British
High Commissioner in Constantinople. At the same time, Britain
was unwilling to relinquish traditional British interests
which would only be secured through her indirect control of
the Straits and which, in turn, determined her military and
commercial prepondernc in the area.
In its efforts to apply a policy along these lines, the
British government found in Greece an ally whose foreign
policy aims at the time largely coincided with the needs of
British policies. For Britain, however, the Greek landing
implied neither a definitive settlement of the Asia Minor
question in favour of Greece nor the conclusion of a formal
official alliance with mutual financial and military
obligations. This position was clearly stated by Andrew Bonar
Law who declared on behalf of the British cabinet that no
obligation whatsoever had been assumed towards Greece 53/.
48/ House,	 Colonel and Seymour,
at Paris. New York, 1921. P. 194.
49/ Mantoux, op.cit., II, LXXIV, p.
50/ Lloyd George, D. War Memoirs.
51/ Nicolsori, op.cit., p. 83.
52/ Pallis, op.cit., p. 43. Caiwell,
53/ House of Commons, 26 March 1920.
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Although the followin g comment seems overly harsh, there is
much to indicate tmt domestic Greek politics were partly
responsible for Brash support of the scheme as the Greek
delegation made very clear that the future of Venizelos'
government at home depended on his success in obtaining the
areas that he had promised to the Greek people in return for
their hardships during the National Schism an the War.
Clearly, his fall from power would in rio way bep British
interests arid influence in the area 54/.Important as all these
factors may have been, it is difficult to see any of them as
constituting the chief reason for the Supreme Council's
decision to sponsor a Greek occupation of Smyrna. More likely
than not, the decision was mainly due to the fact that the
only alternative to Italian hold over Asia Minor, was an
Allied sponsored Greek occupation 55/.
Clearly, it was not generosity of some sort or an
overwhelming feeling of friendship and compassion towards
Greece. On the contrary, the presence of a friendly state
which Britain would have supported in its growth, %Z'ould be.
ideal to act as a counterweight of French and Italian
ambitions in the Mediterranean. A strong Greece would secure
British dominance in the Near East more thoroughly than the
Ottoman Empire had done in the days of its glory. Thus, by
deciding on a Greek landing in Smyrna, the Allies found a
convenient, albeit temporary, solution to the question of Asia
Minor mainly based on the fact that "there was such strong
jealousy among them and they could not go ashore either
together or separately" 56/. None the less, the Four made it
clear that the Greek landing did not in any way signify that
the area had been awarded to Greece on a permanent basis 57/.
For Greece, the Allied decision of 12 May 1919
represented a starting point for the realization of her
aspirations in Asia Minor, as visualized by Venizelos. "The
overwhelmingly favourable impression created by Venizelos in
Paris cannot be overemphasized" 58/. Even those delegates who
bitterly opposed the Greek aspirations, expressed personal
admiration and liking for the man. As for the Allied leaders,
their stance confirmed that they felt a heavy debt of personal
gratitude for Venizelos, much more obligation certainly than
54/ FO 608/37/92-1-1/755, Nicolson memorandum, 26.1.19: "It is
a direct British interest that M. Venizelos' personal
influence in Greece should be maintained and strengthened".
Venizelos made the same point during a lengthy meeting with
Lloyd George on 5.2.19, CAB. 21/153.
55/ Nicolson, Curzon..., pp. 95-96. Churchill, op.cit., p.415
56/ Horton, op.cit., p. 73.
57/ Sakellaropoulos, D. I Skia tis Diseos [The Shadow of the
West]. Athens, 1954. pp. 61-17, 84-92. Panayiotopoulou, Ch.
and Allamani, E. "I Ellada stin Mikra Asia" [Greece in Asia
Minor) in Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous [History of the Greek
Nation]. Athens, 1978. vol. IE, pp. 114-16.
55/ Helmreich, op.cit.. p. 39.
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they felt towards Greece. An enthusiastic admirer among the
British delegates, wrote on the subject: "I cannot tell you
the position that Venizelos has here! He and Lenin are the
only two really great men in Europe" 59/.
Indeed, his skillful diplomatic moves, together with a
serleE of circumstances favouring the Greek cause, brought
about the realization of one of the foremost C-reek irredentist
aspirations. However, the temporary and vague nature of the
mandate together with Italian hostility to Greek expansion and
the centuries'-old differences between Greeks and Turks, were
hound to lead to events which would seriously bring into
question the Greek government's wisdom in accepting the Allied
offer. Churchill, who opposed the scheme from the start, later
commented: "I cannot understand to this day how three eminent
statesmen in Paris,...whose wisdom and prudence had raised
them under the severest tests so much above their fellows,
could have been betrayed into so rash and fatal a step" 60/.
A. H. Lybyer gave a partial, though biased, answer: '5he
pleasant, insinuating ways of Venizelos more and more obscured
the fact that his position even in Greece rested upon Allied
bayonets" 61/.
59/ Nicolson, Peacemaking, p. 271, letter, 25.2.19.
60/ Churchill, op.cit., p. 390.
61/ Lybyer, A. H. The Question of the Near East. New York, 1921.
p. 456.Helmreich, op.cit., p. 99.
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II. The Greek Landing at Smyrna
"I must confess I could not
have imagined a more
unfortunate execution of the
Greek landing".
Captain E. Mavroudis *
* MOFA 141, Report no. 4265/20.5.19, Mavroudis to MOFA.
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In the meantime, preparations for the Greek landing
started simultaneously in Athens, Salonica and Kavala. An
influx of cables from the legation in Paris to the Greek
Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave specific instructions
concerning the details of the operation. Venizelos directed
his ministers to act in utmost secrecy for fear that any
indiscretion would endanger fundamental natoa interests 1!.
The need for secrecy was twofold. First, th nationalist and
CUP bands already active in western Anatolia should not be
given the time and opportunity to organize armed resistance.
Secondly, if t.he local Greeks were informed before the Greek
army had assumed full command of the situator., it would be
impossible to prevent excesses against the Turkish population.
It was unfortunate that this secrecy was not adhered to. The
Ottoman authorities were informed of the project as soon as
the decision was taken in Paris. On 11 May, Baif our said in
the presence of Venizelos that there had been "an indiscretion
in Constantinople. The Turks have been informed -it seems by
our own representatives- about our intentions concerning
Smyrna" 2/.
None the less, Greek mobilization continued at full speed
and all awaiting ships were ordered to sail to the port of
Elefthere, near Kavala, to transport the First Division of
the Greek army to Smyrna. Although the occupation was strictly
military with an overall control over the Turkish civil
authorities, Venizelos ordered the immediate departure of the
Governor General of Epirus Aristidis Stergiadis for Smyrna,
where he was to assume the post of political adviser to the
Military Commander until the Greek occupation was extended to
incorporate the civil administration of the area. Orders were
also given for a 500-gendarmerie corps to follow after the
landing and for the organization of 21 new army regiments to
be held in readiness. Should the number of men available among
the existing forces prove insufficient to form these
regiments, Venizelos suggested that soldiers released on
indefinite leave should be .called back to service. He was
confident that even after seven years of fighting wars the
Greek people would not object to serving again as soon as the
destination of the First Division became known 31.
While preparations for the operation were going ahead,
the danger of a violent Turkish reaction to the Greek
occupation was being considered, together with that of a
simultaneous Italian landing. Mavroudis reported to Paris that
the Turkish population "has obtained arms and has founded a
secret society which will lead the armed masses to the
hinterland and will organize armed resistance in the event of
1' MOFA 141, tel. no. 3823/n.d, Diomidis to Paraskevopoulos.
2/ Mantoux, op..cit., II, LXXIV, p. 41.
3/ AV 5, tel. no. 1204/4226/6.5.19, Venizelos to MOFA. MOFA
141, tel. no. 3849/11.5.19, Venizelos to Repoulis and
3890/11.5.19, Venizelos to MOFA.
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a Greek occupation". He also suggested that the landing should
not solely take place at the port of Smyrna but also at other
strategic points alon g the coast, in the vicinity of the city
4/. At the same time, Repoulis was asking Venizelos for
instructions in the event of an Italian landing before or
after the Greek one. His fears were not unfounded as the
Italians were indeed considering a move along these lines 5/.
Repoulis also informed Venizelos that although all possible
measures had been taken to secure the secrecy of the
operation, very few believed that the aim of the mobilization
was to transport Russian refugees toGreece and rumour already
had it that the destination of the Greek siips was Sniyrna 6/.
In the afternoon of 11 May, the Comrrarider of the First
Division in Kavala, Colonel D. Zafiriou, received orders from
Athens that all troops were to sail by the morning of the next
day. The same orders stressed that any delay would have
serious repercussions for Greek national interests 7/. The
troops had already began embarking when this order was revoked
and the operation was delayed for fourty eight hours 8/.
Before twenty four hours had lapsed, however, the Italian
delegation had been informed, the Supreme Council had reached
a unanimous decision on the issue and Venizelos ordered the
troops to sail for Smyrna immediately 9/. According to his
briefing of the MOFA, "the occupation is precipitated...
because the Italians intend to occupy Bodrurn shortly" 10/. In
the course of 37 hours, 13,000 men and the auxiliary corps
boarded the ships and were ready to sail in pursuit of the
Megali Idea.
On the following day, escorted by 3 British and 4 Greek
destroyers and with captain Granville in command of the
expeditionary force, the 18 Greek transports sailed for Smyrna
11/. Only after their departure did the Greek soldiers learn
that they were not going to Bessarabia to take part in the
Ukraine expedition or to transport refugees from Russia as
they had been led to believe. Zafiriou's order of the day
revealed both the aim and the nature of their mision:
"Wherever we may go, we must know that we are going to
4/ MOFA 141, Report no. 4365/9.5.19, Mavroudis to Venizelos.
5/ ASMAE Turchia, 1644/7738-1647/27.4.19, Sonnino to Naval
General Staff.
6/ MOFA 140, tel. no. 3869/13.5.19, Repoulis to Venizelos and
tel.	 no. 3822/-. .5.19, Politis to MOFA.
7/ General Staff order no. 64087/1037/11.5.19.
8/ MOFA 141,	 tel. no. 4544/11.5.19, Paraskevopoulos to
Repoulis	 and tel. no. 4004/11.5.19, Venizelos to Repoulis
and Diomidis.	 MOFA 140, tel. no. 3958/12.5.19, Repoulis to
Venizelos	 and	 tel.	 no.	 3968/12.5.19,	 Repoulis	 to
Paraskevopoulos.
9/ MOFA 141, tel. no. 4425/12.5.19, Venizelos to MOFA.
10/ AV 5, tel. no. 1204/4226/6.5.19, Venizelos to MOFA.
11/ MOFA 141, tel. n.n./13.5.19, Repoulis to Paraskevopoulos.
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liberate our brethren under alien rule. The enthusiasm filling
our hearts is fully justified but any improper manifestation
of this enthusiasm will be entirely out of place. We must not
forget that when we reach our destination we shall meet Turks,
Jews and Europeans of other denominations. Everybody should be
treated in the same way. In a little while they will become
our brothers as if they were true Greeks" 12/.
In his capacity as Minister of War, Venizelos also sent a
message to the troops, pointing out that their behaviour
towards the foreign elements of the population should be
:impeccable. And he concluded: "The feeling of confidence and
security which you will inspire among the foreign communities
and especially among the Turkish one which is the most
numerous, will greately help the realization of our national
interests. The best wishes of the nation are escorting you"
13/. The text of this proclamation has been repeatedly
published in a modified form 14/. In addition to a few changes
in the vocabulary whereby "the realization of our national
interests" is clanged to "the realization of our national
aspirations", the omission of a whole sentence must be noted:
"The Conference has not announced its final decision
concerning our national claims". This omission was probably
effected "so as not to reduce the enthusiasm of the First
Division" 15/.
To allow time for landing preparations in Smyrna, the
convoy stopped at the port of Gera in Lesvos where it arrived
in the early hours of 14 May. Colonel Zafiriou and his Staff
visited the headquarters of the Mavroudis' Mission in Smyrna
where they discussed the details of the landing with the Greek
representative. The plan prepared during this meeting provided
the Greek troops with two objectives: to surround the city as
quickly as possible in order to curtail any attempts at
resistance and to separate the Turkish and Greek quarters of
the city in order to forestall clashes between the two
communities.
The 1/38 Evzones Regiment was ordered to encircle the
city from the Quarantine to the Fort of Mount Pagos. The Fifth
Infantry Regiment was ordered to surround the city from the
north-eastern side , i.e. from the Pounta Station via the
Aidin Railway up to the Fort of Mount Pagos, while the Fourth
12/ Nider, K. "I Ekstrateia tis Mikras Asias" (The Asia Minor
Expedition]
	
in Megali Stratiotiki ke Naftiki Engykiopedia.
Vol.	 2, no. 37, pp. 12-15. Also, Greek General Staff.
I Ekstrateia tis Mikras Asias, 1, 0 Ellinikos Stratos stin
Smyrni, t4aos 19-1920. Appendix 2.
13/ Original Proclamation in MOFA 105.
14/ Rodas, op.cit., pp. 65-66. Vaccas, D. I Megali Ellas. 0
Venizelos Polemikos Igetis. 	 Athens,	 1964.	 pp.256-57.
15/ Allainani, E. and Panayiotopoulou, Ch. "I Symmachiki Entoil
yia tin Katalipsi tis Smyrnis" in Meletimata yiro apo ton
Venizelo ke tin Epochi tou. Athens, 1979.
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Infantry Regiment was ordered to divide the Greek from the
Turkish quarter by occupying streets and sokaks pointed out to
its Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Schinas by local guides who
were to lead the troops. According to the same plan, the
Turkish troops comprising about 3,000 men were to remain
confined to their barracks behind the Ponak. Mavroudis
furnished Zafiriou with the appropriate maps and assigned a
member of his staff, former Consul 0. Liatis, as his adviser.
During their journey back to.Lesvos, the Staff drew up the
orders for the troops 16/.
Meanwhile, at a meeting held aboard the British flagship
on 13 May, various other aspects of the landing had been
considered. Complying with orders from Paris, it was decided
that all outer forts should be occupied by Allied detachments
on the following day. The forts were then divided into four
groups to be occupied by British, French, Italian and Greek
troops respectively. Admiral CaJ.thorpe's message to the Vali
regarding the Allied occupation of these forts was to be
followed by a second one to be delivered during the early
hours of 15 May, announcing the landing of the Greek troops to
which the forts were to be handed over 17/. A proposal by the
U.S. Senior Naval Officer in Smyrna that the city should be
occupied by Allied detachments on the 14th and handed over to
the Greeks on the 15th of May was rejected. The U.S. Consul
commented on this point: "At any rate this advice could not be
followed for evident reasons. We could not disembark because
[the Allies) were as usual observing...This was the first
indication of the lack of united support that ultimately
caused the Greek disaster and the destruction of Smyrna" 18/.
During the morning of 14 May, the Vali was informed by
Admiral Caithorpe of the Supreme Council's decision to
implement the provisions of Article 7 of the Moudros
Armistice. According to these provisions, the Turks were
placing themselves at the disposition of the Allies to whom
they surrendered the Dardanelles and Bosphorus forts, opened
the Straits to Allied warships, promised to demobilize and
authorized the Allied military occupation of strategic points
such as Batoum and Bacou 19/. The impending occupation of the
Smyrna outer forts was announced simultaneously to the Grand
Vizier and it was stressed to the Porte that the measure had
become imperative in view of the reported deteriorating
situation in the neighbourhood of Smyrna 20/. To a cable from
the Vali requesting instructions, the Grand Vizier replied
that as long as the landing concerned only the application of
the armistice terms, local Turkish authorities should comply
16/ MOFA 141, tel. no. 4265/7.5.19, Mavroudis to MOFA.
17/ On the meeting aboard the British flagship, MOFA 141,
Report no 4163/20.5.19, Mavroudis to Venizelos.
18/ Horton, op.cit.,p. 72.
19/ Temperley, W. V. A History of the Peace Conference of
Paris. London, 1924,. I, pp. 495-97.
20/ FO 608/104/10126, tel. no. 1032/14.5.19, Webb to Balfour.
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with Allied orders 21/.
A little later on the same day, the Turkish military
authorities were informed of the imminent Greek landing. In
his note to Ali Nadir Pasha, Commander of the 17th Army Corps
•stationed in Smyrna, Admiral Caithorpe stressed that all
Turkish troops should remain ir their barracks and await the
2nstructions of the Occupation Arrr Coy r rider. The note went
on to mention that the Allied fleet anchored in the port would
take an active part in the restoration of law and order,
should incidents break out 22/. In vain did All Nadir plead to
Constantinople for instructions. His telegrams remained
unanswered 23/.
News of the Allied landing spread rapidly and crowds
started to gather at the pier, watching the passing troops.
Just before noon, Allied detachments occupied the forts and
put guards on the consulates, banks and foreign post offices
24/. The Creek detachment occupied the çanak Kalesi Fort on
schedule and without any resistance on the part of the Turkish
garrison. Turkish troops retired to their barracks without any
incident. Despite the Vali's silence, news of the planned
Greek landing soon reached the Turkish quarter of the city
where CUP members conferred with the nationalist followers of
Nouredin Pasha who had been Smyrna Military Commander and
Vali at the time of the Armistice and had since organized the
League of Reserve Officers.
These gatherings were subsequently described as
demonstrations of the peaceful intentions of the Turks 25/.
However, A. Morali, a nationalist cadre who took part in the
gatherings and assisted in their organization hs expressed
different views:	 " The Committee Against[Greek) Annexation
f Reddi lihak Heyeti) was organized by the Society for the
Defence of Ottoman Rights twenty four hours before the Greek
landing. On the eve of the Greek occupation, numerous meetings
were initiated and in speeches the population was warned
against the Greek designs at the expense of Turkey. These
protests continued throughout the night. During these crucial
hours, the committee organized the transportation of material
and ammunition to the interior and the release of all
prisoners held in Smyrna jail... After the landing, the
Society continued its activities from Constantinople where it
established its headquarters officially and published daily
bulletins endeavouring to rise the moral of the Turks and
praising the nationalist Yeil Ordu [Green Army). With the
spreading of the nationalist cause, a need was felt to
21/ Turkish report quoted in Rodas, op.cit., p. 55.
22/ Rodas, op.cit., p. 55.
23/Rapports off iciels reçus des autorites militaires Ottomanes
sur 1' occupation de Smyrne par les troupes Helleniques. Con-
stantinople, 1919. pp. 2-4.
24/ Rodas, op.cit., p. 58.
25/ Toynbee, op.cit., pp. 404-5.
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regulate the resistance of the guerilla [efeler) groups and a
vigorous press campaign in such front cities as Denizli and
Aidin were soon under way. After the occupation of the Ottoman
capital by the Allies on 16 March 1920, its members escaped to
Ankara, where they joined the nationalists" 26/. It must be
remembered that the Society for the Defence of Ottoman Rights
was founded on 1 November 1918 27/. its principles, together





clearly depicted in the following text:
"It also became necessary to explain that the British trap,
through their Greek intermediaries, would not only cost a
great deal to the Turks but also to Greece and in particular
to the Ottoman Greeks. This was brought about by great effort
and resolution which resulted in the famous Congress of
Western Anatolia on 19 March 1335 [1919]. In this
unprecedented event, all notables of Western Anatolia were
present...and decided that the Turks had to combat with arms
the danger that the country was facing. The initial success
was largely due to the Vail Nouredin Pasha, but he was
replaced by Izzet Bey soon after the congress.. .The new Vail
discouraged the activities of the Society and accused its
members of CUP and Bolshevik affiliation" 28/.
The subsequent meeting of 14 May 1919, resolved that
the Turkish people should take the situat:ion into their own
hands and organize resistance because both Izzet Bey and Au
Nadir Pasha were ineffective. A Defence Committee was set up
and the Muslim population was invited to the hills of Bahri
Baba to demonstrate its will to resist Greek occupation 29/.
In the meantime, Turkish administration ceased to exist
from the morning of 14 May. The Turkish quarter of the city
resembled a volcano ready to erupt. Nourediri's follower were
conscripting men and in the printing house of Anadolu, two
proclamations of the Defence Committee were printed, once
again inviting the population to the hills of Bahri-Baba
wnere, the same evening, fires were lit and drums beate'i in
protest 30/. Later, the originals of these proclamations were
found and presented to Admiral Caithorpe 31/.
In contrast, no official communication was made to the
local Greeks as to the landing of the First Division,
following strict orders from Venizelos to the effect that the
26/ Morali, op .cit., p. 25 and 27-28.
27/ G. Jaschke, in his	 TUrk Inkilbi Tarihi Kronolojisi
[The Historical Chronology of the Turkish Revolution], vol.2.,
p. 27.
28/ Morali, op.cit., p. 11ff.
29/ MOFA 141,	 Report no.	 4459/23.5.19,	 Mavroudis to
Venizelos.
30/ AV 6, Report no.	 1319/23.5.19, Mavroudis to Venizelos on
the gatherings at Bahri-Baba.
31/ MOFA 141, tel. 4089/13.5.19, Venizelos to Mavroudis.
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dimogerontes were to be informed only a little while before
the arrival of the Greek expeditionary force 32/. In
accordance with these orders, Mavroudis invited the primates
to a meeting in Agia Fotini, the Metropolis, to be held at 4
in the afternoon. By that time, a large congregation had
gathered in the courtyard of the church. In the presence of
Metropolitan Chrysostorros and the primates, Mavroudis read
Venizelos' proclamation "to the Greeks of Asia Minor" in front
of a wildly enthusiastic audience. In his message, the Greek
Premier emphasized that in order to serve "utmost national
interests", the local Greeks should prove to the other
elements of the population that "Greek freedom would bring
equality and justice to everybody, irrespective of race and
religion", while "special consideration should be given to the
Italians living in the area" 33/. The crowds cheered with
enthusiasm for what they believed to be their moment of
liberation and union with Greece. Conscious that this
interpretation was nowhere near the true state of affairs,
Mavroudis asked the crowds to control their emotions and
stressed that "our country requires us to prove worthy of our
great freedom" 34/.
In the meantime, the Turkish proclamations were being
distributed and the printing house of Amaithia was printing
the message of Colonel Zafiiou, Commander of the Greek
Occupation Army, to the people of Srnyrna which announced the
military occupation of the city by order of the Greek
government, implementing a decision of the Allied powers 35/.
In contrast to Venizelos' message which was exclusively
addressed to the local Greeks, Zafiriou emphasized that the
military occupation of the city did not in the least aim at
predetermining the decision of the Peace Conference as to the
future of the area and affirmed that the Greek army would
attach special importance to the free exercise of religious
rights and various other customs of the Smyrna communities.
This proclamation was posted all over Smyrna during the night
of 14 May 36/.
In an effort to exclude all possibilities of
disturbances, an intelligence bureau was organized at the
Greek Consulate under Consul S. Liatis and Naval Commander C.
Bouf is and with the task of observing Turkish movements
closely. A. Vedova, a philhellene of British citizenship,
spent the afternoon and night of 14 May in the Turkish quarter
32/ ibid.
33/ Rodas, op.cit., p. 61. The complete text of Venizelos'
proclamation in Greek General Staff, op.cit., Appendix 3.
34/ Original proclamation in MOFA 105. The text was composed
and cabled by Venizelos to be printed in Srnyrna and await the
arrival of the Greek army.	 MOFA 141, Tel.	 n.n./1O.5.19,
Venizelos to Repoulis.
35/ Original proclamation 	 .C.	 iu.
b/ Angelomatis, Ch. To_Chronikon tis Megalis Tragodias [The
Chronicle of the Great Tragedy). Athens, 1977. p. 46.
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and reported on the situation by messengers.
	 Mavroudjs
communicated his alarming reports on Turkish preparations and
intentions to Admiral Caithorpe who assured the Greek
representative that he had made Au Nadir Pasha and Izzet Bey
responsible for any disturbance caused by the Turkish troops
or population :37/. Nonetheless, that same night and while the
Greek troops were leaving the port of Gera for Smyrna, several
undred convicts were allowed to escape fiom the Turkish
Central Prison, situated behind the Konak (Government House),
with the open complicity of the Turkish authorities and,
especially, of Major Carossini, Head of the Allied Prison
Control 38/. The circumstances of their escape became all the
more suspicious as all Christian political prisoners had been
set free by the British representative in Smyrna after the
Moudros Armistice.
What was worse, a depot near the barracks was broken
into and a considerable number of Turks were furnished with
arms and ammunition. At the same time, the Greek intelligence
bureau was informed that groups led by Turco-Cretans were
organizing active resistance at the Quarantine, one of the
landing points of the Greek troops 39/. During the night of 14
- 15 May, the Quay was lined with barges ready to receive the
Greek troops while excitement mounted in the Greek and Turkish
quarters. The parallel mobilization of the two communities
indicated that unless strict precautionary measures were
taken, the Greek landing would not be effected without
incident.
May 15, 1919 was a beautiful day. crowds of local Greeks
poured towards the pier from all parts of Smyrna and the
nearby villages, some even came from the towns of the
hinterland. Because the gathering of crowds in the landing
area had been prohibited and Greek patrols had blocked all
access routes to the pier, people of every class and age
filled the by-roads and sokaks 40/. With flags and flowers,
they had come to welcome the Greek troops whose imminent
landing signified nothing less than the permanent union of the
area with Greece.
A small Greek detachment had landed a few hours earlier
to guard the disembarkation points but as soon as the first
ship appeared at the entrance of the port, any control the
37/ Rodas, op.cit., p. 62.
38/ Smith, op.cit., p.88. Rodas, op.cit., p. 63.
39/ Panayiotopoulou and Allamani, Istoria..., p. 116. Smith,
op.cit., p. 270.
40/ MOFA 141, Report no. 4265/20.5.19, Mavroudis to MOFA.
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patrols might have exercised became impossible and the crowds
filled the Quay. The first ship to reach the dock was the
liner Patris. The landing started at 7:30 a.m. to be concluded
at great speed 41/. Within two hours, the three Greek
regiments had landed at different points along the Quay and
were ready to proceed with the occupation of the city. The
road from the Post Office to the Pounta was crowded with
troops. Assisted by all the priests of Srnyrna, Metropolitan
Chrysostomos blessed the passing troops in front of the
Hunters' Club. Outside the Kremmer Hotel, a group of Evzones
started a folk dance while the delirious crowds embraced
soldiers and officers.
The 1/38 Evzones Regiment were the last to land. Their
objective was to disembark at the Quarantine and encircle the
Turkish quarter from the rear. Shortly before the rest of the
troops marched off, Mavroudis informed the Chief of the
Occupation Army that he had ordered part of the Evzones
Regiment to land at a different point on the Quay and follow a
revised itinerary. In his opinion, this change was dictated by
strong evidence and information received during the night and
communicated to Admiral Calthorpe immediately, according to
which Turkish preparations for active resistance in the
vicinity of the Quarantine were going ahead at full speed 42/.
Zafiriou commented that it would be better to meet resistance
at the Quarantine so that any eventual clashes could be kept
out of the city centre. At any event, he concluded, if the
Evzones landed elsewhere in an attempt to avoid the alleged
resistance, the Turks would be encouraged in their
intransigence 43/. However, Mavroudis' orders had already been
transmitted and there was no way of revoking them.
This change of itinerary was communicated at the last
moment to Lt. Colonel Stavrianopoulos, Commander of the
Evzones Regiment, who had already landed with the major part
of his troops in front of the Hunters' Club, as originally
planned. Stavrianopoulos thought that these new orders were
the result of a misunderstanding. As he could not communicate
with the rest of his Regiment who were already in the process
of landing at what he believed to be the wrong place, he
decided that in order to attain his objective as soon as
possible, he would have to guide another detachment to the
Quarantine and proceeded to march his troops along the Quay.
Instead of proceeding to the Mount Pagos Fort through Prof itis
Elias Street as the revised itinerary dictated, he led part of
his troops to the Quarantine , via the sea shore, in front of
the Konak, the Turkish barracks and through the Turkish
quarter. By that time, the crowds had managed to break through
the patrols and the Evzones marched towards the Quarantine
41/ MOFA 140, tel. no. 32/15.5.19, Mavroudis to Venizelos and
tel.no. 63/15.5.19, Zafiriou to Repou.lis and Paraskevopoulos.
42/ MOFA 141, Report no. 4265/20.5.19, Mavroudis to MOFA, on
the events of the landing.
43/ ibid.
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encircled by a large number of delirious Greeks.
The Turks were merely watching dumbfounded and motionless
until about 10:00 a.m., when the Evzories took the turning
infront of the Konak. When the troops reached the middle of
the street infront of the prisons, the first shot was heard;
it acted as a catalyst. Pandemonium broke out with the Turks
firing from the prison, the houses of the Turkish quarter, the
barracks, the Konak, the Gendarmerie School and the fishing
ooats in tne narDour. At tflE
been given, Greek troops and
hotels situated opposite thE
first shots, the crowds tried
from the Customs House to th
between the Evzones and the 41
witnessed severe clashes bE
Turkish crowds which had now t
between groups of civilians.
soldiers and approximately ter
this point, together with t}
various nationalities who we
the sea and drowned during ti
shot. For several days, corps
be sunk again by the Greek ma
same time, as it a signai naa
crowds were fired upon from the
Customs House. Following the
to turn back and filled the road
Konak, thus placing themselves
h Infantry Regiment. This area
tween the Greek army and the
aken to the streets, as well as
Later, the bodies of two Greek
Turkish officers were found at
ose of a number of civilians of
e either stabbed or pushed into
e panic that followed the first
es were cast up on the shore, to
ines on Kakoulidis' orders 44/.
Meanwhile, the Evzones replied to these first shots with
a brisk fusillade which lasted for about twenty minutes, until
the Turks surrendered and started coming out of the buildings
with their hands in the air 451. The Konak and the near by
buildings were searched by Greek troops and a large number of
Turks were arrested, the Vali and his colleagues among them.
It seems that the Vali had not been recognized by the Greek
soldiers. As soon as his identity became known, he was
released and reassured by Zafiriou that he would be allowed to
perform his duties unobstructed 46/. The Greek'crowds, still
shocked by the sudden attack, mistreated and beat some of the
prisoners. A little later, when the Turkish prisoners were
being marched along the Quay to be imprisoned on the Patris,
discipline broke down completely. In front of the "observing"
Allied warships, Greek civilians harassed the passing
prisoners while the officers had difficulty preventing their
men from taking part. Some of the prisoners were forced to
shout "Long Live Venizelos" and "Long Live Greece". Finally,
they were imprisoned on the Patris. Further clashes on the
Quay were forestalled by a squall which dispersed the crowds
47/.
44/ AV 9, tel. no. 1769/6015/15.7.19, Diomidis to Venizelos.
45/ Nider, op.cit., p. 14.
46/ MOFA 141, Report n.n./16.5.19, Mavroudis to MOFA.
47/ Housepian, M. Smyrna 1922. London 1972. p. 66. Strange
though it may seem, this sudden change of weather that forced
the crowds to disperse is not mentioned in most accounts of
the landing. The effect of the squall on the crowds was
described to me by an eye-witness, A. Aronis, interviewed in
Athens on 13.8.79.
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While the firing went on, public order collapsed in the rest
of the city. Bands of civilians of all nationalities took
advantage of the disorder to plunder and loot shops and
houses. The disappearance of the police led the looters to
believe that they would go unpunished. However, many of them
were arrested the following day and were later given heavy
sentences by a Greek Court Martial which commenced its
proceedings on 16 May. Those convicted represented most
national groups of the Srnyrna population.
Meanwhile, as fighting and looting continued, during
the early afternoon of 15 May, the Commander of the Italian
dreadnought Duillio suggested to Admiral Caithorpe that "after
the failure of the Greek landing" the Allies should land
troops in order to protect the interests of their respective
subjects. Anticipating an affirmative reply, he had already
even given orders for the preparation of a detachment complete
with machine guns to be ready to land. However, Caithorpe
replied that the Greeks had not asked him to undertake such
action and that he believed that law and order would soon be
reestablished by the Greek troops 48/. Indeed, by four in the
afternoon, the shooting stopped altogether with the help of a
British steam launch which compelled the Turks shooting from
the kaiks in the harbour to stop 49/.
Although popular Turkish accounts of the events name
Tahsin Bey as the person who fired the first shot, it is still
not clear who did fire it 50/. The Interallied Commission of
Inquiry which investigated the matter two months later, found
it impossible to establish who shot first and resolved that
Greek troops only fired in response 51/. However, in the light
of the events that followed, this first shot was probably the
signal for the Turkish attack, planned and executed under
Italian auspices 52/. Turkish sources indicate that as soon
as the Greek troops started marching towards the Konak an
Italian steam launch came near the barracks and gave last
minute orders for the attack. Italian sources confirm this
indication and provide the additional information that Major
Carossini was aboard this launch. The presence of the
notorious Commander of the Turkish gendarmerie in the area
where the first shot was fired and the most serious clashes
ensued is unlikely to have been accidental. Still less so as
48/ Rodas, op.cit., p. 70.
49/ AV 9, Report no. 1769/6015/5.7.19, Diomidis to Politis.
50/ Turkish popular magazine Tarih, May 1980.
51/ DBFP, II, no. 17, app. A.
52/ Telegrams exchanged between Sonnino, Sforza, Tittoni and
Biancheri openly refer to Italian agents active in the area as
well as to the organization of the incidents: ASMAE Turchia,
1651/7732/141/26.10.19, Sonnino to Biancheri. 1641/7734/2130/,
10.7.19, Italian Consul in Smyrna to MAE. 1646/7746/2097/,
7.7.19, Sforza to DICP. 1646/17746/1281/14.5.19, Sforza to
DICP. 1644/7738/1467/27.4.19, Sonnino to Admiral di Revel.
1644/7738/1848/9.5.19, Sforza to MAE.
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immediately after the first shots, and instead of making any
effort to stop the fighting, Carossini left the scene to
appear an hour later at the other end of the Quay, where the
Turkish prisoners were boarding the Patris 53/. The official
Turkish view as to the issue of the first shot is expressed in
Gendarmerie Colonel Mi Xemal's report to his Commander in
Constantinople: "Probably, one of the armed individuals who
followed the Greek battalion fired a shot, possibly
involuntarily" 54/.
A	 few days later, High Commissioner Stergiadis wrote to
Veriizelos:
"There is evidence that the resistance was
organized by the remnants of the CUP in
collaboration with a foreign propaganda which
also influenced the Turco-Cretans. The same
foreign propaganda continues to foment similar
upheavals in the interior, wherever our army
advances. I can assure you that if this
foreign instigation did not exist, we would
have met no resistance but in few, sporadic
cases" 55/.
It is to be noted that although Stergiadis knows quite
well which foreign propaganda he refers to, he hesitates to
name it. This attitude conformed to the venizelist line
expressed in the proclamation to the Greeks of Asia Minor:
"Special attention should be paid to the Italian element of
the population". It is also to be noted that Repoulis did not
agree with Venizelos in this respect: "It is obvious that we
[the Greek army] will meet the Italians in Ayiasuluk...I
believe we should advance and, if they resist, we should clash
so that the Allies will intervene to clarify the situation"
56/.
Italian complicity in the organization of Turkish
resistance was openly criticized in Srnyrna and an official
letter of complaint was addressed to Lloyd George by the
Metropolitan 57/. Likewise, public opinion in Greece was
highly critical of Italian involvement and the Italian
Ambassador to Athens was ordered to complain to the Greek
government about the suposedly unfounded accusations 58/.
By late afternoon on 16 May, the objectives of the
landing had been attained and clashes had stopped altogether.
The Court Martial commenced its proceedings on the same day,
with cases against local Greeks. In an effort to forestall any
53/ ASMAE-Turchia, 1644/7738/Report no. 1200/31.5.19, Admiral
di Revel to Sonriino.
54/ MOFA 59, Report n.n./19.5.19, Au Kema]. to the Chief
Commander of the Gendarmerie in Constantinople.
55/ AV 5, Report no. 1337/26.5.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
56/ MOFA 141, tel. no. 4356/21.5.19, Repoulis to MOFA.
57/ ASMAE Turchia, 1644/7728/2066/18.5.19, Italian Consul in
STnyrna to MAE.
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further anti-Turkish demonstrations and to prove the
impartiality of the Greek army, the first two sentences passed
by the Court Martial were announced on 18 May. Two Greeks, a
civilian and a soldier, received death penalties and were
executed on the same day. The impact of these executions was
so strong that, from 19 May, many articles sto)en during the
looting were abandoned in the treets of the city and tc
suburbs. A special service was immediately organized to
collect them and return them to their owners. A few days
later, Stergiadis wrote to Veni7elos:
"So far, 14 Greeks, 2 Turks and 1 Italian have
received sentences for looting. The date of
the trial of another 10 Turks, 4 Armenians, 3
Jews and 20 Greeks accused of taking part in
the looting has been fixed. At the same time,
inquiries regarding 27 Greeks, 12 Turks, 2
Italians and 2 Serbs are being conducted. Due
to lack of personnel and eye witnesses ready
to testify against the looters, the Court
Martial has not worked quickly so far.
However, the population has regained courage
and more looters are prosecuted while further
arrests are effected every day" 59/.
By the middle of August, the Court Martial had almost
completed its proceedings: 72 individuals were convicted, 3 of
whom received death sentences, 4 life imprisonment and 65
lighter sentences. Fo4j nine were Greeks, thirteen Turks,
twelve Armenians and on Jew. One Greek soldier was given a
death sentence because he couad not explain to the Court how
he had got hold of the Turkish gold found on him at the time
of his arrest 60/.
Although the Greek government was not legally
responsible for damages resulting from the looting that took
place in a city not under Greek occupation at the time, two
commissions were formed to examine relevant claims and
estimate the damage caused by the events of 15 and 16 May. The
first commission examined the claims of persons of French,
British or Italian nationality and was composed of four
representatives of the above communities and the President of
the Serres Tribunal, P. Tsirimonakis representing Greece. The
second commission examined the claims of Greeks, Turks and
other nationals and was composed of Tsirimonakis, the Prefect
of Drama Au Bey Naip Zade and Greek lawyer G. Photiadis.
Venizelos attached great importance to the prompt
settlement of this matter. According to his orders, all those
58/ ASMAE Turchia, 1644/7738/1525/30.5.19, Italian Ambassador
in Athens to DICP.
59/ MOFA 141,	 Report no.	 4981/22.5.19,	 Stergiadis to
Venizelos.
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accused of participation in the events were to be tried and
convicted as soon as possible and the payment of reparations
should start immediately. By August 1919, the two commissions
had deliberated on 780 cases and 764 others were under
consideration. The sum paid for reparations up to th same
time was 2,500,000 francs. The fact that most of those
convicted by the Court Martial were Greek, in conjunction with
Venizelos' declaration that the Greek government would pay
reparations to the victims of looting, amounted in Turkish and
Italian circles to indirect admission of Greek responsibility
for the events 61/.
By 17 May, order had been reestablished in the area of
Smyrna but reports of attacks against Turks in the towns and
villages of the hinterland persisted 62/. The British
representative received orders to protest to Kakoulidis and to
request the immediate implementation of strict measures for
the reinstatement of public order. As a result, Colonel
Zafiriou issued a proclamation ordering the population to
return to their peaceful tasks and stressing that the area was
under martial law which strictly prohibited the possession of
arms 63/. Zafiriou's proclamation did not bear any significant
results and tensions persisted. Yet another proclamation was
issued advising the Greeks to "respect the personal freedom
and religious beliefs" of their compatriots and stressed that
"in the future, the Court Martial will be responsible for the
punishment of those violating these orders" 64/. However, by
this time, the Turks had come out of the initial shock
following the landing events and had started retaliating by
committing excesses against the unprotected Greek populations
61/ MOFA 141,	 Report no.
	 4663/18.5.19,
Venizelos.	 MOFA 73, tel. no. 15833/2.8.19,
MOFA 59,
	
Report no. 6483/6.8.19, Stergiadis
tel. no.	 7279/25.7.19, Kanellopoulos to
constitution of




62/ MOFA 141, tel. n.n./16.5.19, Mavroudis to
no.	 1769/6015/5.7.19, Diomidis to Politis.
63/ Rodas, op.cit., p. 75.
64/ ibid.
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outside the occupied zone 65/.
In the meantime, the Turkish troops had evacuated
Smyrna on 23 May and the city was left to the Greek army 66/.
The Turkish civil authorities and civil employees had been.
restored to their positions by 17 May, following Colonel
Z&firiou's apologies to the Vali for the harsh treatment he
received on 15 May 67/. The matter of the restoration of the
civil authorities was urgent for the Greek military in view of
the problems in communication and provisioning caused by their
absence 68/. At the same time, the need to build up the Greek
forces in Asia Minor had by now become imperative for the
preservation of law and order in the hinterland.
In Smyrna, life recovered its normal pace gradually.
The Court Martial continued its proceedings and extensive
inquiries were held to establish any responsibility of Greek
officers. People returned to "their peaceful tasks" and
business continued as usual. However, the events of 15 and 16
May were far from forgotten. It was clear that they had
torpedoed what chance there had ever been for the successful
implementation of the venizelist policy of peaceful
coexistence. Although there is little doubt that the local
Greeks committed excesses against the Turkish population in
the belief that, at long last, the moment had come for them to
avenge the massacres, violations, looting and plundering of a
decade, responsibility for the incidents can not be attributed
to them. These events, so detrimental to the Greek cause, were
mainly due to Allied hypocrisy as to the nature of the Greek
65/ MOFA 140, Report no. 1144/16.5.19, Mavroudis to MOFA. MOFA
141, Report no. 4164/16.5.19, Kakoulidis to Ministry of
Marine.
66/ For complications and difficulties concerning the
evacuation of the Turkish troops: MOFA 141, tel. no.
4356/21.5.19, Repoulis from Smyrna to MOFA. MOFA 14 1., report
no.. 4558/25.5.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos. Also telegrams by
Au Nadir to the Turkish Ministry of War, protesting against
the evacuation and asking for orders in vain: Rodas, op.cit.,
pp.73-74 and Raports Off iciels reçus des autorites militaires
Ottomanes sur 1 occupation de Smyrne. Constantinople, 1919.
pp. 19-21. Au	 Nadir was subsequently tried for his conduct
during the Greek landing: Altay, F. "Izmir faciasinin
muhakemesi. Yunanlilarin 1919 'da Izmir' i isgallerinde orada
kolordu kumandani bulunan Au Nadir Pasa'nin muhakeme
fezlekesinc3en hulasa ye mutalaa" in Belleten. XXIII/39, 1959.
pp. 137-156.
67/ For - Greek efforts to convince the Vali to resume his
office: MOFA 141, tel. no. 4230/18.5.19, Repoulis to
Venizelos. MOFA 141, report no. 4365/18.5.19, Mavroudis to
Politis. AV 5, Report 1286/18.5.19, Mavroudis to Politis. GAS
1, tel. no. 2530/1.6.19, Stergiadis to Kanellopoulos.
68/ MOFA 141, Report no. 4164/16.5.19, Kakoulidis to Ministry
of	 Marine.
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occupation and the resulting stance of each of the Powers with
reference to the measures to be taken to safeguard it.
The British Admiral seemed to believe that his notes
and recommendations to the Turkish authorities would suffice
to preserve public order. The Italian representative surely
could not be expected to suggest measures to safeguard the
security of a landing operation he was doing everything in his
power to undermine 69/. The French and American
representatives were simply "observing" at a time when they
should have insisted on the evacuation of the Turkish army
before the Greek landing or, at least, the surrender of its
arms. What was more, the Allied representatives had
collectively remained indifferent to the release of so many
criminals from the prisons the night before the landing.
Although not clear from all responsibility, one must
note that the Greek representatives had not had the time to
suggest measures regarding the evacuation and disarmament of
the Turkish troops. They did, however, communicate all
information regarding Turkish preparations for resistance to
Admiral Caithorpe. On his part, he seemed sure that he could
forestall the repercussions of such a provocative action as
the landing of Greek troops in broad daylight in front of
Turkish crowds, by simply holding the Turkish authorities
responsible for any disturbances 70/. The very presence of the
Turkish troops in the city represented a hope for the Turkish
population, inflamed its nationalism and - with the invaluable
aid of the Italian propaganda - turned the city into a
dangerous volcano. It is indicative of the importance attached
to the army's presence that after the Turkish troops were
confined on the Patris , the Muslim civilians returned to
their homes peacefully while the organizers of the Bahri-Baba
demonstrations escaped to the interior. On the basis of this
and subsequent events, it is doubtful if in the army's absence
any Turkish civilian would have dared shoot against the Greek
troops 71/.
The responsibility of the Greek officers in charge of
the landing is also grave, especially as regards the free
movement of the crowds on the Quay. The plans and measures
taken by them were clearly inadequate. This was partly due to
the absence of officers with great prestige among the troops
and from the fact that the whole operation was entrusted to a
Colonel. Later in the year Colonel Zafiriou was dismissed from
69/ Instead, he chose to instigate the Turks by promising them
direct aid. MOFA 141, Report no. 1144/16.5.19, Mavroudis to
MOFA. Horton, op.cit., p. 72.
70/ Admiral Caithorpe's suggestions to the Turkish authorities
were transmitted to the Minister of War in Constantinople by
Au Nadir Pasha. His reports quoted in Rodas, op.cit., pp. 72-
73.	 Smith, op.cit., p. 91.
71/ MOFA 141, Report n.n./16.5.19, Mavroudis to MOFA.
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the army. In two letters he addressed to Venizelos on the
issue of his dismissal, he claims he had been punished
"without any official justification. Unofficially, however, I
was told that my punishment is connected with the landing at
Smyrna, my command during its execution and generally with the
incidents of 15 and 16 May. I was also told that it is based
on the conclusions of an inquiry conducted by Major General
Leonardopoulos" 72/. He further claimed that he did not find
out about the Konak incidents until two hours later and that
he had mistaken the shots he heard around ten o'clock for
shots fired in rejoicing. In his second letter, Zafiriou
stated that during the afternoon of 14 May, he had a meeting
with Admiral Calthorpe who assured him that the Quay would be
heavily policed during the landing, by a naval detachment
under Mavroudis. In fact, he continued, the following day the
detachment had cleared the crowds from only a small part of
the Quay, up to the Customs House, while the remaining part
was full of cheering, delirious crowds. "This uproar is the
reason why neither I, nor my staff or Captain Mavroudis heard
the shooting" 731. Whether disciplinary action against
Zafiriou was justified, is a matter of debate which can be
fully clarified if an answer is given to the question why
Captain Mavroudis was neither repremanded nor punished,
although he shared the responsibility for the landing of the
troops and, what is more, for its preparation.
On the whole, it seems that Greek responsibility for
these events has been exaggerated out of proportion in a
further attempt to serve the interests of those who instigated
them. An eye-witness has commented:
"Much has been said about the atrocities and massacres
committed by the Greek troops at the time of their landing at
Smyrna on May 15, 1919. In fact, the events that occured on
that and the few succeeding days have taken on larger
proportions in the public mind than the deliberate
extermination of whole nations by the Turks, and no
consideration seems to have been given to the prompt
suppression of the disorders by the Greek authorities, and the
summary punishment of the principal offenders, several of them
by death...The whole responsibility was thrown upon the Greeks
who landed among a population, so far as the Turks were
concerned, more insulted by their advent than the white
citizens of Mobile would be if it were given over to a mandate
of negro troops" 74/.
On 23 May 1919, when order had long been reestablished
and High Commissioner Stergiadis had finally arrived in
Smyrna, the Italian newspaper Messagero wrote: "The Greeks
continue to arrest the Turks en masse. The Turkish quarter in
Vourla is in flames. Violence and looting continues. The
situation is menacing".
72/ AV 5, letter n.n./4.1O.19, Zafiriou to Venizelos.
73/ AV 5, letter n.n./7.1O.19, Zafiriou to Venizelos.
74/ Horton, op.cit., p. 72.
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III. The Inter-Alliea Cortmission of Inquiry
68
News of the disastrous execution of the landing reached
Venizelos through the British Admiralty 1'. His colleagues in
Athens chose not to inform him immediately and when they did,
they communicated only half the truth; Mavroudis' shattering
report was conveniently hushed up 2/. In a telegram to Colonel
Zafiriou, the Greek Premier expressed his bitterness and
rspair:
"Greek participation in the events gteved me
immensely. Of course, no city is devoid of rascals
but I could never imagine that (the local Greeks]
could celebrate their liberation with acts that can
seriously damage the national cause...You will
invite the Metropolitan and the primates and
complain about the behaviur of those rascals that
want to call themselves ('-ree).s" 3/.
Fear of possible repercussions, as well as his anxiety
over the delayed arrival of the Greek High Commissioner in
Smyrna, drove Venizelos to despair. As early as February 1919,
he had chosen Aristidis Stergiadis, Governor General of
Epirus, to serve as first Greek High Commissioner of Smyrna,
although he knew that his choice would not be favourably
received by the Liberal Party 4/. On 2 April he wrote to
Stergiadis that "in the event, as I hope, Smyrna is given to
us, you will have to undertake its administration" 5/. Knowing
of Stergiadis' poor health, he invited him to Paris to undergo
treatment and to discuss issues concerning the administration
of the new territories. However, Stergiadis refused to go on
the excuse that his presence in Jannina was indispensable.
On 7 May 1919, Repoulis cabled Stergiadis to return to
Athens immediately. Yet, six whole days passed without any
news from Jannina reaching Venizelos who believed that this
delay was due to forces in Athens acting against Stergiadis.
In the event, he was informed that the Governor General could
not depart immediately because of poor health 6/. The Prime
Minister was very anxious to see the High Commissioner take up
his post as soon as possible because he considered his
presence indispensable for the successful completion of the
landing 7/. "The absence of our political representative in
Srnyrna is especially worrying" he wrote to Diomidis 8/. 	 To
1/ MOFA 141, tel. no. 607/17.5.19, Venizelos to Zafiriou.
2/ MOFA 141, Report no. 4265/20.5.19, Mavroudis' Report on
the events, according to which, Italian officers were the
main instigators.
3/ MOFA 141 tel. no. 4252/19.5.19, Venizelos to Zafiriou.
4/ Smith, op.cit., p. 91.
5/ MOFA 141, tel. no. 3028/2.4.19, Venizelos to Stergiadis.
6/ MOFA 141, tel. n.n. Venizelos to Zafiriou. MOFA 141, tel.no
305/13.5.19,	 Gouriarakis to MOFA.
7/ MOFA 141, tel. no. 4485/11.5.19, Venizelos to MOFA.
8/ MOFA 141, tel. no. 4575/16.5.19, Venizelos to Diomidis.
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fill the vacuum, Repoulis was instructed to leave for Smyrna
immediately to ensure thE establishment of public order and
the restitution of the Turkish civil authorities. This was a
matter of top priority for Venizelos who wanted to be in a
position to refute any claims to the effect that the Greek
presence in Smyrna created chaos whereas no disturbance had
occured at the Italian poi.	 rj lan3±n g
 9/.
Repoulis arrived in Srnyrna on '18 May and the following
day a meeting was held with Admiral Caithorpe to discuss the
situation. After the meeting he reported to Paris:
"[During the events] the most active among the
local Greeks were the Asia Minor reservists
who returned victorious after five years in
exile, to find tneir families ruined both
morally and financially. The Asia Minor Greeks
serving in our army managed to xeturn here
wearing their uniforms despite government
orders" 10/.
Stergiadis arrived in Smyrna on 21 May and Repoulis
left for Athens on the same day. His presence in the city,
especially in the absence of any Greek civil authority,
reassured the local Turkish authorities as to the good will of
the Greek government and, to a degree, helped ease the tense
atmosphere prevailing in the city 11/. In the meantime,
Venizelos in Paris launched a new diplomatic campaign to
convince the Allies that Greece was not responsible for the
landing incidents. In his effort to ensure that the Supreme
Council would not revoke the Greek mandate to Smyrna, he wrote
to Clémenceau: "Unfortunately, this [Turkish] resistance had
been deliberately planned...These disturbances were the work
of the partisans of the Young Turks [who were] encouraged by a
certain propaganda, without the instigation of which - it can
be affirmed - public order would not have been disturbed" 12/.
Yet, Venizelos did not know the whole truth about the
events. He had not been informed of the killing of Turkish
prisoners on the way to the Patris and Mavroudis' detailed
report on the events had not been communicated to him by the
Greek authorities. The full picture was presented to him only
in late June through his close friend Ronald Burrows,
Principal of Kings' College in London, who, in turn, had been
briefed by his contacts at the Foreign Office. Venizelos
9/ MOFA 141, tel. no. 4606/17.5.19, tel. no. 4356/21.5.19,
Repoulis to Venizelos. AV 6, tel. no. '1303/n.n../20.5.19,
Repoulis to Venizelos.
10/ MOFA 141, tel. no. 143/19.5.19 and tel. no. 4356/21.5.19,
Repoulis to Venizelos. AV 6, tel. no. 1303/n.n./20.5.19,
Repoulis to Venizelos.
11/ MOFA 141, tel. no. 4460/24.5.19, Stergiadis to MOFA and
tel.	 no. 4356/21.5.19, Repoulis to MOFA.
12/ AV 9, letter n.n./29.5.l9, Venizelos to Clémenceau.
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immediately employed the good services of his friend to
obtain more information as to what the Foreign Office thought
of the events and Burrows promptly reported:
"I had extracts from the Admiralty reports
read out to me. I am sorry to say that the
iTnprPssion they left on the Foreign Office was
deplorable...[My contact said] We were glad to
observe one Greek officer restrain his
men...The Foreign Office laid stress on the
Evzoni getting out of hand when escorting the
prisoners...ancl themselves taking part in the
killing of men who had surretj-ered. [My
contact continued] The less sa'd about the
matter, the better. It was a bal business.
Probably however, this evidence was given by
the British residents of Sinyrna who, as we
know, are prejudiced" 13/.
Burrows arranged for parts of the Admiralty reports to
be despatched to Venizelos who wrote to him a few days later:
"I need not assure you that the first I knew
of the killing of Turkish prisoners by the
Greek soldiers escorting them was from your
letter..I had known of course that...the
worst elements of the population, which are by
no means scarce in a big sea port, took
advantage of the opportunity and committed
murders and especially gave themselves to acts
of looting...Considering the circumstances, I
did not regard these incidents -however
regrettable they were- as surpassing what one
might expect to happen under similar
circumstances...I am convinced, dear Friend,
that our Army is conscientiously fulfilling
the task entrusted to it by the Council in
Asia Minor, in spite of the greatest
difficulties which naturally the enemy puts in
its way and, what is really the hardest task,
in spite of the intrigues of one of our
Allies"
and Burrows replied:
"My informant [at the Foreign Office] on my
leaving said that this is the end of the Turks
being turned out of Europe...Such views
represent Lord Curzon and they will grow as
letters come back from the fleet. I fear that
they will strengthen the old argument that
Greece cannot be trusted with the Moslem
minority in Cyprus...I feel that the Greek
13/ AV 21, letter n.n./21.6.19, Burrows to Venizelos.
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press has got an altogether too rosy view of
the situation and that it might be well to
prepare them indirectly for disillusionment" 14/.
A few days later, the matter ws brought up in the
Hous& of Commons. Lt. Colonel Aubrey Berbert asked Curzon
whether he had any official information tc the effect that the
Greeks massacred treir prisoners in Smyrna in full sight of
the Allied warships; he received an affirmative reply. The
following day, the Manchester Guardian commented editorially
on the "murder of old grey-bearded civilians as well as of
soldiers". It further regretted the fact that the Foreign
Office and Veriizelos had "avoided menUoning anything of these
atrocities before 26 June" 15/. The news was greeted with
great surprise at the headquarters of the Greek delegation in
Paris. Venizelos, by now exasperated, cabled Stergiadis for
more information regarding the accusations. His deep grief was
expressed in a letter he wrote to Baif our:
"The	 statement	 (in	 the	 House	 of
Commons)....grieved me immensely as I had no
news	 from the Greek authorities or any
intimation	 whatever	 from the	 English
Government	 to the effect that Turkish
prisoners had been killed by Greek soldiers
escorting	 them.	 (The Greek government]
believes that, however regrettable these
incidents may be, they do not exceed in
intensity the unavoidable brought about by the
circumstances under which they occured...But
even if this impression of the Greek
government be proved false, Ewe] would really
prefer the whole truth of the case to come to
light for the sake of establishing the
responsibility of and exacting punishment of
the authors, as (we] do not in the least
desire that such despicable crimes be silenced
or remain unpunished" 16/.
Although in his communications to the members of the
Supreme Council Venizelos tried to minimize the importance and
the impact of the incidents, the language he used when
addressing the troops indicated his full understanding of the
possible consequences:
14/ MOFA 26, tel. no. 7114/23.7.19, Venizelos to Diomidis. AV
9, letter 1693/6345/9.7.19, Venizelos to Burrows. A few days
later, Venizelos wrote to his friend T.P. 0' Connor, M.P,,
repeating the same arguments. AV 9, letter n.n./18.7.19,
Venizelos to 0' Connor.
15/ AV 8, tel. no. 1684a/28.6.19, Caclarnanos to Venizelos. In
July, Venizelos wrote to C.P. Scott, Editor in Chief of
the Manchester Guardian, in an effort to explain the Greek
position. AV 9, letter n.n./16.7.19, Venizelos to Scott.
16/ MOFA 44, letter n.n./2.7.19, Venizelos to Baif our.
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"[These incidents) may destroy our national
cause at the most crucial moment...You must
make the [local Greek] population realize that
no misconduct will be tolerated by the army.
Regardless of our compassion for their past
sufferings, we can not allow ti-em to endanger
the honour of a whole nation through their
bad conduct...If we find them adverse to the
important mission we have undertaken, we will
treat them as enemies..," 17/.
High Commissioner Stergiadis shared Venizelos' views
about the local Greeks:
"Here, the military have difficulties in
reconciling their double task; administration
and police work to preserve public order on
the one hand and fighting on the other. This
difficulty could be easily overcome if it were
not for the disastrous influence of the local
Christians who are disobedient to our orders,
rancorous towards the moslems and ready to
revenge and loot. Sometimes they succeed in
inducing soldiers and officers to
misconduct...No atrocities would have ensued
had the local [Greek) population not taken
part [in the clashes)...When I arrived eight
days later, I concentrated my efforts in
finding and punishing the culprits but no one
seemed to be in a position to inform me, while
many did not seem to realize the necessity [of
my efforts]" 18/.
Yet, Venizelos' harsh words were not only for the local
Greeks:
"The army's misconduct du.ring the first two
days of the occupation in Smyrna, has not only
destroyed us morally but could also influence
and endanger the outcome of our national
interests...Only by confessing the truth about
this misconduct and by punishing these
officers who tolerated such barbarism from
their soldiers, can we minimize its impact..."
19/.
Venizelos was not exaggerating. Although the local
Greeks could not be accused of instigating the incidents, it
17/ AV 9, tel. no. 1783/6625bis/5.7.19, Venizelos to Nider,
Order of the Day, addressed to the Greek troops.
16/ AV 9, tel. no. 1748/n.n./3.7.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
19/ AV 8, tel. no. 1693/6345/29.6.19, Venizelos to Nider and
Stergiadis.
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was clear that their grievances against their former
oppressors broke loose at a most inopportune moment. The
venizelist policy of "peaceful coexistence" between Greeks and
Turks had proved unrealist:ic.
Earlier in June, the Greek General Staff had ordered
Major General Leonardoou1os to proce'3 tc Srnyrna and report
on the events. His report was soon completed and his
conclusions were transmitted to Paris. Leonarc3opoulos praised
the conduct of the troops in general and stated that the 4th
Infantry Regiment had done its best to protect the prisoners.
His investigation concentrated mainly on the issue of the
unfortunate planning and execution of the landing. General
Paraskevopoulos commented that since the Commander of the
First Division was "partly justified" by the report and since
Stergiadis did not "wish the replacement of Zafiriou and
Stavrianopoulos" he had not made any changes in the leadership
of the troops. "However", he noted, "if you think that the
p'blitical side of the issue dictates the sacrifice of a few
[officers), please order their disnissal with the view to
reinstating them in due course" 20/. In view of the
discussion in the House of Commons, Venizelos could no longer
remain satisfied with the investi qation of a Greek officer,
still less so as he wished to make the accusation of the
killing of Turkish prisoners the focus of an Anglo-Greek
inquiry. "Even if these incidents prove to be worse than I
think", he wrote to Caclamanos, "I prefer to have them come
out into the open and to impose the necessary penalties. Only
in this way can we reestablish our good name and not by trying
to cover them up" 21/.
Caclamanos was further instructed to call at the
Foreign Office and leave a note with the Undersecretary for
Foreign Affairs C. Harmsworth, requesting a thorough
investigation into the Smyrna events by a high ranking British
officer in collaboration with a Greek officer of the same
rank. Harmsworth expressed his doubts as to whether the
British government could alone accept a proposition which
seemed to fall under the jurisdiction of the Peace Conference.
Thereupon, Venizelos wrote to Balfour, in an effort to secure
Cabinet approval "to enlighten British public opinion because
the accusation against the Greek army was based...on British
sources". His main arguments for an Anglo-Greek investigation
were as follows:
"The undertaking of this investigation by the
Peace Conference would necessarily imply the
participation of other Great Powers and, owing
20/ AV 8,	 tel.	 no.	 6346/n.n./29.6.19, Venizelos to
Paraskevopoulos. AV 9, tel. no. 1700/n.n./29.6.19,
Paraskevopoulos to Venizelos, communicating Leonardopoulos'
Report.
21/ AV 8,	 tel.	 no.	 1695/6351/29.6.19,	 Venizelos to
Caclamanos.
74
to the conflicting interests of one of them
with those of Greece as regards western Asia
Minor, the impartiality of the investigation
would be greatly handicapped and its success
seriously compromised. Nor do I consider it
fair that the work o the Greek authorities
should be subjected to the criticism of a
government whose agents in the Smyrna region
have done nothing to facilitate the task of
the Greek forces in their undertaking to
accomplish a duty assigned to them by the
Peace Conference" 22/.
However, the British government was unable to see its
way clear to accepting this proposal and Baif our advised
Venizelos not to insist on an Anglo-Greek inquiry but that
such an investigation should be carried out by the Greek
authorities alone, the Greek government communicating to the
British the results of the investigation and the penalties
imposed on the culprits. Should any doubt be expressed as to
the results of the inquiry, Baif our suggested that Venizelos
could then request the investigation of the issue by a mixed
commission 23/. The Greek Prime Minister was obliged to accept
these suggestions and commissioned Colonel Alexander
Mazarakis, his Military Adviser at the Peace Conference, to
proceed	 to Smyrna and conduct investigations. 	 In his
subsequent report, Mazarakis made the following points:
1. There was no doubt that atrocities were committed
against the Turkish army and unarmed civilian population.
2. The landing of the Greek troops should not have
taken place in the city port. After landing at another spot
along the coast and while a curfew had been imposed, the Greek
troops should have proceeded with the occupation of the main
part of the city.
3. In addition to the clashes near the Konak, several
others took place in different parts of the city.
4. The incidents left about one hundred victims, 15 to
20 of whom were among the 2,500 Turkish prisoners.
5. The way the British report was composed gave the
impression that the numerous eye-witness accounts referred to
different incidents when it was obvious that many of them
referred to the same events.
22/ MOFA	 141, letter n.n./2.719, Venizelos to Baif our
23/ AV 8, tel. no. 1695/6351/29.6.19, Venizelos to Caclarnanos.
MOFA 44. letter n.ri./2.7.19, Venizelos to Balfour. MOFA 2,
letter n.n/2.7.19, Venizelos to Baif our. AV 11, note no.
2314/56-57/n.d., not signed, reporting in detail the steps
taken by the Greek side to ensure that the mandate of Smyrna
would not be revoked.
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6. The Command of the First Division was responsible
for the unsatisfactory plan, for the mistakes in its
implementation and for not conducting a prompt and thorough
investigation. Lt. Colonel Stavrianopoulos was not
responsible, even though he had already been punished and
removed from Smyrna.
7. Turks hidden in shops, hotels and boats, started the
shooting. Logic dictated that it would have been unreasonable
for Greeks to hide and shoot against a street filled with
Greek troops and civilians. Consequently, although excesses
were indeed committed against some of the prisoners, most of
the victims were killed in other parts of the city 24/.
In	 the	 meantime,	 against	 Verizelos'	 explicit
instructions to the contrary, Stergiadis and Zafiriou chose to
extend the Greek occupation to the north and east 	 (Manisa,
Kasaba) as well as to the south of Smyrna, in order to
forestall an Italian advance in the Meander Valley which would
hinder a future incorporation of this area into the Greek
zone. According to the original plan, the Greek occupation was
to be confined to the town of Aidin, the sancaks of Smyrna and
Manisa and the kaza of Aivali. Only if there were a real
threat to public order and this only with the Senior Naval
Officer's consent, should the Greek troops advance further
south and, in any case, not beyond Aidin 25/. However, Greek
troops, by now amounting to five divisions, occupied Menemen
on 22 May, Manisa, Ayiasuluk and Aidin on 25 May and Aivali on
29 May. Odemish was occupied on 1 June, Nazili on 3 June,
Akhisar on 5 June and Bergama on 12 June. This advance placed
the Greek troops in a strong position and although the Senior
Naval Officer had not authorized it, he could not order them
to withdraw for fear of new disorders 26/. As cables from
Smyrna to Paris were delayed, probably due to Italian
interference in their transmission via Rome about which
Venizelos complained to the Supreme Council, the Greek Premier
thought that the advance of the Greek troops was the result of
a misunderstanding 27/. It soon proved that a further advance
was necessary and on 27 June, four days after communicating
his decision to the Supreme Council, Venizelos authorized
Stergiadis to undertake a "defensive-offensive", in order to
disperse the Turkish irregular forces threatening to besiege
Smyrna. This resulted in the mistaken evacuation of Aidin on
24/ AV 9, tel. no. 18851n.n./17.7.19, Mazarakis to Venizelos.
Mazarakis, op.cit., pp. 263-265.
25/ MOFA 141, tel. no. 4712/19.5.19, communicating to Smyrna
the decision of the Supreme Council on the issue of the
boundaries of the Greek occupation. Petsalis, op.cit., p. 215.
FO 608/90-16411, SNO Commodore Fitzmaurice's report to
Caithorpe, no. 4 (b), 6.6.19.
26/ MOFA 6, tel. no. 700/11.9.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
27/ FO 608/90-14763, Report by Kerr on his interview with
Venizelos, 7.7.19.
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29 June. The town was subsequently burnt and some 2,500 Greek
inhabitants massacred by the irregulars before it was
reoccupied by the Greek forces on 4 July. The events of Aidin
and the occupation of towns such as Menemen, Bergama and
Odemish by the Greeks had been fpllowed by incidents similar
to those of Srryrna 28/. These incidents were used by the
Sheik-ui--Islam to accuse the Greek troops of alleged
atrocities against the Turkish population.
Mazarakis' report had barely reached Veriizelos when, on
18 July, the Supreme Council discussed a letter from the
Sheik-ui-Islam which stated:
"Thousands of Moslems have perished and more
than 15,000 were obliged tc leave their
villages and seek refuge in the interior in
order to escape the horrors and massacres".
The Greeks were further accused of trying to replace
the indigenous Turkish population with immigrants from Greece
and the Supreme Council was requested to order the evacuation
of the Greek troops and the constitution of an Inter-Allied
Commission of Inquiry (Id) to investigate the alleged Greek
atrocities. However, when the Sheik-ui-Islam was called to
testify under oath before the ICI, he refused because such an
act would not be compatible with his religious status 29/.
During the discussion that followed, Balfour pointed out that
he did not object to the proposal itself, though he thought
that if Commissions of Inquiry had to be sent to investigate
all charges of atrocities throughout the world, he did not
believe he would be able to lay his hand on a sufficient
number of officers. He also thought it was more important to
prevent the recurrence of atrocities in the future than to
investigate those which had already taken place. Nonetheless,
on the same day, the Council decided to appoint a commission
of inquiry, consisting of a British, a French, an Italian and
an American officer 30/. On the same day, Venizelos and
Tittoni announced their agreement in defining the Greek and
Italian zoneSin Asia Minor. Despite the Council's objections,
28/ On the Greek advance and the demarcation of the occupation
line: tel. no. 5811/14.6.19, Venizelos to Stergiadis in
Petsalis, oD.cit., p. 217, FO 608/90-16411, Fitzmaurice to
Caithorpe, Report no. 42/19.6.19. On the Aidin events: FO
406/41-130729, Webb to Curzon, desp. 1630/8.9.19. DBFP, II, p.
229, Report of the Interallied Commission of Inquiry. DBFP,
II, p. 334, app. D to nc. 28, Paraskevopoulos to Venizelos,
2.8.19. FO 608/89-13566 and. 13568, Venizelos' three notes to
the Supreme Council, dated June 18, July 20 and August 23.
With these notes, he urgently requested Allied authorization
for the Greek advance but he received no reply until two
months later.
29/ DBFP, I, p. 128, Sheik-ul-Islam to Clémenceau, letter,
15.7.19.
30/ DBFP, I, p. 130 and 142.
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Tittoni pointed ut that the approval of this agreement by the
upreme Council'intamount to an official recognition of the
Italian presence in Asia Minor. This argument was subsequently
used extensively by the Italians in an attempt to legitimize
their unauthorized presence in the area.
The composition of the Id caused the protests of
Venizelos. Not to allow for the representation of the Greek
army at the Commission, he wrote to Clémenceau, was to inflict
upon it an unwarranted stigma by implying it was collectively
responsible for the alleged crimes. The absence of a Greek
officer from the inquiry would tantamount to disregard of the
mandate by virtue of which the Greek army was now in Asia
Minor where it had been sent at the request of the Allied and
Associated powers. Greek objections were discussed by the
Supreme Council on 21 July and, despite the objections voiced
by Clémenceau and Tittoni, it was agreed that Venizelos "might
appoint a Greek officer to follow the labours of the
Commission. This officer will not however have a vote in the
Id and will take no part in its findings". This decision
appeased the sensitivity of the Greek army to a very limited
extent; nevertheless, Colonel Mazarakis was appointed Greek
representative to the Commission. Yet, the phrase "to follow
the labours of the Commission" was to cause a lot of friction
between the Id and the Greeks, because the members of the
Commission decided to interpret it as excluding the presence
of the Greek delegate from the proceedings 31/.
At a later Supreme Council meeting, it was decided
that the Commission would inquire into the incidents which
took place during and after the Greek occupation of Smyrna,
Aidin, Aivali and adjacent regions. The inquiry was to extend
to all such events from the date of occupation to "the present
moment", 25 July 1919. The ICI was to allocate
responsibilities and to submit a report to the Supreme Council
together with "such conclusions as it might consider relevant"
32/. On 2 August, the Allied High Commissioners in
Constantinople announced to the Porte the decision of the
Supreme Council regarding the delimitation of the Greek and
Italian zones of occupation and the appointment of a
Commission of Inquiry into the events that took place in
consequence of the Greek occupation of Smyrna. Two days later,
an official Turkish communiqué to the High Commissioners
expressed Turkish satisfaction with the composition of the Id
and stated that "without doubt the humanitarian decision of
the Peace Conference will fill everyone with gratitude". Even
before the composition of the Id had been officially
communicated to the Porte, the Turkish Ministry of Interior
had ordered a group of civil employees to prepare all the
necessary documents concerning the occupation of Smyrna in
order to submit them to the Commission. According to this
material, during and after the Greek occupation, 8,500 Turks
31/ DBFP, I, p. 165, Supreme Council meeting of 21 .7.19.
32/ DBFP, I, p. 188, Supreme Council meeting of 25.7.19.
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were killed while another 1 ,500 had disappeared together with
1,200 Armenians and Jews who escaped to the interior. On 30
July, the Ministry of Interior issued a circular according to
which all Turkish authorities should "facilitate" the work of
the ICI and do their best to suppress the bands of irregulars
while the Commission was in the area 33/.
The Commission, onrosed of Adjnirai Bristol for the US,
General Bunoust for F:nce, General i-are for Britain and
General Dal'olio for Italy, held its first meeting in
Constantinople on 12 August, in the absenre of the Greek
representative. Venizelos' protests to the Supreme Council
were received concurrently with a telegram from the French
High Commissioner in Constantinople which requested the
Council to define whether Colonel Mazarakis "can or can-not be
present" and stated that the Turks would also ask to be
represented at the Id should the answer to the above question
be affirmative. The matter was discussed at the meeting of 14
August and it was agreed that all necessary data should be
communicated to Mazarakis by the Commission. Similar
facilities should be extended to a Turkish representative "if
subsequently appointed". Again, the phrase "all necessary data
should	 be communicated	 to him",	 was	 to	 create
misunderstandings 	 as to what should be	 considered	 as
"necessary data" 34/. On 20 August, the ICI informed the Greek
High Commissioner in Constantinople that, following
instructions from Paris, a Turkish officer was to be allowed
to follow the work of the Commission under the same conditions
and with the same privileges as the Greek officer. The rights
of the Turkish representative Kathri Bey were reasserted and,
thus, victorious Greece found herself on the same footing with
defeated	 Turkey	 35/.	 Venizelos repeatedly,	 though
unsuccessfully, solicited a decision of the Supreme Council in
respect of "the unfair procedure followed by the Id in
disallowing the presence of the Greek delegate at the
examination of witnesses and at the work of the ICI in
general", which seemed to disregard the very decisions of the
Council. The Commission deemed preferable that the Greek
representative should not take part in the examination of
witnesses on the grounds that this might intimidate some of
them 36/. The intransigent stance of the Id prompted new
protests from Venizelos. On 14 September, he wrote to
Clémenceau:
"I have already appealed to your sense of justice
in order to secure an alteration in the procedure
33/ DBFP, I, p. 343, Supreme Council meeting of 6.8.19. MOFA
6, tel. no. 7339/27.7.19, Kanellopoulos to MOFA. MOFA 61, tel.
no. 7455/30.7.19, Kanellopoulos to MOFA.
34/ DBFP, I, p. 466. MOFA 141, tel. no. 7775/20.8.19,
Kanellopoulos to MOFA. MOFA 61, tel. no. 7773/20.8.19,
Kanellopoulos to MOFA.
35/ DBFP, I, p. 418, app. E to no. 30. ibid, p. 413.
36/ AV 11, letter 2202b/n.n../14.9.19, Venizelos to Clémenceau.
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which is so obviously contrary to the acknowledged
rights of defence. Since then, through the General
Secretary of the Conference, on several occasions I
have requested the Council to come to a decision
concerning this matter. In the meantime, as no
further instructions reached the Commission, it has
proceeded with its work on the same erroneous
basis...Notwithstanding that in Constantinople the
Commission had declared that in case the Greek
Representative were not permitted to attend the
cross-examination of the witnesses, he would be
subsequently acquainted with their evidence and be
told of the result of the inquiries, I regret to
learn that even this has been denied him. Our
representative has been kept in ignorance of the
examinations carried through and of the conclusions
reached by the Commission, who has often refused to
examine several witnesses proposed by our
side on the ground that information collected thus
far was sufficient. It did not however acquaint our
representative	 with the nature	 of	 this
information...Thus, the inquiry was started in
violation of all common rights of Penal Law and has
been carried on in an atmosphere of increasing
niystery...Through the mere accusation brought
against it by the denunciation of an enemy
authority, the Greek army suddenly found itself
placed in the position of a defendant who does not
even have the sacred right to present his defence"
37/.
The Greek protests were discussed once again by the
Supreme Council at its meeting of 30 September, on the basis
of two letters from Venizelos in which he complained about the
insufficient extent to which Colonel Mazarakis was associated
with the work of the Commission, although on 31 July, General
Bunoust had assured Kanellopoulos that the ICI would
communicate to Mazarakis the depositions of the witnesses 38/.
:t was then decided that the Id should communicate to the
Greek representative the minutes of the meetings, including
the testimony of witnesses. Mazarakis would be asked and
allowed to notify the Commission of any criticisms he desired
to formulate regarding the matters in question 39/. To these
instructions, the Id readily replied that for the purpose of
obtaining reliable information and avoiding reprisals, it had
promised certain witnesses, mainly Turks and Europeans, that
their testimony would be held secret. Therefore, no evidence
could be communicated to Mazarakis. This caused new Greek
37/ AV11, memo n.n./18.10..19, includes Venizelos' letters to
Clmenceau dated 22.8.19 and 29.9.19. DBFP, I, p. 837, Supreme
Council meeting of 30.9.19.
38/ MOFA 6, tel. no. 7453/31.7.19, Kanellopoulos to 	 MOFA. AV
11, letter n.n./27.10.19, Venizelos to Curzon.
39/ AV 11, memo, n.n./18.1O.19....
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protests which were discussed by the Council on 16 October It
was then decided that the Id should communicate to Mazarakis
all the evidence received after 30 September, date of the
previous Supreme Council decision. However, this new decision
did not have any effect as the Id had by then completed its
investigations 40/. Yet, Colonel Maza-akis was informed that
1'e would soon receive the ICI report. nd he was requested to
express any criticism he desired to !ormu:iate. To his previous
protests about not being allowed to participate in the
proceedings, the Id had replied that "the Commission is not a
tribunal to observe the procedures of a court". It also
stressed that it had conducted the	 nru'ry with absolute
impartiality, conforming to the successive instructions
received from the Peace Conference. What could hardly be
concealed however, was the obvious effort to interpret these
instructions in their most possible anti-Greek spirit.
The questions put by the ICI to the witnesses indicated
the view the Commission was trying to establish: The
resistance of the Turks originated from their deep hatred of
the Greeks who were in no position to impose law and order. It
followed therefore that if Asia Minor were given to Greece,
fighting would continue in the area. This view was also
expressed in a cyphered telegram addressed by the Vali to the
Porte and intercepted by the Greek authorities; Admiral
Bristol had assured Izzet Bey that the Greeks would not
achieve their goal in view of the Smyrna events and that
Turkish rights would be respected 41/. The Italian
representative Dal 'olio was also reported to have declared
that the mission of the ICI consisted of examining whether
Greece was capable of undertaking the Asia Minor mandate 42/.
The Inter-Allied Commission of Inquiry concluded its
proceedings in the middle of October, after holding 36
meetings and examining 175 witnesses in several towns of
western Asia Minor, Smyrna and Constantinople. On 14 October,
High Commissioner Kanellopoulos informed Venizelos: "Id has
unanimously adopted conclusions clearly unfavourable to us. It
does not approve of the Greek occupation which it considers as
a mistake attributed to false information passed on to the
Peace Conference (by the Greeks]" 43/. Acting on specific
orders from his government, Mazarakis refused to sign the Id
report. To the relevant request of the Commission, he observed
that the procés-verbaux which supposedly aimed at briefing him
on the proceedings of the Commission, contained only the names
of persons examined and the itinerary followed by the
Commission during its trip within Anatolia. Without the texts
of the witnesses' depositions, he stressed, he could not see
40/ DBFP, II, p. 7, Supreme Council meeting of 16.10.19.
41/ MOFA 6, tel. no. 8463/29.8.19, Katehakis to MOFA.
42/ MOFA 6, tel. no. 7943/23.8.19, Kanellopoulos to MOFA.







how he could comment on them 441.
The conclusions of the Id, formulated in a lengthy
reoort, suggested that the Greek occupation was not necessary
because there had been no massacres of Christians after the
Moudros Armistice and that the Supreme Council had been misled
by false information 2nto cLt'o r i7j.ng a Greek landing. It
attributed the events to an a1leae r deep religious hatred
between the Greek and Turkish communities, the manifestation
of which the Greek authorities took no measure to prevent. The
Greek occupation, far from performing a "civilizing mission",
immediately took the form of conquest and crusade.
Responsibility for the incidents rested with some Greek
officers who did not restrain the population from committing
excesses and with the Turkish authorities who had tolerated
the arming of the escaped convicts a few hours before the
Greek landing. While the Armenian massacres and the Greek
persecutions during the War were forgotten, the mistakes of an
army which the same report partly exonerated, were underlined
:ri other parts, possibly in order to stress its culpability.
Had the mission of the Id been the investigation of
how justified the Supreme Council was in authorizing the Greek
landing, the period between the conclusion of the Moudros
Armistice and the Greek landing should have formed the focus
of the inquiry. Such a procedure would have ascertained that
resistance to the Peace Conference decisions and the
persecution of the Christians had been planned before the
Greek landing was even decided. The fact that the Turkish
intention to resist Greek occupation was violently manifested
during the landing indicated the wish of Turkish nationalists
to place Greece in Allied disfavour through such events. They
also seemed hopeful to take advantage of a resulting rupture
between the Greeks and the Powers, as they had taken advantage
of differences among the Allies in the past 45/. Further, if
the Franco-British alignment could be disrupted, Turkey would
be likely to retain the support of France because of the large
French commercial interests and investments in the Ottoman
Empire and the threat that a disruption of Turkish political
and economic stability would pose to the security of Ottoman
Debt bonds, the majority of which was in French hands. It was
increasingly evident that the interests of the various
European nations in Turkey were tending to create among them
the very split the Turks had so long hoped for. Indeed,
Turkey's foremost hope was to pursue the time honoured
practice of exploiting differences between the victors
46/.Moreover, as the Times commented, the C.U.P. existed
almost intact and was "the only efficient thing Turkey had
44/ MOFA 44, letter n.n./7.10.19, Id	 to
letter	 n.n./8.10.19, Mazarakis to Id. MOFA
7214/20.9.19,	 Politis to Mazarakis. MOFA
8342/21.9.19, Politis to	 Mazarakis.
45/ MOFA 6, tel. no. 7643/5.8.19, Kanellopoulos
46/ Helmreich, op.cit, p.108.
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produced" 47/. Nouredin may have been forced to leave Smyrna
in October 1918, but the underground movement which he had
organized to perfection was ready for action on the day the
Greek occupation materialized. What followed is not without
precedent in Turkish history; the Turks tried and succeeded in
obtaining gains from -cre't! they had themselves prepared
48/.
On 8 November 1919, the Supreme Council discussed the
report of the Id in the presence of Venizelos who had
expressed the wish to be heard before the Council deliberated.
Also present was General Bunoust, French delegate to the Id.
After pointing out that the Greeks had been sent to Smyrna on
the clear understanding that their occupation should not be
considered as a definite award of the territory to Greece, the
report indicated that in many respects the conduct of the
Greeks had been abominable and that Turkey would never
accept either Greek or Italian occupation unless compelled to
by force. What, in effect, the report recommended, was the
replacement of the Greek troops with a much smaller Inter-
Allied force, which might or might not have a Greek
contingent. Evefl this force should be temporary and the
Turkish gendarmerie should be reconstituted under the command
of Allied officers so that the Inter-Allied force could be
withdrawn as soon as possible 49/.
Clèmenceau expressed the view that the information
included in the report was accurate and he felt that the
Council would be increasingly led to respect Turkish
territorial integrity. Under these circumstances, he stressed,
it was imperative to warn the Greeks that they should not
behave as conquerors in Asia Minor because no question would
have arisen had their occupation not provoked certain
incidents. The Italian delegate expressed his agreement with
Clémenceau and went on to say that relations between Italian
troops and the Turkish population of Anatolia were excellent
with no regrettable incidents taking place. On the contrary,
the local population arid authorities had indulged in
manifestations of gratitude towards the Italian occupation on
a number of occasions. At this point, Sir Eyre Crowe, the
British representative, underlined the fact that the ICI
conclusions went beyond the instructions issued by the Supreme
Council as to its task. The report treated in general terms
the whole problem of the Greek occupation and also questioned
the decisions of the Supreme Council. What would happen if the
Council, as suggested by the Id report, asked the Greeks to
47/ Times, 1.1.19.
48/ MOFA 44, tel. no. 6348/31.8.19, Mazarakis communicating to
MOFA the deposition of E. Emmanouilidis, former Greek M.P.
in the Ottoman Chamber.
49/ Text of the Report in DBFP, II, pp. 237-58. For a
discussion of the Id from the Turkish point of view,
Buzanski, P. "The Interallied Investigation of the Greek
Invasion of Smyrna" in The Historian, 25, pp.325-43.
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evacuate Smyrna? If an Inter-Allied occupation was impossible
could the Council really think of allowing the Greeks to
evacuate when there was no one to replace them? This vital
question compelled Clémenceau to agree with Crowe that the
Greeks should not be asked to leave Asia Minor "f or the time
being".
The piovocative comments of Geneai Fnoust to the
effect that the Turkish proclamations distributed on the eve
of the landing were not appeals for resistance and that the
Turkish assemblies at the hills of Bahri-Baba took place in
order to prove that the Turkish element was in a majority,
induced Venizelos to take part in the animated discussion that
followed. He later pointed out to the French General that the
numbers of alleged Turkish victims contained in the report
were largely inaccurate. To this, Bunoust observed that the
Id attached very little importance to the figures and was
perfectly aware of their inaccuracy 501.
Not satisfied with the course of the discussion,
Venizelos asked for the Id investigation to be considered
null and void on.the grounds that in placing Mazarakis on the
same footing as the Turkish representative, the Commission had
violated elementary principles of justice and "put,
unintentionally doubtless, a positive premium upon false
testimony". Further, Venizelos expressed the feeling that
"civil investigators would have been more anxious not to
violate cardinal .principles of justice and that they would
not, for instance, have allowed witnesses to be heard without
being sworn". He concluded his intervention by accepting that
animosity between Turks and Greeks was an uncontestable fact;
it was also certain that many Europeans in Smyrna preferred
the continuation of the Turkish regime which was a regime of
special privileges with respect to foreigners, rather than the
establishment of the Greek regime which was a regime of
equality. He added that he did not wish to discuss conclusions
based on testimony which had not been communicated to the
Greek representative 51/.
On 10 November, the Council discussed the situation in
Smyrna and the Id report once again. Crowe expressed the view
that should the Greek side have been heard during the inquiry,
the conclusions of the report might have been different. He
also repeated that the Id had exceeded the limits of its
authority by questioning the decisions of the Supreme Council.
Bunoust replied that the complaints of the Sheik-ui-Islam had
formed the basis for the investigation and it was these
complaints which emphasized that the Greek occupation was
unjustified. Therefore, he concluded, the Id had necessarily
examined the question. Crowe also observed that it might have
been possible to give Colonel Mazarakis the depositions
without the names of the witnesses. On the whole, he felt that
50/ DBFP, II, p.229, Supreme Council meeting of 8.11.19.
51/ ibid.
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the Greeks had done their best and had succeeded "rather
well". Clémenceau once again insisted that Venizelos should be
"forcibly" reminded that the Greek occupation was only
provisional.
What comes throu gh from the study of the minutes of these
discussions, is an irritation at the Id for reviving an
assue about which the Poers had since come to have a good
many doubts and one that tiiey would have preferred to bury as
far as possible from the light of public display 52/. What
the ICI had failed to consider in the report, was the chief
reason for sending the Greek troops to Smyrna, which was the
threatened Italian occupation. The S.ipreme Council could not
afford to have its excuse about the protection of the
Christian minorities exposed as fake, all the more so as the
disclosure of the actual reason would affect each one's
position at the home front, where public opinion would be sure
to voice loud objections.
During the session held on 11 November, the Supreme
Council composed a written reply to the comments and
reservations expressed by Venizelos regarding the report of
the ICI. The above points were included and it was stressed
that although the Council accepted Greek reservations as to
the conditions under which the inquiry had been conducted, it
did not think that its conclusions could be considered
vitiated in so far as the excesses and acts of violence
committed by the Greek troops were concerned. The
responsibility for these events rested solely with the Greek
military authorities and the main cause for their occurrence
was the almost complete absence of precautionary measures. The
Supreme Council expressed its admiration for the impartiality
of the members of the Commission and the scrupulous conscience
which guided their work. As to the region of Aidin which the
Greek army had occupied without Allied clearance, the Council
deliberated that in view "of the practical difficulties and
political inconvenience" of an Inter-Allied occupation, it was
preferable to maintain the de facto Greek occupation 53/.
In his reply to the Supreme Council, Venizelos
protested about the statement that Greek occupation was
temporary. "In occupying Smyrna", he wrote, "Greece knew that
if she was not yet legally, she was at least morally entitled
to it". The Supreme Council did not seem to agree with this
view. On 18 November, it reminded Venizelos that he had been
warned of the temporary character of the Greek mandate as soon
as the Allies had decided to implement it 54/. The full truth
of the matter, however, justified Venizelos in the sense that
he had not been told initially of the temporary -or any other
for that matter- character of the occupation. The first he
52/ DBFP, i, p. 837, SC, 30.9.19. ii, pp. 262-67, 10.11.19. iv,
pp. 857-69, Crowe to Curzon, 10.11.19.
53/ DBFP, II, p. 275, Supreme Council meeting of 11.11.19.




a 1920 draft document in the
not clear, though, why the Greek
with the publication.
heard about the provisional restriction was only when the
Italians were informed of the landing 55/. The reply of the
Supreme Council and the Allied warnings as to what the future
might hold, did not seem to worry the Greek Premier. "The
hesitations expressed by the Supreme Council as to the final
arrahgements of the future of Smyrna are only due to
disagreements amona the Allies on other matters concerning
Turkey", he wrote to Stergiadis. Clearly, he was unable to see
that these hesitations could prove detrimental to the
realization of his irredentist plans 56/. Once again it was
clear that although nobody, except perhaps Greece, was in
favour of the Greek occupation of Asia Minor, other factors
determined its continuation as the sole alternative to the
"practical difficulties and political inconvenience" of an
Inter-Allied occupation. The ICI ha. a;-Ted et, and succeeded
in proving, that the events of 15 and 16 Ma were merely the
result of	 religious hatred" prevailing between Greeks and
Turks.
The fact that the Id report was not published by the
Supreme Council has been repeatedly interpreted as a
favourable act towards Greece 57/. Yet, the Greek government
had wanted its publication and, at one stage, contemplated
publishing it of its own accord 58/. It seems that the
decision of the Supreme Council to the contrary was due to
its refusal to accept that the decision to send Greek troops
to Asia Minor had been a blunder. Should this bitter truth be
accepted, the Allies would have had to order the evacuation of
the Greek forces, which would in turn l back to the
"practical difficulties and political inconvenience" which had
initiated this vicious circle.
By the end of November 1919, it was quite clear
that the events of 15 and 16 May had achieved the goal set by
their instigators: Greece was in Allied disfavour as, in view
of her inability to restrain the clashing nationalism of
Greeks and Turks, the Supreme Council could no longer rely on
her to play the convenient role of policing Asia Minor until
the oil fields had been distributed and the Peace Treaty with
Turkey had been concluded.
55/ DBFP, iv, p.204, Curzon
56/ DBFP, II, p. 287, app. A
57/ Toynbee, op.cit.,
58/ This is attested by
Venizelos Archives. It is
government did not proceed
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CHAPTER TWO:
I. International Developments 1919 - 1922
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The protracted negotiations and the resulting delay in
the conclusion of the Peace Treaty with Turkey underlined the
inability of the Allies to propose an agreement which could
both accommodate their clashing interests and satisfy the
demands of the various national groups in the Ottoman Empire.
What escaped the notice of the Supreme Council was a factor
that was to play the major role in the final solution of the
Eastern Question. This was the Turkish nationalist movement
which was in the meantime gaining momentum. As a result, in
November 1919, the enforcement of an eventual peace treaty
seemed much more problematic than it had a year before. Curzon
was quick to predict that by the following spring, the
defeated Turkey would declare war upon the Allies and dare
them to enforce their terms. "The ignominious result might be
that the weakest and most abject of our foes would end by
achieving triumph" 1/. The Greek position was further
undermined by the firm and unyielding stance displayed by the
nationalists during the conference of the Ankara National
Council in January 1920, when the determination of the Turks
to repel any efforts to dismember the Empire was manifested.
The display of Turkish determination to resist strengthened
the arguments voiced in many Allied circles, that only after
the evacuation of all foreign troops from Asia Minor could the
Entente seek a compromise with Turkey.
When the Allied High Commissioners were officially
informed of the recommendations of the February 1920 London
Conference regarding the Peace Treaty with Turkey, they
expressed the unanimous opinion that it would be impossible to
enforce such severe terms. In their view, the Sublime Porte
would either refuse to sign the Treaty or, if she signed it,
would refuse to ratify it or, if she ratified it, would refuse
to implement it.
	 At this point, the British government chose
to clarify its position regarding any possible help Greece
1/ DBFP,- IV, p. 879, Curzon's Memorandum, 12.11.19. For an
analysis of the American stance, Smith, D. M., The Great
Departure: U.S. and the First World War, 1914-1920. New York,
1965. ch. 10.
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could expect on its part. On 19 March 1920, Venizelos was
summoned to the War Office where Churchill inquired whether
Greece would be disposed to enforce the Treaty by undertaking
military action against Turkey should the latter refuse to
comply with its terms. It was made clear to him that in view
of her many obligations Britain was not prepared to spare
even one man and that no help was likely to come from the
French or the Italians. To his comment that Greece should
think twice before undertaking a task surpassing her
abilities, Venizelos replied without reservation that his
government undertook to impose the terms of the Treaty in the
zone awarded to Greece 2/. Sir Henry Wilson, who was present
at the meeting, noted in his diary: "I told [Venizelos] that
he was going to ruin his country, that he would be at war for
years with Turkey and Bulgaria and that the drain in men and
money would be far too much for Greece. He said he did not
agree with a word I said" 3/.
Meanwhile, the impact of the Report of the Allied High
Commissioners was such that Millerand announced to Romanos
that he would request the reconsideration of the peace terms
decided by the London Conference because he was convinced that
should the Allies insist on the imposition of a harsh treaty,
then France would have to send 100,000 troops to safeguard her
interests in Asia Minor and to protect the Christian
populations. The French Premier also stated that even if the
terms of the Treaty were reconsidered, Greece would receive
substantial territorial gains which would exclude any
possibility of undermining the Venizelist regime. This last
remark came as a reply to Romanos' argument that, should
France withhold her support of Greek claims, the Venizelist
regime would crumble, to the detriment of both countries 4/.
The Italian position was scarcely discussed since it was
obvious that Greece could not expect any help from this
quarter. During a meeting with Venizelos, Lloyd George openly
admitted that, on the contrary, Italy could be expected to
encourage the Turks to reject the Treaty altogether and would
be only too glad not to see it implemented 5/.
Nonetheless, during the Allied Conference at San Remo
in April 1920, the terms discussed at the London Conference
were confirmed mainly because a number of other pending issues
was regulated according to the interests of each Ally: Italy
was permitted to establish economic relations with the Soviet
regime, France succeeded in prompting a strong Allied demarche
to Germany regarding the issue of reparations and Lloyd George
managed to impose his solution for the Turkish question.
Thus, by a decision taken on 18 April 1920, the Allies granted
the Smyrna zone to Greece for an initial five year period,
2/ MOFA 7k tel. no. 11650/19.3.20, Venizelos to Politis.
/ Wilson, Sir H. His Life and Diaries, vol II, p.230, entry
for 19 March 1920.
4/ MOFA 71 tel. n.n./24.3.20, Romanos to Venizelos.
5/ MOFA 49 tel. n.n./16.6.20, Venizelos to Repoulis.
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under the suzerainty of the Sultan. A plebiscite was to be
conducted after five years to decide whether the zone should
be annexed by Greece. The draft treaty as a whole, was
eventually approved by the Supreme Council on 16 March 1920,
while Allied detachments were proceeding with the occupation
of Constantinople 6/.
Upon notification of the Supreme Council's approval of
the draft treaty, the British, French and Italian High
Commissioners in Constantinople, jointly commented that this
decision violated every principle of self-determination and
Robeck warned Curzon that "it is unthinkable, as the Foreign
Office has constantly been informed by us here, that the
Musulmans in those areas will peacefully accept Greek
annexation...the terms are such that no Turk, CUP or pro-
Entente can very well accept. The Supreme Council, thus, are
prepared to do violence to their own declared and cherished
principles, they are prepared to perpetuate bloodshed
indefinitely in the Near East and for what? To maintain M.
Venizelos in power in Greece for what cannot in the nature of
things be more than a few years at the outside. I cannot help
wondering if the game is worth the candle...M. Venizelos'
deserts vis-á-vis the Entente are great but is it wise to run
the almost certain risk of plunging Asia in blood in order to
reward Greece according to the deserts of M. Venizelos, which
are very different from the deserts of Greece?" 7/.
Lord Curzon commented that if the Allies did not wish
to see the revision of the Treaty imposed on them in a few
months, they should themselves revise it as soon as possible.
Comments in the press went even further. The
Westminster Gazette called the Treaty an "oratorical formula,
destined to mask the problems which the Allies have not been
able to resolve" and the Observer bluntly called it
"artificial", "precarious" and "transitory" 8/. Le Temps
sharply commented that the Treaty had been allowed to come
about simply because it was negotiated at a time when Britain
had France at a disadvantage in view of her total
concentration in the German Treaty 9/. Such was the hostility
expressed by the Italian press that Nitti was obliged to state
that Italy would play no role in any "fatal war" that might
ensue 10/.
Curzon had been right all along. By the middle of June
1920, it was obvious that the only options open to the Allies
were the revision of the Treaty before it had even been signed
6/ DBFP, VII, pp. 238-39, 247, 25.2.20.
7/ DBFP, XIII, p. 18, 19.3.20. CAB 24/101, C.P. 967, Curzon
to Cabinet, 26.3.20. Ronaldshay, op.cit.., vol. 3, p. 272.
8/ "How will the Turkish Treaty Work?" in Literary Digest
6, 28.8.20, pp . 19-20.
9/ ibid. Also, Helmreich, op.cit., p. 314.10/ Ziemke, K. Die Neue Turkei, 1914-1929. Stuttgart, 1930.
jj. 119-20.
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or, alternatively, military action aimed at crushing the
nationalists and compelling Turkey to sign it. Lloyd George
seemed "oblivious to all but his vision of a Greek empire
doing Britain's work in the Eastern Mediterranean, and fully
believed that Greece would undertake a limited campaign that
would humble the Kemalists and force the government at
Constantinople to sign the Treaty...He dismissed all
opposition from within the British government as merely
political and of Tory origin, for at this time the ties that
held the coalition government together were becoming quite
strained especially over the question of Irish home rule" 11/.
In the event, Lloyd George's view prevailed, and as soon as
the French and the Italians reluctantly agreed, the Greek army
was requested by the Supreme Council to restore the peace in
the Ismid Peninsula 12/. The Greek offensive began on 22 June
1920 and met with immediate success. By the middle of July,
the Greek army had removed all nationalist opposition in the
Straits zone and, what was more, pressure on the British
garrison at Ismid was relieved.
At this point Venizelos offered the services of the
Greek army to crush the nationalists once and for all.
However, fears of increased Greek influence in Asia Minor led
France and Italy to demand the immediate suspension of
operations and the Greek proposal was rejected by the Supreme
Council. These spectacular Greek successes soon convinced
those who wanted to be convinced that the proposed treaty
would be enforced and executed.
Nonetheless, during the Boulogne Conference in July
1920, the issue of lessening the terms of the Treaty was
discussed again. After the recent successes at Ismid and the
Dardanelles, the question was whether to review the terms of
the Treaty and make them less harsh for Turkey so as to
secure its implementation, or to insist on the terms already
agreed upon by the Allies and leave Greece to impose them by
force. Venizelos' firm offer to crush nationalist resistance
single handed and to provide the additional troops required
for the operations forestalled the revision of the terms
decided at San Remo, a fact hailed by the Greek Premier as a
major diplomatic victory. Paraskevopoulos, however, did not
seem to share Venizelos' optimism. He feared that the
boundaries arrived at after the June 1920 offensive were not
defensible and argued that Kemal was sure to reject the
Treaty. To his mind, the nationalist movement should be
crushed there and then by capturing the important railway
junctions at Eski Shehir and Af ion Karahissar while at the
same time pressing towards Ankara and even Konya 13/.
Venizelos, though, was convinced that with the support of the
11/ Helmreich, op.cit., p. 317.
12/ For the origins of this expedition, see CHAPTER TWO,
SECTION II.
13/ Greek General Staff, op.cit, ii, app. 27.
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British Premier and despite the adverse opinion of his
colleagues in the government and his Allies at the Peace
Conference, Greece was sure to receive what was due to her.
Once the Greek people realized these gains, he believed that
they would not voice any objection regarding further
mobilization.
However, events subsequent to the signing of the Treaty
of Sèvres were to show that he vastly overestimated both the
extent of his popular support at home and the capabilities of
the Greek military machine. Nonetheless, in August 1920, it
seemed that at long last the struggle to conclude the Peace
Treaty with Turkey was at an end. What remained to be seen was
how and by whom this Treaty would be enforced as the Greek
military operations of the summer 1920 had not succeeded in
eradicating the nationalists.
Despite the Sublime Porte's announcement that-: it
intended to sign the Treaty, the fall of the Italian
government a month earlier and the subsequent denounc,of
the Venizelos-Tittoni agreement by the new Italian Premier,
caused further complications and impeded the signature of the
Treaty. The stalemate was only resolved when Venizelos
announced in turn that Greece would refuse to sign the Peace
Treaty and, what was most important, to recognize the attached
Tripartite Agreement on the partition of Asia Minor into
economic spheres of influence. With Lloyd George siding with
Venizelos, this would have been a serious set back for both
France and Italy as they stood to lose Cilicia and the zone
of Adalia respectively.Through these measures, the Allied
domination of Turkish economic life which had started with the
gradual imposition of the capitulations during the past two
centuries, was institutionalized 14/.
On 10 August 1920, nineteen months after the armistice,
the Allies signed the Peace Treaty with Turkey at Sèvres. As a
result, the nationalist government immediately declared the
Turkish signatories of the Treaty "traitors" and Mustafa Kemal
issued a proclamation declaring Turkey "in peril" and calling
the Turkish people to take up arms for new struggles. The
symbolism of Sèvres, home of the most fragile porcelain, was
soon appreciated with reference to the Treaty with Turkey.
Many agreed with the comment that it constituted "a
nineteenth century imperialistic solution to a nineteenth
century problem" 15/. According to the terms of the Treaty,
the city of Smyrna and its hinterland remained under the
suzerainty of Turkey which, however, transferred her sovereign
rights to the Greek government (Article 69). Greece became
responsible for the administration of the region (Article 70)
and for the organization of a local parliament in which all
nationalities were to be proportionately represented (Article
14/ Treaty Series (no.12), Tripartite Agreement between the
British Empire France and Italy Respecting Anatolia cmd 963,
1920. For further information on this Agreement,see Thompson,
op.cit, p.240-41.
15/ Pallis, op.cit., App V 1
 p.224. Helmreich, op.cit.,
p. 321.
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72). After a period of five years, this parliament could by a
majority of votes ask the Council of the League of Nations for
the definitive incorporation of the zone in the Kingdom of
Greece; in its turn, the Council might require a plebiscite to
be conducted and, should the results favour Greece, Turkish
suzerainty would cease (Article 83). The term "city of Smyrna
and its hinterland" referred to an enclave of about 20,000 sq.
kilometres inhabited according to Greek sources by 550,000
Greeks, 299,000 Moslems and 92,000 others, a total of 941,000
16/. The particulars regarding the powers and functions of the
Greek administration were soon defined by law. The High
Commissioner was given ministerial rank and absolute powers
within the zone, pending the organization of the parliament
17/. Greek administration seemed to be "firmly established" in
Asia Minor
In Greece very few realized that the signature of
the long awaited Treaty signified the continuation of the
war. Among them, perhaps Venizelos was the only one in a
position to realize the major difficulties its implementation
would face, as a result of the harsh terms he had secured and
celebrated as a personal diplomatic victory. The only possible
solution was a large scale expedition aiming to crush the
nationalist movement. He had discussed this on numerous
occasions with the Allies but at this point the implementation
of such a scheme was vital in view of the upsurge of Turkish
nationalism, resulting from the signature of the Treaty of
Sevres. However, this expedition could not be undertaken
solely by Greece without, at least, financial aid from the
Allies. It soon became obvious that such aid was not
forthcoming and Venizelos intimated to Lloyd George that if
help was not granted before the winter, he would be forced to
order the demobilization of the Greek army in view of
political and financial considerations.
Churchill aptly encapsulated the situation :
"At last peace with Turkey: and to ratify it, War
with Turkey. However, so far as the Great Allies were
concerned, the war was to be fought by proxy. Wars when
fought this way by great nations are often very
dangerous for the proxy" 19/.
In Greece, Venizelos presented the treaty to the
Chamber on 7 September 1920, careful to point out that its
lasting effects would depend on the capability of the nation
to continue the struggle until the peace settlement became
permanent 20/. At the same parliamentary session he called for
the long overdue elections to be held on 7 November 1920 21/.
Unluckily, King Alexander died on 26 October 1920, in the
middle of the electoral campaign, thus bringing forward the
16/ Poincarê, R. Histoire Politigue,i, p.264.
17/ GGG, Series A,i, Law 2493/10.9.20.
18/ FO 406/44/no 183/20.9.20.
19/ Churchill, op.cit.,p.339.
20/ Markezinis, op.cit,iv, p.310.
21/ GGG, series A, i, 11/24.9.20.
93
issue of the throne once again and changing the basic issue
of the election to "Venizelos versus Constantine".
In Smyrna, polling day on 14 November 1920 passed
without incident. The venizelist feelings of the majority of
the population were well known and so was the liberal
affiliation of most officers and commanders at divisional
level. Surprisingly, in a sudden change of fortune "which
resembled the apex of an Aeschylean tragedy", the
Phileleftheri lost the elections and their leader was not even
reelected as a member of parliament 22/. Venizelos informed
Stergiadis and Paraskevopoulos of the loss of the election and
pleaded with the High Commissioner to remain in his position
23/. As soon as the venizelist defeat became known in the
city, soldiers flooded the Quai holding pictures of
Constantine and olive branches, the symbol of the royalist
coalition. No officer seemed able to impose order and clashes
with the population were sure to follow. The firm attitude
displayed by the High Commissioner towards alarmist rumours
and the provocative stance of some royalist officers soon
defused the explosive situation and demonstrated that no
change had taken place in Greek policies 24/.
Despite Venizelos' pleas, when the Rallis government
was sworn in and Queen Mother Olga was appointed Regent,
Stergiadis submitted his resignation. However, he was
requested to continue offering "his most valuable services to
the nation" 25/. General Paraskevopoulos lost his commission
and General Papoulas, the new Commander in Chief of the Greek
forces in Asia Minor, arrived in Smyrna on 4 December 1920 to
an enthusiastid reception. He was believed to be the only
General capable of uniting royalist and venizelist troops
under his command and reestablishing the much needed peace
within the army. From a foreign policy point of view, however,
Papoulas was not the best choice as the French considered him
responsible for the events that took place in November 1916,
when one hundred, or so, French marines fell during the
Allied blockade of Athens 26/.
In the meantime, although the full effects of the
change were not felt in Asia Minor, the difficulties
encountered by the new government on the diplomatic front
22/ Pentzopoulos, qp.cit., p.29. For a detailed treatment of
the electoral campaign and the elections, Smith, op.cit., pp.
138ff.
23/ Rodas,op.cit., p.189.
24/ Information about the movement of troops to that end, on
Paraskevopoulos orders is given in GGS,op.cit.,ii, pp.265-68.
Also, in his Memoirs,p.283, Mazarakis suggests that Pangalos
was preparing a coup in case Venizelos lost the elections.
25/ MOFA 22g tel. no. 14730/19.11.20, Stergiadis to the
Regent	 and tel. no. 14731/20.11.20, Rallis to Stergiadis.
26/ On Papoulas' arrival, Rodas, op.cit, p.192-94. On the
events	 of November 1916, Thompson,	 pp. 146-77.
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echoed loudly in Smyrna. The venizelist electoral defeat and
King Alexander's death had opened the way for the return of
Constantine. A plebiscite to decide the question was called
for 18 December against abackground of repeated declarations
by the new government to the effect that there would be no
change in Greek foreign policy and an amnesty would be granted
to all political offenders.
Nevertheless, it was soon apparent that the French
wished not only to prevent the return of the ex-King or,
failing this, to punish the Greeks should they recall him, but
also to take this opportunity to improve their standing in
Turkey by insisting on the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres
27/. The British General Staff advised the British government
to readjust its policy in the Near East with a drastic
revision of the territorial terms of the Treaty with regard to
Smyrna because, it was claimed, it had become unsafe to rely
upon the Greek army to cover the Allied positions in Turkey
28/. On 26 November 1920, during the next session of the
Council in London, the French suggested that Constantine
should not be allowed to return to Greece, urged that Smyrna
be given nothing but local autonomy under Turkish suzerainty
and made it clear that France would not ratify the Treaty
before it was renegotiated. As a result of French pressure,
two Notes were to be handed to the Greek government, one
declaring that Constantine's reinstatement to the throne would
be considered as the Greek people's endorsement of his
hostile attitude towards the Allies during the War, and the
other that all Allied financial support would be withheld from
Greece 29/. On the eve of the plebiscite, the Allied Ministers
at Athens handed a note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
declaring that should the Greek people opt for the return cif
Constantine the Allied powers reserved for themselves the
right to settle the arising issues as they saw fit 30/.
Harold Nicolson who advocated that the British should
support Constantine despite French and Italian determination
to renegotiate the Treaty of Sèvres on the pretext of his
return, commented:
"The idea which prompted our support for Greece
was no emotional impulse but the natural expression
of our historical policy: the protection of India
and the Suez canal...Geographically the position of
Greece was unique for our purpose: politically she
27/ DBFP, xii, no 438, conversation between Crowe and
P.Cambon on 19.11.20. On the French suggestions for the
renegotiation of the Treaty, DBFP, viii, p.816, Minutes of the
Supreme Council session in London (26.11.20). Smith, op.cit.,
p.162.
28/ Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War, 23.11.20,
LLG Papers F92/13/4 quoted by Smith, op.cit., p.162-63.
29/ For the texts of the Notes, DBFP,xii, no 457, 2.12.20 and
no 436, 5.12.20.
30/ DBFP, xii, no 451, 4.12.20, Granville to Curzon.
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was strong enough to save us expense in peace and
weak enough to be completely subservient in war.
The Treaty of Sévres was thus an immense asset had
it succeeded" 31/.
Despite the King's declaration on his arrival in Athens
that he was to work towards a better understanding with the
Allies, it was clear that events in Greece in conjunction with
the growing strength of the nationalists and the urgent Allied
need to conclude peace with Turkey, undermined Greek ambitions
in Asia Minor severely 32/. Clearly, the laments and distress
e)cpressed in Europe following Venizelos' defeat were in the
main insincere as it was obvious that the change of regime in
Greece and Constantine's return to the throne would serve the
interests of the European financial circles and their
respective governments by providing the excuse for them to
implement policies very different from those that had dictated
their brotherhood in arms and, to a large degree, the Treaty
of Sèvres as a manifestation of these policies. France and
Italy could now openly negotiate a new system of capitulations
with the nationalists while Britain would be free to implement
the plans for the Arab federation which would contribute
towards British preponderance in the Near East.
The successive Greek cabinets following the November
1920 elections could be criticized for errors of military
tactics and strategy but, in the sphere of foreign policy, no
mistakes seem to have been committed from the Allied point of
view. Greek leaders made strong efforts to clarify what they
believed to be misunderstandings shading their relations with
the Allies and on many occasions manifested their wish to
follow the foreign policy of their predecessors. They went to
great pains to convince the Allies that by voting against
Venizelos, the Greek people had voted only against his
domestic policies, claiming that Venizelos had not been
constitutionally elected in 1917 but had been imposed by a
coup which was never endorsed by the Greek people. On the
issue of Greek foreign policy, the line followed by Venizelos
was only the reflection of the feelings of the nation which,
it was concluded, no ruler of Greece, whether King or Prime
Minister, could defy 33/.
Meanwhile, the nationalist movement was gaining
momentum and was openly contesting the right of the Allies to
determine the fate of Turkey. By January 1921, Kemal was
demanding no less than the immediate evacuation of Asia Minor
and the restoration of Turkish sovereignty over all parts of
the Ottoman Empire. It was evident that a revision of the
Treatyf Sêvres was on the cards and, in an effort to resolve
the sflemate, a conference was called for February 1921 in
London, to which representatives from Athens, Constantinople
and Ankara were summoned by the Allies.
31/ DBFP, xii, no 488, Nicolson's memorandum dated 20.12.20.
32/ Anderson op.cit., p.369.
33/ MOFA 41a, memorandum n.n,/n.d., signed by D.Dracoulis of
the Press Office.
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By that time, conditions in Greece changed rapidly as
the issues that were to transform the Asia Minor expedition to
the Asia Minor embroglio came to the surface. As the London
Conference was approaching, Venizelos from self-exile offered
his advice: Greece had to choose between the abdication of
Constantine with Prince George succeeding him, and the
3hortening of the military front to cover an area larger than
the one foreseen by the treaty of Sevres but requiring only 3
divisions for its protection according to his calculations.
Although in retrospect this solution may seem attractive, its
military drawbacks were numerous. Therefore, as Venizelos
suggested, there was a need to review the initial line. The
new lines put forward, however, tended to revoke all plans for
withdrawal and defensive tactics because each one of them was
subsequently discarded as unrealistic for military purposes
and a new, longer one, was proposed.
This dilemma was present even before the operations of
the summer 1920 and what brought it to the fore in January
1921	 was the adverse set of circumstances facing Greece in
the diplomatic, military and economic field. Moreover, the
vision of the Megali Idea had contributed to the creation of
an atmosphere overcharged with nationalism which compelled
public opinion to reject the Venizelos' proposal for
withdrawal without second thought. A major reason behind this
stance of the public in Greece was that throughout the 1919-
1922 period a complete absence of public information was noted
and both the press and the declarations of the various
governments played an important part in keeping the public in
the dark or providing it with false information 34/.
During the London Conference, Lloyd George urged the
Greek delegation to show a conciliatory stance and accept a
partial revision of the Treaty of Sêvres. Such a stance, it
was argued, would compel the Allies to support Greece in case
of Turkish refusal to accept the new terms. This British line
of thought clearly provided London with the opportunity either
to find a solution of compromise with Ankara to the detriment
of Greek positions in Asia Minor, or to impose the Treaty of
Sevres through a successful Greek offensive that would not
cost the Allies a penny. However, in the minds of the Greek
delegation, this equivocal stance of Lloyd George tantamounted
to British sanctioning of renewed Greek military operations
in Asia Minor which, in turn, signified future active help.
In view of substantial changes in French and Italian
foreign policy orientations, the London Conference soon lost
its importance. The first few meetings were spent in the
discussion of controversial population statistics, whereupon
the French and Italian delegations proposed that an
Interallied Commission of Inquiry should examine the issue
with view to revoking the Greek mandate should the results of
34/ lEE op.cit, pp. 166 ff.
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its research prove that there was no Greek majority in the
Smyrna zone 35/. The scheme was outwardly rejected by Greece
on the grounds that during the undetermined period of time
required for the completion of the inquiry, military
operations would be suspended thus giving the opportunity to
the Nationalists to conclude their separate negotiations with
the French regarding the evacuation of Cilicia and to
concentrate all their military resources on the Greek front.
What decided the issue though, was the realization on the
Allied side that such an inquiry would form a precedent for
reconsidering issues already decided upon by the Supreme
Council. This precedent could be likely to promote efforts
already under way for the reconsideration of the Versailles
Treaty with Germany 36/.
On 12 March 1921, a further set of proposals for the
revision of the Treaty was submitted by the Allies. This time
the proposed modifications essentially amounted to the
whittling down of the Greek claims 37/. Complying to what
they thought were British soundings, the Greek representation,
including Gounaris who had in the meantime joined them,
accepted the Allied proposals but, at the same time, expressed
strong reservations which amounted to partial rejection. On
his side, the nationalist representative, Bekir Sami Bey, felt
obliged to return to Ankara for consultations before making
any commitment. Thus, no significant progress was made and, at
the end of March 1921, hostilities were resumed 38/. In fact,
it seems that the only positive result from the Conference
came from the contacts made by the Turks mainly with the
French, which ultimately led France to be the first of the
Allies to break the solid front and recognize the Ankara
government 39/. The Allies had not been able to preserve a
common policy regarding the Eastern Question. While the French
and the Italians ventured to conclude separate agreements
35/ For the conversations related to the proposal for an Allied
inquiry into the nationality question in Asia Minor and
Thrace, see DBFP, vol. XV, nos. 22, 23, 24.
36/ For the dropping of the scheme see DBFP, vol. XV, nos.
32 and 33. As a point of reference, it should be mentioned
that the Turkish side claimed that the Turks amounted to 75%
or roughly 1,250,000 out of 1,500,000 in the vilayet of Aidin
and the non-Greeks to 57% in the Smyrna city. On the Greek
side, Gounarakis put the pre-war population of the Treaty of
Sévres zone at 548,000 Greeks and 390,000 Turks and the post-
war population at 460,000 Greeks and 450,000 Turks. Also see
The Times, 25.2.21.
37/ For comments in extenso, see The Times, 14.3.21.
38/ For the Greek offensive of spring 1921, (23.3.21-2.4.21),
see Rodas, op.cit, p. 175ff.
391 ibid.
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with the Nationalists, the British came to realize that a
Greek collapse would present not only a military but also a
political problem of great magnitude since a resuscitation of
the Ottoman Empire would threaten the British position in
Mesopotamia, Palestine, Egypt and India. Further, British
observers suggested, it seemed that the policy of Ankara was
to thrust France and Britain apart and to appease each
sufficiently to deter them from assisting Greece 40/. The
Turko-Soviet agreement of friendship and cooperation which was
signed on 18 March 1921 but dated 16 March 1921 to commemorate
the first anniversary of the Allied military occupation of
Constantinople, strengthened such arguments. Neither the
symboiism of the date nor the significance of the agreement
itself were lost by the Entente observers.
In the meantime, the combination of British indirect
instigation and the rebuff of the London Conference had
decided the issue of the Greek advance. During its course, the
Greek army met with its first check which, although not very
important from a military point of view, was to have severe
psychological consequences on the morale of the troops. What
was more, it seemed by now clear that the government's policy
regarding the Asia Minor war had reached a deadend. As a
result, Ca].ogeropoulos' resignation followed suit and on 8
April 1921, D. Gounaris became Prime Minister. The new
cabinet was soon attacked fiercely in Parliament for its
handling of the national question and the circumstances of the
army.
On 11 June, King Constantine left Athens for Smyrna,
accompanied by the Crown Prince and Gounaris. His presence
there rendered impossible the abandonment of the offensive in
spite of Allied pressure, and, by 15 June 1921, the Greek army
reached Sivrihisar, only 60 miles from Ankara. As a result of
a very short Anglo-French lune de miel, fresh attempts at
mediation were made by the Allies at the end of June, and
Greece was requested to place its interests in the hands of
the Allies 41/. However, with the impressions of the recent
successful offensive still fresh, the Greek government refused
the offer. "Any adjournment of the operations would compromise
the situation to the disadvantage of Greece and the
encouragement of enemy resistance" 42/. Still, the Allied
representatives in Athens seemed convinced that after their
initial successes and the attainment of the line Af ion
Karahissar - Eski Shehir - Kioutahia, the Greeks would accept
mediation 43/.
40/ FO E 6895/1/44, 14.6.21, Rattigan to Curzon.
41/ FO E 7152/143/44, 21.6.21, Granville (Athens) to Curzon.
FO E 7378/143/44, 25.6.21, Granville to Curzon, communicating
negative reply of Greek government. DBFP, vol. xv, no. 88,
Appendix 2.
42/ Text of British note and Greek reply were officially
published in The Times, 27.6.21. FO E 8463/143/44, 21.7.21,
Granville to Curzon.
43/ FO E 7371/143/44, 27.6.21, Granville (Athens) to Curzon.
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In the meantime, Nationalist intransigence intensified.
In July 1921, Kemal sought a meeting with General Harrington,
Head of the Allied forces in Constantinople. On the General's
agreement for the meeting, the Nationalist leader insisted
that the Allied representative should go and meet him at
Inebo]. where he would be welcome provided he accepted that the
basis for all negotiations would be the complete liberation of
the Turkish national territory and total independence of this
territory in the fields of finance, economy, education and
jurisprudence. If General Harrington intended merely to
initiate an exchange of views, then Kemal would not meet him
himself but would appoint one of his aids for this purpose.
The Head of the High Commission at the time reported to London
that he had stressed to the Porte how preposterous he
considered the nationalist stance and added that the Kemalists
appeared "to have taken leave of their senses" in formulating
such a demand. Curzon did not seem to agree with Rattigan's
estimation of the situation and replied: "Question raised by
reply of M. Kemal is really one for Cabinet decision and
ought not to be prejudiced by local action" 44/.
During the Third Allied Conference in Paris in August
1921, the Allies reaffirmed their strict neutrality, at the
same time stipulating that private firms should be permitted
to conclude arms deals with both belligerents 45/. Lloyd
George finally faced up to the facts end announced that the
Treaty of Sèvres "had been torn up" 46/. Still, the British
government could not see its way to taking a firm stance: "Our
view is that we can no longer intervene to prevent military
supplies reaching the Nationalists nor, on the other hand,
deny the Greeks the right of search and blockade" 47/. Far
from favouring Greece, this new scheme brought to the fore the
question regarding Greek rights of search and seizure, which
the Italians and the French refused to recognize on the
grounds that "relations between Allies and Greece were
abnormal and that they were therefore absolved from a strict
interpretation of the neutrality which they had proclaimed"
48/. Despite British protests, large amounts of military
supplies reached Ankara from Western Europe while, in view of
her financial difficulties, 	 Greece was in a precarious
position. By the end of summer 1921, with the Allies
declaring their determination to observe strict neutrality
between the two parties, the momentum of the Greek offensive
was exhausted and the Greek army was in a serious position.
44/ DBFP, vol. xvii, nos. 291, 292, 293.
45/ DBFP, vol. xvii, no. 345, note 4.
46/ DBFP, vol. xv, no. 94, minute 4.
47/ FO E 9662/143/44, 28.8.21, Curzon to Rumbold.
48/ Also, FO E 11054/143/44, 14.10.21, Curzon to Rome and
Paris. For a detailed examination of the issue of seizure and
search,	 DBFP, vol. XVII, floss 376, 377, 378, 385, 391, 403,
409, 463 474, 494.
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Far from the iambic cries of June, the general tone of the
press indicated that mediation would be welcome 49/. At this
juncture it was thought that a British proposal of combined
Allied mediation based on the evacuation of Asia Minor by
Greece was in the wings and the Turks seemed prepared to
discuss it. However, it seems that this opportunity was
compromised by advice deliberately supplied to Ankara from
the Quai d' Orsay suggesting that "it would be a false step
for the nationalists to demand European intervention and that
the weariness of the Greek army would finally compel Greece
to accept Luropean mediation on terms more favourable to the
Turks than it would now accept" 50/.
Meanwhile, in August 1921, Granville suggested to London
that time for negotiations was ripe and requested authority to
give Gounaris a hint to that effect 51/. He further impressed
upon his government that a Greek defeat would be a serious
setback for the Entente and advocated that Britain should
render Greece moral and material assistance 52/. However,
Curzon considered the moment inopportune for negotiations and
suggested that Gounaris should go to London in the middle of
October 53/.
The conclusion of the Franklin Bouillon agreement with
Ankara in October 1921 could not but worsen the situation. For
Greece, it represented the most adverse diplomatic event of
the year as it rendered the Nationalists free to concentrate
their forces along the Greek military front. It also
underlined the complete isolation of Greece which could hope
only for a very limited help from the British. Despite these
grim prospects, in October 1921, Gounaris left for Paris,
London and Rome in an effort to find a way out of the deadlock
54/. The Greek delegation arrived in London in late October,
after two rather disappointing meetings with Briand in Paris,
during which it was stated in no uncertain terms that the only
way out for Greece would be to consider evacuation 55/.
Further, Curzon suggested that Greece should place her
interests in the hands of the Powers who would undertake to
find a solution 56/. This was agreed to and on 2 November
49/ FO E 11071/143/44, 5.10.21, Granville (Athens) to Curzon.
50/The Times, 10.10.21, quoting Nabi Bey.
51/ FO E 9516/143/44, 20.8.21, Granville (Athens) to Curzon.
52/ FO E 10939/143/44, 23.9.21, Granville (Athens) to Curzon.
53/ FO E 11096/143/44, 7.10.21, Curzon's Memorandum.
54/ On the Paris meetings: FO E 11620/143/44, 21.10.21,
Hardinge	 (Paris) to Curzon. FO E 11621/143/44, 21.10.21,
Hardinge (Paris) to Curzon. FO E 11834/143/44, 27.10.21,
Hardinge-(Paris) to Curzon.
55/ FO E 12734/143/44, 19.11.21, "Minutes of a Meeting held
at the Foreign Office between the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston
and Greek Representatives". FO E 12728/143/44, 19.11.21,
Curzon to Paris and Rome. FO E 13179/143/44, 21.11.21, Curzon
to Paris and Rome.
56/ FO E 12088/143/44, 2.11.21, Curzon to Paris and Rome,
announcing Greek acceptance of Allied mediation.
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1921, Greece formally accepted Allied mediation on the sole
condition that the Entente would undertake the protection of
the Christian minorities after the evacuation of the Greek
troops 57/.
Another pressing matter on Gounaris' agenda was that of
contracting a loan in the London free market. If Greece was to
continue the war effort until peace could be secured, then a
loan was essential because the Greek treasury was almost
exhausted 58/. In late December 1921, the British government
gave its consent to the assignment of security by Greece to a
loan to be raised in Britain up to £15 million, as much as
possible of which was "to be expended in Great Britain on
British goods" 59/. Despite jubilation in Athens, this
agreement did not constitute the raising of the financial
blockade imposed in December 1920, nor did it imply that the
British government were prepared to hand out financial
assistance to Greece 60/. As neotiations with the City
and Greek reserves diminished, Gounaris urged the
Forei' Office to mediate as, if loan negotiations broke down,
Greece would have to evacuate Asia Minor without waiting for
the conclusion of a general Near Eastern settlement 61/.
However, whatever meagre chances there were for the
contraction of the loan, seem to have been compromised by the
French who were reported to be doing all they could to prevent
it 62/.
Indeed, it seemed that the situation was getting
desperate. On 28 February 1922, Gounaris, still in London,
authorized his colleagues in Athens to proceed immediately
57/ DBFP, vol. xvii, no. 431 and 449.
58/ FO C 23804/60/19, 22.12.21, Bentnick (Athens) to Curzon,
reporting the grave financial situation of the Greek
government which, although incapable of raising a loan, was
nevertheless trying to pay British debts.
59/ FO C 24060/60/19, 23.12.21, Record 	 by Mr. Nicolson of
a conversation with the Greek Chargé d' Affaires. FO C
24179/60/19, 30.12.21, Bentnick (Athens) to Curzon. FO C
24179/60/19, 3.1.22, Curzon to Bentnick (Athens).
60/ FO C 24179/60/19, 30.12.21, Bentnick (Athens) to Curzon.
61/ FO E 1900/5/44, 17.2.21, Curzon to Lindley (Athens).
62/ DBFP, vol. xvii, no. 539.
with such measures preliminary to withdrawal as they
considered necessary and requested an urgent audience with
Lloyd George in the hope of convincing him to mediate for the
floating of the loan 63/. This audience was not granted and
the Greek Prime Minister left London. To his grim note of 15
February, Curzon noted that as there seemed little prospect
of a Greek loan, he hoped that the Greek military position in
Anatolia was less critical than the note of Gounaris suggested
and that, in view of the Greek failure to raise the loan, a
diplomatic solution must be sought. Obviously, this approach
excluded the possibilty of a hasty Greek evacuation which
would place the Powers in a very difficult position 64/.
True enough, reports from BrItish sources on the spot,
warned that a hurried Greek evacuation of Asia Minor would be
frc%pght with serious consequences for the British position in
the Near East and would render a peaceful settlement on terms
other than the National Pact almost impossible. "No stone
should be left unturned to deter the Greeks from evacuating
Asia Minor precipitately...and every effort should be made to
accelerate a general settlement of which the eventual
evacuation of Asia Minor would form part" 65/.
	
Clearly,
though, it would not be easy to induce the Greeks to hold on
to Asia Minor in the interests of a settlement under which
they would be later asked to evacuate the area
unconditionally.
It therefore followed that the Greek army could neither
take the offensive nor withdraw from Asia Minor in exchange
for a British promise to convene an Interallied Conference as
soon as possible. However, Greece had been expecting this move
since November 1921 when she had accepted _priori, in
principle and unconditionally the Allied peace proposals. With
no other options open, Gounaris agreed to do just that 66/.
63/ FO E 2588/5/44, 1.3.21, Letter from the Greek Charge d'
Affaires to Vansittart, communicating letter of 27.2.22, from
Gounaris to Lloyd George who later claimed that he had never
seen this desperate letter. DBFP, vol. xvii, no. 544, note
3.	 52 H.L. Deb. 5s. cols. 337-40.
64/ P0 E 2471/5/44, 6.3.22, Curzon to Gounaris. This document
was to arouse much discussion both in Britain and in Greece
during the trial of Gounaris.
65/ FO E 1547/5/44, 9.2.22, Memorandum by Ryan, respecting
the Evacuation of Asia Minor by Greek troops.
66/ FO E 745/5/44, Note of conversation held at the Villa
Valetta, Cannes, between Lloyd George, Curzon and Gounaris on
12.1 .22.
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At the same time,it was by now clear that the Turks
would settle for no less than the evacuation of Asia Minor by
Greece 67/. There was little chance that the Allies could
agree to this, as it would create an impossible situation for
their immediate concerns in Turkey because, with Greece out of
the way, Kemal would be free to dictate his terms. For the
Pdlies, the primary necessity was obviously the conclusion of
an armistice which would give them time to manoeuvre and
secure their interests without further compromising Greece and
the Christian minorities and with the ability to use the Greek
army again, should the need arise. Ip the meantime, Gounaris
was pressing for immediate aid e9''tie threatened to order
immediate evacuation. If Britain considered the presence of
the Greek army vital for the maintenance of British or
general Allied interests, then she should contribute towards
the costs of the expedition. Curzon, however, concluded that
although a Greek evacuation would tamount to a serious threat
for the British positions along the Straits, it would not be
implemented by the Greek government for the simple reason that
the desertion of populations forced to seek refuge in Greece
would create internal problems much more serious than the fall
of the government or the abdication of Constantine. Clearly,
not much headway had been made since the London Conference of
March 1921 and the prospects for the future were rather bleak
68/. Meanwhile, the Turkish position remained unchanged: their
government was "always ready to compromise", but, if the
British government departed too far from the Turkish
desiderata, a solution was impossible 69/.
It was against this grim background that on 22 March
1922 the long overdue conversations between the Allied Foreign
Ministers started in Paris 70/. As a prerequisite to a
peaceful evacuation of Asia Minor, Lord Curzon proposed the
immediate cessation of hostilities and the subsequent
retirement of the Greek forces in stages that would last up to
five months. In the event, the Allied proposal was formulated
to include a renewable armistice period of three months, until
the belligerents had come to an agreement as to the general
peace terms.	 With reference to the minorities' issue,
67/ FO E 3001/5/44, 18.3.22, Memorandum of an Interview
between Lord Curzon and Yusuf Kemal Bey.
68/ ibid.
69/ FO E 3001/5/44, 19.3.22, Memorandum of an Interview
between Lord Curzon and Izzet Pasha.
70/ For the minutes and resolutions taken during the
Conversations in Paris between British, French, and Italian
Representatives,_March 22-6, 1922,	 see DBFP,	 vol.	 XVII,
Chapter IV. An interesting interpretation of the meetings is
given by Toynbee,op.cit., p. 106, where these conversations,
far from underlining the struggle between France and Britain,
are interpreted as the first evidence of a genuine
determination on the part of the powers "to act in unison and
impartiality".
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a lengthy discussion resulted in transferring the
responsibility for the protection of the Asia Minor Christians
to commissioners to be appointed by the League of Nations.
The conversations continued until 26 March 1922 and ended
with a text of resolutions of the Conference regarding the
programme of evacuation of Asia Minor, the minorities,
Armenia, Thrace, the demilitarized zones in Europe, Asia and
the Islands, the Turkish armed forces, the Capitulations and
related financial issues 71/. These points were considered by
the Allies as part and parcel of the Near Eastern settlement
and, as they included crucial issues such as those of the
Straits and the Capitulations, they were not willing to give
way to the Nationalist demands for unconditional Greek
evacuation. The Allied proposal entailed the following steps:
a. Immediate conclusion of Armistice between Greeks and Turks,
b. Retreat of both armies to a line 10 kilometres behind their
present lines of occupation. c. Prohibition of movement of
army units to or from the military front. d. Observance of the
implementation of these measures by an interallied commission.
e. The Armistice would initially last for three months. During
these three months, the peace proposals would be submitted to
be followed by the evacuation of the Greek army. This step
would be followed by the elaboration of the preliminary peace
conditions and the final peace treaty 72/. Far from any
thoughts of immediate evacuation, the Allies demanded that the
Greek army remained in full force in Asia Minor 11/.
In Greece, these proposals were met with surprise and
indignation, public opinion against them and the
press reacted violently 74/. The British Representative in
Athens had advised London that as soon as the Allied proposals
were known in detail, regular panic would ensue together with
a general exodus "of frenzied inhabitants who would achieve
destruction of Greece" 75/. It was clear that the Greek
government could neither accept these proposals without
causing popular revolt, nor refuse to accept them. The reply
of Ankara delivered Athens from the dilemma. Kemal rejected
the proposals outwardly not by refusing to accept the general
terms but by demanding changes in the procedure for their
71/ FO E 3512/5/44, Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of Foreign
Ministers at the Quai d' Orsay at 9.45 p.m., March 26, 1922.
FO E 5774/5/44, Text of Resolutions &c., of the Paris Near
Eastern Conference of March 1922 as Finally Agreed upon
between French and British Governments.
72/ FO E 3274/5/44, Minutes of the First Meeting of Foreign
Ministers at the Quai d' Orsay at 1.30 p.m., March 22, 1923.
Greece was quick to indicate that her favourable answer to
Allied proposals for the armistice should be expected. FO E
3509/5/44, Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers
at the Quai d' Orsay at 3 p.m., March 25, 1922.
73/ FO E 3372/5/44, 28.3.22, Lindley (Athens) to Curzon.
74/ See Greek newspapers between 26 March and 3 April 1922.
75/ FO E 3418/5/44, 29.3.22, Lindley to Curzon.
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implementation. He demanded the immediate evacuation following
the conclusion of the armistice on the grounds that the Greek
army would attempt a full scale attack against Ankara , during
its three-month duration.
With Ankara's rejection of the Allied proposals, six
whole months of expectation of a diplomatic solution to the
military deadend following the Sakkariya retreat, six whole
months of Greek inactivity in Asia Minor with disastrous
effects on the morale of the army and the finances of the
state, came to nothing 76/.
	
Poincar seemed set to send
delegates to Ismid to enter into unspecified
pourparlers_prèparatoires with the nationalists on their own
ground and urged the other Allies to do the same as this
course of action seemed to offer the best chances for an
eventual settlement 77/. In the meantime, Greek finances had
dwindled and despite the forced internal loan contracted
earlier in the year by cutting the bank notes in two pieces,
the state revenues were barely enough for the maintenance of
the army and the implementation of the evacuation until
October 1922.
With the Nationalists now pressing for the evacuation
of the advanced strategic position held by the Greeks along
the Af ion Karahisar - Eski Sehir railway line within 15 days
of the armistice, it was obvious that their continued
correspondence with the Allies was intended for purposes both
of propaganda and, what was worse, procrastination 78/.
Clearly, it would not be easy to find "an honourable exit from
the present deplorable impasse" and by May 1922, the main
question that seemed to preoccupy Allied correspondence was at
whose door the responsibility for the eventual breakdown of
negotiations would be laid 79/. For Greece, the sands were
really running out. With the rapid succession of cabinets and
the forced loan, the forecasts of the British Representative
in Athens were quite gloomy 80/. With the French determined to
conclude peace with Kemal at all costs and the Italians eager
to secure economic advantages in Turkey, it was not surprising
that the Nationalists became more intractable daily
76/ FO E 3677/5/44, 5.4.22, Rumbold... P0 E 3718/5/44,
7.4.22, Curzon to Paris and Rome: "On the other hand it is
conceivable that the evacuation might begin before expiration
of the three months if in the meanwhile the body of the
conditions of peace had been accepted".
77/ FO E 4465/5/44, 1.5.22, Hardinge (Paris) to Curzon. At
this point it was announced that M. Kemal himself would be
willing to go to Ismid.
78/ FO E 4853/5/44, 10.5.22, Curzon to Paris.
791 ibid. On the same issue, FO E 4987/5/44, 18.5.22, Curzon
to	 Constantinople. 	 FO E	 5299/5/44,	 23.5.22,	 Rumbold
(Constantinople) to Curzon.
80/ FO E 5499/5/44, 20.5.22, Lindley (Athens) to Curzon. A
few days later, on 23.5.22, G. Hadjianestis assumed the
Command of the army in place of Papou].as who resigned.
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and, by the end of May 1922, no hope could be entertainedcf
bringnkara to accept the Paris proposals through diplomatic
procedures 81/.
TLFrench attitude had driven Curzon to the point of
exasperation, at which he even contemplated independent action
to be decided by a convention of the signatories of the
niginal Treaty of Sèvres:
"My view of the case is that we should decline to be
shuffled or squeezed or shouldered out of the Paris
agreement letter by the tactics of Angora or the
disloyalty of M. Poincarè...But when we know, as we
do, that M. Poincaré is secretly promising the Turks
his assistance and telling them that the Paris terms
will never be enforced, and when we collate this
knowledge with the proposal to hold a meeting on a
French ship with a French Chairman, -we can have
little doubt in our own minds....that what M. Poincaré
is really after is a rupture, the responsibility for
which can be laid upon us " 82/.
What seemed sinister was a belated French effort to
convince the British that the nationalists would not, in the
end, be so intractable as might be imagined and that the
French were still adhering to the Paris proposals which they
were eager to see implemented 83/. However, the scope behind
these renewed declarations of Allied unity was not lost in
London. Crowe minuted on 21 June 22:
"I wish I could believe in the sincerity of the French
declaration that they mean to stand by the conditions
agreed upon at the Paris conference but I cannot...Our
secret information leaves little doubt that the object
of the present French move is to force Great Britain
to concede more favourable terms to Turkey, at British
expense, France being compensated by obtaining special
favours from Turkey, financial & railway concessions,
monopolies, control of the gendarmerie etc., etc...My
belief is that the immediate object of the French
govt. is to delay a settlement, and meanwhile to
supply Angora with a constant supply of arms &
ammunition so that after a certain time, no armistice
81/ FO E 5314/5/44, 20.5.22, Letter from Sir E. Crowe to the
Italian Ambassador.	 FO E 5299/5/44,	 22.5.22,	 Rumbold
(Constantinople) to Curzon. Even the British High Commissioner
at Constantinople who, at the beginning, 	 rejected the Ismid
scheme, seemed now to have come to terms with it.
82/ FO -E 5299/5/44, 23.5.22, Rumbold (Constantinople) to
Cur z on.
83/ FO E 6136/5/44, 17.6.22, Lord Hardinge (Paris) to Earl
Balfour.
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having been concluded, the Turks will have
sufficiently strengthened their position to be able to
undertake another move forward against the Greeks" 84/.
Further, because of persistent rumours that Athens was
trying to establish direct channels of negotiation with
Ankara, a course totally disagreah1e to the Allies, it was
felt that it would be very difficu't to compel the Greek
government to conform to the Paris proposals without threat of
force 85/. By now Britain was determined not to allow Greece
to evacuate or withdraw to new lines on her own accord "as any
withdrawal without previous agreement would react on Allies"
86/. Athens was by now exasperated ac it had become even more
impossible to continue acting in the uncertainty dictated by
the Allied policies and practices. Lindley warned London that
he would not be surprised by a sudden decision of the
government to pull out of Asia Minor and throw the
responsibility for the desertion of the Christian population
on the Allies. He also hinted that Greek troops might be
allowed to occupy Constantinople in the event of British
withdrawal, subsequent to a Greek evacuation of Asia Minor
87/.
According to Curzon, the only course available dictated
that the Allies should formally assure each other that they
intended to adhere to the Paris conversations throughout the
preliminary conference and should present a united front on
this basis. They should also agree to implement the usual
rules of international maritime law thus enabling the Greek
government to exercise its right to visit and search private
merchantmen carrying contraband of war to the nationalists. If
this last point were not agreed upon it would not be just to
condemn such action by the Greek government as the bombardment
of Samsoun 88/. The accepted principle of international law
was that neutral traders may at their own risk sell war
material to a belligerent, but the belligerent had the right
to prevent this operation by searching neutral vessels for
contraband and confiscating it when found 89/.
British insistence that this rule be implemented may
seemed quite odd if examined under the umbrella of British
efforts not to disrupt the Allied united front by hook ot
crook. However, in spite of invoking "principles of vital
importance" in the official correspondence with Paris, a
84/ ibid.
85/ FO E 5986/5/44, 16.6.22, Lindley to Balfour.
86/ DBFP, vol. xvii, p. 873, n. 3.
87/ FO E 6602/5/4, 23.6.22, Lindlay to Balfour.
88/ FO E 6767/5/44, 7.7.22, Lord Hardinge to Balfour. The
French and Italian refusal to grant the right of seizure and
search to Greece was repeated during a "desultory
conversation". -
89/ FO E 6767/5/44, 14.7.22, Balfour to Lord Hardinge.
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private letter addressed by Sir E. Crowe to Lord Hardinge on
14 July, is quite illuminating:
"You should point out verbally to M. Poincar that
quite apart from the juridical aspect of 	 the
matter...the course of action pursued by the
French (in providing Kemal with weapons) might put the
Turks in a position to menace us very gravely in Irak;
and that such neglect of our interests on the part of
in Ally would be tantamount to an unfriendly act. As
it may be necessary to publish our despatch, Lord
Balfour thinks it preferable not to embody the
foregoing in our official instructions to you, but to
leave it to you to mention it orally when acting on
them 90/."
Nonetheless, the French reply stressed that the
application of the right of seizure and search on French and
Italian ships would only result in the Turks obtaining their
weapons from the Soviets and, therefore, being forced to come
to terms with them at the expense of Western interests.
Meanwhile, the preparatory discussions on the proposed
preliminary meeting seemed to last forever especially as now
the preliminary meeting was to be preceeded by an interallied
conference for which the date had not been fixed and at which
the nationalists seemed very keen to participate without
having made any commitments as regarded the Allied proposals
of Paris 91/. With preliminary negotiations to decide the
preliminary meeting continuing, in Greece people were
clamouring for peace and it was now certain that what 4Qu) -
financial resources there were, would dwindle by September or
October 92/. Clearly, there could be no talk of the Greek
army remaining in Asia Minor but, equally, the Allies seemed
reluctant or unable to authorize its evacuation or, even, its
withdrawal. By July, the war was costing the country ten
million drachmas a day and Stergiadis was suggesting as the
only way out the creation of an autonomous zone under the
sovereignty of the Sultan.
While Stergiadis' proposals were being discussed in
Athens, the British Army Council had no difficulty in
obtaining "clear and unimpeachable evidence" that the French
were trafficking Turkish war material under Allied control and
General Harrington warned London that should the Greeks be
allowed to withdraw into the proposed zone, the southern shore
of Marmara in the Mudania - Brusa area would fall jck
nationalist occupation, on the flank of the British troops
93/. Meanwhile, as a result of the deadend facing the Greek
army after the Sakkaria retreat, a Greek advance from the
90/ FO E 6767/5/44, 14.7.22, Balfour to Lord Hardinge.
91/ FO E 6798/5/44, 7.7.22, Henderson to Balfour.
92/ FO E 6800/5/44, 7.7.22, Lindley to Balfour.
93/ DBFP, vol. xvii, no. 684, note 1.
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line of Chataltza in Eastern Thrace to Constantinople seemed
to be the only option open to Athens. In May 1922, the Greek
newspapers started pressing for the implementation of the
scheme. The government, though, continued to be bound by the
a priori acceptance of the Allied terms and was reluctant to
make such a major, unilateral move. When, however, the end of
July came and there was no sign either of an interallied
conference in London or a preliminary conference elsewhere,
Athens reluctantly had resolved to bring matters to a head and
reassume the liberty of action renounced when the Greek case
was placed in the hands of the Allies. In the first weeks of
July, successive crown councils resolved to request Allied
permission to resume freedom of action, to return that is to
the situation prevailing before Greece placed her interests in
the hands of the Entente. At this point, information from a
number of sources indicated that Greek forces in Thrace had
been reinforced by three divisions from Asia Minor and the
possibility of a coup against Constantinople could not be
excluded 94/. In Athens, on his announcement that in the face
of Allied inability Greece was obliged to consider the
best measures to put an end to the conflict, the Foreign
Minister was advised by Lindley that an advance to
Constantinople would not be tolerated and that it would be
resisted by Allied forces of occupation, an eventuality which
entail the most serious consequences for Greece 95/.
Nonetheless, the Greek government declared its
conviction that only the occupation of Constantinople would
bring about the conclusion of peace and on 29 July requested
the Allies to give the necessary orders to the occupying
troops not to contest the advance of the Greek army 96/.
Unluckily for Greece there seemed to be no force in the
country willing to take the risk of such an operation and, as
soon as Balfour expressed his astonishment that such a move
could have been contemplated, the government rushed to declare
that on no account would the Greek forces enter the neutral
zone without Allied consent 97/. During the night of 31 July
1922, a telegram from Athens to the Constantinople High
Commission, ordered th-Q	 QJ	 4kv	 and
General Harrington soon arrived at 1odosto to observe the
implementation of the orders from Athens 98/. Meanwhile,
the Constantinople Interallied Military Command had received
orders to repel by force every military movement directed
against the zone occupied by the Allies 99/.
94/ FO E 7463/27/44, 27.7.22, Henderson to
	
Balfour.
95/ FO E 7471/5/44, 27.7.22, Bentnick to Balfour. FO E
7484/5/44, 27.7.22, Mr. Bentnick to Balfour. FO E 7472/27/44,
28.7.22, Balfour to Bentnick.
96/ FO E 7517/5/44, 29.7.22, Bentnick to Balfour.
97/ FO E 7517/5/44, 29.7.22, Balfour to Bentnick. FO E
7519/5/44, 30.7.22, Bentnick to Balfour.
98/ FO E 7522/5/44, 30.7.22, Bentnick to Balfour.
99/ FO E 7600/5/44, 31.7.22, Bentnick to Balfour.
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to Balfour.
the text of the speech
to Hardinge.
As the Greek government was no longer in a position to
defray the costs of a war it was forced to continue mainly
because of British insistence that the army should not be
evacuated before the nationalists should agree to a general
settlement in Turkey, Athens renewed their request to London
to mediate for the conclusion of a loan 100/. The desperate
tinancial and political situation in Greece was soon reported
to London by the British Ambassador to Athens:
"Late in June I again warned H.M.G. that the sands were
running out quickly, and that it would soon be too late. So
impressed was I with the danger, that I requested leave of
absence earlier than I otherwise should and saw Mr. Lloyd
George and Lord Balfour, who was at the Foreign Office, as
soon as I reached London. The whole situation was reviewed
at this meeting and I expressed the conviction that Greece
would inevitably collapse in the autumn unless she received
material and moral help from Great Britain... Mr. Lloyd
George went straight from the conference to the House of
Commons and made his famous speech of the 4th August, which
was intended to take the place of that material assistance
which I had postulated as a necessary condition of continued
Greek resistance. The speech raised a wave of enthusiasm in
Greece...and it produced in the minds of the Turks the
feeling that, if they did not act quickly, they might find
themselves faced by the British" 101/.
Lloyd George's speech helped preserve until the last
moment the Greek illusions as to a future British help while
its main consequence seems to have been the precipitation of
the nationalist general attack against the Greek forces in
August 1922. If the Turks did not attack before the end of the
summer, their counter-offensive would have had to be postponed
because of weather conditions until the spring or the summer
of 1923 by which time, as Ankara's interpretation of the Lloyd
George speech had concluded, the Greeks were bound to receive
help from Britain.
In the meantime, six months after the Paris proposals,
it now seemed that everything was ready for the preliminary
meetings which would be followed by the preliminary
conference, which was to preceed the final peace settlement
102/. The first step would be to urge on both belligerents
the conclusion of an armistice in Asia Minor and a
corresponding immobilization of the Greek forces in Eastern
Thrace. The second step would entail efforts to recommend and
explain to both Greeks and Turks the peace proposals drawn up
j9/ FO E 7785/5/44, 5.8.22, Bentnick
101/ FO ARG 1922. DBFP, xvii, p. 3. For
see 157 H.C. Deb. Ss., cols. 1997-2006.
102/ FO E 7759/5/44, 18.8.22, Curzon
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at Paris in March 1922. Failing the conclusion of an armistice
and the acceptance of the peace conditions in principle, there
would remain no basis for discussion or negotiation and the
preliminary conference would end there and then without any
decisions being taken 103/.
Meanwhile,	 the draft of the invitation to the
participants was being scrutinized in a time-consumrning
correspondence between London and Paris and the wording was
being carefully examined while Italian sources indicated that
Kemal was preparing an offensive "somewhere on the Eski Sehir
front" and thought it had a good chance of success 104/.
Athens' request for a loan had not even been replied to when
the Greek government reiterated that, without it, they could
no longer maintain an army in Asia Minor. To this plea, the
Treasury's reply came quickly: "...As was explained to
Monsieur Gounaris when he was in this country, there is no
government control upon the flotation of loans in the London
market and it is the policy of H.M.G. not to intervene between
Foreign Governments and potential lenders in this country,
such questions being left to be decided according to purely
financial considerations. In these circumstances there can be
no question of the encouragement of a Greek loan by H.M.G.,
apart from the facilities already granted by the agreement of
22nd December last" 105/. Again, there seemed to be a crossed
line in communications. Was Greece simply a Foreign Government
or an Ally fighting Britain's war in the Near East? Lord
Curzon did not seem to think this reply was quite right and he
minuted: "1 am not clear that it would be advisable to send
this telegram in the hour of Greece's disaster. No loan can
save them now..." 106/.
Indeed, it was too late. While the Greeks were
expecting British aid, the British Representative in Athens
commented that, despite the Greek government's perfectly loyal
stance towards Britain, he could not be certain that this
attitude would continue "if it should transpire that H.M.G.
have merely encouraged the Government to continue the war
against an enemy who was known to receive material support
from Britain's Allies and that Great Britain should show
weakness and not only not assist Greece in any material
degree, but should give away Greece's interests for the sake
of good relations with France and Italy" 107/. If the
preliminary Conference failed, or worse still, if England
should fail them, he continued, none of the courses which the
103/ FO E 7759/5/44, 18.8.22, Curzon to Hard inge.
104/ For scrutiny of draft invitations, FO E 8497/5/44,
28.8.22, Curzon to Rumbold and FO 8497/5/44, 28.8.22, Curzon
to Rumbold. Quotation from FO E 8355/76/44, 21 .8.22, Rumbold
to Curzon.
105/ DBFP, vol. xvii, no. 741, note 2.
106/ DBFP, vol. XVII, p. 933.
107/ FO E 9230/27/44, 29.8.22, Bentnick to Curzon.
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Greeks might take would be pleasing to London. Therefore, the
British Representative concluded, if Britain did not intend to
remain indefinitely in occupation of Constantinople, handing
it over to Greece was the only solution of the Eastern problem
which contained seeds of finality. A solution of this nature,
he stressed, was hinted at in the Treaty of Sèvres 108/.
While the situation at the military front was going
from bad to worse, British attention focused in the discussion
of the question regarding the supply of munitions by France to
the Kemalists. The evidence collected was so serious that the
Foreign Office committed in writ,ing its fears that, unless
the right of seizure and search was recognized to the Greeks,
one of the indirect results of the provision of French
munitions to the Turks would be their use for a possible
eventual attack on British troops in Irak 109/. It seemed that
the munitions referred to were not supplied by private
merchants but by the French government or by the French forces
in Syria. Poincarè denied the accusations on the grounds that
any arms used against the British in Mesopotamia might
possibly in the long run be utilized against the French
themselves in Syria 110/. General Harrington, however, did not
seem to agree. In his words, the irrefutable fact remained
that "the Greeks have been unfairly handicapped by ...arms and
amunition being transferred by French and Italians from
Turkish dumps in Allied charge and by being denied right of
search....It is right to say Kemalists have been helped as
hard as they could be by Constantinople government officials,
French and Italians" 111/. Most independent observers would
have additionally argued that the Greeks had also been
unfairly handicapped by British inactivity in changing this
state of affairs. In the event, with the Greek collapse, the
British military position in the Near East was jeopardized and
the Chanak incident of October 1922 indicated what pressure
the joint Greek-British action could have brought to bear on
the nationalists 112/.
By the first days of September, the situation at the
front and the failure of the two army corps to join hands,
made all these considerations insignificant. On 2 September,
there was already talk of abandoning ship -and Smyrna, and the
Greek government was ready to accept proposals for an
armistice on the basis of immediate evacuation of Asia Minor.
The Greek government made a definite request to the British
government to arrange an armistice for them on the basis of
immediate evacuation which Kemal had demanded in March 1922
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29.8.22, Bentnick to Curzon.
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September 1922 113/.
With the Greek collapse and unconditional request for
an armistice, one would have thought that the worst was over.
This, though, was not the case. French susceptibilities were
hurt because the Greeks had not asked Paris to mediate for the
irrnistice and, to avoid irritating the French, a lengthy
*.'orrespondence ensued with the result that the armistice was
tiot requested until one week after the Greeks had placed their
fate in British hands for yet one more time 114/. One of the
most striking points of this correspondence was the fact that
Lloyd George suggested to Lord Curzon that in order to induce
the Turks to accept the protection of minorities by the League
of Nations, Ankara and Constantinople should be informed that
the British were ready to grant facilities for a Turkish loan
on the London market. Although Lord Curzon commented that the
proposal was "inadmissible", the point remained to show how
rigid British policy was in connection with facilitating the
contraction of loans by Foreign Governments 115/.
The effort to defer the issue of asking for an
armistice was paramount. The Greek government were convinced
that London would be able to obtain better terms for Greece
than they could themselves obtain by direct request to Kemal
116/. The question was whether British interests in Turkey
would be hampered by such mediation which would identify in
the minds of the nationalists His Majesty's government with
that of Greece. Sir H. Rumbold advised: "I feel that we should
keep our hands as free as possible even at the expense of
advising Greeks to seek armistice in the usual military
fashion by arrangement between military commanders" 117/.
By 7 September 1922, the gravity of the military
situation was such that Sir H. Rumbold decided to waive all
opposition to the scheme and convinced his colleagues to
endeavour at once to bring about an armistice 118/. Now that
the question of who was to ask for the armistice seemed to be
settled, another question arose: were the Greeks and the
Turks still to be summoned to Venice or would they be allowed
to establish peace on their own? "If Turks and Greeks came to
agreement between themselves, they might do so to prejudice
Allied interests, and [it would be preferable] that the Allies
should keep some control over the negotiations" 119/.
113/ FO E 8748/27/44, 2.9.22, Bentnick to Curzon.jjj/ See DBFP, Vol. XVIII, p.vi. FO E 8792/27/44, 3.9.22,
Bentnick to Curzon. FO E 8766/27/44, 4.9.22, Curzon to
Hardinge.
115/ FO E 8766/27/44, 4.9.22, Curzon to Hardinge.
116/ FO E 8878/27/44, 4.9.22, Rumbold to Curzon.
117/ FO E 8890/27/44, 5.9.22, Rumbold to Curzon.
118/ FO E 8981/27/44, 7.9.22, Rumbold to Curzon.
119/ FO E 9095/27/44, 8.9.22, Graham to Curzon.
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IT. Asia Minor, 1919 - 1922
"Mais l'invasion des grecs au sein
mme de notre patrimoine national,
nous a sécou de la torpeur
produite par les fatigues de la
guerre et nous a jets dans les
tourbillons d'une nouvelle lutte
avec toute la vehemence d'uri homme
qui ne craint plus de perdre quoi
que ce soit. Ii s'en est suis qu'au
lieu de nous mettre devant la table
de la conference en vaincus, nous y
sommes alls en vaingueurs" *.
*Turguie Nouvelle, 3.12.23.
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As the territorial extent of the Greek mandate was
rather vague, further talks in Paris resulted in the Allied
consent to the advance of the Greek troops to occupy the whole
of the Smyrna sancak and the kaza of Aivali, should this
advance become imperative for the preservation of public order
1/. Although the relevant military operations were left to the
discretion of the Greek High Commissioner and the Commander of
the Greek army, the Allied decision specified that under no
circumstances should the Greek occupation extend south of
Ayiasuluk. These boundaries in no way formed a viable military
front for the Greek forces to repel Turkish attacks which,
according to intelligence sources, were imminent 2/. Several
points of concentration of Turkish "regulars" and "irregulars"
were reported, especially in the areas south of the Meander
and around Panderma, Bergama and Aivali.Further, Greek
intelligence reported from the areas of Aidin and Odemish that
the Italians were providing arms to the Moslem population
3/.The Greek landing had convinced the Turks that the
consequences of not resisting the occupation forces would be
far greater than any breach of the armistice terms such
resistance would entail. Therefore, disarmament came to a
halt, breech blocks and munitions were no longer handed in,
reservists enlisted again and the Turkish army began to grow.
As predicted by Greek intelligence, the advance met with major
nationalist resistance in most areas while the Greek forces
were also restricted in their attempt to occupy strategic
positions necessary for the efficient protection of the
occupied districts against attacks by the Turkish forces. In
fact, during the period June 1919-June 1920, the Greek army
was under the command of the British G.H.Q in Anatolia and
could not assume any initiative but for purposes of limited
local defence, despite its superiority to the nationalists and
the immediate need for their dispersal.
At the end of May, the Greek occupation extended to
the Smyrna-Aidin railway in the South, up to the Aidin-Nazili
railway in the South-East, to the towns of Manisa and Kasaba
in the North-East and to Aivali and Bergama in the North. By
this time, the Greek military considered that it was essential
for the security of the occupation to extend its limits and
incorporate all the principal communication lines leading to
Smyrna from the North, the East and the South, which, in
Venizelos' mind, appeared to constitute the absolute minimum
necessary to guarantee the security of the Smyrna region 4/.
Nonetheless, it was due to Stergiadis' decisive moves
that Greek presence was initially established in Asia Minor.
As Commodore Fitzmaurice noted, "through his non-compliance
1/ MOFA A/5 IV, Tel. No. 4622/17.5.19 and 4670/19.5.19,
Venjzelos	 to Zafiriou.
2/ MOFA 136s Tel. No. 38535/20.6.19, Caclarnanos to Venizelos.
3/ AV Tel. No. 307/69/21.5.19, Zafiriou to Venizelos.
4/ MOFA 136 t letter, 18.6.19, Venizelos to Clémenceau.
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with his instructions, Stergiadis has put the Greeks in quite
a strong position 5/.
	
The Greek High Commissioner ordered
the occupation of Menemen, Manisa, Kasaba, Ayiasuluk, Aidin
and Nazili which took place between 22 May and 12 June, 1919,
against the orders of Venizelos and without authorization from
the S.N.O. As Stergiadis was to explain to Venizelos later,
the animosity of the local Allied representatives,
continuously enhanced by Levantine and Italian propaganda,
was so considerable that he had concluded that the chances of
obtaining permission to occupy territories beyond the Smyrna
sarcak were very slight indeed 6/. At the same time, British
intelligence informed London that "the situation in the Smyrna
region [was] practically one of formal war between Greeks and
Turks. The Greeks were ready to make fresh advances ignoring
the SNO's instructions and the Turks were determined 'to push
the Greeks into the sea'. Taking advantage of the restrictions
imposed on the Greeks by the Supreme Council, the Turks
launched attacks from outside the Greek zone and instituted
sabotage by the Turkish population from within" 7/.
Therefore, a rapid advance had been necessary and the
occupation of Manisa, Kasaba and Aidin was ordered in order
to pave the way for the Greek army's move eastwards, in the
direction of Alasehir, and southwards, in the direction of
Nazili and Denizli. The Greek forces occupied Menemen on 22
May, Manisa and Ayiasuluk on 25 May, Aidin on 27 May, Kasaba
and Aivali on 29 May, Odemish on 1 June, Nazili on 3 June,
Akhisar on 5 June and Bergama on 12 June.
In the south, the nationalists attacked the Greek
positions around Aidin and forced the Greek troops to retreat.
Their short-lived reoccupation of the city was marked by arson
and extensive massacres of Christians. When the Greek army
recaptured Aidin three days later, out of 11,000 Greeks only
4,500 had survived 8/. A few days later, the retreat of the
Greek troops from Menemen was met with fierce Turkish
resistance and a two hour battle ensued within the town during
which deplorable excesses took place on both sides !/. These
events were soon followed by inflammatory nationalist
proclamations calling for the immediate mobilization of the
Turkish nation 10/.
The Aidin events were proof that the Turkish itregulars
were in a position to challenge and threaten the security of
the Greek forces. In the eyes of the military, the situation
worsened daily as cooperation between Turks and Italians came
5/ FO 608/9/16411, Fitzmaurice to Curzon, no. 40 (b), 6.6.19.
6/ MOFA 73st2 Tel. No. 3979/3.6.19, Stergiadis to MOFA.
7/ FO 608/9/20692, Operations and Intelligence Summary June-
August 1919.
8/ MOFA 136 s Tel. No. 6048/22.6.19, Venizelos to Stergiadis
and	 Tel. No. 6627/15.7.19, Venizelos to Stergiadis.
9/ MOFA 136 s Tel. No. 6120/21.6.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
1!2/ MOFA 26 st Tel. No. 7400/31.7.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos
transmitting copies of proclamations.
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into the open 11/. The only way to strike a decisive blow
against the nationalists seemed to attack them within their
base in the Italian zone. As this was out of the question, the
Greek army found itself in a precarious position which belied
the optimism expressed by the Salonica Mi ,litary Headquarters
and General Paraskevopoulos in particular. However, three days
after his arrival in Smyrna on 28 June, the Greek Commander in
Chief lost his pptimism and advised Venizelos that the centres
of Turkish resistance should be crushed immediately even
without the consent of the Allies. The S.N.O, however, did not
agree with this view and believed that the Greeks should carry
out any further occupation "in a peaceful manner" 12/.
Venizelos had written to Clemenceau on 20 June,
requesting that the Supreme Council should grant the Greek
troops freedom of action to counterattack the nationalists. As
no reply seemed forthcoming and in the face of the growing
risk to the security of both Greek troops and population, on
23 June 1920, Venizelos ordered the army to abandon the
"ruinous inaction" and undertake operations to stop the
nationalist advance, disperse the Turkish forces and prevent
any eventual reconcentration. As ,no reply was received, on 10
July 1919 Venizelos addressed yet another letter to the
President of the Supreme Council stressing the point that
nationalist mobilization threatened to extend the theatre of
military operations throughout Anatolia thereby making an
Allied agreement over the whole of Turkey impossible 13/. The
fact that the Supreme Council chose not to comment on
Venizelos' note announcing his orders whicth gave the Greek
army freedom of action in Asia Minor, was perceived by Greek
circles as indirect tolerance of this initiative 14/.
Stergiadis was instructed not to agree to any intervention by
the Senior Naval Officer and to inform him that the Greek
forces were acting on the specific orders of the Prime
Minister. Should he wish these orders revoked, Fitzmaurice
would have to address himself to his government which, in
turn, should request the retreat of the Greek forces L/.
Although these orders remedied part of the problem, the
situation in the southern part of the Greek zone did not
change as the nationalists remained free to launch their
attacks from the Italian zone and retreat to it in safety. In
the meantime, the May-June operations had led to the
establishment of the first military front. The Greeks had
secured elbow-room for holding' Smyrna and its maritime
approaches but, while the Greek army remained inactive within
its "boundaries", the nationalist military organization went
11/ MOFA 136 t letter, n.n., 18.6.19, Venizelos to Clrnenceau
12/ MOFA 26p Note 12.7.19, Commodore Fitzmaurice, Commanding
Officer of the Aegean Squadron to Stergiadis.
13/ DBFP, I, no 11, app. H, Note 10.7.19, Venizelos to
Clèmenceau.
14/ MOFA 114b Tel. No. 6300/15.6.19, Venizelos to Stergiadis.





forward in the interior of Anatolia 16/.
On the basis of the situation evolving in Asia Minor,
on 18 July 1919 the Supreme Council fixed the boundaries of
the provisional Greek zone. These boundaries extended eight
kilometres to the north of Aivali, 20 kilornetres t.o the north
of Bergama, 15 kilometres to the north east rf Manisa, 20
Kilometres to the north east of Kasaba and ended on the left
bank of the Meander in the south, including Aidin and Odemish.
This line came to be known by the name of Admiral Caithorpe's
successor, General Mime who was appointed Commander of the
Allied forces in Asia Minor and was entrusted with the task of
delimiting the Greek zone, keeping the Greeks within it and
preventing serious Greek-Italian friction 17/. The Milne Line
was defined by barbed wire which separated the Greek forces in
forced passivity from the nationalist attacks. "Guerilla
warfare", commented Mime, "will continue as long as Greek
troops remain in [the] sancak and any further advance will
tend to create further difficulties" 18/. He also suggested
that the Greeks should either be allowed to proceed and extend
their zone until they had attained a defensible frontier, or
vacate the Meander valley and be replaced by an inter-allied
force. However, this military point of view was not taken into
consideration and the Supreme Council decided that the Greeks
should not advance or retreat, and that they should remain the
sole occupying force in the territories they held.
The Supreme Council's decision regarding the Mime Line filled
Venizelos with renewed optimism. He wrote to General Nider
that Milne's orders should be followed to the letter and
concluded: " I am sure you are aware that the enemies of our
occupation of Asia Minor are many. However, I believe that we
have succeeded in dispersing all the hopes they had based on
our mistakes of the first days. We must therefore make certain
that these mistakes will not be repeated" 19/.
Nonetheless, despite the delineation of the Mime Line
and the Venizelos-Tittoni agreement, the guerilla warfare on
the part of the nationalists intensified and concentrated
efforts were needed once again to secure Allied consent for
the freedom of movement of the Greek troops. These efforts
resulted in the Greek army being granted the right to
persecute the nationalists one and a half kilometres outside
the Greek zone with the obligation to return within its
boundaries after each operation. Everi(so, each operation
undertaken would have to be sanctioned ty General Mime in
advance. Towards the end of September 1919, there were signs
of improvement as Milne gave the Greek military permission to
enter the Turkish zone in order to repel attacks. Renewed
16/ MOFA 114b Tel.	 No.	 5507/25.5.19 and 5587/27.5.19,
Venizelos to Stergiadis.
17/ FO 608/103-17942, Tel. No. A6746/11.8.19, Mime to Curzon.
18/ DBFP, i, p. 879, S.C., 10.7.19, App.
19/ MOFA 114b Tel. No. 7557/12.11.19, Venizelos to Nider.
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pressure by Venizelos resulted in yet another agreement
providing for the freedom of the Greek troops to advance
within three ki].ometres from the point of the nationalist
attack, again with the obligation to return to their original
positions after each operation. As no solution was given to
the problem of inaction, a wave of discontent swept the army.
9owever, any thought of offensive military action on Greek
initiative was out of the question 20/.
On 7 October 1919, the Supreme Council examined a
report submitted by General Mime regarding the boundaries of
the Greek occupation. The General pointed out that the
nationalist forces "completely escaped the power of the
Constantinople government, adopted an aggressive attitude and
were of considerable number.	 Any further advance in order to
secure better positions, the report concluded, was sure to
meet with strong resistance and had no hope of succeeding
without heavy fighting 21/.
Mime could not have been nearer the truth. After his
arrival at Samsoun on 19 May 1919, Moustafa Kemal gradually
organized a new body from the debry of the CUP. The new
organization had clear nationalistic aims which featured the
concepts of national identity and popular sovereignty. Turkish
nationalism was at once the acceptance of a western idea and a
revolt against western domination 22/. With the incorporation
of the $ivas declaration of 19 September 1919 with the Ainasya
Protocol, the National Pact took shape and spelled clearly
such principles as the renunciation of the capitulations and
the rejection of any outside interference "in political,
financial and other matters" 23/. By this time, Kemal had also
succeeded in establishing channels of communication with
several Allied groups and agents. One such British agent was
reported to have warned Curzon of the nationalist danger in
20/	 MOFA	 ii4b Tel.	 No.	 11608/26.2.20,	 Venizelos	 to
Paraskevopoulos.
21/ Mime was requested to compile this report on 18 July 1919,
upon conclusion of the Venizelos-Tittoni agreement. AV lip,
Letter, 9.10.19, Clmenceau to Venizelos.
22/ Toynbee, op.cit., p.322. Kinross, op.cit., pp. 179-85.
Karpat, K. Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party
System. Princeton, 1959, pp. 33-34. Fisher, N.S. The Military
in the Middle East. Columbus, 1963, pp. 25-29.
23/ For the text of the National Pact see Webster, D. E. The
Turkey of Ataturk: Social Process in the Turkish Reformation.
Philadelphia, 1939, pp. 81-82. Temperley, op.cit., vi, pp.
605-6. Sousa, N. The Capitulatory Regime of Turkey, its
History Origin and Nature. Baltimore, 1933, p. 206.
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the early fall of 1919 24/.
With the strength of the nationalist forces increased
many times over since September 1919 and estimated to comprise
80,000 men, it was already too late 25/. By that time, in
Europe and Anatolia there were 160,000 Allied troops out of
which some 90,000 were Greek. Back at the Conference, Lloyd
George argued that "if two soldiers could not defeat one Turk,
the Allies ought to start their conference anew and ask the
Turk upon what terms he would condescend to make peace" 2./.
It is difficult to understand the optimism expressed
by Venizelos when, at the Supreme Council meeting of 16
February 1920, he was asked as to the numbers involved in
the permanent Greek garrison to be maintained in Asia Minor
after the conclusion of peace with Turkey. Although not in a
position to give exact numbers, he declared that the Asia
Minor garrison should, in his opinion, bear the same ratio to
the population as the number of troops maintained in any other
part of Greece. His belief was that in case of difficulty,
some 100,000 men could be raised from the one million Greeks
of Turkey 27/. Further pressed by Lloyd George to give his
opinion as to the possibility of the nationalist attacks
continuing after the Greek takeover, Venizelos replied that
since the Greek forces had been able to repel the nationalists
until then, he was confident that after the conclusion of
peace, "the likelihood of any such attacks would soon
disappear" 28/. A few days later, he expressed the same, if
not stronger, sense of optimism. When the French Premier made
it clear that his country had no intention of entering into
further hostilities with Turkey in order to impose the peace
treaty, Venizelos assured him that Greece not only would not
need such assistance as she was in a position to enforce the
terms relating to her territorial claims, but also intended to
play the major role in the imposition of the peace treaty on
Turkey as a whole 29/. The only move needed after the
conclusion of his agreement with Tittoni, he wrote, was an
Allied demarche to the Porte demanding that no relations
24/ This agent was Colonel A. Rawlinson. See Rawlinson, Sir A.
Adventures in the Near_East,	 1918-1922. New York 1924, pp.
188-252. Kinross, opcit., pp. 203-4. FO 608/112/385-1-
15/18202, Rawlinson Report, 18.8.19. 18356, Webb to Curzon,
(Rawlinson Report) 30.8.19. Upon his return to Anatolia,
Rawlinson was imprisoned because of the Allied occupation of
Constantinople.
25/ Times, 7, 14, 17 and 28 February 1920. Les Temps, 20
February 1920. France, Journal Off iciel, Dbats
parlementaires,: Chambre des Députés, 1918-1925, pp. 739-62,
26.3.20-27. 3.20, pp. 108-12, on Mara massacres.
26/ DBFP, vii, pp. 416-18, S.C., 5.3.20.
27/ AV 15d Tel. No. 2684/16.2.20, Venizelos to Stergiadis.
28/ MOFA 41n Tel. No. 11433/25.2.20, Venizelos to MOFA.
29/	 MOFA	 114b	 Tel.	 No.	 6999/3.7.19,	 Venizelos	 to
Paraskevopoulos.
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should be fostered with the nationalists. If this step were
taken, Venizelos concluded, the nationalist formations would
be reduced to insignificance as far as the security of the
occupied territory was concerned and, as a result, fewer Greek
troops would be required for its protection 30/.
In fact, the question of maintaining troops in Anatolia
had been preoccupying the Allies and the French in particular
for the past few months as they found themselves in an
increasingly awkward position in Cilicia. By February 1920,
nationalist raids reached the point of a full-scale revolt,
which escalated into a general massacre in Cilicia,
particularly around Mara, essentially because the majority of
the occupying French forces consisted of enlisted local
Armenians 31/. Following these events, the Supreme Council
decided to occupy Constantinople as a means of bearing
pressure on the nationalists. This occupation was enforced on
16 March 1920, by a contingent of British, French and Italian
forces.	 Allied proclamations assured that it was of a
provisional character, seeking to support the Constantinople
government and the authority of the Sultan 32/. This
operation brought the Straits zone under exclusive Allied
control and was followed by the deportation of some forty
members of the Ottoman parliament which was dissolved on 11
March 1920 at the insistence of the Allies.
Kemal proclaimed elections for an "extra-ordinary
assembly", which convened with the participation of members of
the old parliament on 22 April 1920 in Ankara, as the Grand
National Assembly. Its professed purpose was to free the
country from the invaders and rescue the Caliphate from the
hands of the enemies 33/. Kemal later suggested that even at
the time of the Constantinople occupation, French and Italian
agents assured him that this was all due to British policy
with which Millerand and Nitti did not agree 34/. Upon the
official announcement of the treaty terms, a large scale
Turkish exodus from Constantinople to Asia Minor was
witnessed, together with a marked increase in the number of
recruits rallying to the nationalist cause 351.
By March 1920, while the arbiters of the world were
convening at San Remo to confirm the harsh peace treaty on
Turkey,the Italians had evacuated the area of Konya, the
French had come to an initial agreement with Ankara and in
April, the Allied detachments and control officers in Anatolia
30/ Toynbee, op.cit., pp. 226 ff.
31/ DBFP, vii, p. 85, 16.2.20.
32/ DBFP, vii, pp. 415-20, S.C., 5.3.20. FO 406/43/105, Curzon
to Robeck, 10.3.20.
33/ DBFP, xii, pp. 22-24, Curzon to Lindsay, 12.3.20.
34/ Davison, B.. "Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne" in
The Diplomats, 1919-1939, Craig, G. A. and Gilbert, F. eds.
Princeton, 1953, p. 181.
35/ Kinross, op..cit., p. 266. Adivar, H. E. opcit., pp. 69ff.
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were being withdrawn to escape internment. The uninterrupted
reinforcement of the nationalist movement, despite itsinternal difficulties, had radically changed the scenario of
the secret War treaties and in June 1920 the Allies sanctioned
the Greek occupation of a new front line extending from
Panderma through Balikesir, Soma, Kirkaga; and Ahmedli to
Alasehir (Filadeif Ia). This permission came as a direct result
of the threat presentd to the inadequate Rritish forces
stationed in the Ismid 'listrict by nationalist concentrations.
The British further requested that the Greeks advance as far
as Brusa. Neither Venizelos nor Paraskevopoulos considered
the occupation of this largely Moslem city as indispensable
for the security of the Greek zone 36/. On the contrary, a
little before the operation was suggested by the Allies,
Venizelos had advised Paraskevopoulos not to advance eastwards
unless such an advance was deemed extremely necessary. "The
enemy", wrote Venizelos,"has every interest in inducing us to
advance. But we have the opposite interest: not to extend our
lines of communication and not to advance among a population
for the most part alien" 37/.
When Venizelos was informed of the Allied wish for the
Greek troops to occupy Brusa, he wrote to Paraskevopoulos
that although Greek interests lay in the concentration of
every effort for the immediate occupation of Eastern Thrace,
it was the duty of the Greek forces to hasten to the aid of
the Allies if the British feared a nationalist attack against
them in Ismid, which they thought could be counteracted by the
Greek occupation of Brusa 38/. In the event, after "a
careful estimation of the situation in view of this highly
critical moment in the country's history", Venizelos declared
to Lloyd George not only that he would send one division to
Ismid but also that he undertook to crush the nationalist
concentrations and safeguard the coast of Propondis from any
possible invasion 39/. In the event, the Greek army extended
its occupation to Brusa, Panderma and Uak in order to
accommodate Allied requests 40/. Thus, after the June 1920
offensive, the Greek zone of occupation covered over 53,000
square kilometres 41/.
Within a month, the objectives of the operation had
been attained and the Greek army had occupied Panderma,
36/	 MOFA	 161 Tel.	 Nos.	 12060/2.7.20,	 Venizelos	 to
Paraskevopoulos, 	 3563/1 .7.20, Paraskevopoulos to Venizelos
and 4019/5.7.20,	 Romanos to Venizelos.
37/ MOFA 16 1 Tel. N.N./25.6.20, Venizelos to Paraskevopoulos.
38/ MOFA 114b Tel. No. 12087/25.6.20, Venizelos to
Paraskevopoulos.
39/ MOFA 7k Tel. no. 12086/n.d., MOFA (Press Office) to
Stergiadis.
40/ MOFA 114b Tel. No. 64/18.2.21, Stergiadis to High Command
and	 10862/20.8.20 Venizelos to Paraskevopoulos.
41/	 MOFA 55d Report	 10542/11.7.20,	 Summary of Military
2perations,	 signed by Th. Pangalos.
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Alaehir and Brusa. After this successful offensive, combined
French and Italian action secured an Allied decision to the
effect that since the Dardanelles and the Ismid peninsula were
now secure, there was no need for a further advance of the
Greek army. The halting of the Greek offensive resulted in the
loss of a unique opportunity to crush the nationalists and
jave Kemal ample time to reorganize his forces. Despite the
stunning success of the operations, it was clear o military
observers that the Greek forces had abandoned a continuous
front near Smyrna for three isolated fronts, ill-connected
with their base. What was more, the Ismid occupation force had
sea communications alone, between Panderma and Brusa there was
no railway while the lines between Smyrna and Panderma were
exposed to nationalist attacks. At the end of the day, the
positions gained by the Greek army during its last offensive
could only be temporary and its leaders had to chose between
proceeding with the occupation of Af ion Karahisar and Eski
ehir, thereby reducing the distance between the two major
points of troop concentration, and withdrawing towards Smyrna,
thereby attaining a defensible military front.
After the extensive changes in the army leadership took
place after the November 1920 elections. General
Paraskevopoulos was replaced by General A. Papoulas while many
high ranking officers known for their venizelist affiliation
resigned and were replaced by some 1,500 officers who had been
dismissed by the venizelist regime during the 1917-1920
period. Some 150 of the resigned venizelist officers went to
Constantinople where they founded the National Defence
(Ethniki Amyna) with the financial assistance of the local
Greeks 42/. The overall result of these changes was the
creation of an experienced, 	 "venizelist" army with an
antivenizelist leadership which had no knowledge of the
conditions prevailing in Asia Minor 43/. Thus, at the
beginning of 1921, the Greeks had won brilliant but precarious
successes and the nationalist tide was gradually gathering in
intensity 44/. By this time, the Greek army consisted of
eleven divisions organized in three army corps, one cavalry
brigade, two regiments of army troops and a line of
communication troops including five special battalions which
brought the number to some 200,000.
Fresh operations started on 5 January 1921, entailing
a "reconnaissance" mission from Brusa towards Eski Sehir and
Af ion Karahisar. It was felt that the occupation of these two
vital railway junctions and the railway connecting them, would
42/ Alexandris, A. "The Constantinopolitan Greek Factor during
the	 Greco-Turkish	 Confrontation of	 191 9-1 922"	 in
Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, vol. 8, (1982/83).
43/ Smith, op.cit., p.173 ff. Some eight months later, British
sources observed that "balancing losses and gains, the army
has benefited on the whole by the changes in the command".
DBFP, xvii, p. 239, 16.6.21.
44/ Temperley, op .cit., p.31.
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deprive the nationalists of their continuous interior lines
and it would reunite the discontinuous Greek front which would
then be served by an uninterrupted railway from Smyrna to
Ismid. Although the Greek army had no orders to occupy these
towns, the fact that it retreated towards Brusa and Uak after
its reconnaissance operation was widely interpreted and
publicized as a defeat of the Greeks. This exercise, more
than anything else, brought home to the Greek authorities
that the nationalist forces had significantly improved in
numbers, arms, organization and discipline in comparison with
their performance during the operations of the previous
summer. The warning about the intentions of the Greek forces
was not lost by the nationalists who spent the next two months
fortifying the approaches to Eski Sehir, while the Greeks were
marking time in Brusa and the Peace Conference was dragging on
in London.
In March 1921, the Greek Northern array was halted in its
second attempt to reach Eski Sehir by the well-trenched slopes
manned by the nationalist troops and in a few days the Greek
forces had fallen back to their old lines. Not only had the
Turkish military machine been reassembled, but also it had
succeeded in the repulse of the Greek army at the battles of
in8nfl, in effect on the first occasion that Greek and Turkish
regular forces had clashed. Indeed, these battles proved the
turning point in the Anatolian War and demonstrated the danger
of an unnecessary dispersal of forces. Despite the spring
rebuff, by the end of July 1921, the long-coveted positions of
Af ion Karahisar and Eski Sehir had been captured by the Greek
army. However, as in 1920, no serious blow had been inflicted
against the bolt of the nationalist forces. Despite their
estimated hundred-fold increase in numbers -from 20,000 in
1919 to 200,000 in July 1921- the nationalist leaders clearly
bartered territory for time 45/. Evidently, if the Greek army
wanted a full scale clash with the nationalists, it would have
to go a long way to find them.
In the event, after a ten-day march, the two forces came
face to face on the banks of the Sakkaria river. The result of
the ensuing battle was not clear and both forces officially
celebrated their "tremendous victory" after strenuous weeks of
fighting which ended with the Greeks withdrawing west and
north of the loop of the Sakkaria. The stalemate thus reached
predicted that the Anatolian war would not be decided on the
battlefield. Since mediation by the Allies was proving
impossible, the only alternative could be a passive contest of
endurance between the two nations, with the Turks fighting
what was essentially a defensive battle in their own country.
After the battle of Sakkaria, the Greek army appeared to be
holding its own, and retiring in good order to positions
already decided upon, despite the energetic raids of the
Turkish cavalry 46/.
45/ Toynbee, op.cit., p. 237.
46/ DBFP, iv, pp. 998-99, Curzon Memorandum, 4.120.
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Time was clearly on the Turkish side, since the Greek
troops' morale was sure to suffer during the winter months in
the trenches. In all fairness, the Greeks had gambled for a
military decision in Anatolia on a very narrow margin and the
circumstances under which they were striving for victory over
the nationalists could not have been more adverse 47/.
At this stage, and as a rational preliminary to the
projected summer offensive, a withdrawal from the Ismid and
Yalova areas was decided by the Greeks in an effort to
concentrate their dispersed forces. Although the British
Military Council admitted that when the Greeks withdrew, the
Christian population of the peninsula would be in serious
danger and that many would be killed, the War Office intimated
to Curzon that even if a sufficient force were available to
replace the Greeks, this was not considered a wise move as it
would "jeopardize our position of neutrality in the present
Greek-Turkish operations" 48/. In a half hearted effort to
mitigate the evil, the British proposed that .an effective
Turkish gendarmerie be established before the Greek withdrawal
but the French and Italian governments refused to cooperate
"and they must bear the responsibility for any massacres which
take place" 49/. The Greeks withdrew from Ismid on 27 June
1921. Their withdrawal inspired panic in the district and a
number of Turks were reported massacred by Armenians in the
town itself 50/. Practically all inhabitants were evacuated
with the Greek forces, but both Armenians and neutral Turks
were terror stricken and attempted to flee to the
Constantinople zone.
Thus, the occupation of Ismid which had been effected a
year earlier at the expressed request of the British, ended in
shambles, with the British refusing to extend help to
populations whose predicament could largely be laid on their
doorstep. Soon, extensive massacres on both sides were
reported and in early July, on Curzon's initiative, the Allied
representatives were instructed to complain to the Greek
government because the Greek troops retreating towards Yalova
were reported to be burning villages along the coast 51/.
Granville in Athens, however, did not seem to agree: "I
presume", he wrote, "that General Franks had evidence that
burning of villages was done by Greek troops and was wanton
destruction. But it should be remembered that during the Greek
retirement from Eski Sehir in March and April, the Third
Division and probably others were fired at from practically
every village near the line of march and that several villages
on the road were set on fire by Turkish inhabitants to make
47/ Toynbee, op.cit., p. 247.
48/ DBFP, xvii, no. 174 and 71.
49/ DBFP, xvii, no. 199.
50/ DBFP, xvii, no. 267.
51/ DBFP, xvii, no. 286.
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the road impassable. I would point out that the repeated use
of the word retreat for the movement of the First Division
from Ismid to Yalova gives a wrong impression; this movement
was part of the Greek scheme of concentration and was planned
and communicated to the Commander in Chief in Constantinople
some weeks ago" 52/.
In early August "grave moslem excesses in
Anatolia against christian inhabitants" were reported by the
Allied representatives in Constantinople. In a private letter
to the British Ambassador in Paris, Curzon commented that it
was this sort of nationalist action that made it difficult for
the British to accord Turkey the concessions that the Indian
moslems were demanding on their behalf. He was convinced that
Ankara was pursuing the policy of extermination systematically
and that it was "incubent on the Allies to do everything they
can to stop these barbarities" 53/. However, the Italian
government soon stated that the terms of the proposed
representation were unsuitable "in view of the policy adopted
by the Allies of holding themselves completely free with
regard to the two belligerents", in order to be in a position
to intervene when the occasion was presented to secure a
cessation of hostilities 54/.
To make the situation quite intractable, every vestige
of Allied control in Anatolia had ceased to exist. In March
1920 the control officers disappeared from the scene on both
sides of the front; a year later the Allies had officially
declared their neutrality in a joint proclamation by the three
High Commissioners in Constantinople. This declaration, a
confession of impotence on the part of the Allies, contrasted
strongly with the impression of omnipotence pervading the
Treaty of Sèvres 55/. By March 1922, it was clear that the
situation entailed grave risks for the Allies themselves: if
they failed to secure peace they would be in great
difficulties as the whole question of Islam in Morocco and
India would be involved 56/. On the basis of these
considerations, the Council decided to brief the press on its
plans "for the peaceful evacuation of Asia Minor" 57/. The
major dilemma in the drama was thus presented: the Greek
government could neither hold nor relinquish its occupied
territories. To hold them indefinitely would mean more money
and men than could be obtained or mustered because of the long
period of mobilization and the depreciation of Greek currency.
To let them go and withdraw the Greek troops would bring
greater calamity and more persecutions of the local Greeks
52/ DBFP, xvii, no. 308.
53/ DBFP, xvii, rio. 321.
54/ DBFP, xvii, no. 366.
55/ Temperley, op.cit., pp. 48-49.
56/ DBFP p. 680
57/ MOFA 52a Tel. N.N./24.3.22, Metaxas from Paris to MOFA,
reporting on the reaction of the French Press.
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than they had yet witnessed 58/.
Stergiadis was of the opinion that if a peaceful
evacuation could be negotiated to include guarantees for the
protection of the local Greeks, a major catastrophe could be
averted. This view was openly criticized in the Athenian press
and Liberal circles as defeatist 59/. Nonetheless, it seems
to have reflected the true situation. The morale of the army
seemed to be at its lowest ebb. News about a possible
evacuation was received with enthusiasm and desertions reached
an unprecedented number. When officers were asked to explore
the possibility that the troops would welcome orders to remain
in Asia Minor after the official evacuation, the result of the
inquiry was a foregone conclusion 60/. Aptly describing the
situation, Patriarch Meletios wrote to Venizelos: " It is
certain that we are all fighting aimlessly in the dark, firing
against friends and enemies alike and we are not able to agree
even as regards the utmost national interests" 61/. This was
the reality against which the idealists of the Asia Minor
Defence were planning to hold on to Asia Minor even without
the support of the Greek state 62/.
The signs of impending disaster were now clear on the
diplomatic scene and the final act of the drama only remained
to be enacted on the military front. General Papoulas resigned
at the end of May 1922, and from June 1922, the nationalists
started raiding the towns along the front. General
Hadjianestis, the new Commander in Chief, was speaking about a
partial retirement to a new line of defence to reduce costs
or, alternatively, to withdraw into a zone immediately around
Smyrna, the retirement to which would mean that the Greeks
would have at least 500,000 refugees on their hands, if the
Ismid experience was anything to go by, and this at a time
when even the provision of food to the army would become
problematic.
By August 1922, the aeroplanes received by the
nationalists from Italy the previous June enabled them to
paralyze Greek air reconnaissance while the Greek cavalry were
too few to watch the whole of the military front 63/. This was
one of the reasons why the nationalist concentration near
Af ion Karahisar was discovered too late for the
reinforcements to arrive from the general reserve twenty-five
miles away, eventhough some days before the nationalist
58/ Henderson, H. A. "Aristides the Just"in Current History,
16 (1922), pp. 595-96.
59/ MOFA 118h Embros, 9.4.22. MOFA 48b p. 76 AV3ab 1/5.4.22,
Liberal Parliamentary Committee to Venizelos.
60/ AV aS unsigned letter, dated 7.4.22 and addressed to
ear George".
j ./ AV a2 letter, 25.4.22, Meletios to Venizelos.
62/ AV 21b letter, 173/?.4.22, Papoulas to the Council of
the National Defence in Constantinople.
63/ DBFP, xvii, p. 936.
128
attack, a Turk had appeared at the First Divison and informed
them that the enemy was concentrating its forces south of the
Akar river and the Greek airforce had verified the information
64/. Initially, the General Staff seemed confident that the
incidents in the Meander valley and the offensive launched on
26 August 1922, would be repelled. However, the communique
issued two days later stated that a Turkish force of ten
divisions with strong artillery had attacked Greek positions
south of Af ion Karahisar from the Akar river and that
fighting continued day and night /. A few hours later, a
further communique stated that because of the severity of the
enemy's offensive, the evacuation of Af ion Karahisar had been
ordered and that the Greek forces were now occupying lines to
its west 66/.
Within a week,	 the situation had deteriorated
dramatically. Stergiadis informed Athens that conditions in
the army were extremely serious and that it was imperative for
the Minister of War to go to Smyrna immediately to be briefed
on the real state of affairs 67/. But the visit	 of the
ministers could not reverse the situation. One of the army
corps was reported cut off and driven north with supplies and
ammunition only sufficient for a few days. The army seemed to
have lost its morale and Athens was seriously contemplating
asking for an armistice. On 2 September 1922, Stergiadis
warned the Allies that in view of the impossibility of
defending Smyrna against the nationalists, urgent measures
were required for the protection of the town in the interests
of their nationals 68/. While the British High Commissioner
in Constantinople was instructed to concert with the Commander
in Chief for the Mediterranean for the protection and possible
evacuation of the British colony of Smyrna, the British
Embassy in Athens conveyed to the •Foreign Office that the
Greek government "would accept proposals for an armistice on
the basis of an immediate evacuation...The Greek government
begs H.M.G. immediately to take such steps as they judge
necessary in the circumstances" 	 /.
64/ Angelomatis, op.cit., p. 177.
65/ Istoria tou Ellinikou...., xv.
66/ Angelomatis, op.cit., p. 179.
67/ Housepian, op.cit., p. 181.
68/ DBFP, xvii, p. 947.
69/ DBFP, xvii, p . 947.
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CHAPTER	 THREE:
I, The Greek Administration, 1919-1922
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During the first days of the Greek occupation, the
foreign press predicted that, in administering Smyrna and its
hinterland, Greece would have no easy task to perform. If she
were to make the most of the territory and to do it justice,
her administration would need to command the goodwill and
respect of the foreign communities and at least the respect of
th€ Tinkish population 1/. Yet, pending the signature of the
1€ dce Treaty with Turkey, this occupation was of a very
particular nature. Had it been a strictly military occupation
of an enemy country, Greece would only have had to take the
necessary action pertaining to the attainment of military
objectives, without becoming directly involved with its
administration. In fact, Greece's presence in Asia Minor did
not solely come about as a result of military operations nor
was the land exclusively hostile. On the contrary, as the
resolution of the Supreme Council ernphaszed, the Greek
mission was perceived largely as a means of securing peace,
law and order in a country where a substantial part of the
population was Greek. In effect, this entailed direct
involvement with the Turkish administration, which was itself
in need of extensive re-organization as several attempts at
administrative reform had failed in the past. 	 Undoubtedly,
Greece found herself in an awkward predicament: her
representatives in Asia Minor had to collaborate with the
local Turkish administrative authorities, who were, at best,
suspicious of Greek good will or, at worst, sabotaged every
effort and worked hard for the promotion of the Turkish
nationalist movement. The first signs of organized nationalist
resistance to the Greek occupation manifested themselves in
early June 1919. A proclamation by the Commander of the
Turkish troops in the area of Denizli invited the inhabitants
to take up arms and resist the Greek invaders. Proclamations
posted in Mentee stressed that the Turkish people might
possibly tolerate the occupation of their country by a foreign
army but in no way would they agree to be subjugated by Greece
2/.
To complicate matters further, the efforts of the new
regime to convince the Turkish community of its good will
risked alienating the the local Greek element which, after
decades of persecution, expected preferential treatment by the
Greek authorities. Moreover, those foreign communities with
vested economic interests in the area were anxious to see the
system of capitulations maintained, and had to be placated and
convinced that these interests were in no way threatened by
the Greek occupation. It was thus obvious from as early as May
1919 that the interval between the Greek landing and the
signature of the Peace Treaty with Turkey would serve as a
test period during which Greece would have to perform a tight
rope walk and prove at every instance that she was capable of
administering a society of so many inherent contradictions.
1/The Times, 17 and 20 May 1919.
2/ MOFA 1361 tel. no. 5902/15.6.19 Zafiriou to 	 Venizelos.
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Already in February 1919 Venizelos had selected Aristidis
Stergiadis as the future ruler of Asia Minor. His strict and
uncompromising character guaranteed that he would not tolerate
any form of misconduct on the Greek side. In April 1919, two
months after he was informed of his selection, Stergiadis was
still very reluctant to take office, on the grounds that he
suffcied from poor health. Venizelos, however, was adamant and
suggested that he should visit him in Paris to discuss the
details of his appointment and consult a doctor 3/. Stergiadis
still did not comply and when, on 7 May 1919 Repoulis
urgently recalled him from his post of Governor General of
Epirus, it took him a whole week to reply that he could not go
to Athens because he was ill 4/. The reasons for his
reluctance will probably never be known. However, if one is to
draw conclusions from his subsequent conduct, it is quite
likely that he was against the expedition from the outset and
very reluctant to take part. As the occupation was to be of a
nominally military character only, Stergiadis would initially
go to Smyrna as political counsellor to the Commander in
Chief, until the situation permitted his appointment to the
position of	 High Commissioner.	 This was yet
	
another
contradiction since, according to Venizelos' specific
instructions, Stergiadis was to be considered by the Greek
army as the highest authority representing the government,
whose orders should be unquestionably obeyed, although
nominally he would be under the jurisdiction of the army 5/.
The Greek Premier strongly believed that Stergiadis would be
able to exert his authority over both the Greek army and the
Turkish authorities, to deal successfully with any problems
that might arise with regard to the foreign communities and,
also, to pave the way for the future Greek administration of
Western Asia Minor 6/.
After the events of May 15 and 16, the urgent need
for a political representative of the Greek government became
apparent as the absence of a political coordinator at the time
of the landing had proved detrimental. Mavroudis urged
Athens to send a person invested with the authority to deal
with all matters pertaining to the administration of the area
and to the relations with the foreign, non-military,
representatives. He felt this was essential as Zafiriou's
perception of the problematic situation was purely military
and, consequently, his actions were not governed by any
political or foreign policy considerations. There was clearly
no time to experiment with Stergiadis in the role of political
counsellor to the Commander in Chief and orders were issued to
the effect that he should take up the post of 	 High
Commissioner immediately 7/. Venizelos had such confidence in
3/ MOFA A/5V1 tel. no. 3028/2.4.19 Venizelos to Repoulis.
4/ MOFA A/5V1 tel. no. 3686/7.5.19 Repoulis to Stergiadis and
tel. no. 305/13.5.19 Gounarakis to Repoulis.
5/ MOFA A/5V1 tel. n.n./28.4.19 Venizelos to Paraskevopoulos.
6/ MOFA A/5V1 tel. no. 3890/24.4.19 Venizelos to MOFA.
7/ MOFA 141 tel.no. 4606/17.5.19, Venizelos to Repoulis.
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Stergiadis that he attributed his delay in taking up the post
either to a breakdown in communications or to machinations
from Athens 8/. Describing the Greek Premier's helplessness,
Politis wrote to Diomidis: "Venizelos had foreseen and
organized everything. He prepared the details of Stergiadis'
mission months in advance because he knew that only he could
save our prestige in Smyrnd" 9/.
The Greek military authorities in Turkey were
immediately ordered to conform to Stergiadis' directives and
it was made clear that his jurisdiction was to extend over all
aspfcts of the occupation, military, political and civilian
alike, except for matters of discipline within the armed
forces and their tactical use during military operations, of
which, nonetheless, he would have to approve. Venizelos was
convinced that even without his personal instructions the
military authorities would stand by the High Commissioner and
render him all possible assistance towards the completion of
his task 10/.
In view of the critical situation created by the events
following the landing, urgent steps were required to establish
a semblance of normality in the everyday life of the city.
Venizelos' orders regarding the Turkish authorities were
clear: no cost or effort should be spared in order to
persuade the Turkish civil servants to resume the
administrative duties they had abandoned after the events of
May 15. The Turkish civil authorities should be preserved at
all costs although they were to be under the High
Commissioner's control. Should the Vail or any member of his
administration refuse to continue to offer their services,
Venizelos suggested the replacement of the former with a high
ranking Turkish official and the latter with Turko-Cretans
willing to serve under the Greek regime. The incentive of a
substantial raise in salaries should also be used 11/. At the
same time, these directives were motivated by Admiral
Caithorpe's intimation that failure to reinstate the Turkish
civil servants would prove detrimental 12/. In the event,
Izzet Bey, the Vali of Smyrna, resumed his duties with little
persuasion by Repoulis and he was soon followed by most of the
members of his administration. Only those serving at the
Smyrna Municipality were hesitant to return to their posts but
adequate prompting on the side of the Greek authorities soon
8/	 MOFA A/5V1 tel.	 nos.	 4521/15.5.19,	 4575/16.5.19,
4682/19.5.19	 Venizelos	 to	 Diomidis	 and	 tel.	 nos
4191/17.5.19,	 n.n./19.5.19	 Diomidis to Venizelos	 and
tel.no . 243/24.5.19 Stergiadis to 	 Venizelos.
9/ DPA, - letter in French 17.5.19, Politis to Diomidis, in
Petsalis, op.cit., p.211.
10/ MOFA 141 tel.no. 4536/14.5.19 Venizelos to MOFA.
11/ MOFA 141 tel.nos. 4606 and 4607/17.5.19, Venizelos to
Repoulis and Zafiriou respectively.
12/ MOFA 141 tel. no. 4164/3.5.19 (16.5.19), Kakoulidis to
Ministry of Marine.
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convinced them that Greece would respect them as she had
respected the Turkish municipal authorities in Macedonia 13/.
Moreover, it was stressed, every effort would be made to
ascertain the position of the Turkish language as one of the
two official languages to be used under the Greek occupation.
All official announcements and communications from the civil
and military authorities were to be made in both languages.
As this system was to continue after the signature of the
Peace Treaty and the anticipated handing over of the
administration to the Greek side, a special translation
department was to be instituted at the High Commission 14/.
It was not until 22 May, a whole week after the
landing, that the High Commissioner took up his post. The
foreign press commented that the selection of Stergiadis,
regarded in many quarters as Greece's up and coming man, made
it clear that the government realized the necessity to create
the best impression in the new territory and it had therefore
sent its ablest available representative to take control in
Smyrna. "The Greek High Commissioner", wrote the Times, "has
completed a successful two years of office as Governor of
Northern Epirus, where any improvement that has been effected
in the relations between Greeks and Albanians may be
attributed to his personal efforts, his broadmindedness and
administrative capacity. No better choice could be made for
Smyrna. Mr. Stergiadis is prepared to face facts and he has
shown that he could even face the unpleasant facts of the
original Greek landing" 15/.
The	 High Commissioner was accompanied 	 by	 P.
Gounarakis, Secretary General of the Epirus Administration,
Au Bey Naip Zade and G. Krionas, nomarchs of Preveza and
Drama respectively, G. Xynopoulos of the Ministry of National
Economy and E. I<oufidakis of the General Accounting Office.
The members of t1ie Mavroudis' Mission were to join this team
while Mavroudis returned to his duties on the Averof, as
Commander of the Greek naval base in Smyrna 16/. Thus, the
nucleus of the Greek High Commission was formed. More
employees were to come from Athens as soon as the specific
needs were evluated. Irrespective of which Greek ministry
they came from, they were to report and be responsible
directly to Stergiadis who would appoint them to such
positions as the situation necessitated 17/.
At the same time, the importance of training the
employees to serve under the prospective Greek administration
was not overlooked. Venizelos and Stergiadis shared the
13/ MOFA 141 tel. no. 143/19.5.19, Repoulis to Venizelos.
14/ MOFA 141 tel. no. 4888/22.5.19, Venizelos to Stergiadis.
15/ The Times, special Correspondent, 30.5.19 and The
Near East 21 .6.19.
16/ AV6z tel. no. 1286/18.5.19, Mavroudis to Politis, MOFA 141
tel. no. 1170/4.5.19, Venizelos to MOFA.
17/ MOFA 141 tel. no. 4536/14.5.19 Venizelos to MOFA.
134
opinion that the youth of Asia Minor, Turkish as well as
Greek, should have an important position within the new
regime. Local high schools such as the Evanqeliki
Scholi Smyrnis were known to produce graduates of a high
standard. Those interested in taking up a post with the
administration would be sent to Athens for a short period of
training and would subsequently return to Asia Minor to serve
in appropriate positions 18/. Furthermore, from the first days
of Stergiadis' presence in Smyrna, the leaders of the Jewish
and Armenian communities in the city were informed that the
future Greek administration intended to employ a significant
number of well qualified Jews and Armenians. Those Turks
working in the public sector until the Greek landing would be
asked to remain in their positions, while more would be added
according to the needs of the new regime, with a view
ultimately to forming a multiracial administration reflecting
the nature of the society to be administered 19/.
The High Commission was housed in the former Greek
Consulate and several high ranking civil servants from Greece
soon joined Stergiadis' team. As the military occupation was
extended over a major part of the zone anticipated by Greece
from the peace treaty, representatives of the High
Commissioner were sent to the interior of Asia Minor to take
charge of the situation. In view of the influx of civilians
and army officers taking part in the occupation, their housing
was one of the immediate problems for the Greek authorities.
Services and departments were to be housed in public buildings
while appropriate houses, preferably of Greek ownership, were
to be rented by a special committee for the housing of
officers and civilian employees of the administration,
comprising of one officer, one primate and one representative
of the High Commission. Army officers were not allowed to
accept hospitality from local civilians of any nationality and
commandeering of houses was forbidden 20/.
Gradually, the departments of the High Commission
started taking shape. Their task was threefold: to exercise
discreet control over the Turkish authorities until Greece
assumed the administration of the area after the signature of
the peace treaty, to represent Greek interests and liaise with
the representatives of the powers in the city as well as with
the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople and, thirdly,
to lay the foundations for the establishment of an effective
state machinery in Asia Minor.
The administrative work carried out by the Greek High
Commission of Smyrna, falls into two periods: that preceeding
the signature of the peace treaty (May 1919 to August 1920)
18/ Vaccas,op.cit, p.269 quoting Venizelos' instructions to
Stergiadis.
19/ MOFA 136z tel. no. 2884/17.6.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
20/ MOFA 141 tel. no. 4003/29.4.19 , Venizelos to Mavroudis
for Zafiriou.
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and t•hat following the treaty and lasting until September1922.
During the first period, the High Commission was to exercise
overall control over the Ottoman administrative authorities
which were to be preserved intact until the Peace Conference
conferred the rule over the occupied area to Greece. This
arrangement entailed a number of problems in view of the
reforms needed and the bad faith displayed towards the new
regime by the Turkish, Greek and foreign communities alike. To
complicate matters further, the administration of Turkey as a
whole,	 including the zone mandated to Greece, was under the
direct supervision of the Allied High Commissioners in
Constantinople during both periods. After the signature of the
treaty, Greece was to receive administrative responsibility
for the zone assigned to her [Greek zone) and, at the same
time, to exercise control of the Turkish authorities in the
area she occupied de facto, as a result of subsequent military
operations outside the boundaries of the officially mandated
zone.
Initially, the High Commission was organized into
twelve departments including the Office of the High
Commissioner, the General Secretariat, and the Departments of
Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Repatriation and
Rehabilitation of Refugees, Post Offices, Prisons, Finance,
Public Works, Moslem Affairs, Public Health and Translation.
Commenting on the tremendous task undertaken by these
departments, Stergiadis noted:
"The task we have undertaken in Asia Minor is
not beyond our capabilities and I am convinced
that it will be completed. I must, however,
forewarn you that it is unlikely that we will
complete it impeccably. My cause of concern
lies with the military and the local christian
population: the military experience
difficulties in reconciling their double task,
i.e. police and administrative work for the
preservation of public order on the one hand
and military duties on the other. These
difficulties could probably be overcome if it
were not for the destructive influence of the
local Christians. They are disrespectful to us,
resentful towards the Moslems and, being
inclined to revenge, they induce our soldiers
to cause disturbances. What is more important,
still petrified of the ferocious past, they
initiate rumours exaggerating the numbers of
the enemy as well as the dispositions and plans
of the local Moslems, thereby creating an
atmosphere prone to panic" 21/.
Venizelos was aware of these problems and realized
that Zafiriou and his staff might not be able to impose
21/ MOFA 136t tel. no. 6578/3.7.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
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discipline on the local Greeks, thereby risking their amicable
relations with them. In his messages he underlined the risks
involved and with pleas and firm orders urged the military to
face the situation with severity. Diomidis wrote to
Paraskevopoulos along the same lines:
"We shall be on trial and the final form and,
above all, the territorial extent of our role
will depend on the impartiality of our
administration and our strong defence of the
rights of the minorities. If events prove that
we are not even subconsciously inclined to
avenge our sufferings at the hands of the Turks
for five centuries and that we know how to
treat them because we are carriers of a higher
civilization,	 only	 then can we hope	 to
extricate the decision of the conference for
extensive	 rule over extensive territories"
22/.
Indeed, the work carried out by the High Commission
during the three years of Greek occupation and the diversity
of the tasks undertaken indicate that Stergiadis was one of
the best administrators ever produced by Greece. These tasks
ranged from the repatriation and rehabilitation of some
250,000 refugees to the institution of the most progressive
university in the area, the organization of an excellent
public health service free to all nationalities, the conduct
of major archaeological excavations and the care of Moslem
institutions such as the Vakoufs, in a way that doubled their
proceeds. However, the efforts of the High Commissioner and
his team to create the circumstances which would secure the
peaceful coexistence of the various communities and result in
the prosperity of the country were impeded by numerous
factors.
The Ottoman Empire had always been an important field
of western european economic activity mainly because of the
absence of Turkish businessmen antagonizing foreign interests.
By contrast, Greek merchants and businessmen were eager
to occupy a dominant position in the economy of the area
should Smyrna, the entrepot of trade between East and West, be
assigned to Greece. This was well known to western
capitalists who had rio wish to share the Anatolian market with
their former employees. Venizelos optimistically believed,
however, that the "European communities of Smyrna" which
reacted negatively to Greek claims would soon become the best
allies of Greece in her effort not only to keep the zone
awarded to her but to increase it further. It was his belief
that this would happen once the levantine community was
convinced that Greece was there to stay 23/. What he did not
22/ Petsalis, op.cit, p.210, quoting a letter from Diomidis
to Paraskevopoulos dated 16.5.19, from DPA.
23/ MOFA AAE 1919 tel. no. 4384/11.5.19, Venizelos to MOFA.
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seem to have considered was the fact that the major financial
interests of Britain, Italy and France in such Turkish
monopolies as the Regie des Tabacs, the Ottoman Bank and the
Ottoman Debt, together with smaller private interests,
exercised tremendous pressure on the Allied leaders and their
representatives in Turkey. Indeed, this pressure had a lot to
do with the Allied refusal to agree to a permanent role for
Greece in Asia Minor 24/.
	
What was more, the preservation of
the capitulations and extraterritoriality for foreign
nationals within the Greek zone led to the creation of an
Allied state within the Greek state which, in its turn, was a
state within Turkey, at the time divided into the state of
Constantinople and the state of Ankara 25/. At the same time,
the absence of a clear definition of the Greek mandate and the
existence of interallied authorities whose functions and
duties	 largely	 overlapped	 with those	 of	 the	 Greek
administration complicated matters further. This situation,
coupled with the decision of the Supreme Council that all
movements of the Greek army had to be approved by General
Mime, resulted in a series of misunderstandings and friction
between the Greek High Commission on the one side and the
Allied representatives and the Turkish authorities on the
other. These were mainly due to the absence of any definition
of the mandate over Smyrna and its hinterland given to Greece
by the Allies. No one knew the extent or the limits of the
authority and jurisdiction of either the Greek High Commission
or the Allied representatives. It was thus clear that, as
long as this confusion persisted, it would be impossible to
avoid regrettable incidents.
The first to complain was the Italian Consul in Smyrna
who protested to his Minister in Athens about the alleged
anti-Italian stance of the Greek authorities. In his reply,
Stergiadis did not refute the fact that there existed open
animosity on the part of local Greeks towards the Italians
but, he went on, this animosity was reciprocated. Despite the
bad feelings, the Greek High Commission did its best to
forestall any serious manifestation of this animosity and gave
in to nearly all the demands of the Italian representative
with the exception of cases where vital Greek interests were
at stake. One such instance arose when the Italian Consul
demanded that the capitulatory rights of his citizens be
applied not only as they used to be under the Turkish regime
but also in connection with cases before the military courts.
This in effect meant that Italian citizens charged with
espionage against the Greek forces would be tried by the
Italian	 consular	 court.	 This	 demand	 was	 satisfied
"temporarily" and the matter was to be settled at
intergovernmental level 26/. The Greek authorities went to
extremes to placate the Italians. When a letter addressed to
24/ Solomonidis, V. "International Finance Versus Greece in
Asia Minor", article submitted for publication.
25/ ibid.
26/ MOFA l36p tel. n.n./20.6.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos and
Diomidis.
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Major Carossini -well known for his spying activities- was
mistakenly opened by the military censors, Stergiadis
apologized publicly after the incident was reported to the
Italian Ambassador in Athens who made a demarche to the MOFA
in this respect 27/.
Following the example of his Italian colleague, the
French Consul reported to Paris that the Greek civil employees
were using their position to extract money from Turkish and
Greek civilians. Stergiadis protested strongly against this
accusation and, in his turn, accused the French Consul of bad
faith. Although the conduct of the civil servants was spied
upon on a methodical and constant basis and reported directly
to the High Commissioners in Constantinople, the issue was
never raised officially. On the contrary, he continued, the
trust of the locals towards the Greek authorities had grown
steadily to the extent that issues falling under the
jurisdiction of the Allied Consular authorities in Smyrna were
brought to them instead, in the belief that the Greek Hig1
Commission would be able to resolve them sooner, in a more
efficient way . A telegram sent to Constantinople by the Vali
and intercepted by the Greek authorities, wrote Stergiadis,
confirmed that the Greek civil servants were treating the
Turkish public well 28/.
These and other incidents soon resulted in a demarche
by the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople to their
respective governments requesting the intervention of the
Supreme Council to resolve the issue. In December 1919,
the Supreme Council referred the matter to the Greek Committee
which, in turn, asked the Allied representatives in
Constantinople "to proceed with the examination of questions
relating to the Greek administration and to establish certain
facts relative to the interference of the Greek authorities in
the administrative and judicial affairs of the interallied
services or the Ottoman authorities in Smyrna" 29/. In their
note to the Greek High Commissioner in Constantinople, his
Allied counterparts concluded that, far from disturbing the
Greek authorities, this inquiry would facilitate their mission
by defining their role and jurisdiction and could, in any.
case,	 only serve to clarify the situation 30/.
Venizelos was quick to realize the real issues behind
this proposed inquiry and, in view of Greek blunders in the
27/ MOFA 136t 6327/28.6.19, Diomidis to Italian Ambassador. For
Italo-Greek relations in Smyrna, Solomonidis, V."Italy Versus
Greece in Asia Minor", article submitted for publication.
28/ MOFA 59g tel. no. 7338/24.9.19, Stergiadis to MOFA and
Venizelos.
29/ DBFP IV, no. 581, tel. no. 2033/5.11.19, Robeck to Curzon,
FO 608/103-21220, desp. 330/5/11.19 Morgan to Robeck, desp.
2174/19.11.19, Robeck to Curzon. MOFA 76z tel.no .
12192/5.12.19, Kanellopoulos to MOFA.
30/ AV14e 173/2629/5.12.19, Kanellopoulos to Venizelos 	 and
Stergiadis.
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execution of the landing, the events following the occupation
of Menemen and Akhisar and the destruction of Aidin, he
feared that there was a serious risk of Greece being ousted
from Smyrna as a result of the inquiry 31/. He believed that
these blunders "were expertly used by the enemies of the Greek
occupation in order to cast doubts on its credibility and
possibly succeed in bringing it to an end as it afflicted a
multitude of powerful foreign interests" 32/.
He was also quick to draw the attention of the Greek
military to the need for close contact and cooperation with
General Mime so as not to give him any caus for complaint,
but, on the contrary, to win him over and put him in a
position to testify in favour of the rk side at the
inquiry. In view of the blunders committed since the landing
of the Greek troops, Venizelos seemed to have lost his faith
in the ability of the Greek soldiers and the local population
to behave in a way "worthy of the Allied trust" and took every
opportunity to castigate civilians and soldiers alike:
" Until now we have not proved worthy of the
trust of the Allies. If we do not remedy the
situation immediately and if we do not
forestall any further regrettable incidents, it
is likely that we will be subjected to the
insult of being considered once and for all
unworthy of this tr.ust and everyone understands
what this will entail. I demand from the
officers that they realize the gravity of the
situation at hand and act swiftly in order to
avoid any further complications. . . The local
Greeks should also come to realize that no act
of revenge will be tolerated by the army. As
much as we sympathize with their past
sufferings, we cannot allow them to endanger
the good name of the nation. We came to Asia
Minor not only to bring freedom to our brothers
but also to secure the freedom of all the
elements of the population. If we find them
standing in the way of the honourable task we
have undertaken, we will treat them as enemies"
33/.
In	 fact,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 local	 Allied
representatives	 were partly responsible for the akward
situation.	 The Greek High Commissioner in Constantinople had
31/ For the events following the advance of Greek army see
Chapter Two, Section II.
32/ MOFA 4lth tel. no. 7267/16.11.19, Venizelos to Zafiriou.
33/ MOFA 136t tel. no. 6625/5.6.19, Venizelos to Stergiadis
for Zafiriou. In the same message, Venizelos instructed the
army officers not to accept any accusations of the local
Greeks	 against foreign nationals before careful examination
of the	 facts.
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repeatedly reported to Athens that, ever since their arrival,
whenever a case arose for them to mediate between Greece and
Turkey, they refused to do so on the pretext that they were in
Constantinople in order to survey the execution of the
armistice terms. Kanellopoulos' comment was that if one were
to judge by the facility with which the population was able to
procure arms, one could safely say that even this surveillance
was not carried out effectively. The Greek High Commissioner
further reported that, in his mind, the Allied representatives
were in no position to intervene mainly because of lack of
unity among them as they each sought to attract the favour of
the Turks by using old diplomatic methods. Thus, a mutual
mistrust had developed which was soon perceived and cultivated
by the Porte to its advantage while on a number of occasions,
the policies followed by the Allied High Conrrissioners on the
spot, were contrary to the official policies of their
governments vis-á-vis Turkey. Kanellopoulos concluded that the
Allied representatives had a large share in the blame they
attached to the Greek administration of Smyrna 34/. Venizelos
seemed to share this view and complained to Clmenceau, at the
time President of the Supreme Council, that "certain agents"
of the Allied powers misunderstood the intentions of their
respective governments and continued to manifest their
negative attitude towards the Greek administration of Smyrna
"in the most deplorable way". The Greek Premier further
requested that the Powers instruct their agents to be
objective in their assessment of the situation in order to
avoid regrettable complications from which only the enemies of
the Allies could benefit 35/.
In the meantime, the Greek Committee had briefed Venizelos
on the grievances of the Allied High Commissioners against the
Greek administration, which mainly revolved around the issues
of press censorship and the existence of two parallel boards
of censors, one interallied and one Greek, the alleged
obstruction of the duties of the Turkish police and
gendarmerie, the operation of the Turkish civil courts and the
substitution of the Allied port, customs and immigration
authorities by Greek ones. In a letter to Stergiadis,
Venizelos commented upon this meeting: "As soon as we managed
to avert the dangers emanating from the International
Commission of Inquiry, we are again facing obstacles 	 put in
our way by the ever-powerful, pro-Turkish international
circles" 36/. The Greek premier immediately requested a report
on the situation and, in the meantime, tried to convince the
Committee that all grievances, even if based on facts,
referred to the exercise of rights given to Greece as a result
of a military occupation . He argued that it was already a
great concession on the part of Greece to allow an Allied
censorship to operate and, if there was any obstruction of the
duties of the gendarmerie, it was probably due to the mistrust
34/ MOFA 26d tel. no. 5119/27.1.19, Kanellopoulos to MOFA.
35/ MOFA 59b letter, n.n./4.11.19, Venizelos to Clémenceau.
36/ MOFA 4lth 7367/1911.19, Venizelos to Stergiadis.
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it generated by its anti-Allied conduct. Although the
Committee accepted Venizelos' explanations, it did nothing to
ameliorate the tense situation and the relations between the
Greek administration, the Allied authorities and the local
population.
Although no practical decisions were taken at that stage,
VE-ni'elos intimated to Stergiadis that, as he understood it,
the adversaries of the Greek occupation were striving for the
creation of a council comprising six Allied representatives
with the Greek High Commissioner as chairman, supposedly to
avert similar problems and grievances but in reality to
diminish the authority of the Greek High Commissioner and to
interfere in the affairs of the Greek administration on a
daily basis. The establishment of such an Interallied
administration could not of course be accepted by Greece and
it was Venizelos' conviction that he would be able to
forestall these efforts as "in Smyrna we have gone to 	 stay
for	 good despite the venomous -albeit 	 understandable-
reactions of many circles" 37/.
Stergiadis hastened to reply with a long report
refuting	 all accusations and explaining	 the	 difficult
conditions	 the Allied representatives imposed on	 the
performance of his duties. He made the following points:
According to international law, the occupation of Smyrna
by Greece should have had as a normal consequence the
conducting of press censorship by the Greek military
authorities. This procedure, however, entailed the abolition
of the Smyrna branch of the Interallied Board of Censors which
had been established after the armistice to exercise
preventive censorship and to consider applications for the
publication of new newspapers 38/. Taking into consideration
Allied susceptibilities, the Greek government tolerated the
existence of the Interallied Board of Censors (IBC) and was
willing to let things be were it not for the grave problems
this state of affairs presented. For this reason, it was
decided to create a parallel Greek board, independent of the
military authorities and to relieve the IBC of the duty to
examine applications for new publications. In this way,
although the IBC was free to allow the publication of any
article that would seem reprehensible, the Greek board would
be able, in turn, to prevent publications against its
interests. This measure, Stergiadis emphasized, was based on
the precedent set in Salonica where, during the War, the
37/ MOFA, ibid and AV14a tel. no. 2577/966/22.11.19,Stergiadis
to Venizelos.
38/ It is worth mentioning that the Interallied Board of
Censors in Constantinople was	 reported to present grave
problems to the local Greek press. 	 At one stage, even the
publication of the text of Venizelos' speeches was censored.





Commander in Chief of the Eastern Armies had reserved the
right to exercise censorship alongside the Greek authorities
eventhough Greece was not an enemy country under occupation.
The	 Alli.ed High Commissioners perceived	 this
measure as an effort on the Greek side to nullify the work of
the IBC.	 Although they noted the fact that the Greek
administration was responsible for the security of both the
troops and public order and,
	 therefore,	 more directly
interested in the control of censorship, they underlined that
"this legitimate anxiety" must be in harmony with the
interests represented by the Allied delegates. To their mind,
the problems that occured could be remedied by abolishing the
Greek board of censois and by attaching a Greek officer to the
IBC. Every member of the IBC would hve the right of
veto, whereupon the publication of the articie in question
would immediately be subject to the approval of the three
Allied delegates and the Greek High Commissioner in Smyrna. In
case of disagreement at this point, it was proposed that the
matter would be decided by the Allied High Commissioners in
Constantinople, in whose mind the measures described above
would alone lead to a precise definition of the character of
the Greek mandate in Turkey 39/.
To these arguments, Stergiadis countered that the
Greek High Commission recognized the unlimited right of the
IBC to censor all publications favouring Greece but not the
right to award unlimited freedom to the Turkish press. As
early as November 1919, Venizelos had drawn Clémenceau's
attention to the fact that the IBC was unnecessarily hostile
to any pro-Greek publication. The case at hand concerned the
suppression of an article by a French engineer, in which he
elaborated on the view that, far from clashing, French and
Greek interests in Asia Minor were in perfect harmony, and
another article in which the High Commissioner was praised
for the measures he had taken regarding the lighting of the
streets at night 40/.. Although no satisfactory reply was
received to this complaint, it was the IBC that precipitated a
direct clash with the Greek authorities when a Turkish
newspaper was convicted by the Greek court martial for
publishing an article accusing the Greeks of being "detestable
insects sucking Turkish blood for one and a half centuries".
This article was passed by the IBC and its publication -along
with others on the same lines- made a strong impression in
Moslem circles which interpreted the tolerance of the IBC as a
sign of its pro-Turkish sympathies and led them to believe
that any revolutionary move on their part would be tolerated
arid even encouraged by the Allies. Upon publication, the
author of the article and the owner of the newspaper were
courtmartialled	 and	 received sentences of	 one year's
39/ MOFA 36t tel. no. 3357/13.3.20, Kanellopoulos to MOFA
communicating the Report of the Allied High Commissioners
on the administration of Smyrna and its hinterland.
40/ MOFA 59b letter, nn./4.11.19, Venizelos to Clémenceau.
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imprisonment. The Greek Court Martial perceived these
sentences as a preventive measure against any eventual rising
of the Turks in the Greek zone. Commenting on this particular
article, the Allied High Commissioners pointed out that "it
would be preferable if the article had not been published" but
they also remarked that the Creek duthorities should not have
prosecuted those responsible fot rirtjcle passed by the IBC.
As it happened, a month later, Venizelos asked Stergiadis to
set. the two men free in view of "foreign policy considerations
41/.
Stergiadis pointed out that the IRC assumed great
responsibilities when displaying such severity towards all
articles favouring Greece and such magnanimity towards all
publications encouraging revolutionary tendencies. The Greek
authorities were prepared to overlook the suppression of the
former but they could not accept that the IBC had the right to
protect the freedom of the Turkish press at the expense of the
preservation of public order for which Greece was solely
responsible. The Greek argument was given further credibility
by the fact that Stergiadis was adamant that journalism in
Srnyrna should be left to its own devices and that there was
no reason for the Greek administration to exercise any sort of
influence on the newspapers. On the contrary, he advocated
that	 neutrality	 in this matter was essential 42/.
In the event, the Greek side compromised and the
Greek board of censorship was abolished as a result of allied
pressure. The IBC was reorganized to include a Greek delegate,
on the same footing as his Allied colleagues, and an agreement
was reached on the following points: as requested by the Greek
side, no new Greek or Turkish newspaper would be allowed to
start publication during the armistice period; for newspapers
in other languages a special permit by the IBC was required;
the IBC had the power to enforce the temporary suspension of
the publication of a newspaper; the censoring of articles was
to be decided by a majority vote. If the Greek delegate
objected to an article passed with a majority of votes, its
publication was to be postponed until the Greek High
Commissioner and the Allied representatives in Srnyrna had
expressed their opinion. Stergiadis reported that through
these measures, sources of friction with regard to the
control of the press were minimized 43/. After the signature
of the treaty, the IBC for Smyrna was disbanded and all
matters relating to the press came under the jurisdiction of
the Press Office of the Greek Administration of Smyrna.
41/ MOFA 59b letter, n.n./4.11.19 Venizelos to Clémenceau.
MOFA	 143d tel. no. 12298/8.12.19, Venizelos to Stergiadis.
42/ MOFA 142o tel. nos. 7493/12.8.19 Diomidis to Stergiadis
and 7755/9.8.19, Stergiadis to Diomidis. At that time, 27
newspapers were published in Smyrna: 11 Greek, 4 French, 5
Armenian, 5 Jewish and 7 Turkish. List in GAK 53/1919.
43/ MOFA 143g tel. no. 12492/12.12.19 Stergiadis to MOFA.
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With reference to alleged obstruction of the
proceedings of the Turkish civil courts, Stergiadis reported
that problems arose only when a decision of a court had to be
enforced against a foreigner enjoying capitulatory and
extraterritorial rights. In fact, no decision of a Turkish
court against an Allied citizen could be carried out if it
were incompatible with the system of capitulations. The source
of friction in this respect stemmed from the fact that at one
stage the Greek court martial took upon itself to try common
law cases. When the Allied representatives refused to
recognize this extension of the court martial's authority and
jurisdiction, the matter was dropped 44/.
As far as the issues connected with the Turkish
gendarmerie were concerned, Stergiadis agreed that there
existed a very serious problem. He argued however that the
Greek administration had never obstructed its functioning but
was exercising overall control. This control was vital in
view of the fact that the Turkish gendarmerie was a body of
well trained, armed men, the majority of whOm had nationalist
or CUP connections. Therefore, should the gendarmerie be
allowed to perform its duties without any control, it would
constitute a grave danger to the security of the Greek forces
which could at any time be attacked from the rear. Even small
units of gendarmerie could cause grave damage by transmitting
or facilitating the flow of information and war material to
the nationalist camp or, even, by contributing to the blowing
up of bridges and railways. Stergiadis was not speculating but
speaking on the basis of plots already uncovered by the Greek
forces. On a number of occasions he mediated with the military
authorities regarding the sentences received by gendarmes
arrested on charges of espionage. At times he even set a
number of them free on the condition they left the Greek zone
'immediately and, as a rule, he did not permit any death
sentences to be executed.
Precautionary control was exercised in the
recruitment of gendarmes and the numbers to be assigned to
each district and through the immediate transfer of any
gendarme under suspicion. Their duties were restricted to
escorting the tax collectors, executing court orders, guarding
public buildings and escorting the mail pouches to the
interior of the zone. This restriction of duties, however, was
possible only in places where an adequate Greek gendarmerie
unit existed to undertake the remaining responsibilities of
the corps.
In areas where no Greek gendarmerie or troops were
available, the Turkish units were allowed to perform their
44/ MOFA 12e tel. no. 6484/12.10.19, Diomidis to Venizelos.
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duties on the condition that, should a crime be committed in
their area of jurisdiction, the nearest Greek authority should
be informed and those arrested should be handed over to be
prosecuted under Greek martial law. Although all heavy weapons
had to be surrendered, the gendarmes were allowed to keep
their knives and revolvers.
During a meeting with the commander of the Turkish
g'ndarmerie, Stergiadis analyzed the contradictions involved
aU the resulting suspicions of the Greek military and added
fhot, as he was convinced that they would perform their duties
impeccably, he would not hesitate to entrust his men with the
sccuiity of the urban areas, if the nationalists stopped
attacking the Greek army and if serious guarantees were given
to this effect. The Turkish commander recognized the difficult
conditions that caused the Greek authorities to doubt his men
and agreed that the measures taken by Stergiac3is were the best
under the circumstances.
According to Stergiadis, the grievances of the Allied
High Commissioners with regard to the Smyrna Port Authority
were unfounded. After the conclusion of the armistice, the
Allied High Commissioners had established an Interallied
Commission of Navigation Control in Turkish waters, whose
delegation in Srnyrna functioned satisfactorily but it was
deprived of its objective when the Greeks took over the port
and the Customs House and, with the exception of a small
Turkish police contingent, placed the policing of the port
entirely in the hands of armed Greek marines under the direct
control of the Greek Port Master 45/.
The Greek side had taken over "by right emanating
from the military occupation " and exercised the policing of
the port with the exception of passport control, travel
permits, and arrivals and departures of civilians. These
duties were entrusted to the Interallied Port Police headed by
a French, an Italian, a British and a Greek officer working
"in harmony". This arrangement had been arrived at by a
compromise on the Greek side. From the first days of the Greek
occupation it had been established that the Italian
authorities issued Turkish nationalists with passports on the
basis of which they arrived at and departed from Smyrna
freely. What was more, they were also provided with
certificates of Italian protection and were made to wear
special badges. The pretext in most cases was that the
protected person was of Albanian or Dodecanesian origin. This
measure was thought as contravening the decision of the
Supreme Council by which the protection of the Smyrna
45/ MOFA 36t doc. no. 3357/13.3.20, Report...Stergiadis had
insisted that experienced officers be sent from Athens to
undertake	 the administration of the port. 	 MOFA	 142st
tel.no . 10472/4.9.19, Stergiadis to Ministry of National
Economy.
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population as a whole was entrusted to the Greek army 46/. On
Venizelos s
 specific orders, the Greek authorities refused to
accept the validity of these passports and did not allow
anyone to leave the city without documents issued or endorsed
by the Greek police. As the military occupation of the city
was in Greek hands, it was stressed, it was the Greek
authorities who were responsible for the preservation of
public order and, consequently, f. r the performance of police
duties 47/.
Demarches to the Italian Ambassador in Athens were to no
avail and, at first stage, the issue of the passport control
was arranged as follows: Foreign nationals holding passports
of their own nationality and endorsed by the Interallied Port
Authority, were allowed to come and go as they pleased.
Turkish or other nationals, who were holders of protection
certificates required a permit by the Greek police to travel.
Those who had not secured this permit beforehand, obviously
met with difficulties at the time of departure. In the event,
because of strong allied pressure, the Greek side was forced
to abolish all distinctions between foreign nationals and
Turkish citizens under foreign protection 48/.
Furthermore, despite the dangers this arrangement
entailed in view of the martial law in force, the Greek Port
Authority did not interfere with the management of the quay
and the lighthouses in the Smyrna gulf which had been
entrusted by the Ottoman regime to international companies
within the context of capitulations 49/. Clearly, this was yet
another case where the function of a Greek authority
overlapped with that of an Interallied one.
To complicate matters further, major problems arose
over the control of the Health Services and the demand of the
Allied High Commissioners that the Greek Health Authorities
should conform to the orders of the Interallied Commission on
Health and Hygiene established in Constantinople. The real
cause of the friction between the two authorities seemed to
lie in the fact that the body in charge of the Health Service,
effectively had in its hands the best propaganda machinery
with which to convince the Turkish population of the benefits
of this or the other regime.
In September 1919, following a plague epidemic in
Smyrna, the Allied High Commissioners decided to establish an
Interallied Commission on Health and Hygiene composed of
French, English, Italian, American, Greek and Turkish doctors.
Its mission was to exercise control over the health conditions
46/ AV tel. no. 1304/21.5.19, Repoulis to Venizelos.
47/ MOFA 141 tel. no. 4396/28.5.19, Venizelos to Stergiadis.
48/ MOFA 136t tel. no. 6327/28.6.19, Diomidis to Italian
Ambassador.MOFA	 136p tel.
	 n.n./20.6.19,	 Stergiadis	 to
Venizelos and Diomidis.
49/ AV 14a tel. no. 2577/966/22.11.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
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in the area while the Turkish administration was responsible
for the implementation of the measures suggested by the
Commission. The Turks, however, were soon in no position to do
this because of lack of funds. In view of the grave danger of
epidemics spreading to the troops, the Greek authorities could
not overlook the Turkish inar'tivity and soon established their
r,wn Health Authority 50/. The Hii1h C r)mmissioners admitted that
"this initiative was le3it irnized by the necessity to protect
the health of the troops". In their opinion, however, this
preorcupation could not justify the fact that the Greek
duthorities implemented various measures without previously
consulting the Interallied Commission on Health and Hygiene.
To their mind, "the Interallied Commission on Health has been
reduced to insignificance, its role is nominal and it is not
in a position to implement the orders given to its Ottoman
agents". The only way to improve health and sanitation
conditions in Smyrna, it was argued, was for the Greek
government to instruct the Health Authority to conform to the
decisions of the Interallied Commission 51/.
At the insistence of the High Commissioners, Stergiadis
agreed to let the Health Service be provided by the agents of
the Interallied Commission on the condition that the Greek
Health Authority could function alongside it and implement as
many measures as it considered necessary for the protection of
the Greek army and population, including, among other things,
vaccinations and the disinfection of buildings. Showing a
conciliatory spirit, Stergiadis agreed that the Turkish Health
Inspectors acting for the Interallied Commission should
inspect the ships arriving at the Smyrna port first, to be
followed by their Greek colleagues. Should a ship flying a
foreign flag refuse to accept this second inspection, the
Greek Health Inspectors had orders not to insist.
The matter of the Customs Authority was rather more
complicated as it touched upon an area more sensitive to
Allied susceptibilities than the health of the troops and
population or the freedom of movement and contraband granted
de facto to the nationalists by the various Interallied
Authorities. The Allied High Commissioners complained that
although the Turkish Custom Authorities continued to function
regularly, they were subject to the strict control and the
constant intervention of Greek functionaries attached to them
and responsible for the consideration of applications for
exports. The Greek military authorities had taken upon
themselves to compose a list of articles whose exportation
from the Greek zone was prohibited so that the needs of the
army should receive priority. Although this list, the High
Commissioners admitted, remained a dead letter, General Nider
who instigated it, had perpetrated the crime of ignoring the
existence of the Interallied Commission of Exports in
Constantinople which was the only body competent to regulate
50/ On the work of the Greek Health Service see Chapter Three,
Section III.
51/ MOFA 36t doc. no. 3357/13.3.20, Report...
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the matter and to ensure the regular provisioning of goods for
the whole of the Ottoman Empire.
This in effect meant thaE the Greek Customs
Authority not only had to observe the controls set by the
Interallied Commission for the whole of the Empire but also to
apply to this Commission in order to secure permission to
implement the special measures needed in Smyrna at any point
in time. However, this procedure was not easy to apply because
as soon as the news of a Greek application reached the foreign
businesses dealing in the merchandise in question, all the
stocks of the merchandise were exported from Smyrna before
this application could be considered by the Commission.
Therefore, it was essential for the Greek authorities to be
able to ban the exports of a particular product pending the
decision of the Interallied Commission 52/.
The Greek authorities were also criticized "for
interpreting the term exportation in its widest sense" as they
had not only prohibited the exportation of certain goods from
the port of Smyrria to other countries but also to
Constantinople. Since no definite decision had been taken by
the Supreme Council regarding the future of Smyrna, the
prohibition of exports from one Turkish port to another could
not be accepted 53/. In the minds of the Allied High
Commissioners, the matter could be resolved by the institution
of yet another Interallied Authority to represent the
Interallied Commission of Exports in Smyrna. What they did not
seem to appreciate was that the Greek authorities had to
reinforce the Custom House with a large number of guards in
order to forestall the contraband of arms and ammunition
destined for the nationalists and flourishing along the coast
of western Asia Minor 54/.
In January 1920, the Allied Admirals in
Constantinople communicated to Stergiadis their decision to
establish a new Interallied Authority in the port of Smyrna,
comprising three Allied and one Greek officer. Its functions
would be as follows:
To secure the implementation of all measures taken for
the abolition of contraband in war material; to survey the
52/ MOFA ibid. This procedure was followed in the autumn of
1919 when the export of cotton from the port of Smyrna was
prohibited for a few days, pending a decision from the
Constantinople Exports Commission. The decision to ban cotton
exports was taken to safeguard the local thread and yarn
industry, mostly in the hands of French businesses. It was
lifted within a few days because of strong protests by the
British Chamber of Commerce of Smyrna. AV 14a tel. no.
2557/966/22.11.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
53/ MOFA 36t doc. no. 3357/13.3.20, Report...
54/ AV 14a tel. no. 2557/966/22.11.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
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exports and imports of merchandise in conformity with the
rules set out by the Interallied Commission of Exports in
Constantinople; to have overall authority on matters relating
to the surveillance of the movement, docking and security of
ships in the port, the implementation of all measures set out
by the Interallied Commissir.'i on health and Hygiene, the
policing of the port and thc f'&i ti ,uinT imf the lighthouses in
the port of Smyrna. Finally, to assist in all matters relating
to the Interallied Passport Control, t e administration of the
local police and the functioning of the C]stoms House. In
all cases, the duties of this new Interallied Authority would
be exercised with "every respect due to the rights of the
international companies in charge of the quays and lighthouses
of the Smyrna gulf". Each of the four officers was to be
allocated specific duties and was to conform to orders
received by his respective superior in Constantinople.
Stergiadis immediately communicated this note to Athens and
Paris with the comment that under no circumstances could he
accept "interallied interference" in the policing of the city
55/. Politis expressed the view that should these measures be
implemented the Greek occupation would prove impossible to
maintain. The Greek Foreign Minister was most annoyed as no
previous intimation had been made to the Greek government
regarding the institution of yet another interallied authority
56/.
Following Venizelos's instructions, Stergiadis replied to
the Allied High Commissioners that the Greek High Commissioner
in Smyrna had been appointed by his g9vernment in order to
supervise the implementation of a mandate entrusted to Greece
by the Supreme Council. He therefore assumed absolute
responsibility for the maintenance of public order within the
Greek zone, a duty he would not be in a position to fulfil on
the basis of orders and directives by the Allied High
Commissioners in Constantinople. For this reason, Stergiadis
wrote, the High Commissioners were requested whenever they
wished to propose the application of new measures, to prompt a
relevant decision of the Supreme Council. The latter was sure
to request the view of the Greek government before taking any
decision and would, in this way, provide the Greek High
Commissioner with the chance to voice his comments or
possible objections. According to the system the Allied High
Commissioners sought to implement, Stergiadis concluded, the
Greek High Commissioner was asked to become an executive organ
arid implement measures and decisions taken without his being
consulted, "by persons residing in a city where news regarding
the situation in Smyrna cannot always be objective" 57/.
55/ MOFA Sib tel. no. 11333/2.1.20, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
56/ MOFA tel. no. 12885/7.1.20, Politis to Venizelos.
57/ MOFA 51b tel. no. 111517/7.1.20 Venizelos to Stergiadis and
345/18.3.20, Stergiadis to Venizelos. It seems that the French
Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not been informed either and,
for this reason, the strong words used by Stergiadis in his
reply to the note, received Clmenceau's approval.
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After this reply the matter was dropped, only to be
raised again three months 	 later,	 when the Allied
representatives in Smyrna reminded Stergiadis that "the
jurisdiction of the Allied High Commissioners extended over
the whole of Turkey, including.Smyrna" and informed him that
an Interallied Authority for the port of Smyrna would soon
arrive in the city and hoped to collaborate with a Greek
officer. In a conversation with Admiral Fitzmaurice and
General Highbury, Stergiadis established that the British
delegates considered the implementation of the measure
pointless as it had been conceived at a much earlier stage
under different circumstances and with reference to the whole
of Turkey and not exclusively to Smyrna. However, they were
quick to point out that, as this decision was taken by the
Allied High Commissioners, the British authorities in Smyrna
could not disobey their orders or refuse to implement the
measures. To a question by Admiral Fitzmaurice asking what
his reaction would be should the High Commissioners insist,
Stergiadis replied that the Greek authorities could in no way
accept the interference of an Interallied Authority in the
policing of the city. "With reference to the administration of
the port, should they insist despite our objections, we do not
plan to put up armed resistance" 58/. Stergiadis seemed
convinced that the local British representatives wished to see
the measure suspended because they recognized that
interference by the various Allied bodies in the
administration of Smyrna complicated and obstructed the Greek
task. In the event, it was decided in Constantinople not to
insist on the institution of the Interallied Port Authority
but to maintain the unofficial surveillance of the passport
control. Nonetheless, "it was in this desire to prove their
liberalism that the Greek authorities were unable to forestall
the levantine-european conspiracy and, in effect, allowed the
nationalists to prepare everything from the start" /.
It was quite clear that all these problems and sources of
friction were the result of a clash of authority between the
Greek administration and the various Interallied bodies. The
only possible way to remedy the situation, it was felt, would
be to define in a precise manner the role and the powers of
the Greek functionaries 60/. At this point, another issue of
considerable importance was noted: "The accession of territory
which Greece receives as an outcome of the war, brings to the
fore the broad question of the country's administrative
capacity...At a moment when Greece finds her administrative
responsibilities largely increased, she is trying to carry on
with a civil service considerably depleted as a result of the
division of the country into two hostile camps. In the
interests of Hellenism, it would now be necessary to make a
definite attempt to heal the breach that now renders Greece a
58/ MOFA	 51b tel. no. 345/18.3.20, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
591 Andreadis,A. La destruction de Smyrne, Athens 1923, p.11.
/ Near East, 21.6.19.
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country divided against herself" 611.
The Treaty of Sèvres assigned an area of 17,452 square
kilometres in Asia Minor to the jurisdiction of Greece, under
the suzerainty of the Sultan. The area was to be administered
by Greece with the cooperation of alocal parliament where the
various national and religious groups would be proportionately
.tepresented. The Treaty also provided for a referendum to be
c'r)nducted after five years to decide the issue of the
annexation of the area by Greece 62/. Under the Turkish
alministration, Asia Minor was divided into 13 vilayets
(general administrative units), which consisted of sancaks
(provinces), in turn consisting of kazas (counties). The Vali,
the Moutesarif and the Kaimakam were in charge respectively.
The vilayet of Aidin consisted of four sancaks, those of
Smyrna, Sarouhan, Aidin and Denizli. The sancak of Smyrna had
13 kazas, the sancak of Sarouhan 11, the sancaks of Aidin and
Denizli 6 kazas each.
The Treaty of Sevres Zone, or the Greek Zone, extended
over parts of the vilayets of Aidin and Brusa and had an
estimated population of just over a million. The Greek part of
the vilayet of Brousa extended over the kaza of Aivali, the
Emrout-Abat area of the kaza of Vourhanie and the Moschonisia
islands. In the vilayet of Aidin, Greece received the
following areas:
a.The sancak of Smyrna except for a small part of the kaza of
Odemi, and the kaza of Kouadasi (Ephesos). The Greek
administration estimated that 806,000 out of the 827,000
inhabitants of the sancak were included in the Greek zone.
b. Part of the sancak of Sarouhan including most areas of the
kazas of Manisa (Magnesia), Kasaba and Akhisar (Axari). It
was estimated that out of 398,700 inhabitants, 195,000 were
included in the Greek zone.
c. A small part of the sancak of Aidin, extending over parts
of the kazas of Aidin and Nazili and totalling 45,000 out of
the 204,500 inhabitants.
When there were no more doubts about the signature of
the Treaty and the extent of the zone to be mandated to
Greece, orders were received from Paris to the effect that all
the ground work for the take over of the administration should
be completed as soon as possible 63/. The day following the
signature of the Treaty of Sèvres, Stergiadis was to summon
the Vail and request the handing over of the administration.
This by no means signified that the Turkish authorities would
be abolished or that the Turkish civil servants would be
61/ ibid.
62/ For the complete text of the Treaty of Sèvres pertaining to
Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace, as well as for the other
Treaties signed on the same date at Sèvres see
British and Foreign State Papers, Treaty Series, no 11 (1920),
CMD 964.
63/ MOFA 49a tel. no. 11445/25.2.20, Venizelos to Stergiadis.
1 52
dismissed. On the contrary, every effort should be made to
incorporate them into the Greek administration which, at the
same time, should make use of the local Greek, Armenian and
Jewish resources in personnel, on as great a scale as
possible. Instead of dissolving the Turkish administrative
structure in order to introduce a Greek one, Stergiadis tried
to shape the existing machinery to the needs of the new regime
and add Greek as well as foreign nationals to the civil
service, thereby reflecting the multinational character of the
zone to be administered. The only major change to be effected
was, the severing of all links between the Turkish employees
and the Ottoman government. Stergiadis was to decide on the
time limit to be given to the Turkish civil servants to
declare whether they wished to offer their services to the new
administration. On the issue of the customary oath taken by
the members of the Greek civil service, Stergiadis suggested
that the Turkish nationals should sign an affidavit instead,
until such date as the Parliament decided on the issue 64/.
By the end of July, the High Commissioner reported
that the Greek authorities were ready to assume the
administration and that an adequate number of experienced
civil servants had already arrived from Athens to take charge
of the departments of justice, finance and national economy
65/.
To ensure that the take over would be effected without
problems, Stergiadis asked the Vail to request instructions
from Constantinople. As it did not seem that orders were
forthcoming and in order to avoid any unnecessary delay and
subsequent friction with the Turkish authorities, the High
Commissioner sent a group of high ranking Turkish civil
servants to Constantinople, to request directions. The Sublime
Porte instructed them to relinquish the administration of the
area as soon as the Treaty was signed and gave permission to
those wishing to offer their services to the new regime to do
so. This was vital for the Greek authorities who wished to
maintain as many of them as possible as a guarantee of their
good intentions towards the Turkish community.
Only three sections of the civil service were not
included in the offer of the Greek administration: the
gendarmerie, the police corps and the judiciary. Stergiadis
considered reemploying at a later stage those who were
prepared to resign from the Turkish gendarmerie to join the
equivalent Greek corps.The local police force could not be
maintained because no such body was to be included in the
Greek administration. As far as the judiciary was concerned, a
special law was needed to modify the organization of the
equivalent body in Greece as the prevailing law did not
provide for the incorporation of judges into the hierarchy.
When this law was passed, the members of the Turkish judiciary
/ MOFA 41e tel. no. 12124/20.7.20, Venizelos to Stergiadis.
65/ MOFA 16k tel. no. 818/18.8.20, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
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would be asked to join the Greek administration. The personnel
of all the other departments were to remain in their positions
provisionally until a gradual evaluation of the abilities of
each civil servant could be made. Similarly, no changes were
to be made in the personnel of the Moufti's Office, the
Ottoman Bank and the Turkish schools.
The instrument of the Treaty between the Allied
and Associated Powers and Turkey was signed at Sèvres on 10
August 1920. Two days later, a protocol was signed at the
Governor's House (Konak) in Smyrna by which the Turkish side
relinquished all authority to the Greeks. The Protocol was
signed by Ahmet Besin, representing the Vail, and
P.Gounarakis, representing the High Commissioner 66/.
The division of the Greek zone into administrative
units was largely based on the system prevailing under
Ottoman rule. Except for the kaza of Smyrna and the adjacent
area of Ayiasuiuk which were under the direct control of
the Smyrna High Commission -renamed the Greek Administration
of Smyrna (GAS)- the remaining zone was divided into fourteen
counties (Ypodioikiseis) and one province (Nomarchia), as
follows: The Province of Manisa and the Counties of Odemi,
Tire (Thira), Baindir (Vaindirion), Nympheon, Krini,
Karaburna, Sivrihisar, Vryula, Palea Fokea, Menemen, Kasaba,
Bergama and AivaliG7/.
In the area occupied by the Greek army outside the
Treaty of Sèvres zone, the system prevailing before the
signature of the Treaty would be maintained since this
territory was not, in any sense,given to Greece. Moreover,
whilst the Greek administration was anxious to preserve both
public order and the Turkish authorities at all costs, it
viewed this area merely as a buffer zone between the
nationalists and the Greek army. According to Venizelos,
Greece would not evacuate the extended zone occupied in the
summer of 1920 until the terms of the Treaty were carried out
and, what was more, should Turkey fail to do so, the Greek
forces were to advance far enough to render any efforts of the
nationalists ineffective 68/. This area was known as the
Militarily Occupied Zone (Stratiotikos katechomeni chora-MOZ)
and, under the Greek regime,it was divided into
administrative units, each headed by a representative of the
High Commissioner.
By September 1922, the number of these units came to
twenty.	 These	 were:	 the	 Higher	 Representation
(Anotera Antiprosopia)	 of Brusa and the Representations
(Antiprosopies) of Mudania, Panormos, Kios, Mihalits, Inegiol,
Biga, -Ezine, Balia, Balikesir, Soma, Adramyt, Salihli,
Alasehir (Filadelfia), Koula, Uak, Simav, Af ion Karahisar,
Kutahia and Eski Sehir. The Turkish authorities within these
units would be preserved intact, together with the gendarmerie
and the police force. The task of the Greek representatives
66/ MOFA 49a tel. no. 11445/25.2.20, Venizelos to Stergiadis.
67/ ibid.
68/ AV26t letter, n.n./5.8.20, Venizelos to Viscount Bryce.
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was to supervise the Turkish administration and the
application of Turkish laws regarding the administration, the
tax system, the courts of justice etc. The representatives
also saw to the application of the High Commissioner's orders
and directives and, whenever possible, acted as intermediaries
between the Greek military authorities and the Turkish
administration.
After the military offensive during the summer of
1920 and the addition of new territories to the MOZ,
representatives of the High Commissioner accompanied by
Turkish gendarmerie units were sent to the areas of Salihli,
Kirkagac,	 Soma, Adramyt and Kemer. Their first task was to
reinstate the Turkish authorities, an effort which,
reportedly, went a long way towards winning the trust of the
local population and securing public order. After these
successes of the Greek army, Stergiadis seemed to believe
sincerely that the attitude of the Turkish public was "almost
friendly, mainly because of the insufferable tyranny of the
Kemalists and the certainty that the nationalist movement had
been crushed" 69/. By September 1921, another thirteen
representatives of the High Commissioner had been put in
charge of the 31 kazas of the MOZ. Four of them doubled as
inspectors of finances. They were all directly responsible to
the High Commissioner and a special department was organized
at the GAS to supervise and coordinate their work 70/.
After the successful offensive of the Greek army,
Stergiadis himself travelled in the occupied zone to secure
the immediate reestablishment of the Turkish authorities and
to persuade those Turkish civil servants reluctant to resume
their posts to do so. Special orders to the Greek military and
his representatives stressed the need not only to allow the
Turkish administration to operate normally but also to protect
it and render it every possible assistance. He also asked for
the cooperation of the acting Vail of Smyrna and the
Moutesarif of Manisa in the attempt to convince the Turkish
civil servants to return to their duties and, failing this, to
appoint new ones so that the work of the administration should
not be disrupted. On the delicate issue of tax revenue
management, Stergiadis ordered that all taxes should be
collected by the Turkish authorities as in the past but all
proceeds would be used in the first instance to pay the
salaries of the Turkish civil servants. The rest would be used
according to the directives of the Ottoman government. He
further asked the Greek High Commissioner in Constantinople to
inform the Allied representatives and the Sublime Porte that
the Greek administration had no wish to interfere in the
financial affairs of the occupied zone (MOZ) but, in view of
the deplorable financial situation of many Turkish civil
servants due to delays from Constantinople in the payment of
their salaries, he would have to intervene and use part of the
69/ MOFA 41e tel. n.n./23.7.20, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
70/ GAK 14a4 1978/22.9.21, Circular signed by the Secretary
General of the GAS.
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taxes for this purpose should these delays persist.
After the signature of the treaty and the official take
over of the administration, Stergiadis was anxious to have his
jurisdiction, and especially his legislative powers, specified
by law in order to govern the area with a free hand until the
local parliament could be convened and for this reason he went
to Athens on 20 August 1920 71/. During his absence in
Athens and on the occasion of the signature of the Treaty,
the local Greeks prepared to organize celebrations "for the
liberation of Smyrna and its unification with the motherland".
Admittedly, this was a day the local Greek population had been
awaiting for a long time. However, as the day of the
"unification with the motherland" was in reality nowhere near,
Stergiadis gave orders from Athens to the civil authorities
not to take part in the celebrations so as not to offend
Turkish national pride. He also ordered that the celebrations
should be confined to the Greek Cathedral and strictly
forbade all pageants, processions and the delivery of "the
usual stupid speeches" 72/.
As a result of the High Commissioner's talks with the
government, a law was passed stipulating that the Greek
Administration of Smyrna would be headed by a representative
of the government to whom all authorities in the Greek zone
would answer, including the military High Command. This
representative would bear the title of Smyrna High
Commissioner and would be appointed by Royal Decree on the
recommendation of the Council of Ministers. The law further
stipulated that the post of High Commissioner was compatible
with a ministerial portfolio and would have absolute
administrative, judicial and legislative powers until such
date as the local parliament could be convened after the
ratification of the Treaty by Turkey. The High Commissioner
was further given power to issue and sign decrees and to
establish a University, a Moslem seminary and any other
institutions he deemed necessary 73/. Another law passed on
the same date provided that the appointment of civil servants
to the GAS and the institution of posts was to be done by
Royal Decrees 74/.
The Greek Administration of Smyrna (GAS) was
organized into the following departments: Office of the High
Commissioner and General Secretariat, Departments of Interior,
Finances,	 Justice,	 Education, Public Health and Social
Welifare, National Economy (divided into sections of
Commerce, Industry and Agriculture), Public Works, Moslem
Affairs and General Inspectorate.
71/ MOFA 3p tel. no. 9957/ 12.8.20, Stergiadis to Venizelos
and	 Repoulis.
72/ MOFA 106b 1072/28.8.20, Stergiadis to Gounarakis.
GGG, Series A, Law no. 2493/10.9.20.
GGG,Series A, Law no. 2495/10.9.20.
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Following the military operations of the summer
1921 and the addition of new territories to the MOZ, a major
redistribution of tasks and a reorganization of the various
departments within the GAS took place. As a result, ten
departments were formed in order to deal more effectively
with the ever increasing work load. These departments were:
1.General Secretariat: This included the Office of the High
Commissioner, Sections for Political Affairs, External and
Foreign Affairs and the Press Office.
2.Department of Justice 	 with	 Sections	 for	 Prison
Administration, Legal Translations and Personnel. This
Department was represented in fifteen major towns of the Greek
zone 75/.
3.Department of the Interior with Sections for Local
Authorities and Administration, General Administration, Public
Order and Religion.
4.Department of Education 	 with	 Sections for Primary,
Secondary and Higher Education,	 Antiquities,	 General
Inspectorate and School Hygiene.
5.Department of Finances with Sections for Direct Taxation,
Indirect Taxation, Public Property and Proceeds and
Administration.
6.Department of National Economy,	 divided into two sub-
departments:a.Commerce and Industry with Sections for
Commerce,	 Industry-Employment-Statistics,	 Provisioning
and Mines.	 b.Agriculture with Sections for Agriculture,
Agricultural Economy, Forestry and Veterinary.
7.Department of Public Works	 with	 Sections	 for
Administration, 	 Roadworks,	 Harbours, Sewerage, Plumbing,
Architecture and Public Buildings.
8.Department of Telecommunications with Sections 	 for the
Post Offices and Telegrams-Telephones.
9.Department of Public Health and Social Welfare with Sections
for Public Health, Rehabilitation of Refugees, Care of
Soldiers and Charitable Institutions for Social Welfare and
Hygiene.
1O.Department of Moslem Affairs with Sections for Moslem
Institutions, Moslem Education and Moslem Courts-Judicial
Affairs 76/.
11. Department of the Militarily Occupied Zone, which acted as
a coordinating body for all the representatives within the
MOZ.
After this reorganization, the civil personnel of
the GAS, with the exception of the judiciary, was incorporated
75/ MOFA 120g doc. no. 9475/31.5.21, Department of Justice to
the	 High Commissioner.
76/ MOFA 120a2 circular 2/1.8.21, Stergiadis. The following
were	 in charge of the Departments: 1. P. Gounarakis 2. G.
Tomas 3. S. Skarpetis 4. S. Vassilias 5. I. Karamanos 6.
Ortentzatos 7. G. Xynopoulos 8. D. Voudouris. For the
Departments where no Director was appointed, Stergiadis acted
as Head.
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into the following categories and ranks, with monthly salaries
specified accordingly:
I .Administrat ion
1. Head of Department and Secretary General	 2,000 drs
2. Director of Department (First Grade) and Nomarch 1,200 "
3 Director of Department (Second Grade)
	
1,050	 "
4. Head of Section (First Grade)	 900	 "
5. Head of Section (Second Grade), Representative
and Deputy Governor (First Grade)	 750










10.Administrative Personnel A' Grade 	 300
	
,'
11.Administrative Personnel B' Grade 	 250
	
I,
II.Translators, Interpreters and Foremen
1. First Grade	 600 drs






4. Assistants B'	 300	 'I


















In October 1921, Stergiadis visited Athens to discuss
further administrative measures to be taken for the effective
organization of a civil administration throughout the area
under military occupation 77/. The administration of the
Treaty of Sèvres Zone was to continue as it was, while in the
rest of the occupied territory, more Greek controllers and
gendarmes would be appointed. In a subsequent meeting with
Granville, Stergiadis tried to press the point that these
measures were made necessary by the non-ratification of the
Treaty and urged the imperative necessity for a speedy
settlement. He seemed satisfied with the performance of the
Ottoman authorities who were continuing to offer their
services in the name of the Sublime Porte within the MOZ. All
in all, the new measures agreed in Athens, came to an
extension of the up until that time Smyrna Administration, to
include the occupied territories (MOZ), without involving
annexation or administrative assimilation to Greek territory
78/. In the framework of this reorganization, the Smyrna High
Commission (Ypati Armosteia Smyrnis) was renamed Greek
Administration of Smyrna (Elliniki Diikisis Sinyrnis) 79/.
The Greek Administration of Smyrna continued its work
along the same lines for the next year, until August 1922,
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has since been claimed that from the study of the negotiations
that brought about the disaster of September 1922 "no villain
emerges. Yet there is alas much to criticize and unfortunately
little to praise" 81/. If this statement is true, then the one
aspect of the 191 9-1 922 period which stands out as positive
and constructive, is the work carried out by the High
Commission of Smyrna, against all odds. Even if its
achievements were lost under the crumbling 19th century
diplomacy that dictated the Treaty of Sevres, one thing
remains clear: The Greek functionaries had been given the most
difficult administrative task conceivable, because they had to
govern a country with a mixed population in which, one of the
elements was of the same nationality as themselves. As Toynbee
noted, the problem of ruling Turks and non Turks in the
Ottoman Empire had completely beaten the Osmanlis themselves
82/. However, it would be rather oversimplified to suggest
that national animosity was the only or even the primary
reason for the collapse of the Greek venture. Still, despite
its predicament, the Smyrna High Commission, manned by a
substantial number of very able functionaries, produced the
only positive work carried out throughout the three years,
three months, three weeks and three days of official Greek
presence in Asia Minor.
Toynbee's own account of Stergiadis' administration,
clearly refutes his conclusion that the ledger balanced
against the Greek administration:
"[on the credit side, 	 the chief item] was	 the
repatriation of more than 120,000 Greek refugees and
deportees, which was admirably done...Bergama and
Aivali got on to their feet after the harvest of 1920;
Kinik was struggling up by the winter of 1921...Relief
was also given to the Turkish population. I saw
destitute Moslem women receiving rations of food from
the High Commissioner's representative at Aidin and
subsidies were paid to the Turkish orphanage (Daru'l-
Yetim) at Smyrna. Besides this, certain positive
measures were taken for economic and social
development. In rural districts, cheap light ploughs
were put on sale at cost price by the administration;
an experimental farm for mechanical agriculture was
established at Torbaly and Professor Karatheodoris
began to organize his new university of which the
departments of hygiene and oriental languages were to
be launched in the autumn of 1922. If this scheme was
prematurely ambitious, nothing could have been more
practical than the overhauling of the municipal
administration of the Smyrna city, which was entrusted
to a Greek refugee from Varna Mr. [A.] Krionas" 83/.
81/ Helmreich, op.cit., p. 327.
82/ Toynbee, op.cit., p. 158.
83/ Toynbee, op.cit., pp. 153-207, also app. on p. 387-89.
Quotation from p. 167. Housepian, 2p.cit., p. 73, n. 68.
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On the basis of the archival evidence, it is safe to
say that had the torch which burnt down the city not been lit,
the Greek Administration of Smyrna would have left behind a
lot more that the ruins left standing in Cilicia after the
French departure a year earlier.
To counteract efforts to discredit the work of the
Greek administration, in 1921 the Press Office of the MOFA
publlshed a pamphlet entitled "Greece in Asia Minor, 1921",
which seems to have been an official apologia of the Greek
administration of the occupied territories and a detailed
description of the work carried out. It is unfortunate that
during the course of research for this study, it was not
possible to consult this publication. It is also unfortunate
that the existing archival or secondary material does not
include details for most of the departments of the
administration and, consequently, it is not possible to give a
full picture of their endeavours or to give a complete
catalogue of those who worked for the High Commission.
Nonetheless, archival research has produced some material
reflecting the task of three of these departments, namely
those for Public Health and Social Security, Education and
Moslem Affairs. In addition, secondary material provides
information on the establishment of the Greek Post Office in
Smyrna 84/.
Qj/ See Chapter Three, sections II to VI.
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II. The Repatriation and Rehabilitation of Refugees
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In May 1919, as soon as the Greek authorities were
established in Smyrna, the repatriation of the Greeks from
Asia Minor who had sought refuge in the Greek Kingdom as a
result of the deportations and persecutions during the period
1908 - 1919, assumed top priority. What the Greek authorities
wanted to avoid at all costs was the return of the refugees
without their supervision and planning of the homecoming. This
could prove catastrophic as clashes with the Turkish
population, who had by that time moved into the Greek
properties, were sure to ensue. A Department to supervise the
return of the refugees to their homes was organized within the
High Commission and several surveys were conducted in Greece
to establish the number of refugees that wished to be
repatriated. The High Commissioner was adamant that all
surveys and infrastructural work were completed before the
arrival of any refugees because he wanted to forestall all
possible disturbances and, also, because only those refugees
originating from the zone under Greek occupation should be
repatriated. In view of these considerations, orders were
issued by the Greek authorities prohibiting the repatriation
of any refugees without clearance from the High Commission
!/.Those who came back without permission were threatened with
immediate deportation, to serve as an example to the rest of
the refugee population eager to return and unable to
understand the political considerations necessitating the
measure. In the event, no one from those who returned without
clearance was deported on the condition that each refugee
group would be collectively responsible for the payment of
indemnities and would be punished with immediate deportation
should any anti-Turkish disturbances occur 2/. However, the
return of the refugees could not be postponed for later than
November as weather conditions would not permit their
provisional settlement in camps etc. Consequently, the
Department had a very tight time limit within which to
complete the preparatory work required. The return of the
refugees who held permits to do so was further impeded by the
lack of ships to transport them to the ports scheduled for
their landing, as well as of means of transport to their final
destination 3/.
The safe reinstatement of the refugees under the
supervision of the Greek authorities assumed urgent priority
as, immediately after the Greek landing, they started
proceeding towards their places of origin in large numbers
while armed Aivaliot refugees crossed to Aivali from Lesvos
and tried to re-occupy their properties forcibly evicting the
Turks who occupied them since their deportation. What made the
1/	 MOFA	 141	 tel.	 no.	 4263/20.5.19,	 Diomidis	 to
Paraskevopoulos: 	 "For the time being, the repatriation of
the refugees should	 not be allowed".
2/ AV11 tel. no. 8021/18.9.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
3/	 AViOst tel.	 no.	 2082/6925/23.8.19,	 Stergiadis	 to
Venizelos.
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situation worse was the fact that during the period 1914-1918,
the Turkish authorities had established some 30,000 Moslem
refugees (mohadjirs) from Serbia, Macedonia, Albania, Epirus,
the Aegean islands and Crete in the homes and properties of
the deported Greeks 4/. Evidently, there was grave danger for
the collapse of the already shaky public order in the area and
Venizelos requested from the Supreme Council permission to
extend the Greek military occupation over the coast from
Aivali to Ayiasuluk. As a further precautionary measure to
avert any clashes, the Greek authorities were presented with
the task to organize the resettlement of the Moslem refugees
and, at considerable cost on the part of the High Commission,
some were transported and reinstated in their properties In
Greece, others were moved to the interior of Asia Minor or
the zone around Constantinople while those who wished to do so
were established in exclusively Turkish villages within the
Greek zone 5/. In areas with dense Moslem refugee population,
the repatriation of the Greek refugees was altogether
prohibited.
At this point, the efforts of the Department for the
Return and Rehabilitation of Refugees were further hindered by
the Turkish authorities which, naturally, urged the Moslem
refugees not to hand back Greek property and to remain in the
Greek zone. In a number of confidential telegrams to the
Ministry of Interior in Constantinople, the Vali of Smyrna
accused the Greek authorities of evicting the Turks "from the
homes they inhabit" in order to install "Greek migrants". He
further urged the Sublime Porte "to exercise its rights and
forbid the installation of the Greeks", which, in his view,
was illegal 6/. In the meantime, the Turkish authorities
continued to install local Moslems in Greek properties 7/.
In the event, the danger of major clashes between the
returning Greeks and the Turks -local or refugee- were averted
by policing the area with special patrols and by the issue of
orders by the High Commissioner to the effect that any
repatriated Greek intending to harm a Turk or disrupt public
order would be deported immediately. The fact that major
clashes were averted, constituted a major success for the
Greek authorities, even more so as in other areas of the
Ottoman Empire where refugees had returned after the War, it
4/ In the area of Bergama alone, 12,000 mohadjirs had been
settled during the same period. MOFA 116 a5.
5/ GAK 22a file 85-86, doc. no. 25545/9.9.20, Gounarakis to
High	 Commissioners's representative at Adramyt.
6/ MOFA 143 doc. no. 5567/9.12.19, Katehakis to First
Military Corps in Smyrna, transmitting copies of six telegrams
by the Vali. The fact that these telegrams, containing hard
accusations against the Greek authorities, had not been
intercepted in Smyrna but had been freely transmitted, tends
to suggest that the Turkish authorities were not limited in
their movements by the Greek occupation
7/ MOFA 116 a5.
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had not proved possible to avoid them 8/.
By October 1919, the preparatory work was completed and
official permission was granted for the return of the Greek
refugees in stages 9/. As a result of concentrated Turkish
efforts,the Allied High Commissioners trid to prevent this
repatriation and presented a collective note to the Greek High
Commissioner in Constantinople stating that "in view of the
density of the population and the unsatisfactory conditions of
sanitation in the Greek zone", no person embarking from Black
or Aegean Sea ports and travelling 3rd class would be allowed
to disembark in Turkey without hav[ng secured a written
permission signed by a representative of one of the Allied
powers at the point of embarkation. At the port of
disembarkation, it was also stated, the traveller should give
"substantial" reasons for his trip to Turkey and prove to the
representatives of the Interallied Port Authority that he had
adequate means of support. With the same note, the Allied High
Commissioners also made known that the repatriation of large
refugee groups was prohibited "in principle". Exceptional
cases were to be studied by the Allied representatives at the
port of embarkation and the High Commissioners were to decide
whether their return would be permitted 10/.
Stergiadis refuted the reasons given by the High
Commissioners for the prohibition of the repatriation of the
refugees and asked Venizelos to secure a Supreme Council
directive lifting the ban imposed from Constantinople. Should
the ban remain in force, he concluded, friction between the
Greek authorities and the Allied representatives in Smyrna and
Constantinople could not be avoided 11/. His view was that the
area where repatriation was taking place was definitely not
overpopulated and that the standard of sanitation and public
health in the Greek zone was far better if compared to
previous years. In collaboration with the Department of Public
Health of the Smyrna High Commission, doctors were posted to
the refugee camps and sirgeries were established to look after
public health and distribute medicine free of charge wherever
needed. Despite the heavy winter conditions and the multitude
of endemic diseases, the refugees were in good health 12/.
Stergiadis further argued that there was no danger of large
8/ G. Gantherot, Commander of the French Army in the Levant,
in his book La France en Syrie et en Cilicie, p.192, describes
the clashes between Armenians and Turks in Cilicia and
concludes: "Comment eviter d'ailleurs des sanglants rencontres
entre les maiheureux refuges gui commencaient a rentrer et les
demobilises, les deserteurs, les vagabonds de tout sorte qui
se rendant dans les localites videes de leurs habitants par la
guerre, les deportations et les massacres, y prenaient
possession de maisons et des biens armeniens".
9/ High Commissioner's order no. 13319/19.10.19.
10/ MOFA 51g tel. no. 19029/3.1.20, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
11/ MOFA 51g tel. no. 19029/3.1.20, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
12/ MOFA 116 a5.
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refugee groups returning at the same time as the resettlement
was carried out gradually and, in any case, half of the
refugees had already been repatriated.
In the event, the repatriation continued with the
refugees arriving at ports other than Smyrna, where the French
representative prohibited their disembarkation and, to make
matters more difficult, the Interallied Passport Control
enforrc inflexible and strict procedures through which the
place of origin of those refugees who had received permits was
doiibtel and their right to disembark was put to question 13/.
The next major problem was the housing of the
returning refugees. A survey conducted by the Department
showed that more than 150 towns and villages along the coast
from Adramyt to Sokia had been destroyed diring the War. Of
the 45,000 households belonging to Greeks, 23,000 were
destroyed, 18,000 partially damaged and only about 4,000 were
in habitable condition. Building materials in the Greek zone
were scarce and went for exhorbitant prices, thus making the
repair of the homes impossible and the housing of the refugees
problematic. Those that returned during the first months of
the Greek occupation had to stay in tents while the huts built
for the refugees from the Erithrea Peninsula during their stay
in Chios (1914-1918) were dismantled and their components were
used to repair partially damaged houses in thirty one villages
and towns of the peninsula. Additional materials came from
Smyrna and the builders and technicians among the refugees
were recruited by the Department to repair the houses. Some
800 refugees were employed and organized into 30 teams which
worked to rebuild homes, churches and schools, to clean water
pumps and to repair roads and bridges 14/.
The need to provide jobs for the returning refugees
in order to support them until they could harvest their lands
again was pointed out by Venizelos in early May 1919. The MOFA
was instructed to send to Smyrna a team of engineers with a
senior official of the Ministry of Public Works in charge, to
plan, organize and supervize roadworks urgently needed for
communication and transportation purposes. Furthermore,
roadworks of local or minor importance should be undertaken to
provide the refugees " with wages instead of unemployment
benefit" 15/.
By employing the refugees to carry out part of the
work needed for their rehabilitation, the Greek authorities
made good out of an idle workforce, which would have been
bound to cause problems had it remained unemployed for a
protracted period of time. This, however, could not but be a
temporary measure because the major part of the returning
refugees were farmers for whom the point at issue was the
13/ MOFA 116 a5.
14/ MOFA 116 a5.
15/ MOFA 141 tel. no. 4166/3.5.19, Venizelos to MOFA.
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redress of their farms. These farms were, for the most part,
in deplorable situation as they had not been cultivated for
four consecutive seasons or they had been cultivated by
ignorant hands. This was one of the major reasons why
Stergiadis suggested that those refugees who had been
successfully settled in Macedonia between 1914 and 1918,
should be discouraged from returning 761.
Urgent measures were needed to remedy the situation.
The law by which the Greek High Commission of Smyrna was
instituted provided for loans up to a sum of 20 million drs to
he extended to the inhabitants of the Greek zone 17/.
Stergiadis urged Athens to establish a branch of the National
Bank of Greece in Asia Minor. He considered this an absolute
must for, among other reasons, the impartial distribution of
the loans. Despite the efforts of A. Korizis, the
representative of the Bank in Smyrna, the scheme did not take
off until November 1919, mainly due to lack of personnel 18/.
Until May 1920, the Bank had distributed loans to a total of
15 million drs among the 80,000 refugees already repatriated.
Some five more million were awaiting the return of another
25,000. The loans were distributed under the supervision of
the Department and their repayment was secured by holding the
refugee community the recipient belonged to collectively
responsible. Stergiadis strongly believed that the Greek state
was sure to recover the loans nd that collective
responsibility would have better resuls than the introduction
of farmers' cooperatives or of a mortgage option to secure
payments 19/. Although strong efforts were made to distribute
the loans equally and according to lhe needs of each area,
some of the refugee communities seemed to have important
connections in Athens through which they pressed for
preferential treatment and a bigger share in the loan. They
also pressed for the initial total sum of 20 million drs, to
be increased. Their wishes were transmitted to Venizelos who
sought Stergiadis' advice. The High Commissioner was adamant
that the loans should not exceed that sum and that each
community should receive loans according to its particular
needs and not according to its connections. " If we give in to
all the requests for loans we receive without prior
examination ", he concluded, " we will end up paying for the
upkeep of the whole population of Asia Minor " 20/.
One of the communities which expressed requests
for bigger loans were the Aivaliots. They claimed that as
their town was exclusively Greek and because their area had
been particularly stricken during the past decade,	 an
16/ AViOst tel.	 no.	 2082/6925/23.8.19,	 Stergiadis to
Venizelos.
17/ GGG, Series A, Law 2493/10.9.20.
18/ For the institution of the National Bank in Smyrna,
Solomonidis, V. "International Finance Versus Greece in Asia
Minor", article submitted for publication.
19/ MOFA 36 tel. no. 563/18.5.20, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
20/ ibid
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additional loan of 5 million drs should be extended to them.
Asked by Venizelos to comment, Stergiadis insisted that the
request should not be granted as the Aivaliots were not worse
off than other refugee communities. To their subsequent
request that the distribution of the loans allocated to them
should receive priority, Stergiadis replied that no priorities
could be given and the loans were to be distributed all at the
same time. If there were any areas were preferential treatment
should be given, he concluded, they should be those with a
large Moslem population. He further intimated to Venizelos
that should the Aivaliots, or any other group for that matter,
be put on a better footing as a result of "string-pulling" in
Athens, it would transpire that the only procedure to be
followed by a community seeking preferential treatment would
be to appoint a " protector " in Athens, bypassing the only
authority responsible for such decisions, that of the High
Commissioner 21/. These ideas were of course incomprehensible
for the mass of the returning refugees who, because of their
past sufferings, could not possibly understand that it was
absolutely necessary for the Greek authorities to prove .their
impartiality. The incidents connected with the distribution of
the loans and the refusal of Stergiadis to grant the slightest
concession to any group, community or nationality set the
first seeds of discontent against him.
Stergiadis' hard line towards the Aivaliots was
very much due to the fact that they had been the first to
organize acts of revenge against the Turks, after the Greek
landing. On 20 May 1919, Repoulis reported to Athens that he
had sent a destroyer in order to restore public order "and to
make them realize that if they revert to revenge, they would
destroy all hopes for permanent liberation" 22/. Despite
Stergiadis'inflexibility and threats, the Aivaliots repeatedly
defied his orders. At one instance, an important number was
repatriated without the permission of the High Commission,
with the excuse that the Aivali area was exclusively Greek
and, therefore, no clashes between refugees and Turks could
ensue. The High Commissioner threatened to deport them and
only the persistent representations of the Metropolitan of
Kydonies (Aivali) averted the implementation of the measure.
Stergiadis postponed the deportations on condition that the
whole Aivaliot community would be responsible and liable for
deportation should any disturbances occur. As it happened the
community undertook the responsibility for most of the
repatriated with the exception of 40 individuals who, however,
were given permission by the High Commissioner to stay 23/.
After the offensive of June 1920 and the addition
21/ MOFA 143a tel.	 no.	 11033/26.11.19,	 Stergiadis to
Venizelos,	 in reply to his 10983/20.11.19.
22/ MOFA 142 tel. no. 23719/16.8.19, Governor of Lesvos to
MOFA, tel. no. 7816/10.8.19, Diomidis to Stergiadis, tel. no.
6988/12.8.19, Stergiadis to MOFA.
23/ ibid.
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of new territories to the Greek occupation, the gradual return
of more refugees was permitted. The movement of the refugees
towards their homes in the Adramyt area was officially
authorized in July 1920 on condition that those returning
would be allowed to disembark only if they held permits issued
at their port of provenance by the appropriate Greek
authorities. Firm orders were issued to the effect that they
should be housed in their own properties under the supervision
of the High Commissioner's representative. Should their homes
be damaged or occupied by Moslems, they were to be housed
provisionally in schools, churches and other available
buildings. No Moslem refugee or local Turk should be evicted
without the permission of the Smyrna High Commission, to be
granted on the basis of a report by its local representative.
The same procedure applied to farms 24/. The Kaimakam would be
responsible for the preparation of adequate housing facilities
for the Moslem refugees, mostly Bosnians and Pomaks, who were
to be moved to homogeneous Turkish villages in the area. No
undue pressure should be exercised upon them in order to
vacate the Greek properties they occupied and they should be
given adequate time limits to facilitate their departure.
Whenever Moslem refugee groups were to be moved to the
interior, the Mutesarifs of all the villages on the itinerary
were to be informed in advance so as to assist them in every
possible way during their passage 25/.
During 1920, the loans allowed the refugees to
cultivate their farms up to 80% of their capacity. Badly
needed ploughs were imported, mainly from the USA, and were
sold at very low, subsidized prices or, at several instances,
they were distributed free of charge. Mechanical cultivation
and tractors were introduced and a 30,000 acre model farm at
Tepekioy which was to form part of the lonian University,
provided short training courses for farmers. During the same
year, an additional number of public works was undertaken,
this time not to secure work for the unemployed but to
facilitate the transportation of agricultural produce, and
especially raisins, to Smyrna 26/. Those refugees reinstated
in their farms during the summer of 1920, were given
permission to harvest the crops cultivated by the Turks during
their absence. The farm owners were obliged to pay back all
the costs of the cultivation and give two thirds of the
harvest to the Turks who had produced the crop. Anyone who did
not observe these regulations would be arrested 	 and
24/ GAK 22a doc. no.	 20545/13.7.20, Gounarakis to High
Commissioner's representative at Adramyt.
25/	 GAK 22a doc.	 no. 25545/9.9.20, Gounarakis to High
Commissioner's representative at Adramyt.
26/ MOFA 3k tel. no. 13904/18.5.20, Stergiadis to Venizelos,
in reply to the latter's querry in tel. no. 6301/15.5.20. The
decision to import ploughs and other agricultural equipment
from the USA came as a result of "political considerations" as
Stergiadis accepted in his telegram to Venizelos.
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deported immediately 27/.
By August 1920, out of the initial sum of 20
million drs, only 3.5 million had not been absorbed. As this
sum was not adequate for the rehabilitation of the remaining
30,000 refugees from the areas of Adramyt and Akhisar and,
at the same time, subsidiary loans were badly needed for
Bergama where adverse weather 'onditions had destroyed the
crops, an additional loan of 5 miLlion drs was successfully
negotiated in Athens 28/. By 1921, out of the estimated
180,827 Greeks deported from the Treaty of Sévres zone during
the War, some 144,000 had been rehabilitated 29/.
During the period of the repatriation of the
refugees, the Department also had to cater for those Ottoman
Greeks from areas not included in the Greek zone, who were
seeking refuge in their hundreds in order to avoid the fury of
the nationalists. With them, came Armenians, Jews,
Kurds,Circassians and Turks who, for various reasons, did
not wish to. remain in the nationalist occupied territories.
The daily arrival of such refugee groups from the interior and
the urgent task of catering for their most immediate needs,
represented yet another major problem for the Department and
an additional strain on its budget. Provisions were made and
services offered to all of them, irrespective of creed or
religion. As an illustration indicating the numbers involved,
it may be mentioned that during the period May 1919 - June
1920, 64,500 refugees from the interior of Asia Minor flooded
the Greek zone and especially Smyrna. In all major towns,
free meal services were organized for both the refugees and
the poorer of the inhabitants and orphanages were instituted
for hundreds of orphans who had sought refuge in the Greek
zone. One was in Smyrna and caterd for 180 boys, one in
Bayrakli for 200 infants, one in Buca for 180 girls and one in
Moschonisia for 200 boys and girls 30/.
In Smyrna alone, the other services provided
included a free meal service distributing 2000 portions per
day, 1000 of which were exclusively distributed among the
Moslem population; a bureau under the direction of Sivri Bey
of the Turkish civil service was organized to coordinate the
measures taken for the welfare of Moslem refugees, distribute
clothing, flour, small sums of money and look after the
housing of the refugees and the repatriation of those from
Greece who were in Smyrna in transit, wishing to return to
their place of origin;a refugee camp was established in
Kokaryali with room for about 150 families of 4 to 5 members
27/ GAK 22a doc. no. 20545/13.7.20, Gounarakis to High
Commissioner's representative at Adramyt.
28/ MOFA 22g tel. no. 11300/28.8.20, Gounarakis to Stergiadis
in Athens.
29/ Notaras, op.cit..
30/	 MOFA 116a2	 Report	 Ekthesi Pepragmenon Dimosias
Antilipseos. (Report on the Activities Pertaining to Social
Welfare),	 1.11 .21.
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for about 150 families of 4 to 5 members and a job centre was
created to provide jobs to those who wished to remain in the
Greek zone.
In March 1921, a special infirmary and surgery was
established in the Turkish section of Smyrna to cater
exclusively for the Moslem refugees. The doctors paid house
rills to those unable to visit the surgery and, except for the
medical care, they also provided small sums of money to buy
milk, coal and meat for the patients. During the first six
months of operation, the surgery looked after 3,556 patients,
inoculated Moslem refugees against major endemic diseases
and was in charge of the immunisation work carried out in all
Moslem refugee camps 31/.
When in the early summer of 1921 it became obvious
that the Greek army would soon have to retreat from Nikomedia
(Ismid), the High Commissioner urged Athens to allow the
transportation of some 35,000 refugees from the area to
Thrace. The number included 22,000 who had sought refuge in
Ismid during the period of Greek occupation and the 10,000
Greek and Armenian inhabitants of the city who wished to be
evacuated for fear of nationalist persecutions 32/. Stergiadis
believed that the best solution to the problem would be for
the British forces to occupy Ismid, or, as this was quite
unlikely, to allow the Christian population to move into the
Constantinople zone of occupation 33/. As it happened, the
evacuation had to be completed within two weeks because the
Greek retreat was imminent. At the same time, the Greek
government was anxious to receive information concerning the
number of refugees in the rest of the territory to be
evacuated. Gounarakis was sent to examine the situation and
reported that in Brusa alone, 12,500 Greek and Armenian
refugees were being supplied with food and medical care by the
Greek army and the Armenian community since the summer of
1920 when the Greek army occupied the city. This population
would have to be evacuated before the departure of the Greek
forces and was sure to be followed by a mass exodus of the
Greek and Armenian residents of Brusa. In the event, 32,000
refugees were evacuated to Thrace immediately after the Greek
31/ MOFA 116a2 Report	 Ekthesi Pepragmenon tou para tin
Tourkiki synoikia Leitourgountos Iatreiou
	
(Report on the
activities of the Infirmary Operating in the Turkish quarter
of Smyrna)	 27.10.21.
32/ On the reasons for the occupation of Ismid and its
subsequent evacuation, see Chapter Two, Sections I and II.
33/ Although they were never accepted by the British, these
proposals together with the interest he showed in all matters
related with the refugees, suggest that the accusations voiced
against the High Commissioner after the disaster to the effect
that he did not have any feelings for the human factor
(Akropolis, 4.3.79, to state one recent example), were quite
far from the truth.
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army left 34/.
The three year period of Greek administration
experienced a continuous movement of refugee populations
which, in their transit from the Greek zone, were cared for by
the Greek authorities with the help of charitable institutions
of the Turkish, Armenian and Greek communities and bodies such
as the Red Cross and the Patriotiko Idryma (Patriotic
Institution).
This destitute population fell mainly into three
categories: The Asia Minor Greeks, deported during the War and
returning to their homes, Moslems from the Balkans transported
to Turkey during the same period and sent to Greece or other
parts of Turkey after the Greek occupation, and, thirdly,
refugees of various nationalities, originating either from
areas outside the Greek zone or from areas which the Greek
forces evacuated after a brief period of occupation.
34/ The cost of the upkeep of these refugees came to a total




One aspect of the work carried out by the Department of
Public Health and Social Welfare of the Greek Administration,
was the strenuous effort to improve public health and to rid
the area of widely spread venereal and other contagious
diseases such as malaria, small pox etc. The important number
of obstacles encountered by the Department in this task were
c-rnnected, to name but a few, with the construction of Asia
Minor towns which usually excluded any sanitary measures, the
fatalistic beliefs of the Moslem population in matters of
health and the lack of any statistics on the mortality and
birth rates which could fcilitate the task of the
administration by suggesting the weak points of public health
and the intensity of measures to be taken.
During the Ottoman rule, no registry of births and deaths
was kept nor were any statistics on the numbers of the various
age groups ever conducted. At the same time, no law provided
for the registration with the Health authorities of either
patients suffering from contagious diseases or of the deaths
caused by them. Although from August 1920 a weekly statistical
record was kept with reference to contagious diseases (cases
and deaths), no accurate comparison between the state of
public health under the Turkish and Greek administrations is
possible.
The measures taken by the Greek administration included
the following:
Teams of doctors and nurses were organized and divided
into mobile and permanent surgeries. Each team included one
doctor, vaccination and disinfection specialists, nurses,
technicians and ratkillers. Two mobile inoculation teams
furnished with micorbiology laboratories were established to
diagnose infectious diseases. They visited every village in
the Greek zone for that purpose and complemented the work
carried out by a major microbiological laboratory, organized
in Smyrna to perform various clinical and other tests free of
charge. The mobile teams did not only go wherever they were
called but also went in search of plague victims and proceeded
with their treatment and the Inoculation and immunization of
the area. In its effort to combat small pox, the team met with
major difficulties in view of the particular need not to
intrude in Moslem households. When, however, in the summer of
1920 a small pox epidemic was diagnosed, the teams conducted
practically a house to house search escorted by the police. As
a result, very few cases were reported in the subsequent
months. These teams also worked in hotels, public lavatories
and refugee camps to clear them from lice and distribute
apropriate medicine.
Ambulances and special vehicles were purchased for the
transportation of infected articles and patients suffering
from contagious diseases. Stationary steam furnaces and
smaller mobile ones were procured to disinfect homes and
household articles on the spot. They were also used in
conjunction with the Smyrna Hospital for Contagious Diseases,
to combat the epidemics with the result that, within a year
from the take over of the administration, the three major
diseases from which the zone was suffering, i.e. plague,
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exanthematic typhoid fever and small pox, lost their endemic
character and only sporadic cases were reported. A major
contribution was also made to the fight against influenza
through medical care, distribution of milk and medicine to the
poor and,	 what was vital,	 instructions for personal
protection.
In August 1919, a Rabies Hospital was instituted
in Smyrna together with a branch of the Pasteur Institute and
Inspectorates for Public Health at all ports of the Greek
zone. These had the task of tracing all carriers of
contagious diseases. The Metropolis of Smyrna offered to house
the Hospital in one of its buildings, near the grounds of the
Panionios Athletic Association, in the outskirts of the city.
Special care was given to the health of the children. A
children's hospital was organized in Smyrna while the
orphanage at Bayrakli included a clinic for eye and skin
diseases. In April 1921, a Clinic for Skin and Venereal
Diseases started operating for the first time in Asia Minor,
attached to the Hospital for Skin and Venereal Diseases of
Manisa. The Clinic and the Hospital provided a much needed
service as, during the War, these diseases had assumed almost
endemic proportions and they also undertook the conduct of a
campaign to inform the public on matters of personal hygiene.
The scope of this exercise was not only the combating
of particular infectious diseases but mainly the
establishment of a high standard of public health throughout
the Greek zone. For this reason, an Institute of Hygiene
equipped with the latest facilities and specialized personnel
was foreseen to operate within the lonian University. The
Institute was to carry out research, conduct tests, produce
vaccines, antitoxins, antidotes etc. and, at the same time,
supervize the planning and implementation of public works
relevant to the hygiene of the area such as sewage, plumbing,
water provisions etc. It was also to organize courses for
doctors wishing to serve in the public sector and antenatal
classes for expectant mothers.It would supervize the
organization of the registry for births and deaths, compile
medical statistics and recommend special health measures
needed for the various professions 1/.
The Greek Red Cross also played an important part in
the effort to provide a good standard of health service to the
population. Through its efforts , two hospitals were
established in Aidin in early June 1919, one for the Greek and
one for the Turkish community. After the destruction of the
city, during the military operations of the same month, one
hospital was organized in Aidin to take care of the destitute
population and another one at the refugee camp established
for those who had sought refuge in Smyrna after the tragic
1/ MOFA 116a4,	 Report,	 Ekthesi Ypiresias Dimosias Ygias
(Report of the Department of Public Health, 1.11.21.
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events 2/. The number of Turks seeking treatment and help by
the Red Cross could have been much larger had it not been for
the unsuported accusations that it had exclusively political
aims and that its main task was to transport arms and
ammunition for the Greek civilians 3/.
	
The work of the Red
Cross was complemented by the activities of	 the
Patriotikon Idryma (Patriotic Institution) which provided
clothing and other essential items to refugees coming to the
Greek zone from the interior of Asia Minor. It also organized
orphanages and homes for the needy and was in charge of the
Children's Hospital in Smyrna and the Department of Obstetrics
in the two General Hospitals of the city. Further, it
subsidized the local Community Hospitals and many other
charitable institutions. The activities of the Institution
extended over the whole of the Greek zone and into the Turkish
territory where money and clothing was sent to the
Metropolitans for distribution among the needy in districts as
far as Kayseri, where 800 orphans were clothed and fed through
these funds 4/.
Although it is quite probable that the measures
taken by the Greek administration were intended to a certain
extent to placate the non-Greek communities of the zone and
particularly the Moslems, it is also quite clear that the
impact of these measures on the population was considerable as
no previous administration had shown such diligence and care
in matters of public health. It is equally clear that this
impact did not please the local anti-Greek circles who pressed
the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople to institute
an Interallied Health Authority in Smyrna to undertake total
responsibility for matters of Health. The opportunity for such
a request arose with a plague epidemic during the summer of
1919. The High Commissioners thought fit to propose the
measure to the Greek authorities but Stergiadis was adamant
5/. As a result of concentrated efforts by a team composed of
12 doctors (Greek and foreign), the epidemic soon receeded and
the Allied demand was dropped.
At the same time, the Red Cross and the other
charitable institutions operating in Asia Minor had to answer
serious accusations. In January 1920, the President of the
British Red Crescent published an article in the Morning Post
to the effect that the Greek institutions did not treat
Turkish patients.	 Rev.	 Rbbert Frew was sent as his
representative to examine the' situation at the Greek zone and
2/ See Chapter Two, Section II.
3/ For the activities of the Greek Red Cross and the
accusation	 against it, see Rodas, op.cit..
4/	 For	 information on	 the activities	 of	 the
Patriotiko Idryma, see Rodas, op.cit. Nata Mela, chairman of
the Patriotiko Idryma, visited
	 Smyrna on a number of
occasions. See below, Chapter Four, reference 	 from the
Diary of Ph.Dragoumis.
5/ For the Allied proposal see Chapter Three, Section I.
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the Aidin area in particular because, in October 1919, the
League for the Defence of Ottoman Rights had complained to the
Supreme Council and had expressed worry for the 300,000 Turks,
who, according to the League's estimations, had left the area
as a result of Greek persecutions. At this point, Venizelos
had provided the Supreme Council with information according to
which the number of Turks who had left the Greek zone did not
exceed 180,000. They originated mainly from the areas of
Brusa, Aidin, Nazili and Denizli. Some of them had
subsequently returned but, according to the Greek Premier, a
great number wishing to do the same was impeded by the
nationalist forces while the Smyrna High Commission made every
effort to make the return to their homes possible. To this
effect, Stergiadis wrote to Colonel Henderson, C.C. to General
Mime, assuring him that no Turk wishing to return to the
Greek zone would be prosecuted for crimes committed against
the Greek army or for common law offenses. He also promised
that every possible help would be extended to the Turkish
refugees, including health service and the distribution of
farming equipment free of charge. For their protection, the
Turkish communities would be allowed to elect among them a
group of men who would form civil guards and would be paid by
the Greek authorities. In effect, the High Commissioner
undertook the commitment to examine favourably and to grant
every "logical" demand on the part of the Turkish refugees.
Colonel Henderson agreed that these proposals were
satisfactory and conveyed them to the refugee groups outside
the Greek zone who rejected them.As the report of the Id
established, this rejection was mainly due to pressure
exercised by the nationalists and, what was more, to the fact
that they were not prepared to return to areas bound to be
under nationalist attacks in the future.
After touring the area, Rev.Frew testifed that
the number of refugees stated by the League was grossly
exaggerated and that the main number of them was so far from
the Greek zone that the Greek charitable institutions could
not help them no matter how much they wished to. He was also
convinced that the High Commissioner wanted to assist these
refugees but was unable to do so because of the nationalist
intervention which compelled them not to accept any help from
the Greeks. As examples of this policy of the nationalists, he
mentioned the cases when the Greek administration sent
T.L.6,000 to the British Red Crescent to be distributed among
the refugees from the Aidin area but it was son returned as no
one would put a claim. The Greek authorities also sent 2,500
and T.L. 2,000 respectively to Nazili and Denizli refugees
through the Ottoman Debt and the Règie des Tabacs, but both
sums were returned. As far as the treatment of Turkish
refugees within the Greek zone was concerned, Rev. Frew
testified that "they enjoyed such good care and protection
which they could have never dreamt of" 6/.
After this testimony, Stergiadis asked him to
6/ Correspondence with Rev. Frew in MOFA 136.
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arrange for another article by the President of the Red
Crescent in the Morning Post but Rev. Frew expressed the
opinion that it was up to the President to revoke his article,
which he never did 7/.
The Greek administration's extreme efforts to establish
a reasonable standard of public health in its area of
jurisdiction were primarily dictated by the necessity of
keeping the troops in good health and, at the same time, by
considerations of political expediency and purposes of
propaganda. Nonetheless, the fact remained that throughout the
p'riod under examination, the Asia Minor zone under Greek
occupation experienced the benefits of a public health
service which was easily accessible and free for all who cared
to request it. Significantly enougti, this was one of the few
activities of the Greek administration that the foreign press
did not choose to criticize.
21 ibid.
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IV. The Department of Moslem Affairs
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After August 1920, all sections of the Turkish
administration that dealt with matters pertaining to religion,
education and family affairs were transferred intact under the
umbrella of the Department for Moslem Affairs of the GAS which
coordinated their work. The Greek personnel added to the
Department was fluent in Turkish and included experts of the
Ottoman legal system and Moslem affairs in general.
Correspondence with the Moslem institutions was conducted in
Turkish and major efforts were made to ensure that no changes
were effected to their particular administrative system. The
interest of the GAS in the welfare and prospering of these
thstitutions was obviously great and an annual sum of 175,000
Turkish liras, an equivalent of 2,500,000 drs, was spent on
their upkeep 1/.The Department of Moslem Affairs coordinated
the work of the following institutions:
a. Religious Courts. On the basis of the Holy Law, the $eriat,
these dealt mainly with the settlement of inheritances and
other matters involving family relations such as marriage,
divorce, setlements etc. All the Religious Courts which came
under the GAS were maintained under the supervision of the
Religious Judge of Smyrna, the Kadi, and their judgements were
executed with the help of the Department. The salaries of the
Religious Judges and the administrative personnel of the
courts, together with the running costs, were met by the GAS
to a total of 35,000 Turkish liras per year. Should a
position of a Religious Judge become vacant, the GAS appointed
a successor at the suggestion of the Kadi of Srnyrna.
b.Mouftis. The main task of this body was to supervise the
operation of the mosques and perform all religious services.
They also had the right to interpret the Holy Law whenever
their ecpert opinion was requested by either by the Religious
Judges or by private citizens. The GAS met their salaries
which came to an annual sum of 6,747 Turkish pounds.
c.Orphanage Treasuries. These institutions continued to work
under the supervision of the respective Religious Judge, on
the basis of the Turkish law governing the properties of
orphans, and retained the administrative system they had under
the previous regime. Their task was to manage the properties
of orphans until their coming of age. In order to avoid
mismanagement and profiteering at the expense of the orphans,
the GAS had the overall inspection of the operations and paid
a total of 6,190 Turkish pounds annually for the salaries of
the employees.
d.Vakoufs. These institutions dealt mainly with the management
of the properties, farms and land bequethed to mosques or
other, charitable Moslem establishments. Previously under the
1/	 MOFA 116a Report Merimna Ellinikis Dioikiseos Smyrnis
pen ton Mousoulmanikon Plythismon tis Dioikoumenis Zonis
(Measures Taken by the GAS for the Welfare of the Moslem
Populations of the Greek Zone).
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management of the Turkish Ministry of Vakoufs and the local
Ephors (Mutevievi), they now came under the jurisdiction of
the Department of Moslem Affairs which was anxious to provide
an excellent service to the Vakoufs as the maintenance of very
important religious and other, social, Moslem institutions
depended upon their proper management. The Vakouf Committees,
composed of primates and religious men enjoying the respect
of the community, were introduced by the Turkish
government to control the Vakoufs and the rent of their
lands. These committees were retained by the new regime with
the additional task of managing the taxes collected by the
GAS on their behalf and kept at the Vakouf Treasury. The
proceeds of the Vakoufs were used according to the wishes of
the donors. Despite the financial difficulties and the urgent
military needs, every effort was made so that no building or
land belonging to the Vakoufs would be commandeered by the
Greek authorities. The reasons of political expediency
dictating such a policy became all the more evident when on
the one case where a building belonging to the Moslem High
Schools of Smyrna was commandeered, the press in
Constantinople and abroad made the most of the event to
suggest that the Greek administration was exploiting the
Religious institutions and their property 2/.
e.Moslem Education. Under the Turkish regime, the Moslem
secondary schools were maintained by a special tax imposed
over the farm tax. As the GAS did not collect this tax which
had been mortgaged by the Ottoman Public Debt against a loan
contracted by the Turkish government, their costs were met by
the Greek Treasury. Further, the GAS provided funds for two
Moslem Schools in Smyrna, two in Manisa and Odemi and three
Religious Seminaries in Thira, Odemi and Manisa to a total of
70,000 Turkish liras per year. A special polytechnic school
was instituted in Smyrna and catered for 210 Moslem students
for whom board and lodging were also provided. Its running
costs came to 45,000 Turkish pounds per year and were met by
the GAS.
As regarded Moslem primary education, educational
committees were instituted at the seat of each county as
stipulated by the Turkish law. School committees were also
instituted in all towns, or neighbourhoods, where a primary
school existed. These committees consisted of Moslem primates
who supervized the schools and conducted the fund raising
among the population for the maintenance of the schools, as
stipulated by Turkish law. Moreover, the GAS actively
encouraged the institution of new Moslem schools even in the
most remote villages of the Greek zone 3/.
2/ For example Presse du Soir, 28.1.22, (Constantinople).
Toynbee, op.cit., pp. 174, 176, 387, 388. The building was
used for the Courts of Justice and the High School was
transferred to suitable premisses.
3/ MOFA 94th doc.no. 351/3.2.22, Department of Moslem Affairs
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V. . Archaeological Excavations
181
Archaeological excavations in Asia Minor were of
special importance for the Greek administration as any
discoveries in this domain would contribute to "the
irrefutable establishment of the Hellenicity of the area" . On
the other hand, during the last years of Turkish rule, a
number of archaeological expeditions were organized by
various European countries to discover and study the ancient
Greek towns of Asia Minor. These expeditions concentrated
mainly In areas around major towns and along the coastline.
After August 1920, the archaeological exploration of
Asia Minor became the object of the Antiquities Section at
the GAS. The excavations were to be conducted by Greek
trchaeo1ogists and, at the same time, other countries would be
isked to participate. Greek excdvations were conducted during
the seasons of 1921 and 1922 at three different sites:
a.Klazomene, a town well known to archaeologists for the
hand painted clay shrines found scattered in the fields near
Vourla. The excavation was conducted by G. Oeconomou of the
Athens Archaeological Society and soon an ancient cemetry was
discovered together with a multitude of pottery items which
brought to light an important part of the history of lonian
ceramography. On the nearby island of St. John, excavations
uncovered a cobblestoned road together with the remains of a
few houses with mosaics in excellent condition dating from 2nd
century BC.
b.Ephesos. This excavation was conducted by G. Sotiriou,
Ephor of Byzantine Antiquities. In previous years, the British
had conducted excavations in the same area and had discovered
the temple of lonian Artemis. Also, Austrian archaeologists
had excavated the remains of the city built in the period of
Lysimachos. The Greek excavation aimed to uncover the
Byzantine church of St. John the Theologian which, according
to a legend, was built by Justinian in the 6th century AD. It
was believed to have been an immense, luxurious church,
comparable to St. Sophia. Until 1921, the local Greeks had
resisted persistent efforts of foreign archaeologists to
excavate the remains of the church, mainly because of their
religious beliefs. The findings of the Greek excavation
suggested that the church was as large as the legend would
have it and was decorated with beautiful mosaics. This
discovery was to be a major contribution to the history of
Byzantine Art as the church dated from the first years of its
peak period. At the same time, this excavation provided
interesting material for the history of Ancient Greek Art as
several pieces of marble, believed to have been parts of the
badly damaged temple of Artemis, were incorporated into the
masonry of the church.
c.Nissa was a town built by Antioch of Syria during the 3rd
century BC in the vicinity of the Meander river on the
Ephesos-Trallea road. It had been excavated by the German
archaeologist V.Diest who brought to light the position of the
various important buildings of the town such as the Library,
Gymnasium, Agora etc. The Greek excavations aimed at
uncovering and restoring the remains of these buildings. By
July 1922, most of the Agora had been uncovered and restored.
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VI. The lonian University of Srnyrna
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One of the major projects undertaken during the
Greek administration of Asia Minor, was the institution and
organization of the lonian University of Smyrna. Originally
conceived by Venizelos, this grandiose scheme was entrusted
for realization to Professor C. Karatheodoris of G8ttingen
University, who had long since called for the creation of a
new University in Greece 1/. aratheodoris believed that this
new University was needed to cdter for the enormous needs in
higher education created with the addition of new territories
luring the past decades and the urgency to educate those who
were to work for the progress of the country into the
twentieth century. "He was interested in everything", writes
Toynbee. "Archaeology, hygiene, economics, languages- and
constantly reminded me of what I had read about Ludwig Ross
and the other German savants who came out to Greece in the
thirties of the last century in the train of King Otto. In
fact, Karatheodoris was a Westerner abroad -constructive,
broadminded, humane and out of water" 2/.
With Greece extending its rule over Asia Minor, it
was thought that the significant number of minorities to be
incorporated within the Greek Kingdom would, ideally, take an
active part in the public life and the progress of Greece.
Therefore, it was argued, Greece should also take an active
interest in the Eastern World and its various cultures and
come to realize the importance of educating specialists in the
field. On the other hand, the creation of a genuine
Universitas Literarum in Smyrna would serve as a means of
reconciling the differences among the various population
groups and, at the same time, show that "Greece did not go to
Asia Minor to conquer alien populations, but to bring to them
her superior civilization" •I.
In September 1919, Karatheodoris was invited to Paris
to discuss the project with Venizelos and, a few weeks later,
he submitted a lengthy report in which he described in detail
his views on the scopes of the scheme and put forward
proposals regarding its operational framework, means of
instruction to be employed and Schools and Departments to be
instituted 4/ . His proposals accepted by Venizelos, at the
end of the academic year 1919-1920 he left Berlin University
for Athens to undertake the supervizion of the preparatory
work. In August 1920, he accompanied Venizelos during his
brief visit to the harbour of Smyrna where he met with
1'	 For extensive notes on Karatheodoris, Vovolinis, op.cit.,
V, pp . 484-504.
2/ Toynbee, op.cit., p.l66.
3/ Ioakimoglou, G. Praktika Akadimias Athinon (Annals of the
Athens Academy), vol. 25, p.680.
4/ MOFA 23 Projet d' une nouvelle Universit en Grace presenté
au Gouvernement Hellénigue par C.Karatheodori, Paris 20.10.19.
This report was later formulated into the Decree for the
Institution of the Smyrna University (Diatagma Idryseos
Panepistimiou Smyrnis), GGG, Series A, ii, Law 2251/14.7.20.
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stergiadis to discuss the scheme which was to become the High
Commissioner's dearest project 5/.
On 28 October 1920, the High Commissioner issued a
decree appointing Karatheodoris head of the project and
Professor of Mathematics at the University of Smyrna. At the
same time, a special section was organized within the
')epartment of Education of the High Commission to deal with
all matters pertaining to the organizational infrastructure.
N. Kritikos, at the time doing his military service in Asia
Minor and later to become Professor of Mathematics at the
National Technical University in Athens, served as secretary
to this section which was called Grafio Organoseos
Panepistimiou Srnyrnis 6/. This section initially worked on
several legal aspects, the drafting of rules and regulations,
the completion of the buildings and the development of the
surrounding sites. The finances for the scheme were provided
by the High Commissioner who also offered to house the
University in two unfinished buildings situated on the hills
of Bahri Baba, on the western side of Mount Pagos.
Originally, the major part of the expenses regarding
the completion of the building and the running costs of the
University, was to be met by S. Palantzis, a Greek magnate
living in France. On 1 November 1919, Palantzis signed a
contract to this effect with Venizelos, acting on behalf of
the Greek government. By this contract, he undertook to pay 2
million french francs towards the buildings, equipment etc,
and promised to pay 250 thousand french francs per year
towards the running expenses of the University. In the event,
for some unclear reason, Palantzis did not contribute a penny.
The buildings that were to house the University were
originally constructed by Rahini Bey, Vail of Smyrna until
1918, to house a public library and an institute of higher
education. The site had been used in the past as a cemetry for
the needs of the Jewish community. In 1914, defying the
latter's claim to ownership, Rahmi Bey proceeded with the
construction of the buildings on the grounds that the
community had not paid any rates for the use of the land since
1883. After the Moudros armistice, the Jewish community
attempted to assert the same claims but the Smyrna County
Council ruled that the area was public property which had been
rented to the community in the past. As no rent or rates had
been paid since 1883, the Jewish community had no rights on
the site. This was the situation in 1920, when the Greek
administration decided to use it for the needs of the
University. The Jewish community staged a complaint and tried
to obstruct the scheme but, as the land and the buildings had
been declared public property by the Turkish administration,
5/ Vovolinis, op.cit., V, p.490.
6/ Grafio Organoseos Panepistimiou Smyrnis (Bureau for the
Organization of the Smyrna University).
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the rightful owner was the GAS 7/.
By the summer of 1922, the buildings were completed at
a cost of 110,000 Turkish liras and included 70 lecture
rooms, a large amphitheatre, separate smaller structures to
house the offices of the chancellor and the professors as well
as a number of laboratories. Although the buildings were quite
spacious, it was believed that they would not be sufficient to
house all the departments envisaged for the future. Therefore,
the remaining site was to be used as a public park in which to
construct new buildings as the needs would arise 8/.
Karatheodoris and his team were on excellent terms
with Stergiadis who took an active interest in the affairs of
the University and helped solve the numerous problems faced by
the organizers. It was the Greek Administration of Smyrna and
not the Greek Ministry of Education, which was responsible for
the implementation of the project and Karatheodoris had to
receive clearance from Stergiadis before proceeding with book
and equipment orders or before negotiating with prospective
professors and lecturers of the University 9/. Karatheodoris
envisaged a thoroughly modern university that would not
imitate either the English or the German educational systems,
a university that would reflect and cater for the local needs.
He believed that the lonian University should be the antipode
of the Athens University, by nature orientated towards
classical antiquity, and significantly chose as its motto 'tEx
Oriente Lux" 10/. The University was to comprise of the
following schools 11/ :
a. The School for Natural and Technical Sciences consisting of
Departments for civil and chemical engineering, geology,
botany, zoology and physics. It was intended to become the
centre for scientific research in the area and to produce the
scientists that would be entrusted with the planning and
construction of vital public works, essential for the
exploitation of Asia Minor's rich natural resources to the
full.
b. The School of Agriculture was going to offer courses of two
or four year duration in order to cater both for those
interested in the practical study of agriculture as well as
for those intending to pursue a scientific career. Also, it
would organize seminars for farmers and landowners and conduct
scientific research in its well-equipped laboratories in
conjunction with the experimental farm at Tepekioy. The
7/ Solomonidis, Chr. I Pedia Sti Smyrni, (Education in Smyrna),
Athens 1961.
8/ MOFA 116a7. The plans were made by architect A. Zachos,
1879-1 939.
9/ See reports published in Vovolinis, op.cit..
10/ Kritikos, N. Pedia ke Zoi, (Education and Life), Athens,
1950.
11/ MOFA 23a Projet...
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purpose of the School was threefold: to educate specialists in
the science of agriculture, to educate those engaged in the
practical side of agriculture and advise them on matters of
cultivation, husbandry etc and, finally, to improve the
existing methods of cultivation, introduce new ones and
promote the agricultural industry. As there was a shortage of
labourers in the area, the School also aimed to promote
mechanized cultivation.
c. The School of Oriental Ethnology and Languages was to
provide courses on the history, literature, civilization,
culture and language of the various eastern peoples. It was
mainly envisaged as a means to promote peaceful coexistence
among them, through the knowledge and understanding of each
other's culture. In this framework, Turkish, Arabic, Farsi,
Armenian, Hebrew and Greek would be taught and special
seminars would be organized to be attended by the students of
the other Schools of the University. Even if the University
was "a castle in the air, without local foundations...a
.doubtful experiment even if made at the cost of nothing else",
as Toynbee believed, it would seem fair to claim that its
existence would have been fully justified by the operation of
this School alone 12/.
d. The School of Civil Service. With the addition of such
extensive territories to her boundaries, Greece faced a lack
of adequate personnel to administer them. This School was
designed to educate highly competent civil employees and would
in time, expand to become a School for Economic and Social
Sciences.
The University would also include the following:
a. The Department of Preliminary Studies which would provide
one year courses for prospective university students who
did not have the necessary qualifications to be eligible for
matriculation with one of the Schools.
b. The Institute of Hygiene, which would conduct medical
research and offer various microbiological and biochemical
tests to the public, together with inoculations etc. It would
also run courses for medical doctors wishing to specialize in
the sector of public hygiene, for midwives and for nurses. By
the summer of 1922, the instruments for its laboratories had
been installed and were considered to be the best laboratory
equipment in the Balkans and the Near East.
c. The Department of Commercial Studies was intended to
educate employees of the major international commercial firms
which -would be encouraged by the Greek State to expand their
operations in the area. It proposed to offer higher as well as
intermediate level courses.
12/ Toynbee, op.cit., p. 175.
1 87
d. The School for Construction Supervisors was to educate
technical personnel urgently needed to supervize the
construction of major public works planned to start in Asia
Minor as soon as the military situation permitted it.
e. The School for Higher Studies in Moslem Religion would
offer courses for the prospective Mouftis and Religious
Judges. Initially it was going to form part of the School of
Oriental Ethnology but, in view of the particular nature of
the courses, this idea was abandoned.
f. The Experimental Farm at Tepekioy, already in operation
since 1920, was to serve as the basis for the practical
instruction of agriculture students at all levels. In the
meantime, experimental cultivation methods were tested and
farmers were taught to use and repair tractors and other types
of machinery used in agriculture 13/.
g. The Library was considered by Karatheodoris the backbone of
the University 14/. It was to expand and become a public
library and to include books and periodicals covering subjects
not taught at the University. A special bureau was organized
to deal with the acquisition of the books and, until September
1922, an important number of volumes had been bought,
including collections of rare books on Asia Minor such as the
collection of the Austrian Archaeological Institute, for which
the sum of 18,000 swiss francs was paid. The Library was also
to contain a collection of all newspapers published in Asia
Minor, including those published at the military front.
The various Schools and Departments of the
University were to start operating gradually. The Institute of
Hygiene, the Department of Preliminary Studies and the . Library
were scheduled to be inaugurated at the beginning of the
academic year 1922-1923. However, the lonian University of
Smyrna was destined never to open its gates. C. Karatheodoris
left Smyrna on 8 September 1922, aboard the Naxos. He
succeeded in taking with him the archives of the University,
some of the precious laboratory equipment and a significant
number of the Library books. The books and equipment were
later distributed among the relevant Schools of the Athens
University, while the Archives were deposited with its
Department of Chemistry jj.
13/ On the work carried out at the farm, Horton, op.cit. Also
Toynbee, op.cit., p.2Olff and p. 166.
14/ MOFA 23a Projet...
15/ The biggest part of the Archive remains unpublished. Some of




I. Aristidis Stergiadis, High Commissioner of Smyrna
"He did not flatter the masses
with rhetoric and he had such
authority that he could oppose
them and provoke their rage".
Thucydides, B' 65.
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Born in Heraclion, Crete, in 1861, of Macedonian
origin, Aristides Stergiadis studied Law at Athens
University and completed his studies in France, Germany and
Italy. He returned to Heraclion in 1889 where he practiced law
for several years and was considered one of the best lawyers.
Although, at the time, distinguished lawyers had brilliant
prospects in Greek politics, he chose to stick to his
profession. He became closely involved with the
Therissos Movement and, as a result, he was imprisoned by the
British. He had a keen interest in the municipal affairs of
his home town and on 2 March 1906, he was elected president of
the Municipal Council of Heraclion, a post which he held until
December 1910 1/. A personal friend of Venizelos, he worked
closely with the Prime Minister before and after the
unification of Crete with Greece and contributed to the
extensive legislative work carried out by the first liberal
government. Among other laws, he was responsible for the one
regarding local government. 	 With the end of the Balkan	 Wars,
he took part in the drafting of the Treaty of Athens as an
expert in Moslem Affairs 2/. In 1917 he was appointed
Governor General of Epirus, a post he held successfully until
his transfer to Smyrna as High Commissioner. During his term
in Epirus, he achieved the supression of brigandage and came
to be known as a very able administrator. After the Asia Minor
Catastrophe, he became the target of serious accusations
emanating from refugee circles and regarding his
responsibility for the disaster that befel them. " It is quite
rare for one person to attract so much hatred. With the
passing years, the law of mercy was applied to others
responsible. Half a century after the destruction, however,
the hatred of Stergiadis remains deep" 3/. He soon became one
of the most contradictory figures in modern Greek history,
with the myth that he was the principal culprit persisting
until today in refugee circles. However, careful examination
of his service as High Commissioner on the basis of archival
material suggests otherwise.
Stergiadis was very reluctant to take up the post
offered to him in Smyrna and the real dimensions of the task
ahead did not escape him. He was afraid that the Greek venture
in Asia Minor could degenerate into a war between Greece and
Turkey which would result in a state of devastation. In his
view, Asia Minor would become the tomb of Greece and, in
Smyrna, Athens would find a second Syracusan expedition from
1/ Information and dates confirmed by the Editor of the
Heraclion daily Allagi. For an example of his deep interest in
municipal affairs, see Spanakis, S. I Idrefsi tou Irakliou,
T.E.E. [Greek Chamber of Engineers], 1981, publishing a long
speech by Stergiadis regarding the issue of water provision.
2/ For his contribution to the Treaty of Athens, Neoteron
Enkykiopedikon Lexikon Iliou, vol. 	 17, p. 257. For the
Therissos Movement see Istoria tou Ellinikou Ethnous, vol.
14, pp. 210ff.
3/ Venezis, op.cit, p.69.
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which she could never recover 4/. The reasoning behind his
decision to accept the post is not clear. His subsequent
stance, however, rules out political opportunism and suggests
that his friendship with Venizelos and the latter's insistence
that only Stergiadis was capable of dealing with this
tremendous task, tipped the balance and decided the issue.
Despite the general hrlief thdt Stergiadis was a megalomaniac
"thirsty for power", during his time as High Commissioner he
took a number of decisions v'hich suggest the contrary. He not
only refused offers such as the post of Minister of Foreign
Affairs and the leadership of the Liberal Party, but he even
declined to accompany the Prime Minister at the March 1921
London Conference and, on this occasion, declared that "only
in Smyrna could he be of some help and this for a limited
period " 5/. In the world of Greek politics, however, the post
of the High Commissioner was a very desirable appointment as
it was considered to be one step away from an important
ministerial portfolio. The Smyrna High Commission, presented
the added attraction of the cosmopolitan character of the city
and, therefore, the jealousy Stergiadis attracted and the
constant efforts to undermine his standing in the eyes of
Venizelos, and public opinion, should not be difficult to
comprehend.
Adding insult to the injury effected on Greek
professional politicians by his appointment, Stergiadis made
clear from the start that he was not going to tolerate any
interference from Athens in the performance of his duties and
forewarned Venizelos that the government would only have the
right to appoint and dismiss him should he fail in the mission
entrusted to him 6/. Venizelos' trust in his judgement was
such that he left major issues requiring "on the spot"
solutions to be decided by the High Commissioner, providing
him not with orders but with suggestions and, wherever
apropriate, sanctioning the measures taken in retrospect 7/.
Despite the fact that Stergiadis took up his duties in
Smyrna on 21 May 1919, he was not formally appointed until 25
January 1920 and there is no archival evidence to suggest that
he ever took the necessary oath. Although he went to Athens in
4/ FO 608/91-17424, Bucker to Vansittart, letter, 7.8.19,
communicating Horton's minutes on his discussions with
Stergiadis (19.7.19).
5/ MOFA 121 b Tel. No. 8847/26.8.22, Kalogeropoulos to
Stergiadis. AV 3a4, Memo 1/5.4.22, not signed. Quotation from
MOFA 124a4 Tel. n.n./7.2.21, Stergiadis to Prime Minister.
6/ F. Dragoumis, Diary, entry for 12 April 1921, reporting on
his meeting with the High Commissioner. This Diary has not yet
been published. The extracts relating to Dragoumis' visit to
Smyrna in the spring of 1921, as escort to Nata Mela,
president of the Patriotiko Idryma, were kindly brought to my
attention by Dr. P. Kitromilidis of the Centre for Asia Minor
Studies (KMS).
7/ AV 6e Tel. No. 1272/5086/29.5.19, Venizelos to Stergiadis
and MOFA 59b Letter, n.n./4.11.19, Venizelos to Clémenceau.
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February 1920 to be sworn in by the King, he had to return to
Smyrna, as the sovereign was visiting Salonica at the time
8/. Until his official appointment he continued to receive
his salary as Governor General of Epirus with the addition of
the sum of 5,000 drs per month. 9/. Research in the Government
Gazzette indicates that he continued to sign laws and decrees
with regard to Epirus until late October 1919, in his capacity
as Governor General 10/.
His appointment was hailed as a success for the
government by foreign and Greek press alike and he seemed to
be regarded with high esteem by the menbers of the cabinet.
Introducing him to the Italian Minister at Athens, Diomidis
noted: "Mr. Stergiadis has the absolute confidence of the
government and during his term in Epirus gave ample proof of
his competence in the field of politics and his conciliatory
spirit to which the Italian authorities have paid homage on
many occasions. His presence in Smyrna is a guarantee for the
establishment of friendly relations between our two
communities" 11/. Venizelos missed no opportunity to express
his trust and support for the High Commissioner and the
reports of the foreign representatives in Smyrna more often
than not gave credit to the impartiality of his
administration, although he was usually pessimistic about the
outcome of the venture 12/. However, after the initial lune de
miel, when it became clear to all interested parties that
Stergiadis was determined to rule on his own following the
directives of the Prime Minister to the letter, the situation
changed radically.
The first to express their dissatisfaction were the
local Greeks who, rightly or wrongly, believed that their time
had come to rule Asia Minor and were ready to put into
practice the experience gained by their leaders, 	 the
dimogerondes, after decades of community self-government. As
the events following the occupation of Aidin, Menemen etc.
were to show, this attitude entailed acts of revenge against
the Moslem communities which neither Stergiadis nor Venizelos
were willing to condone 13/. The Prime Minister's orders in
this respect were clear: the local Greeks would have to
realize that no misconduct on their part would be tolerated.
No matter how compassionate the Greek authorities were towards
8/ AV Letter, n.n/27.2.20, Politis to Venizelos, reporting on
Stergiadis' visit to Athens.
9/ MOFA 141 Tel. No. 5002/25.5.19, Diomidis to Venizelos.
10/ GGG, Series C, May - October 1919.
11/ MOFA 136t Note 6327/28.6.19, Diomidis to Italian Minister.
12/ MOFA 141 Tel. No. 4536/14.5.19, Venizelos to MOFA. MOFA
22g Tel. No. 10615/15.8.20, MOFA to Stergiadis. Also MAE
Turquie, 210, 280-1, Laporte to Defrance desp. n.n./3.8.19;
210, 341-3, Laporte to Defrance, desp. n.ri./20.8.19.
/ For detailed account of the events following the
occupation of these towns, Rodas,op.cit, pp.153 ff. Also,
Chapter Two, Section II.
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their sufferings, they could not allow the local Greeks to
endanger the good name of the nation of which they formed an
integral part. Greece, Venizelos stressed, had come to Asia
Minor not only to bring freedom to her unredeemed children
but also to secure it for the other communities. Should the
local Greeks obstruct this task, they would be treated as
enemies 14/.
These were Venizelos' guidelines. The military
authorities chose to be lenient towards the local Greeks and
not to apply them, except in a few extreme cases. Stergiadis
chose to implement them to the letter thus displeasing both
the local Greeks and the army leadership, whom he had to call
to order in this respect on numerous occasions 15/. The
critical situation created by the events of Aidin caused
extreme anxiety to Venizelos and cast grave doubt on his
optimism about the successful outcome of the expedition. He
wrote to Stergiadis that his only encouragement was the
latter's presence in Smyrna which assured him that all
possible measures were being taken 16/. Despite the
Premier's approval of his methods, Stergiadis did not fail
to recognize the fact that he was far from lenient in his
treatment of the local Greeks: "I am obliged to inform you
that I have dealt strictly with any Greek misconduct, at times
displaying excessive severity" 17/.
Stergiadis could not be dissuaded from actively
opposing anything he considered incompatible with his duties
and the confidential mission entrusted to him by the
government. It was mainly this conviction which was the
immediate cause of his discord with the local primates. He
considered himself the only authority responsible to the
government and the Allies and for this reason he could not
accept neither their interference with or their suggestions as
to what his stance vis-á-vis the various issues facing the
administration should be, especially after the international
outcry against the local Greeks following the events of May 15
- 16. In his opinion of the local Greeks, Stergiadis was by no
means alone. In late June 1919, expressing an extreme view
General Paraskevopoulos' ADC Major Vyzas wrote: "Our worst
enemy here is neither the Turks nor our Allies. It is the
local Greeks who think they found the opportunity to avenge in
a few days the pressures and persecutions of many centuries"
18/. And Vyzas concluded: "It is also some officers and
14/ AV 9th Tel. No. 1782/6625/5.7.19, Venizelos to Nider and
Stergiadis.
15/ ibid
16/ MOFA 136t Tel. No. 6627/5.7.19, VenizelosjjJ MOFA 59g Tel. No. 7338/24.9.19, Stergiadis
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soldiers with their miserable 1912 conception of plunder and
massacres...All this would have been of no consequence if we
had countered the propaganda of our dearest Allies and our
friends the Levantines who, with excellent skill, manage to
represent the insignificant as important and vice versa" 19/.
It should, however, be remembered that the local Greeks
either as members of the communal organizations (Dimogerondia
nd Keritriki Epitropi) or as ephors of the educational and
charitable institutions or, finally, because of their social
status, had been used to playing an active role in all matters
relating to the Greek Orthodox Community. The Smyrniot
primates in particular, could not comprehe'-id the fact that the
establishment of the Greek administration would signify the
end of the privileged regime of self government they had
enjoyed for decades. This was not the first time the local
notables tried to assert their authority. On a number of
occasions they had been at odds with several Metropolitans and
in open conflict with each other 20/. Complaints became the
order of the day as soon as the various departments of the
High Commission began to "interfere", in the primates'
opinion, with the administration of what they considered to be
community affairs. Their view was that the High Commission and
its representatives in the various towns, together with the
military, should seek their advice before taking any major
decisions in view of their long experience of dealing with
Asia Minor realities. As far as Stergiadis was concerned, this
could have been the case if the vilayet of Aidin had been
permanently annexed by Greece but jr no way could he accept
their involvement in the administration under the prevailing
conditions. What seemed to escape the attention, of the local
Greeks was the fact that peace had not come yet and that a
long battle lay ahead.
These conflicting views resulted in the High
Commissioner's harsh treatment of the local Greeks and their
mistrust of his good intentions. To make matters worse,
Stergiadis' relations with Metropolitan Chrysostomos were not
smooth from the start. The issues causing the rift between the
two men stemmed from an inevitable clash of authority, given
that before the advent of the High Commissioner the
Metropolitan was the undisputed leader of the Asia Minor
Greeks and, as such, he had exercised total authority which
after May 1919 was claimed by Stergiadis as the lawful
representative of the Greek government and mandatory of the
Allies. "This fact seemed to be beyond the comprehension of
Chrysostom" 21/.
19/ ibid.
20/ N. Beis, "Pen Dimitriou Lotou" [On Dimitrios Lotos],
Mikrasiatika Chronika,	 VI. G. Anastasiadis, "Mitropolitis
lakovos" (Metropolitan lakovos), Mikrasiatika Chronika, VII.
21/ Prosfygikos Kosmos (Refugee World), 11.1.1970.
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The situation deteriorated further when Stergiadis was
asked by Venizelos to persuade the Metropolitan and the clergy
to restrict themselves to their religious and charitable
duties and to avoid in their sermons any explicit or implicit
nationalist remarks that might offend foreign nationals and
especially the Turks. It was the Prime Minister's belief that
the priests and notables of Asia Minor should become apostles,
going around the provinces and preaching the gospel of
forgiveness for the past Turkish crimes in order to secure
peaceful coexistence between the two communities under an
impartial Greek administration 22/. For their part, however,
the local Greeks were still under the bitter impressions left
behind by the events of 1913-1918 and did not seem able to
grasp the essence of this policy. Clearly, somewhere along the
line, Venizelos had made a wrong judgement with regard to the
conditions prevailing in Asia Minor and, as a result, his
policy of a rapprochement between the Greek and Turkish
community seemed rather unfeasible 23/.
For his part, Stergiadis did not seem offended by the
fact that he was thought to favour the Turks when on various
occasions he was forced by political considerations not to
justify the Greeks. Clearly, his priority at the time was to
convince international public opinion that the Greek
administration was not behaving as a conqueror towards the
alien communities under its jurisdiction. He seemed prepared
to fight his battle on the home front if the army were left to
settle the issue at the military front. However, matters came
to a head only two months after his appointment. Numerous
complaints by the Smyrniots of alleged mistreatment were
transmitted by General Paraskevopoulos, a Smyrniot himself, to
Diomidis and Repoulis in Athens who hastened to inform
Venizelos that Stergiadis had probably lost his senses and, in
any case, was not capable of performing his duties
successfully. Venizelos was enraged by these communications
and immediately replied that if anyone had lost his senses,
it was not Stergiadis but his colleagues in Athens whQ could
not perceive how critical the situation was and were simply
accusing Stergiadis in order to see him replaced by one of
their own. And Venizelos errupted :
"I see and understand from here, that there are people
in Athens who claim that they ought to have been
entrusted with this difficult commission
themselves...And when I see such petty mindedness at a
time when our position in Smyrna is daily rendered
politically more dangerous, not from Stergiadis'
incapacity but from the misconduct of our army, from
the damaged brains of his collaborators who provide
ammunition for our innumerable enemies of all
22! AV9v Letter 1880/7037/18.8.19, Venizelos to Diomidis. Also
quoted by Petsalis, op.cit., p.223-227.
23/ For comments on the letter and the feasibility of the
scheme, M.Notaras, op.cit., pp.53-57.
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nationalities who lie there in ambush, I then despair
and begin to wonder whether those who sneer at my Asia
Minor policy might not have been right or whether our
stature is too small for works of such
magnitude...'Verily I say unto you ' that if we do not
recover our senses and, particularly, if our military
in Smyrna do not recover from their intoxication,
prevent any further misdemeanours and punish with the
necessary severity those already perpetrated, we will
end by being thrown out of Smyrna bag and baggage,
degraded and humiliated.. .Let [Paraskevopoulos] raise
himself to the height of circumstances. Let him knock
down whomsoever will not comply with the new
conceptions. I will support him to enforce the harshest
punishments. But let him not tolerate it to be said
that the Greek army proved unworthy of the trust of the
conference while he was its Commander..." 24/.
Although Venizelos did not seem to believe any of the
accusations voiced against Stergiadis, 	 he thought it
appropriate to send his private secretary, Klearhos
Markandonakis to Smyrna to investigate the situation on the
spot. He wrote to Repoulis that the fact that both he and
Diomidis had been convinced by the polemics against stergiadis
worried him and Markandonakis' mission would entail a
prolonged stay in Smyrna so that, if the President's views
proved correct, the High Commissioner would have near him
someone who could share his anxiety. If on the contrary the
accusations proved to be valid, Markandonakis was to suggest
Stergiadis' replacement 25/. In the same letter to Repoulis,
he went on to note that if General Paraskevopoulos wished to
remain in Smyrna, he should stick to his military duties and
follow Stergiadis' instructions and recommendations to the
letter. In the event, Markandonakis' report not only
confirmed Venizelos' suspicions about the nature of the
accusations but also underlined the good name the High
Commissioner had created for the Greek administration and
himself among the Turkish communities, which Markandonakis
visited extensively 26/. Confidential Turkish intelligence
reports confirmed the information: "It is noted that the
Moslem population is gradually becoming accustomed to the
Greek administration. The Greek civil servants and military
24/ AV9v Letter 1879/7036/18.7.19, Venizelos to Repoulis with
a	 copy of Repoulis' letter to Venizelos. Translation of the
letters from Petsalis, op.cit., pp. 223-227. These letters
have been widely published and are included either in part or
as a whole in most works dealing with the Asia Minor
expedition.fl/ AV 9v Letter 1879/7036/17.7.19, Venizelos to Repoulis.jj AV lOd Report 1989/7.8.19, Markandonakis to Venizelos.
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officers treat the Turkish population well" 27/.
Commenting on the effect of the accusations against
Stergiadis on Venizelos, Politis informed Diomidis that the
President was now convinced the Greek populations in Asia
Minor and his colleagues in Athens were "incapable of
realizing the duty which is imposed on them in their own
intrest...and even if they are willing to listen to his
policy they do not understand it" 28/. On Prime Minister's
orders, Diomidis was asked to visit Smyrna "to ring a clear
bell of warning to Paraskevopoulos". Reporting to Venizelos on
his brief visit to Smyrna, the Foreign Minister commented that
his perception of the situation had changed radically and
that, indeed, Stergiadis was in complete control. His
impression of the local notables did not differ from that of
Venizelos:
"Having themselves created the adverse situation, the
notables are and will remain furious with Stergiadis
but they are in the wrong...They demand to be obeyed
and they are prepared to exercise their authority
tyrannically, owing to their lack of any political
instinct...Stergiadis does not pay too much attention
to them, he keeps them at a distance and does not
hesitate to discipline them with a rather heavy
hand...Any future Greek governor will have to struggle
with this difficulty " 29/.
Another factor which contributed to his strained
relations with the Smyrniots, was his belief that by placing
himself outside the circle of soc.al relations, he would be in
a better position to achieve the tasks entrusted to him by
Venizelos. He lived a lonely life, out of which stemmed the
accusation that he was a misanthrope. With his total
dedication and application to his mission, he offended the
hospitable establishment of Smyrna which did not succeed in
welcoming the High Commissioner to its drawing rooms where
local politics were extensively discussed according to the
centuries-old custom 30/.
Although Diomidis was quite honest in his description
of Stergiadis' relations with the local Greeks, his perception
of the High Commissioner's rapport with the military leaders
was far from the real state of affairs as, in the same letter
to Venizelos, he reported that their relations were "smooth".
Despite Paraskevopoulos' declaration that he unreservedly
placed the army at the disposal of the High Commissioner and





28/ AV9v Letter 1868/15.7.19, Politis to Diomidis.
j/ AV9v	 Letter 1881/26.7.19, Diomidis to Venize].os.
30/ M.Notaras, çp.cit., p. 57.
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that he would suppress any misbehaviour ruthlessly 31/,
Stergiadis had realized from his first days in Smyrria that
his relations with the military would prove difficult in view
of the dual task of the latter, a task entailing their active
participation in the administration, which was foreign to the
military character 32/. To complicate matters further, the
High Commissioner himself had to deal with a dual task: he had
to administer the zone successfully and, at the same time,
control the military expeditions in such a way as both to
avoid alienating the Allies by allowing the occupation of
areas outside the vague Greek mandate and to ensure the
security of the Greek forces and population without provoking
the nationalist feelings of the Turkish population 33/.
Soon after his arrival in Smyrna, Stergiadis advised
Athens that the High Command of the army was inadequate both
in numbers and because "unsuitable" officers had been
appointed 1. Paraskevopoulos agreed with the High
Commissioner on this point but attributed the initial
problems to friction between the Commander of the First
Division and his Chief of Staff which led to "regrettable
incidents, gravely compromising the task of the High
Commissioner and his relations with the military" 35/. The
General considered the matter closed as he had already ordered
substantial changes in the High Command arid had appointed
Lieutenant Commander Sarriyannis as Chief of Staff. This,
however, was not to be: Stergiadis' already strained relatLons
with the military were further tested by his issuing orders
regarding the expansion of the Greek occupation, thereby
superseding the Army High Command.
It should at this point be remembered that Stergiadis,
defying Venizelos' orders to the contrary, took the initiative
to order the occupation of Manisa, Kasaba and Aidin. It was
his belief that swift action by the army was the only viable
weapon against the hostility of the local Allied
representatives, who opposed any expansion of the Greek zone.
This initiative brought about a falt accompli which the Allies
could not ignore 36/. Nevertheless, the advance of the Greek
army created more problems for Stergiadis because of the anti-
Turkish persecutions that ensued in a number of towns. After
the events in Menemen, he was obliged to send the public
prosecutor to investigate the incidents on the spot and arrest
those found implicated. In his report to Venizelos, he
underlined his anxiety that these incidents might	 be
31/ AV 9v Letter 1881/26.7.19, Diomidis to Venizelos.
32/ AV 9d Tel. No. 6578/22.5.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
33/ MOFA File 1919 AAK , Tel. No. 4670/18.5.19, Venizelos to
Zafiriou.
34/ MOFA 141 Tel. nn./30.5.19, Stergiadis to MOFA.
35/	 MOFA 141, Tel. No. 5209/20.5.19, Paraskevopoulos to
Venizelos	 and MOFA.
36/ FO 608/90-16411, Report no 40 (b)/6.6.19, Fitzmaurice to
Caithorpe.
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repeated wherever the Greek army advanced "because of the
character and attitude displayed by the local Greeks and the
leniency of the military authorities in dealing with them"
37/.
The strict sentences pronounced by the court martial on
army officers and soldiers found guilty of "rn 4 indling the
situation" in Menemen, Akhisar and elsewhere, were received
with indignation in Athens. Concern was expressed over the
investigations against Greek military and their detention in
custody because of "the manner with which they defended
themselves against Turkish slaughtering".Such treatment, it
was claimed, might result in cooling off the impetus of the
army and embolden the Turkish nationalists. This view was
voiced by Repoulis who argued that at a time when Turkish
nationalists were "impaling" the dead bodies of Greek
soldiers, he did not consider just to conduct investigations
against soldiers and officers, particularly since these
investigations aimed at clarifying the conditions under which
"some Turks" had been killed during military operations. His
view was that even during a period of armistice, Turkey was
continuing the excesses and the war against the Greeks. What
was worse, the Allies not only tolerated the situation but
also did not allow the Greeks a free hand. "As the centre of
Turkish activities is Panderma", he concluded, "the mere
appearance of the Allied fleet in the sea of Marmara would
suffice to compel them to stop" 38/.
This view was widely shared by the members of the
cabinet and the Athenian press. Invested with the authority to
deal with those deported by the High Commissioner to Old
Greece for "disturbing public order" in Asia Minor, the
Minister of Justice repeatedly interfered and asked Stergiadis
to grant pardon to individuals found guilty by the court
martial. This interference enraged the High Commissioner as he
believed it weakened the discipline of the local population
and their obedience towards his directives. Therefore, he
informed the Minister of Justice that nobody, either in Athens
or in Smyrna, should be allowed to believe that one could
secure personal favours through petitions or mediation of
"protectors" within the government. In this context, he
stressed, the question of granting pardon should be left with
the High Commission 39/. The authority to deport any Greek
responsible for anti-Turkish activities had been given to the
High Commissioner by Venizelos after the disturbances of 15
and 16 May 1919. The Premier had given orders for the strict
punishment of local Greek "rascals who did not prove worthy of
37/ MOFA 136p Tel. No. 3028/19.6.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
38/ MOFA 136h Tel. No. 5590/22.6.19, Repoulis to Venizelos.
39/ MOFA 143b Tel. No. 12225/6.12.19, Stergiadis to Minister
of Justice and MOFA.
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their liberation" 40/.
Stergiadis attached such importance to this point that
he threatened to resign his position if the government did not
share his views. Should this be the case, he noted, his
departure from Smyrna would be the best solution because the
incompatibility of views in such a delicate matter would prove
harmful to "the Greek cause". He further asked the Minister of
Justice to refer all petitions to him and inform the
petitioners and their protectors that the High Commissioner
was the only authority competent to examine their requests
41/. This was by no means the only instance in which
Stergiadis had complained against interference from Athens
regarding the preferential treatment of an individual or a
community. As soon as the distribution of state guaranteed
loans to the returning refugees commenced, continuous requests
from Athens for the favourable treatment of various
communities compelled him to communicate his strong disaproval
of this procedure to Venizelos. He argued that the strenuous
efforts of the Greek occupation had finally succeeded in
securing the strict, sometimes grateful, discipline of one
million Greeks and Turks and it would be at least unwise to
let the population believe that in order to secure
"favouritism" it would suffice to either send a committee to
Athens or appoint a "protector" in the capital, thereby
bypassing the only authority competent to decide on such
matters, i.e. the High Commission 42/.
Another factor which contributed to his strained
relations with the military was the frequent transfer of
officers from posts where they had succeeded in securing the
trust of the population -christian and moslem- through their
good conduct. Stergiadis argued that as these transfers were
not dictated by strategic considerations but by pure
favouritisni, they could not contribute to the consolidation of
security and order in the area which should be the top
priority of the army 43/. However, it was not only the
transfers of lower rank officers that were decided without
consulting the High Commissioner. Major decisions such as the
transfer of the Greek forces' High Command from Salonica to
Smyrna and the subsequent arrival of General Paraskevopoulos
were only communicated to him at the last minute 44/.
Venizelos shared his dissatisfaction on the issue and tried
40/ MOFA 141 Tel. No. 4252/19.5.19, Venizelos to Zafiriou and
Stergiadis. These orders, together with Stergiadis' experience
on the spot, seem to have laid the foundations of mutual
mistrust.
j/	 MOFA 143b Tel.	 No.	 12225/6.12.19 Stergiadis to
Minister of Justice and MOFA.
42/ MOFA 143a Tel. No. 1033/26.11.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos
and MOFA. MOFA l42p Tel. No. 7656/6.8.19, Stergiadis to
Venize].os.
jj GAK 8d Tel. No. 2243/11.11.21 Stergiadis to High Command.
44/ MOFA 106d Tel. No. 909/29.10.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
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to play down its importance by stressing that the transfer was
of a temporary nature in view of the imminent military
operations. The matter of the seat of the High Command was to
be discussed between the two men at the first opportunity. The
Greek Premier was right in suspecting that the reason behind
Stergiadis' opposition to the transfer of the High Command
was that he foresaw problems in his collaboration with
Paraskevopoulos. He assured therefore the High Commissioner
that the General would be replaced should cooperation with him
prove impossible 45/.
In the event, relations between the military and the
High Commissioner reached a stalemate and Venizelos himself
visited the port of Smyrna in January 1920 to settle the
issue. During a conference between the military leaders, the
High Commissioner and the Prime Minister it was decided that
while the High Command would be responsible for the military
aspects of the occupation, Stergiadis would have the overall
command and would take the political decisions 46/.
However, the peace resulting from the Premier's
mediation was short lived. When in February 1920 the High
Command was transferred from the military front back to
Smyrna, the storm broke out 47/. Stergiadis was in Athens at
the time and the Secretary General of the High Commission
advised him to return immediately as major changes were likely
to be ordered by Paraskevopoulos during his absence 48/.
Indeed, despite Stergiadis' protests these changes were
effected. The High Commissioner was convinced that they were
only the result of the Greek government's favourable treatment
of officers who wished to be transferred from Old Greece to
what were considered "the prestigious posts of Asia Minor".
Even if they were due to the actual needs of the army, he
argued, it was essential that the High Commission's views be
heard beforehand as it was vital to appoint officers with
whom a harmonious collaboration could be secured.
While in Athens, Stergiadis had made clear to the
Minister of Defence that should the government wish him to
remain in his post, he would not tolerate any change in the
officer corps without his previous consent. Nonetheless, three
major changes were soon announced without Stergiadis' being
consulted, and Colonel Pangalos, General Paraskevopoulos'
Chief of Staff, had left for Smyrna to persuade the High
Commissioner to accept the appointments. At this point,
Stergiadis demanded the revocation of the transfers as well as
the cancellation of Pangalos' mission and threatened to
prohibit the landing of the three officers in Asia Minor.
45/	 MOFA 106d Tel.	 No.	 7173/31.10.19,	 Venizelos to
Stergiadis.
46/ On Venizelos' visit, lEE, op.cit., p.124.
47/ MOFA 106d Tel. No. 7419/17.2.20, Paraskevopoulos to High
Command.
48/	 MOFA 106d Tel.	 No. 202/16.2.20, P. Gounarakis to
Stergiadis.
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Should the government disagree with his decision, he asked to
be recalled to Athens as this was the third time within eight
months that he had had to express serious complaints against
the military. He further commented that even though urgent
military considerations necessitated the immediate
reinforcement of the troops as well as the replacement of
15,000 men discharged after the last operations, the Ministry
of Defence and the High Command were occupied with personnel
changes that could have serious repercussions. Stergiadis also
stressed that after this telegram, the government should
either recall him or compel the Ministry of Defence and the
High Command to conform to the terms "on which my stay in
Smyrna depends" 49/. As noted by a foreign commentator, it
was "an open secret that the Greek civil and military
authorities in Asia Minor have been hotly engaged in a
struggle which seems inevitable in the circumstances
prevailing in occupied territory" 50/.
Stergiadis' task in Asia Minor was further complicated
by the involvement of the Allied representatives in Turkey in
matters related both to the administration and to the military
occupation and its expansion. With few exceptions, the
representatives opposed the Greek presence in Asia Minor on
various grounds, ranging from genuine concern as to any
chances for the success of the venture to outward hostility
towards anything Greek. These views corresponded to a large
extent to the ones that had been expressed by the various
Allied experts in Paris, during the first months of the Peace
Conference 51/. Although it is widely admitted that on a
personal level the High Commissioner had established a good
working relationship with most Allied representatives,
archival sources show the continuous struggle he had to put up
in order to counteract the anti-Greek propaganda mainly waged
from within the Allied Consulates in Smyrna and their
respective High Commissions in Constantinople.
This was not going to prove an easy task. Although no
effort was spared to convince the foreign representatives in
Turkey of Greek good intentions, minimal progress was made.
General Mime, Commander of the Allied troops in Turkey,
visited Smyrna in early August 1919. He shared the views of
the British High Commissioner in Constantinople; they both
believed that the best solution to the Asia Minor question
would be the withdrawal of Greek and Italian troops 52/.
49/ MOFA 106d Tel. 	 n.n./21.2.20, Stergiadis to MOFA.
50/ FO 371/7584/5681/1.6.22, British Legation in Athens to Earl
Balfour.
jj For an analysis of the various opinions expressed
regarding the Greek venture, see Kitsikis, Le r6le
des experts.... Also Petsalis, op.cit, pp.172-228. Helmreich,
opcit..
T DBFP, IV, no. 14 and FO 608/91 - 18090, Tel. No.
1669/17.8.19, Webb to Curzon.
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Mime further suggested to the Foreign Office that the
administration of the Greek zone should be entrusted to an
interallied commission 53/. The views of Osmin Laporte,
French Consul General at Smyrna, went even further. As early
as March 1919, he wrote to his superiors in Paris: " No future
solution can have more adverse consequences for our national
interests..,, than the attribution of this province, in part
or as a whole, to Greece" 54/. Laporte seemed convinced that
Greek chauvinism would leave little room for the commercial
activities of the European communities of Smyrna which would
soon be forced to leave. Soon after the Greek administration
took shape, he expressed the conviction that the zone should
remain in the hands of Turkey under interallied control.
Annexation by Greece, he noted, would have deplorable effects
and there was no way it would be accepted by the Turks 55/.
At the same time, he reported that the Greek authorities
adopted a conciliatory stance towards the Turks and
Stergiadis' "tyrannical but honest" administration had brought
a semblance of normality to the area 56/. It was quite clear
that Stergiadis was fighting a losing battle: any successes
the Greek authorities might score in their administrative task
of administration, would have little impact on the final
settlement of the issue.
It was also clear that his friendly relations with the
Consuls could not counterbalance the pressure exercised by
their nationals and their continuous complaints against the
Greek administration. Even though Stergiadis' attitude towards
the foreigners, and especially the Italians, was dictated by
the Prime Minister's directives to placate, compromise and
give way, at times their direct involvement in anti-Greek
propaganda was so obvious that he could not avoid expressing
his displeasure:
"Dear Mr. Delegate,
I have the honour to bring to your attention that on
every occasion a communication containing complaints by
Italian citizens has been received from your office,
I have immediately ordered the conduct of an inquiry to
establish responsibilities. In my sincere wish to prove
my amicable feelings towards you, I have taken measures
to your satisfaction even before the matter at hand had
been examined by the Greek authorities or even in cases
I had the absolute right to refuse...I could have, in
my turn Mr. Delegate, communicated to you numerous
complaints against Italian citizens, some of which are
53/ FO 608/103-17942, Tel. No. 6746/11.8.19, Mime to War
Office.
54/ MAE Thrquie, 208, 102-3, Report, 29.3.19, "La situation
politique de Smyrne et du vilayet d' Aidin". P221.
55/ MAE Turquie, 210, 282, desp. n.n./4.8.19, Laporte to
Defrance.
56/ MAE Turquie, 210,280-i, desp. n.n./20.8.19, Laporte to
Defrance.
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extremely grave. But in my sincere wish to contribute
to the confirmation of amicable relations between our
two countries, I have refrained from doing so " 57/.
What made matters worse was the fact that Stergiadis'
leniency towards those Italians suspected of espionage and
whose arrest he refused to permit, soon became another source
of friction with the military. As a result of the provocatve
Italian stance, Stergiadis assumed the role of mediator
between the Italian authorities and the Greek military. His
position was made even harder by his conviction that the
military were in the right 58/. The High Commissioner fully
realized the danger emanating from this policy and believed
that his leniency and conciliatory spirit could not prevail
over the just indignation of the military towards espionage
activities sponsored by the Italians 59/. In his efforts to
avoid any friction with the Italians, Stergiadis had to
restrain the military from taking action against them because
of the open assistance they rendered the Turks both inside and
outside the Greek zone, the prime example being the use of the
Sokia region as a nationalist haven 60/.
Pressure exercised by the local European residents on
the representatives of their respective countries soon
resulted in official complaints being voiced against the
administration. While a number of these complaints were
justified, the overall purpose was to precipitate an Allied
decision that Greece should withdraw from Asia Minor. Thus,
in September 1919, the British Delegate in Smyrna J. Morgan,
complained that Stergiadis maintained the Turkish
administration in theory but ignored it in practice. "Every
day", he wrote, "sees some further attempt on the part of the
Greeks to substitute their administration for that of some
Turkish department. As long as the Greeks remain in
Smyrna...one may be justified in saying that their attitude
towards foreign authorities in military and other matters will
be marked with duplicity...It would seem impossible to keep
them to their word" 61/. What seemed to escape his attention,
however, was the duplicity with which the Greek authorities
were presented by the Allied representatives and, needless to
say, the Turks, which necessitated their taking over the
administration if the Greek venture was to have any chances of
success. As Stergiadis reportedly pointed out to Morgan, "the
expressed trust of the British government is of no use if its
representative in Smyrna shows such enmity towards the Greek
57/ MOFA 136 Draft Note to Italian Delegate in Smyrna.
58/ MOFA 21a Tel. No.3527/17.3.20, Stergiadis to Venizelos.
59/	 MOFA 35b Tel. No. 8645/6.8.21, Stergiadis to MOFA,
reporting on complaints of the Italian Consul. " I can
not...impede the prosecution of individuals whose activities
endanger the security of the army".
60/ MOFA 86 Tel. No. 12036/30/13.11.19, Stergiadis to MOFA.
61/ FO 608/9-20692, desp. 179/10, 12.9.19, Morgan to Robeck.
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occupation " 62/.
Significantly enough, only a month later, Morgan
himself admitted that the numerous complaints against the
Greek administration had been brought up "by the Turks" for
political reasons and that the Greeks were the better
administrators. "Owing to the efficient control of the Greek
gendarmerie", he further commented, "there were very few cases
of crime; the Greek disregard of Turkish rights has something
to recommend it. The Turk, who mistakes mildness for weakness,
is at his best when under firm rule" 63/. This view regarding
the harsh treatment of Turks by the Greek administration is
characteristic of the vicious circle Stergiadis had found
himself in. Accused by the local Greeks of being unfair
towards them and too lenient towards the Turks, he also had to
deal with daily complaints on the part of the Allied
representatives of his alleged maltreatment of the Moslem
community. Despite these complaints, however, Stergiadis seems
to have been regarded with great respect by the foreign
representatives and their colonies. "On many occasions",
writes Paraskevopoulos,	 "the High Commissioners, various
foreign nationals, 	 even the Levantines, expressed their
admiration.	 Stergiadis'	 prestige	 grew	 among	 the
representatives of the Allied powers who considered him a
most able and trustworthy person "
	 64/.
Their admiration for the High Commissioner did not
stop the foreign and the Levantine communities from presenting
him with numerous issues, stemming from their determination
not to allow the Greek merchants to usurp their privileged
position in the commerce of the Near East. When, for example,
the export of rolling stock from the port of Smyrna was
temporarily prohibited in view of pressing army needs, the
British, American, French, Italian and Dutch Chambers of
Commerce in Smyrna presented the British delegate with a
memorandum criticizing the Greek administration, addressed to
the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople and requested
it to be forwarded to them. The High Commissioners immediately
asked to receive Morgan's comments on the complaints and
requested that he should call attention to any further
grievances in his future despatches. Morgan though did not
feel justf led in doing so because, as he commented, the
complaints were mainly based on grievances from businessmen
who did not like the fact that their trade was interfered with
by war conditions. "The Levantines of Smyrna", he noted, "did
not so much resent the doings of Stergiadis as the very
presence of the Greeks whom they dislike because they are
accustomed to look upon the Greeks everywhere as an inferior
62/ Rodas, op.cit., p.126.
63/	 FO 608/103-20831, desp. 264/10, 10.10.19, Morgan to
Robeck.
64/ L. Paraskevopoulos, Anamnisis, vol. II, Athens 1935.
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Morgan's report was forwarded to the Times with an
unsigned memorandum, probably by a local correspondent. The
author of the memorandum noted that even though the Times'
diplomatic correspondents referred to Stergiadis both as an
excellent governor and as a man who might take a leading part
in . a ministerial coalition, certainly not all Smyrna was
enamoured of him. For his part, Morgc *n nted that there was no
doubt that Stergiadis was not populai. with a large number of
Smyrniots whether Greeks, Turks or foreigners and that he had
been told by the Greeks that the day they got hold of him they
would lynch him and drown him in the bay of Smyrna. These
intentions were expressed a year before the catastrophe and
the alleged abandonment of Hellenisn by the High Commissioner,
which is said to have been the main cause of the hatred of the
refugees 66/.
After the loss of the November 1920 elections by the
Liberals, Stergiadis was quick to submit his resignation.
However, concentrated efforts and pleas from both Venizelos
and the Royalists persuaded him to remain in his post. It is
significant that the new government refused to accept his
resignation although practically all Venizelist officials,
civil and military, had been replaced. The general feeling was
that "there was no other man who could take his place in Asia
Minor" 67/. Nonetheless, it was soon felt that the government
had complete confidence in Stergiadis' ability and equity and
had practically given him carte blanche in Smyrna 68/.
The change in the government soon brought changes
in the military and civil personnel serving in Asia Minor. The
changes in the civil service and the police force within the
area of his jurisdiction enraged Stergiadis who threatened to
resign once again. This latest incident was caused by the
order of the Minister of Interior regarding the transfer of I.
Karidis, Commander of the Police, who had served under
Stergiadis both in Epirus and Asia Minor. The High
Commissioner guaranteed that the Commander was a man of duty
on whom any government could rely. In a long telegram to the
government he argued that for 19 months he had striven to
apply an administrative system according to which the High
Commissioner was responsible for all the civil employees and
members of the police under his jurisdiction, without allowing
any governmental interference whatsoever in what concerned
matters of personnel,	 be it appointments, transfers or
dismissals. This was a method he had successfully applied in
65/ MOFA 41d, copy of Morgan's report and attached memo,
n.n. m.d.
66/ ibid.
67/ Hendersori,op.cit, p. 596.
68/ DBFP, xvii, no. 428, Bentnick to FO, 15.8.22, reporting
conversation with M. Baltazis.
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Epirus and had tried to repeat in Smyrna, on a wider scale.
The careful implementation of this policy, he claimed, was
essential in Asia Minor in view of the delicate conditions
necessitating specially trained personnel. Should the need
arise for the replacement of civil employees, of high and low
ranks alike, it would be pointed out by the High Commissioner
himself who had not hesitated in the past 19 months to replace
two commanders of the Smyrna police force. The commanders were
excellent officers, Stergiadis noted, but had proved unable to
adapt to the local circumstances. These and other changes
requested by the High Commissioner had nothing to do with
prsonal preferences and favouritism. They were due to the
implementation of "a particular administrative method which I
have not regretted and which I cannot alter (if I am to help
the government] with the national task, not completed or
consolidated as yet" 69/. His vigorous reaction prevented
any further changes without the High Commissioner's consent.
He was further assured that this transfer W35 due to a mistake
of the Ministry of Interior, which had now received strict
orders not to effect any changes in the High Commissioner's
area of jurisdiction. The government expressed its confidence
in "his enlightened administration" and its wish "not to
interfere in the performance of his duties" 70/.
The change in the regime and the subsequent changes in
the army leadership do not seem to have had any positive
effect on his strained relations with the military who chose
to disobey the orders of both the government and the High
Commissioner and continued to interfere with the
administration of the finances of the zone under military
occupation. Within this zone, the High Commissioner had
established a special administrative system of civil and
financial affairs with satisfactory results. His intention was
to develop this system gradually in such a way that the
militarily occupied areas (MOZ) would be administratively
absorbed into the Treaty of Sèvres Zone. By November 1920, the
Greek administration had absorbed the zone north of the
Meander up to Smyrna and aimed to incorporate soon the area
from Adramyt to Balikesir and Soma, to Salihli and Alasehir
(Filadelfia).This move would not cause any Allied protests as
it would only affect the Turkish authorities without touching
upon vested western interests such as the Public Debt, the
Règie des Tabacs, the administration of the railways etc. It
was also contemplated as a means to free the military
authorities from duties for which they did not possess the
administrative competence or the ability to adapt continuously
to the ever changing conditions and to give solutions to the
various problems arising daily. It was Stergiadis' conviction
that the interference of the military in the administrative,
judicial and, what was most important, financial affairs of
the occupied zone would certainly lead to "an upheaval which
69/	 MOFA 22g Tel. No. 15374/27.11.20, Stergiadis to Prime
Minister.
70/ MOFA 22g Tel. No.15374/28.11.20, MOFA to Stergiadis.
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could compromise the Greek cause by shaking Allied confidence
in Greece's ability to govern and pacify Anatolia" 71/.
Stergiadis requested the 1mmediate intervention of the
government so that the military authorities would strictly
abstain from any interference in the administration of the
finances of the occupied territories and adhere to the High
Commissioner'sinstructions . This intervention was requested
because his repeated demarches to the High Command had brought
no results. General Viachopoulos, Chief of Staff at the time,
refused to comply with the instructions of the High
Commissioner because he had conflicting orders from the
Commander of the Asia Minor Army. This seemed to be the case
with most instructions of the High Commissioner to the
military authorities which, once they had received a given
order from the Commander of the army, could not follow
opposite orders received from the High Commissioner.
Therefore, Stergiadis concluded, it was up to the government
to decide on the administration of the occupied territories
and to issue specific instructions so that no doubt or
friction could arise 72/.
All in all, Stergiadis was very reluctant to give his
consent for the military to undertake activities of what he
described as a "civilian or political nature". The experiences
of the first months of the occupation had taken their toll in
his view of the ability of the officers to perform "civilian
tasks" 73/. At the same time, the Greek military were not
ready to accept the authority of the High Commissioner over
them or his right to issue orders to them. The frequent
conflicts that ensued were usually solved to Stergiadis'
satisfaction with the mediation of Athens. Nevertheless, this
involved a time consuming procedure which annoyed Stergiadis
immensely' because it conflicted with the strict system of
administration he wanted to implement in Asia Minor. In April
1921, he confided to Philip Dragoumis that under normal
circumstances he would be the first to criticize his severe
treatment of military and civilians' alike. He believed however
that the delicate situation dictated his actions which, in the
long run, would prove beneficial 74/. In order for a system
of administration to succeed, he concluded, the person chosen
to implement it must dedicate at least ten years to the task
but, in view of his poor' health, he did not believe he was to
stay in Smyrna for long 75/. Admittedly, his administrative
methods were not contpatible with the character and strong
personality of the Smyrniots. One of his critics comments:
From the first days of his presence in Smyrna, Stergiadis put
into practice administrative methods using terror against the
local population. Surrounded by men who sought to conceal
71/ MOFA 24a Tel. No. 9507/19.8.21, Stergiadis to MOFA.
72/ MOFA 24a Tel. No. 9507/19.8.21, Stergiadis to MOFA.
73/ Rodas, op.cit., p. 165.T/ Dragoumis, ph.op.cit., entry for 15/16 April 1921.
75/ ibid.
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their ignorance behind a stupid arrogance, Stergiadis proved
to be a real tyrant with interminable crises of madness..In
his internal politics, Venizelos has committed a series of
grave mistakes which accelerated the dramatic failure of his
foreign policy. One of these mistakes was the appointment of
Stergiadis" 76/.
On the contrary, Prince Nicholas who met the High
Commissioner during his visit to Asia Minor with King
Constantine in June 1921, noted in his diary: " Stergiadis
seems to be a man of rare abilities and energy. He works
tirelessly and, what is rare, his administration is impartial.
I believe he is a Venizelist, a fact he does not refute
anyway, but, above all, he considers himself to be a Greek who
is interested in the progress and the good name of his
country...Let us hope he will remain the same person until the
end...Without any doubt he is today what the British call the
right man in the right place " 77/.
Although an ardent Venizelist, Stergiadis did not seem
to have any difficulties in collaborating with the new regime
as he could easily distinguish party political preferences
from his duties as a civil employee. His strong sense of
duty was one of the main reasons that led him to oppose the
Asia Minor Defence plans for autonomy. Indeed, if one is to
draw conclusions from his past performance, it would have been
impossible for him to actively assist or even endorse a
movement that was not sponsored by the Greek government, let
alone to assume its leadership. His allegiance to the elected
government of Greece must have also been the main reason for
his disapproval of Patriarch Meletios and the circumstances of
his election to the patriarchal throne 78/. For his part,
76/ Dourmoussis, op.cit., p.30. Although criticizing
Stergiadis on many points, M. Rodas who worked in the High
Commission for the most pa'rt of the Greek administration, he
does not seem to agree with Dourmoussis on the issue of
Stergiadis' surrounding himself with ignorant and arrogant
men. On the contrary, he emphasizes the fact that the
formidable administrative task accomplished in such a short
period of time was due to a team effort. Rodas, op.cit..
77/ Markezinis, op.cit., p.291. For the royal visit to Asia
Minor, Nicholas, Prince My Fifty Years, London n.d., pp.
293ff.
78/ On the election of Meletios Metaxakis and subsequent
reactions,	 A.Alexandris,	 "The Constantinopolitan Greek
Factor...", Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, vol. 8,
1982/83. In his Annual Report (1922), the British High
Commissioner in Constantinople criticized Meletios for
inciting the Greeks against the Turks with his inflamatory
sermons. FO 371/91 76/7.11.23, Henderson to Curzon, p.34 ff. On
Stergiadis and his refusal to head the movement, AV 21b
Pepragmena Ethnikis Amynas Constantinoupoleos (Annual Report,
Constantinople National Defence), 23.4.22. Also Chapter Four,
Section II.
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Meletios accused Stergiadis of having turned against Hellenism
in Asia Minor and of having changed from "a liberal aching for
the salvation of Asia Minor" to "the most fanatic organ of the
royalist regime, striving to silence every voice of protest
against the imminent return of the Christian population to
Turkish rule" 79/. These accusations, however, came only
after the High Commissioner had turned down the offer extended
to him by Meletios and the Asia Minor Defe 	 to assume its
leadership 80/. Another issue closely related with that of
the Amyna, was the proposal for the organization of a civil
guard. The High Commissioner was very much against the
organization of such a body and of supplying arms to the local
Greeks 81/.
Even if the government had sponsored this movement, it
is highly unlikely that Stergiadis would have been involved in
its leadership. As he explained to General Danglis, at the
time leader of the Liberals, he did not trust either General
Papoulas or the army to undertake successfully such a major
task. At the same time, he feared that once this movement
failed, which it was likely to do, the disaster would be even
greater. To his mind, only intense diplomatic activity could
secure the protection of minorities in Turkey, the only issue
in which Greece could have a say 82/.
It is quite surprising that although the Smyrniot
establishment had fought for Stergiadis' replacement from his
first days as High Commissioner and had repeatedly accused him
of behaving as a tyrant, it decided to offer him the
leadership of the Antyna. Albeit at a very late stage, the
Smyrniots seemed to have discovered his virtues as a leader
and the respect he enjoyed within Allied circles.
Significantly enough, Venizelos had not changed his mind about
his former colleague, despite the venomous accusations from
Smyrna and Athens. When Meletios asked for his advice as to
whether the Antyna should go on with its plans despite
Stergiadis' refusal to assume its leadership, Venizelos
commented that if the High Commissioner did not support the
movement then no good could come out of it. At the same time,
he had repeatedly advised the leaders of the
Mikrasiatiki Antyna that none of their plans should be
implemented unless Stergiadis undertook the leadership of the
movement 83/.
Until April 1922, the Venizelists had generally
79/ AV a2 Letter, n,n./24.5.22, Meletios to Venizelos.
80/	 On this offer, see Chapter Four, Section II.
81/ In a long report regarding the organization of the civil
guard, General Petimezas criticizes Stergiadis strongly for
not	 allowing	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 plan.
Petimezas Archive, Benaki Museum.
82/ AV 3a1 Letter, n.n./12.4.22, Danglis to Venizelos.
83/ Notaras, op.cit., p. 62.
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refrained from openly accusing Stergiadis for fear of his
being replaced by a confirmed royalist. The Smyrniots in
particular, did not dare to lodge any complaint with the
Gounaris government against him because, as Venizelists, they
abstained from openly discrediting the only remaining high
Venizelist functionary. A British correspondent noted:
"...The Royalist government did not dare touch him for fear it
might arouse an outcry like the one caused in January 1921,
when it removed Zaimis from the directorship of the National
Bank...In all the time he has been in Smyrna he never mixed
with the people, he never condescended to recognize socially
any of the leading Greek families, he never accepted an
invitation to their homes and never invited any of them to his
residence which is guarded like a bear's den". The same
correspondent reported that although he had asked to be
received by the High Commissioner twice and whilst the King,
Gounaris and all the Ministers accepted readily, Stergiadis
had refused twice and said that he never received journalists
84/.In the spring of 1922, however, his having opted for the
solution of the evacuation of the Greek army brought on the
open attack of the Venizelist press. " Contrary to all
expectations", wrote Embros, "surprising and disappointing all
those who believed in his wide and mature political horizons
and based many of their hopes on his character and strength,
Mr. Stergiadis has agreed with the [evacuation] policy of Mr.
Gounaris. The policy of evacuation and abandonment of Asia
Minor"	 85/.
What Embros failed to mention was that in February
1922, during one of his visits to Athens, Stergiadis had a
meeting with the leaders of the Liberal party and expressed to
them his anxiety over the Asia Minor question. He insisted
that the army should be evacuated immediately with exemplary
order so as to make the most out of the situation and not to
compromise "the national prestige". The Liberal leadership
seemed to agree with his views and P. Melas inquired whether
Stergiadis would consider resigning from his post to assume
the leadership of the Phileleftheri. To this offer the High
Commissioner replied that it was his wish to remain in Srnyrna
and "drink the whole glass" 	 86/.
Meanwhile, a number of newspapers, including some
reflecting the views of the opposition, voiced the view that
Stergiadis should assume the Premiership. In February 1922,
Lindley briefed Curzon:
"It is here that M. Stergiadis comes in. He was one of M.
Venizelos's most trusted lieutenants, but has kept
studiously out of party politics. He is universally
respected both for his political and financial honesty,
and public opinion is more and more turning towards him in
this critical time. In the conversation with him...of the
84/ Copy of the report in MOFA 41d.
85/ MOFA 118h Embros, 9.4.22.
86/ AV 3a4, 1/5.4.22, Memo to Venizelos, not signed.
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6th instant, he did not touch on the possibility of his
forming a government hut I have since learned that he
contemplates it seriously -after but not before- he has
carried out the evacuation of Smyrna. His idea is to gain
the support of the moderate wing of the anti-Venizelist
party by accepting King Constantine and to take with him
the Right Wing of the Venizelists, who are naturally
inclined to support him, and whom he would satisfy by such
measures as the dissolution of the political clubs
[epistrati].
It will be sure that M. Stergiadis aims at nothing
less than the pacification of the country. His programme
is that of a statesman and a patriot, but there is no
doubt that he will meet with serious difficulties. In the
first place, signs are not wanting that already some
Venizelist veterans resent the appearance of a new man
just as the old party leaders resented the appearance of
M. Venizelos. They are jealous of him and twit him with
disloyalty to the illustrious exile [Venizelos]. If some
of the Venizelists think in this manner, it may be
imagined what the leaders of the older parties feel. They
are like a flock of daws on whom has fallen the shadow of
a peregrine -cawing abuse and tumbling in the air without
the courage to come to grips. In spite of these
difficulties, I am inclined to think that events will
bring M. Stergiadis into power before many months are
over. How long his collaborators will stomach his despotic
methods and violent temper is another matter; still more,
perhaps, how long his compatriots will bear with his
superiority to themselves. The examples of Aristides and
Venizelos are not encouraging" 87/.
It seems, however, that Lindley had misinterpreted
Stergiadis' intentions, and a few days later he reported to
London that when he asked the High Commissioner about the
truth in the reports about his assuming the premiership, he
replied that the internal and external situation of Greece
were inextricably interwoven, and that he thought no good
would follow a change of government at that stage. "The
present government must liquidate the war, and it was the duty
of all patriotic Greeks to help them. Besides, he would have
no majority in the Chamber were he to try to form a
Government, and fresh elections were not to be thought of now.
He could not take up the responsibility of forming an
unconstitutional Government in present circumstances" 88/.
Despite Stergiadis' blunt refusal to commit himself,
the campaign to bring him at the forefront of Greek politics
appears to have continued right until the first days of
September 1922, when Bentnick reported: "It is of interest to
note that the "Kathimerini", hitherto the chief prop of M.
87/ FO 371/7584/ Lindlay to Curzon 20.2.22.
88/ FO 371/7584/ Lindlay to Curzon 24.2.22.
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Gounaris, is now one of the newspapers which attacks him and
his Government with great violence and advocates with all its
eloquence the resignation of the present Cabinet and the
access to the Premiership of M. Stergiadis. Some of the
Venizelist newspapers, on the other hand, which used to place
all their hopes on M. Stergiadis, have now turned against
him...Prince Andrew (is] favourable to M. Stergiadis, as he
thought he was strong enough to tell the King, if need be,
that he ought to retire" 89/.
In the chaotic situation of early summer 1922, with
conflicting rumours about the Greek position in Asia Minor and
at the conference table, only Stergiadis seemed to realize
what the final outcome of the situation was going to be. "The
High Commissioner was totally pessimistic. He was the only one
to foresee the disaster. He kept telling us that everything
would be lost soon" 90/. Indeed, it seems tragic that the
High Commissioner from Smyrna could make such predictions
while the government which knew the harsh reality of the
fruitless negotiations, was in no position to take measures
for the evacuation of the population 91/.
Meanwhile, Stergiadis did not fail to inform the
Liberal leadership about the real state of affairs in Asia
Minor and about his views on the hopelessness of the
situation. In early July 1922 he had long talks with George
Papandreou, specially sent by the Liberal leadership to meet
with the !igh Commissioner aboard the ship taking him from
Athens to Smyrna. During these talks, Papandreou reportedly
informed Stergiadis that the Liberal party had also adopted
the policy of the immediate evacuation of Asia Minor 92/. The
High Commissioner seems to have convinced Papandreou that any
thoughts for the self defence of Asia Minor by the Amyna were
out of the question. Further, he conveyed to the Liberal envoy
his anxiety and helplessness over the imminent disaster.
"Nothing, absolutely nothing could be done" 93/.
89/ FO 371/7585/ Bentnick to Curzon 6.9.22.
90/ Deposition of N. Theotokis during the trial of The Six.
Pro!a publication.
917 See Chapter Two, Section I.
92/ An unnamed journalist or agent of the MOFA Press Office
travelled on the same boat with Stergiadis and Papandreou to
report on their movements MOFA 52b, Report, n.n./4.7.22,
unsigned addressed to Aravantinos, Head of the Press Office. A
popular account of the meeting between the two men is given in
Venezis' Mikrasia Chaire, p. 76 and is a characteristic
example of how events could be distorted or magnified out of
proportion, or both, to give credibility to criticisms.
According to this account, the author of which was supposed
to have organized the meeting between the two men, the
encounter did not take place on the liner to Smyrna at all but
in Smyrna itself and Papandreou is supposed to have said to
this witness that Stergiadis was having a nervous breakdown.
93/ ibid.
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When Stergiadis visited Athens in July 1922, Exindaris,
another leading Liberal and close friend of Venizelos,
approached him with a view to arranging a meeting of the two
men at the request of the ex-Prime Minister. In the past, the
High Commissioner seems to have expressed the wish to meet
with his former "brother in arms" and, when Exindaris put the
details to him, he was willing to go ahead with the proposal.
However, when Exindaris returned a few days later to make the
final arrangements, he found a completely changed man.
Stergiadis had in the meantime received a number of venomous,
anonymous letters and had become furious. At the same time, he
had come to realize that the esteem and the trust he had
enjoyed among the Liberal followers in the past had now been
replaced by accusations and mistrust. The realization of the
new situation, of which he was hitherto unaware, created in
him a stormy psychological condition. "Mixed feelings of
surprise, bitterness, grievance and despondency seemed to
clash in his soul"94/. He believed that rarely had a man found
himself in the difficult position he was in. While performing
what he thought was his duty, he had wasted all his energy and
mental abilities. Nonetheless, instead of his services being
recognized, as he hoped they would, he suddenly realized there
was a general outcry against him 95/. This sudden discovery
had turned him into a broken man and his disappointment was
such that Exindaris admitted he felt sorry for him. After
these events, he saw the prospect of a meeting with Venizelos
in a totally different light. "It will seem", he said to
Exindaris, "as if I am going to the meeting in order to defend
myself and this I will never do, for the life of me. If Jesus
Christ said to me 'light a candle in my name and you will go
to Heaven', I would reply I do not care about you or your
paradise" 96/.
This was the High Commissioner's state of mind when he
was asked to accept the portfolio of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs "in view of the critical situation" 97/. Needless to
say, he did not even consider the possibility not only because
he knew very well that no governmental change could have any
effect on the impending disaster, but also because, as he had
repeatedly declared, he did not have any political ambitions
and considered himself a "high ranking functionary".
Therefore, irrespective of whether the Asia Minor disaster was
the result of military failure or political imprudence, it can
in no way be attributed to Stergiadis. He was neither in
charge of the army nor did he take part in the shaping of the
country's foreign policy. He was not even a politician
collaborating with the government. On two issues he was
totally responsible and indeed had every initiative:
	
the
94/ AV 4b Letter, n.n./16.8.22, Exiridaris to Venizelos.
95/ ibid.
96/ ibid.
97/ MOFA 121b 8847/26.8.22, Kalogeropoulos to Stergiadis.
FO 371/7585/ Bentnick to Curzon 6.9.22.
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internal administration and the preservation of public order
within the zone under Greek occupation. As admitted by his
critics, he was successful in both areas:
"If we wish to be objective, we must accept that the Greek
administration of Smyrna conscientiously performed its task,
which was both heavy and awkward and at the same time
patriotic and of extreme national importance. The exemplary
and enviable [administration] of the area, together with the
consolidation of public order were the achievements of the
High Commission. Under the circumstances, no one but the dry
and realistic Stergiadis could have been more appropriate
for the post of the High Commissioner. With his policies
Stergiadi.s not only did not harm but without doubt benefited
the Greek cause" 98/.
Nonetheless, the slandering canpaign in the press
had already started. Lindlay noted in his report: "There is no
doubt that the strong line taken by M. Stergiadis, both
towards the National Defence Movement and towards the Greek
Military Authorities in Asia Minor has made him many enemies
in Greece. The papers have lately been full of abuse of the
High Commissioner, who is denounced by some of the Venizelist
Press as a renegade and by other journals as a traitor to the
cause of Hellenism. In my opinion he is almost the only man of
strong character and high political integrity at present
occupying an important post in Greece, and he is the greatest
moral asset possessed by the Greek Government and the Crown"
99/.
Despite the fact that he had informed all the
interested parties on the disaster about to befall the
Christians of Asia Minor months in advance, the responsible
political leaders -royalist and liberal alike- did not deem it
essential to prepare the poptilation. Highlighting the
tremendous complexities involved, Lindlay commented in
February 1922: "Although most responsible Greeks would be glad
now to evacuate Asia Minor immediately, I do not believe the
present Greek government would have the nerve to do so without
adequate guarantees for the safety of Christlans...I doubt
even if Mr. Stergiadis were he in power would take
responsibility for either leaving the population or swamping
this impoverished country with two or three hundred thousand
more refugees. It may be that at one time the safety of the
Christian population was a pretext for the Greek occupation.
If this was so, it has long ceased to be the case. It is now
the real obstacle to the evacuation and has become more
serious since the guarantees obtained by the French for
Cilicia proved inadequate to prevent the population from
leaving the country en mass"
98/ Prosfygikos Kosmos, [Refugee World], 14.9.72.
99/ FO 371/7584/5681 Bentnick to Earl Balfour, 1.6.22.
100/ DBFP, xvii, no. 536, Lindley to Curzon, 19.2.22.
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Nonetheless, when the disaster came, he was accused of
having hidden the truth from the population and of not
providing the means for Its departure from Asia Minor. These
accusations, however, do not reflect the true state of
affairs. In repeated telegrams he had requested the immediate
dispatch of ships to transfer the population and when it
became clear that none were available, he asked the Royal Navy
to anchor along the coist to encourage the population and give
a semblance of security. He also asked those representatives
of the High Commission who believed that their stay in their
area of jurisdiction was essential, to remain until further
notice 101/. Even if he had wanted to hide the truth, he
would not have succeeded since from June 1922 the Greek
inhabitants of the interior of Asia Minor began arriving at
the coast, and especially Smyrna, in their hundreds, bringing
the news of the catastrophe 102/. However, it seems that
although the Christian communities and especially their
notables knew the real state of affairs, no one wanted to
believe that the end was so near 103/.
Despite stories to the contrary, Stergiadis was the
last Greek official to leave Smyrna. General Polymenakos,
Commander of the army, and his staff had boarded the warship
on 7 September and were ready to leave. On 8 September, the
High Commissioner boarded the British Iron Duke. There were
no enraged crowds and no foreign detachment with fixed
bayonets to protect him 104/. Stergiadis handed the keys of
the High Commission to the French Consul and left, "a broken
man who had assumed a post he did not want and had retained it
out of duty" 105/. The following morning, the first Turkish
detachments entered Smyrna while the ship that was to
transport Stergiadis to Constantinople was still in the
harbour.
In June 1922, during a debate in parliament, the
spokesman of the Liberal party said: "No one appreciates more
than the Liberals the task performed in Asia Minor by Mr.
Stergiadis,	 thanks to whom Greece can today proudly
demonstrate an original, civilized administration which
honours the Greek state. No one is in a position to criticize
the patriotic work of the High Commissioner and all of us
agree about the excellence of his work" 106/. This was said
only two months before the disaster. When a hate campaign was
started against Stergiadis after the destruction, no official
101/ MOFA 121g Tel. No. 15007/25.8.22, Stergiadis to the
Representatives of the High Commission.
102/ Notaras, op.cit., p. 64.
103/ Venezis, op.cit., p. 94.
104/ For the legend surrounding his departure and the
alleged	 efforts of the crowds to lynch
	 him,
Venezis,op.cit., p. 68. Angelomatis, op.cit., p.213.
105/ Notaras, o.cit, p.76.
106/ Praktika Voulis ton Ellinon, 	 (Minutes of the Greek
Parliament], 10 June 1922.
voice rose to defend him although no government and no
political party has ever officially accused him of the
charges made against him, initially started by a small group
of refugees from Smyrna. The origins of the public outcry
against Stergiadis coincided with the arrival of the first
refugees to Greece and, mainly, of those Smyrniots he had
embittered with his policies. As no one seemed to object to
the accusations, they soon found their way into publications,
inflamatory articles and speeches, creating a myth which,
without any thought or research, was soon adopted as part of
the story. The atmosphere prevailing in Greece at the time
helped the word to come out,make its round with extreme speed
and convince the long suffering masses of the refugees that,
as well as The Six "who found the end they deserved",
Stergiadis was also responsible for the disaster. Since he was
neither dead, nor in Greece to reply to his critics, he
attracted the formidable hate of more than one million people.
Thus, hastily formed public opinion soon found its
place in Greek folklore. Venizelist declarations to the effect
that "no liberal politician believes that the governments
following November 1920 committed treason against the
motherland or that they consciously directed the country to
the Asia Minor disaster" 107/, precipitated the process by
suggesting that if the royalist politicians were not
responsible for the disaster, then it surely followed that
Stergiadis was the sole culprit for the sufferings of the
refugees. It would be unrealistic to expect the political
leaders and parties of the time to defy public opinion by
defending Stergiadis, as such a stance would certainly have
been tantamount to political suicide 108/.
In contrast, when in 1924 a group of refugee MPs
attacked him in parliament, the then government and the other
political leaders avoided taking part in the debate. By this
stance, they neither endorsed the accusations nor did they
side with Stergiadis. Was their silence an indication of
their endorsement of the accusations or was it dictated by
other considerations? The one person who could have changed
public opinion in favour of Stergiadis was Venizelos. He chose
not to do so although it is very unlikely that he did not know
the facts. In a rare moment of compassion for his former
comrade in arms, Venizelos wrote to his sons : "I beg you not
to forget that you should never condemn a person before giving
him the chance to be heard, no matter how self-evident the
charges against him are. In this instance, compassion is due
to Stergiadis because he found himself under very difficult
circumstances, under which anyone would have broken" 109/.
107/ AV1 Letter, n.n./3.2.29, Venizelos to Tsaldaris.
108/ Notaras,op.cit..
109/	 AV 25, Letter, n.n./13.10.22 Venizelos to his sons
Kyriakos and Sophocles.
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These comments were prompted by Stergiadis' visit to
the Paris residence of Kyriakos and Sophocles Venizelos in
early October 1922. The biographer of Sophocles Venizelos
notes: "At the end of September 1922, Stergiadis arrived at
the French capital. His first concern was to leave his
visiting card at the residence of Sophocles. As soon as E.
Benakis knew of the event, he advised Sophocles to return it.
Such was the outcry against Stergiadis, mainly among the
refugees, that any contact with him would be to the detriment
of the Venizelos' family. The opinion of the father was
sought, and he was quick to reply: 'Dear Sophocles, to the
question of Kyriakos, I replied yesterday on the telephone
that I do not approve of the view of our friend Mr. Benakis
that you should return the visiting cards left by Mr.
Stergiadis. I believe that you must return his visit without
delay, by simply leaving a card without seeking to see him.
But if he asks to see you, you must hurry to receive him and
to listen to him with great attention. If you find his
explanations sound and worthy of attention you should not
hesitate to tell him so...You may also add that I will return
[from Deauville] on Saturday and that I will be happy to see
him if he is in Paris" 110/.
There seems to be no evidence to suggest that this
meeting took place. Nonetheless, Venizelos' advice to his sons
tends to indicate that the Liberal leader who was among the
very few to know how and why Greece's Anatolian venture had
failed, was reluctant, to say the least, to accept that the
fate of the refugees was all Stergiadis' doing.
During his twenty eight years of self exile in France,
Stergiadis spoke but once. In April 1927 he gave an interview
to Kostas Ouranis for the leading Venizelist paper
Eleftheros Typos 111/. Ouranis reportedly asked him what was
his reaction towards the refugees, in view of their hatred
towards him and their convinction that he was the only person
to be blamed for the catastrophe that befell them and
Stergiadis commented:
"I know it, I know that if I fall in their hands
they will lynch me. I will not however try to change
your mind. Maybe one day the truth will be known and
then you will realize and all the world will realize
that I did what I had to do and, therefore, I can have
a clear conscience. I had two obligations: to secure
the transportation of the army and to avert panic. In
the first one I succeeded. In order to succeed in the
second, I assured the public that Smyrna was not facing
any immediate danger. It goes without saying that I did
not give this assurance on my own. On this occasion I
was but the porte parole of the military who were
adamant that it would take the Turks at least one month
110/ Daphnis, G. Sophocles E. Venizelos, Athens 1970, p. 112.
111/ Eleftheros Typos [Free Press], 7 April 1927.
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to enter Smyrna 112/. I did nothing more but repeat their
assurances and, also, I did not for a moment stop asking the
government to send an adequate number of ships to Asia Minor
for the transportation of the population. The official
documents are there to prove it".
Indeed, archival material supports this statement. What
Stergiadis did not mention either during this interview or at
any other point, was the fact that although he had foreseen
the necessity for an evacuation as early as the beginning of
1922 and he could have resigned under any pretext a few months
before the catastrophe, he remained in his position in order
not to cause panic or be accused of cowardice. It must be
remembered that in May 1922, General Papoulas, Commander in
Chief of the Greek forces, had resigned. Therefore, Stergiadis
had both the alternative and the precedent.
To Ouranis' remark that he could have requested the
Allied warships at the time at the port of Smyrna to transport
the Christian population to the neighbouring Greek islands,
Stergiadis observed that he had indeed tried to do so but the
Allied commanders had received orders from their governments
to remain neutral "until the situation was stabilized". At
this point, Stergiadis expressed his indignation towards the
Allies "who did not protect the Christians because they did
not want to dissatisfy the Turks. It is for this reason that
they went to the extent of throwing boiling water on those
that managed to swim to their ships". Although clearly
Stergiadis knew a lot more about the Asia Minor question than
any other Greek, except perhaps Venizelos, during this
interview he only touched on events that were common
knowledge. If there is a mystery surrounding the man, it is
his reasons for not speaking or writing about the tragic
events he knew so well. It has been suggested that this was
maybe due to his "magnanimous and forgiving character" or to
the fact that he did not wish to name the real culprits of the
disaster i_i_./.
Stergiadis shared the opinion of Patriarch Joachim III
who, contrary to those believing in the Slavonic danger,
estimated that no other power except Russia could offer a
guarantee of security to Hellenism in Turkey. This was because
the Turks tolerated the Greeks as long as the Christian
Orthodox Russian boge existed. When the Soviet regime came to
power, the Turks wex'e ready to exterminate the Greeks and the
Europeans were sure to observe this extermination not only
with indifference but even with malice. These views,
Stergiadis concluded, he had analyzed to Venizelos when the




having reassured Metropolitan Chrysostomos on 4
September 1922	 that the Greek army was capable of holding
the front for a year.
113/ Dafnis, op.cit., p. 113.
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post of the High Commissioner was offered to him 114/.
Ouranis noted that Stergiadis had not exchanged a word
with a living soul for six months and that even with his maid
he seemed to communicate with gestures and half sentences. The
High Commissioner's seclusion was confirmed some twenty years
later in a letter from Nikos Kazantiakis to M. Sakiabanis. In
this letter, Kazdntzaki r€ported that he found Stergiadis a
broken man, both physically and mentally. He seemed to have
forgotten the Greek language and conversed with the author in
French. Although he knew Kazantzakis and his family very well,
he did not seem to recognize or remember him 115/.
In December 1922, a confidential communication from the
Commission of Inquiry into the National Disaster to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, requested Stergiadis 1 address in
France together with the Ministry's opinion whether his
extradition would be possible, should the need arise 116/. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs soon informed the Commission that
Stergiadis was in Paris and that the outcome of an application
for extradition depended on the nature of the crime for which
the extradition would be requested 117/. In the meantime, the
Commission submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a set
of questions to form the basis for a statement by Repoulis, at
the time also in Paris, in order to establish the culpability,
or otherwise, of the High Commissioner. The Commission wanted
to know what Repoulis knew of the contacts between Venizelos
and Stergiadis after November 1920, what were Venizelos'
instructions as to the policy to be followed in Asia Minor,
whether the ex-Premier had given instructions to the High
Commissioner regarding the schemes for the autonomy of Asia
Minor and, finally, what Repoulis knew as to the extent of
Stergiadis' responsibility for the disaster 118/.
Although there seems to be no archival evidence as
to the replies Repoulis gave to the above questions, the
matter of Stergiadis' legal prosecution seems to have been
dropped because no charge could be established against him.
Should it have taken place, Stergiadis' trial would have been
of extreme interest, even more so as Venizelos would have
had to testify. As indicated by the questions put to Repoulis
by the Commission, what the Inquiry mainly wanted to establish
was the ex-Prime Minister's stance vis-á-vis Stergiadis and
the Asia Minor question after November 1920.
Until his death in 1950, Stergiadis lived in France
114/ Views expressed to Ouranis, Eleftheros Typos, 7.4.29.
115/ Kazantzakis' letter published in 	 Allagi [Change], 4.5.83.
116/	 MOFA A/2 1923, Doc. No. 189/30.12.22, Commission of
Inquiry	 into the National Disaster to MOFA.
117/ MOFA A/2 1923, Doc. No. 150/7.1.23, MOFA to Commission...
118/	 MOFA A/2 1923, Doc. No. 159/12.12.22, MOFA to Greek
Embassy in	 Paris, communicating questionaire by the
Commission...
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where he kept a very low profile. None of his former
colleagues and friends kept contact with him andhe seems to
have led a very lonely life. During his 28 years of self
exile, in contrast to so many others, he neither spoke nor
wrote to defend his name. This would have been out of
character as, in order to whitewash himself, he would have had
to bring accusations against many others. Folklore around
Stergiadis suggests that during his exile he was supported by
the British Intelligence Service, whose agent he was supposed
to have been despite the fact that he had spent one year of
his life in a British prison. The truth of the matter,
however, is quite different. Until his death Stergiadis was
supported by his nephew 119/. N. Plastiras who remained a
friend until the end and visited him regularly, knew the bad
state of his finances and the dignity with which he faced his
poverty.
Several among his long list of critics were army
officers who had served in Smyrna. Most of them did not have
any specific charges to make but simply repeated the
accusations of the Smyrniot notables with whom they were in
close contact throughout the period of the Greek occupation.
Very few among those not convinced by the charges against
Stergiadis stood up to be counted. It is significant that this
short list includes persons who served at the High Commission
through the 1919-1922 period and therefore witnessed the
events closely. Among them, Petros Gounarakis, Secretary
General of the Armosteia wrote in 1968:
I do not believe that a close associate of Stergiadis
has the right to remain silent when for the last fourty
years his name has continuously been soiled with mud,
without the altera pars being heard. There is no doubt
that Stergiadis sometimes reacted in an exaggerated way
but his exaggerations were always dictated by deep
thinking and by the policy he was ordered to
follow...Even E. Repoulis in his regrettable telegram
to Venizelos recognized the many qualities, the
tireless work and activity of Stergiadis in the same
way they were recognized by all the politicians and
military who lived through the 1919-1922 tragedy. One
119/ Stergiadis' nephew was a civil employee with the Greek
Parliament. The information regarding the sums of money he
sent to his uncle was first published in Notaras, op.cit., p.
82,
It was further confirmed to me by D. Papamichalopoulos, who at
the time	 was serving at the Smyrna Port and subsequently
became a Liberal	 MP for Lakonia and Minister for Merchant
Marine in all the
	
post- 1922 liberal governments. During
our interviews, Papamichalopoulos, an ardent friend of
Venizelos, confirmed that both his experience of the events
and his subsequent talks with the Liberal leader had
convinced him that Stergiadis did not bear any blame for the
disaster.	 Interviews with D. Papamicha].opoulos, Athens 13-18
July 1979, 20-30 August 1983.
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should not forget that it is a fact of history for the
captain of the ship to bear the responsibility for its
sinking, irrespective of whether he contributed to it
or not...As his associate both in Epirus and Asia
Minor, I can certify that Stergiadis may not have had
the qualities of a parliamentarian and it is doubtful
whether he could have distinguished himself in
parliamentary activity. He was, however, a unique
administrator of a calibre Greece does not have but a
few...[In a number of incidents] I would not have
reacted as Stergiadis did. But as a just person, I am
obliged to say that his policy was correct: the Greek
population of Srnyrna had to stop believing that the
freedom brought to it by the Greek landing signified
that the Greeks could revenge all the crimes
perpetrated against them by the Turks during the course
of four centuries" 120/.
This letter was sent to Estia as a reply to an article
entitled "The Miserable Activities of Stergiadis in Smyrna",
published in the newspaper on 26 February 1968 and reprinting
a selection of the stories regarding his alleged beating of
priests etc. Although Gounarakis' letter is of significant
importance in that it was the first time such a close
associate of the High Commissioner had decided to take his
side openly, the newspaper did not print it. Such publications
continued well into the 70's and 80's. On 4 March 1979, for
example, the Athenian daily Acropolis, devoted one of its
leaders to the "Stergiadis' Issue' 1 and concluded that had he
returned to Greece, even the dead would have thrown stones at
him.
Among the few Greeks who have defended Stergiadis in
their writings, is M. Notaras who also served with the High
Commission. He is emphatic that Stergiadis' only mistake was
that "because of his sui generis character and the difficult
circumstances he embittered and mistreated 50 to 60 members of
the Smyrniot establishment mainly due to his insistence on
not allowing the clergy, the notables and the dimogerondes
to share in the government of Asia Minor "...tThe High
Commissioner] was distinguished for his honesty, his maturity,
his acute intelligence and correct judgement. He always said
what he believed to be true, he was very active and liked to
work. At the same time, he was very authoritative, easily
angered, and not at all flexible. This is to say he was a
person of opposing qualities and defects. His image was
damaged by his lack of political flexibility and his
exaggerated reaction in a number of cases. Very few men have
been the object of such unjust] fury" 121/.
120/ Letter by Petros Gounarakis to Estia, dated 5.3.68. This
letter was kindly given to me by Mrs. Gounarakis together with
other papers of her late husband relevant to Stergiadis and
the work of the High Commission.
121/ Notaras, op.cit., p.55.
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Charilaos Zamarias who served as Stergiadis' secretary
both in Epirus and Smyrna, confirmed these comments and added
that the High Commissioner was not a man to be evaluated by
conventional standards. He was a very important man, a great
patriot with strong will power who simply happened to use
extraordinary methods in his collaboration with his colleagues
and his treatment of the public 122/. Zamarias further
expressed the view that Stergiadis was a man of very simple
needs and illustrated his point by mentioning that when at one
point the High Commissioner was offered a villa to use as his
residence, he decided to turn it into an orphanage for girls
which was urgently needed. On an earlier occasion, he had been
sent a car from Athens to use in his public appearances, which
he had sent back immediately because he thought it was
useless. He refused all social engagements and lived in total
seclusion, lest he be accused of partiality towards the Greeks
123/.
G. Spyridonos, who served with the General Staff as
colonel, gives a clear picture of the problems faced by the
High Commissioner: " [Stergiadis] enjoyed the absolute trust
of Venizelos and received orders from him alone. These orders
governed all his actions and were manifested in his behaviour.
He had to safeguard the Turkish population and to repress
immediately any tendencies for revenge on the part of the
local christians...It is thus evident how heavy a
responsibility he carried on his shoulders. He had to face a
series of never ending insoluble issues and strove to restore
amicable relations between groups of individuals who had
clashing interests. The continuous interference of the Allied
High Commissioners and the Allied military authorities made
his task even heavier. This interference caused the discontent
of the local Greeks and their resentment of the High
Commissioner who, in my opinion, did everything possible to be
consistent with Venizelos' directives and who at every
opportunity stressed the necessity for a benevolent treatment
of the Turks. It is also my opinion that he fulfilled his
mission. His only defect was that he behaved in a rough manner
and thus caused unnecessary discontent" 124/.
Toynbee who met Stergiadis during his visits to Asia
Minor as correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, had this to
say for the High Commissioner:
122/ Interviews with Ambassador Ch. Zamarias, 15, 23 June
1979.
123/ Both stories are confirmed by documents in the MOFA
archives, MOFA 136 st, 3306/29.6.19, Stergiadis to Venizelos
and MOFA 2b1 9871/5.10.19, StergiadIs to MOFA. Before leaving
Smyrna in 1922, Stergiadis left a substantial sum with the
American Consul General, to be used for the upkeep of the
orphanage. Angelomatis, op.cit. p. 426.
124/ G. Spyridonos, I Mikrasiatiki Ekstrateia Opos tin Eida,
[The Asia Minor Expedition as I saw it], Athens 1957.
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"Stergiadis began his career as a successful barrister
in Crete and bears the marks of his country and
profession. He is highly strung -resourceful and
courageous but capricious and hot-tempered- and his
method of administration was to strike unexpectedly and
hard, as if he were pleading a weak case or fighting a
desperate duel. This fencing style of government, with
its lunges, feints and dexterous avoidance of hostile
thrusts, is unwestern and particularly un-English, but
then Stergiadis did not command the means of an Indian
lieutenant governor. To begin with...he had no judicial
system and no civil service. He had to hold his own
against the military who became less amenable as the
situation grew more grave...He had to improvise
everything pending the inauguration of the Sêvres
regime and to act as if he believed in the prospects of
Greek rule in Anatolia when every month it as becoming
more evident that the Supreme Council's irresponsible
decision would have to be reversed...If the Treaty of
Sévres had come into force and the plebiscite in favour
of Greece, he would not have been accused of having
misused his powers. If the vote had gone the other way,
his fellow country men would have made him the
scapegoat for their national disappointment...He could
hardly have had a worse start or performed a more
brilliant acrobatic feat than to keep afloat as he did
in such a sea of troubles t' 125/.
Although "such difficulties might paralyze a
professional western administrator", Stergiadis seemed to fare
well 126/. Clearly, he was not an ordinary man for he
succeeded in reducing troops and civilians to order and in
asserting his authority in the occupied area. With his team,
he managed to construct an effective civil administration
under conditions of martial law and continuous warfare.
However, his achievements were nullified by the fact that his
task presupposed a reversal of local relationships which only
time and tranquility could have brought about.
125/ Toynbee, op.cit., p. 163.
126/ ibid, p. 159.
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II. The Asia Minor Defence Movement
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The rumours of an imminent Greek evacuation of Asia
Minor became more persistent towards the end of 1921 and gave
new impetus to the Asia Minor Defence Movement which had been
organized in Constantinop1r after the elections of November
1920 by Venizelist officers, mainly colonels, members of the
Liberal party and prominent rric"mbers of Constantinopolitan
society. Little is known about the internal organization and
the wider orientations of the movement. It seems, however,
that it sprang up as a direct expression of the fears and
apprehensions of the Asia Minor Greeks regarding the policy to
be followed by the new regime, faced by the crucial dilemma
of the continuation of the war for the imposition of the
Treaty of Sèvres or the evacuation of Asia Minor. By the end
of 1921, these fears had been calmed but the inability of the
Gounaris cabinet to effect a major military success and the
persistent rumours of the evacuation of the army led the
Defence to the decision to mobilize with the view to declaring
the Smyrria zone an autonomous state with its own army. It was
envisaqed that this army would be mainly composed by officers
and soldiers of the regular Greek force who would choose not
to be demobilized and by volunteers from the zone itself and
other Greek communities abroad. It was also envisaged that
these communities would undertake to support the autonomous
state	 financially,	 either through fund raising or	 by
contracting an internal loan 1/. Their first aim was to gain
British support through the good offices of Venizelos because
they believed that this support was of paramount importance
for the creation of the envisaged autonomous lonian State. For
some of the Defence members, this state would be the launching
pad for the operation to overthrow King Constantine and unite
Asia Minor with Old Greece in the same way that the 1917
revolutionary regime of Salonica had achieved the restoration
of Venizelos to power with the help of the French bayonets.
The relationship between the Liberal leader and the
Defence is not very clear. It seems that Venizelos was not
himself very sure as to where he stood vis--vis the movement
and, except for his unequivocal good will, he does not appear
to have offered very much towards its success. One possible
explanation for his stance may be that he did not want to
assume the leadership of the Amyna in order to avoid the
suggestion that he was trying to return to power and also in
order not to compromise politically its "national aims" 2/.
Nonetheless, it was through his mediation that in January 1921
the representatives of the Defence visited London and briefed
Lloyd George in an effort to enlist his support. Lloyd George
displayed an interest in the movement but, as with the
approaches of the Greek government, he did not commit the
British government to any form of practical aid. However,
during their visit to London, the representatives seem to have
established close contact with major Greek personalities, such
as Sir John Stavridi,	 who are thought to have
jI lEE, op.cit, pp. 189-196.
2/ lEE, op.cit, pp. 189-196.
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helped the movement financially.
At the end of October 1921, a similar organization
sprang	 up	 in Smyrna.	 The	 Asia Minor Defence Committee
of Smyrna comprised 33 members, twelve from the various
community institutions of Smyrna and twenty one members from
the corresponding bodies in Ephesus, Aivali, Filadelfia and
other districts. A three-strong governing body was elected
with its base in the Metropolis of Smyrna. Its scopes and
goals were incorporated in the "National Programme" which
consisted of the following points:
a. The preservation of the freedom of the areas
liberated by the Greek army and
b. The assurance of guarantees for the protection of
the sister minorities of the int r io r , whose redemption had
not been achieved.
One of the Committee's main tasks was to reinforce the
ranks of the regular Greek army with a many Asia Minor Greeks
as possible. At .the same time, it undertook "to enlighten
public opinion in Europe and America about the plight of Asia
Minor, by organizing rallies, signing petitions, sponsoring
publications in the foreign press and despatching
representatives abroad" 3/. For a later stage, the Defence
advocated the conscription of all the Asia Minor Greeks from
18 to 50 years of age and the commandeering of 1/5 of their
properties, together with that of the churches 4/.
Surely, the Defence leaders could not have expected to
secure Allied support as far as recruitment and conscription
were concerned. Their position in the matter was clear in a
note they had addressed to the Greek High Commissioner in
Constantinople 5/. Moreover, Allied support or not, the
experience of conscripting Asia Minor Greeks during the
previous two years, indicated that the results of such a move
in 1922 would bear fruits nowhere near the numbers anticipated
by the optimistic expectations of the Defence. Even before the
1920 elections, when things seemed to be going well,
Stergiadis was reporting that he had to exercise pressure on
the Asia Minor youth to undertake military service. Their
reluctance was apparent when in June 1920 officers were sent
to the interior of the Greek zone to raise volunteers. The
same reports applied to Smyrna where it appears that a number
of Greek citizens eligible for military service put to
question their citizenship in order to avoid conscription 6/.
What was more, :n order to curb the flight of the Asia Minor
Greeks liable to: military service, both the High Commissioner
and the military authorities issued strict orders to the
effect that no Greek between the age of 18 and 37 years of age
shou, d be given permission to leave Asia Minor regardless
3/ Unsigned and undated memorandum in MOFA 113b.
4/ Angelomatis, op.cit., p. 146.
/ Unsigned and Undated Note, MOFA 26d.
6/ MOFA 3m tel. no. 637/5.6.20, Stergiadis to MOFA.
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of his citizenship 7/. In the event, as the wave of desertions
increased an amnesty was granted providing both for the
deserters and for those evading military service, on condition
that they would enlist within 15 days 8/.
The establishment of the Smyrrra Defence was soon
followed by branches in London, Bucharest and in other cities
with major Greek communities. Two months later, the election
of Meletios Metaxakis to the Patriarchal throne of
Constantinople gave a tremendous boost to the activities of
the Defence as he was quick to lend his unlimited and
unconditional support 9/. By now, the initiation of Stergiadis
and Papoulas, Commander in Chief of the Greek forces in Asia
Minor, had assumed top priority for the movement. However,
this task did not prove an easy one. The High Commissioner
was known for his conviction that Asia Minor was to be
governed by Athens through him and not by the old
Dimogerondia or any organization willing to take its place.
Therefore, it could be expected that he would not permit any
movement which would not be directly controlled by the High
Commission.
True enough, when he was approached by the leaders of the
Amynamovement to enlist his support, Stergiadis was adamant
that he would not allow any organization to operate if it
would not obey his directives. The reasons behind Stergiadis'
decision not to support the Defence were mainly that he did
not believe that there was any chance of holding the military
front or, even more so, of crushing the Kemalist forces
according to the plans of the movement for autonomy. The High
Commissioner evidently refused to lull the Defence leaders
with false hopes or to assume its leadership of the movement
himself because he seemed convinced that the whole operation
was condemned to failure and that the plan as such was based
on over optimistic assumptions. What was more, the government
had intimated to the High Commissioner that it did not support
the movement and it would have been totally out of his
character to implement plans contrary to the wishes of Athens
10/. It is characteristic that during one of his meetings with
the Defence leaders, he is quoted as having told them: SI am
not Venizelos. He is both a politician and a revolutionary. I
have neither his abilities nor the strength for such a
responsibility" 11/. On 1 January 1922, 3,500 well-wishing
telegrams were reportedly sent to Stergiadis from the military
front as part of the effort to convince him to assume the
Amyna leadership. To all this, the High Commissioner retorted
that he was a civil servant and not a revolutionary 12/.
7/ GAK 20n	 Asia Minor Army, General Staff, Order No.
31175/18151/22.4.21.
8/ GAK 20 st Circular No. 9936/28.5.22, Gounarakis to the
Representatives of the High Commission.
9/ Alexandris, A. The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-
Turkish Relations, 1918-1974. Athens, 1983. p.96.
10/ Notaras, op.cit., p. 61.
11/ Angelomatis, op.cit., p. 144.
11/ Rodas, op.cit., p. 269.
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The stance of the Commander in Chief was bound to be
more favourable. Since his arrival in Asia Minor he had shown
a conciliatory stance towards the Venizelist officers serving
at the front and this had gained him popularity among the
troops. In December 1921, he had a first contact with Yiangos
Siotis, one of the most prominent members of the
Constantinopolitan Defence, who visited him in Smyrna to
propose that he would assume the leadership of the movement.
Papoulas showed a keen interest in the plans for autonomy but
declared that he could not assume the leadership without the
approval of the government. Indeed, this was a point of
paradox. The Defence, an essentially Venizelist movement which
in its aims included the overthrow of the legitimate regime in
Greece,	 was now requesting the support of the Athens
government in order to achieve these very aims.
In February 1922, Siotis came to Smyrria for a second time
and Papoulas seems to have been convinced to assume the
leadership of the Amyna"in principle". However, he pointed
out, the movement would not have any chances of success if it
were not supported wholeheartedly from Athens, both militarily
and financially. By then, it should have been clear to the
Amyna that Papoulas was willing to contribute to the struggle
in every possible way, but not to the extent of assuming the
leadership of the autonomy movement without the government's
approval 13/. In order to prove his good will, he sent two of
his close aides without delay to Constantinople to discuss the
plans with the Patriarch and to negotidte a possible
collaboration between the Amyna and the Asia Minor army 14/.
From Constantinople, they proceeded to Athens accompanied by
Siotis, to brief the government and enlist its support.
Evidently displeased with Papoulas' involvement with a
Venizelist organization both Gounaris and Theotokis, the
Minister of Defence, asked the Commander in Chief to come to
Athens and explain the situation.
This was exactly what Papoulas did on 19 March 1922, a
little after the announcement of the Paris proposals which had
caused a tremendous upheaval in Greek public opinion.
Naturally, the Asia Minor Greeks were particularly perturbed
by the prospect of evacuation, as envisaged in these
proposals. The Smyrna Defence leaders addressed a resolution
to the Allied governments, proclaiming their determination to
leave Asia Minor rather than see it return under Ottoman rule
15/. On 21 March 1922, Tharros published flaming proclamations
of the Amyna with which all Greeks between 18 and 50 years of
age were called to the colours and every one was urged to
continue the struggle against the implementation of the Paris
proposals 16/.
	
Reflecting this frame of mind, Papoulas
13/ Angelomatis, op.cit., p. 152.ii! Unsigned, undated memorandum in MOFA 113b.
15/ Angelomatis, op.cit., p. 137.
16/ Tharros, 21 .3.22.
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told Gounaris that if the government could not denounce these
proposals, it should either accept his resignation or allow
him to declare the autonomy of lonia in collaboration with the
Asia Minor Defence. In the event, Papoulas was persuaded not
to resign but to return to Smyrna and await the reinforcements
the government had been promising him for months.
The Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence were riot
in a position to agree with Papoulas because they considered
the plan totally unrealistic and, in the remote chance that it
succeed in both securing Allied approval and defending the
Greek zone with only 60,000 men as it professed, it would
quite probably turn against Athens. What was more, it was
quite clear that the Allies, includin q the British, would
never give their consent for the inip]ernentation of the plan.
When Lindley reported from Athens that the movement for
defending the Smyrna zone and establishing autonomy was
gathering strength, Curzon asked him to make clear to the
Greek government that such a movement would be viewed in
England "with the greatest disappointment and displeasure and
could only have disastrous results" 17/. Sir Harry Lamb, the
British Consul General in Smyrna, was also instructed to make
a similar communication to Stergiadis. In his reply,
Stergiadis assured nirri that he strongly opposed the Amyna and
although he was unable to suppress all expression of opinion
or the manifestation of feelings on the part of a population
"whose welfare and even existence was at stake", he had
prevented the movement from assuming a really dangerous shape
18/. In the meantime, the Grand Vizier had protested against
the institution of the Amyna to the British High Commissioner
in Constantinople, who was quick to comment that any attempt
to create an independent state in Asia Minor by a refusal of
the Greek army to evacuate, could be defeated by a British
threat to cut off sea-borne supplies 19/.
Patriarch Meletios had been trying to contact Venizelos
for some time seeking his advice as to the chances of the
autonomist movement. To this end, he despatched P.
Argyropoulos, one of the Constantinopolitan Defence leaders,
to meet the former Premier and brief him on the situation
prevailing in the City and in Smyrna. In his introductory
letter, Meletios wrote:
"Among the many insoluble problems we face is that of
the stance of M. Stergiadis. Towards the Patriarchate
he displays a stance more inimical that that of
Gounaris. While he professes that the State cannot
prolong the Asia Minor occupation, he treats badly the
Metropolitans we sent to guide the population.. . It is
certain that all of us both in Smyrna and in Athens, we
are fighting in the dark, shooting against friends and
17/ DBFP, vol. xvii, nos. 577 and 578.
18/ DBFP, vol. xvii, no. 578, note 2.
19/ DBFP, vol. xvii, no. 552.
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enemies alike without any particular goal since we
differ hopelessly even in the understanding of the
general interests of the fatherland. For this reason,
we are all expecting the sun beams of your ingenuity so
that we can at least understand where we are and what
we should aim at. If, like Mr. Stergiadis, you consider
the continuation of the struggle against the interests
of the nation, please let us know so that we can change
the stance of the Patriarchate accordingly" 20/.
In a lengthy reply, Venizelos declined the leadership
of the movement which he considered to entail unsurmountable
difficulties. He was very cautious, however, not to assume any
responsibility in advising the Asia Minor Greeks either to go
on with their plans or to drop them. What he did advise was
that the scheme would have better chances of success if it
were to assume an "Asia Minor/Christian" character as opposed
to an "lonian/Greek" one. In any case, he seemed convinced
that the Entente would never support such a movement and, if
Stergiadis did not accept the leadership, he suggested that
the whole issue be dropped.
His gloomy predictions appear tc have emanated from a
conversation he had at the Foreign Office shortly before
writing to the Patriarch. During a meeting with Sir E. Crowe,
Venizelos put forward the thought that,
	
now that the
evacuation of the Greek army was a must, the only possible
solution to the issue of the protection of minorities would be
if the districts from Smyrna to Isrnid were patrolled and
guarded by a local organization. This would make it
impossible for Kemal either to penetrate into these districts
or to leave them aside "whilst undertaking enterprises across
the water [against the British zone]". When the Greek army
would be evacuated, he continued his argument, plenty of
officers and men, originally drawn from those districts, would
be willing to remain if some security were offered to them.
What Venizelos in fact was suggesting was that the Allies
should support the venture financially and share the costs
among them with the British footing the Greek bill as well
21/. On the record of this conversation, Curzon minuted: "M.
Venizelos's suggestion that the situation can be saved and the
safety of the minorities secured by the arming of the local
organizations in the area between Ismid and Smyrna (to be
financed by Europe) is in my view quite illusory. That the
Allies will finance the attempt is doubtful. That the bands so
organized would be able to stand against the armies of Kemal
(with all the resources of modern warfare) and to hold the
wide area from Ismid to the Mediterranean is quite out of the
20/	 AV3a2 Letter,	 n.n./25.4.22,	 Patriarch Meletios to
Venizelos.
21/ FO E 5425/5/44, 25.5.22, Record of a Conversation between
Sir	 E. Crowe and M. Venizelos.
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question" 22/. In retrospect, it seems that Venizelos only put
forward this scheme in an effort to test the waters at
Whitehall. He must, however, have known that this plan had no
chance of being accepted by the Allies who were not even
willing to come to the aid of the regular Greek army. Leading
Venizelists in Athens, like General Danglis, were fully aware
of the difficulties inherent in the novement which were at the
same time the prerequisites for its success: financial
resources, substantial armed forces and excellent leadership.
All three were simply non-existent in Smyrna 23/.
Veriizelos' letter to the Patriarch was followed on 22
April 1922 by an official declaration of the British
government which refuted rumours that it sponsored the
Defence. It appears that this declaration came as a result of
a conversation between Stergiadis and Lindley on 20 April
1922, when the High Commissioner assured the latter that the
Amyna would have been even less successful had it not been for
"certain Greeks" who gave out that the movement was encouraged
by "influential persons abroad" 24/. Stergiadis was also
quoted as having appealed to the British Ambassador "to help
dispel the idea that there was one official and another
unofficial policy regarding this question" 25/. Evidently,
Stergiadis' remarks were intended to apply to influential
Greeks in London, who were soon informed that they could not
be allowed to work in Britain against the policy of the
government and its Allies and equally against the policy of
the Greek government 26/. On 22 April, Harold Nicolson
recorded that he had spoken to Sir John Stavridi along the
above lines. In his presence, Stavridi telephoned General
Frantzis, a liaison with the Defence who was to leave for
Constantinople the following day, and instructed him to inform
the Patriarch and General Papoulas that the British government
would in no circumstances countenance their movement. Harold
Nicolson recorded after his meeting with Stavridi on 22 April:
"I gained the impression from Sir John Stavridis's attitude
that they had no hope of either M. Venizelos or M. Stergiadis
heading the movement. I gathered however that they were
convinced that the movement would be supported, either openly
or secretly, by the present government at Athens and that in
such an event they would be able to resist the Kemalists for
at least two months" 27/.
In a last effort, to convince Papoulas, Argyropoulos,
on his way to visit Venizelos in London, visited Smyrna on 28
April 1922. However, this effort also met with failure and, by
now, the Smyrniot Defence which was of decidedly less
Venizelist character, had dropped all ideas of renouncing the
22/ ibid.
23/ AV3 Letter, n.n./12.4.22, General Danglis to Venizelos.
24/ FO E 4180/27/44, 20.4.22, Lindley (Athens) to Lord Curzon.
25/ ibid.
26/ ibid. Minute by Osborne, dated 22.4.22.
27/ ibid.
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Athens government and proclaiming autonomy during a mass
demonstration. Instead, they were convinced that their only
chance of success came hand in hand with securing the support
of the government. To this end, three members of the Committee
visited Athens at the end of April 1922, where Gounaris tried
to assure them that the Greek army would never evacuate and
leave them to their fate but, at the same time, refused to
sidke any commitments for aid and suggested that from then on
they should address any request to Stergiadis who enjoyed the
wholehearted support of the government. As a result of this
visit and in open contrast to Greece's acceptance of the
Paris proposals in principle, an official communiqué published
on 24 April 1922, assured the Asia Manor Greeks that the Greek
army would not be evacuated before the signature of the peace
treaty.
In a letter to Siotis, Papoulas stressed that all plans
pertaining to the struggle for the defence of Asia Minor
should be made in the light of the "pessimistic reality" and
not of idealistic, non-existent circumstances suggested by the
Amyna in its estimation of the situation 28/. All in all,
Papoulas seems to have been more reluctant to accept the Amyna
leadership than popular accounts appear to suggest. One month
before his resignation, he published a declaration in the
Athenian and Smyrniot newspapers to the effect that in order
to stop speculation around his name, he declared that he only
followed orders from the government and would not be prepared
to take any action contravening his military oath 29/. Not
discouraged, in May 1922 Siotis made yet another effort to
convince Papoulas but, by that time, it seems that the
Commander in Chief had already decided to resign his
commission and his resignation on 23 May 1922 sounded the end
of the Asia Minor Defence efforts for the autonomy of lonia.
One of the last activities towards that goal, was a collective
letter addressed to Sir H. Rumbold, the British High
Commissioner in Constantinople, in an effort to protest
against the restoration to Turkey of territories under Greek
occupation, in an effort to exercise moral pressure on the
Powers in favour of reconsideration of the Paris proposals
30/. An earlier meeting with Meletios had clarified the
ideclogical standing of the Amyna, which was now viewed not
simply as a purely Venizelist movement but as a general Greek
movement of resistance to the implementation of the plans for
evacuation 31/. Patriarch Meletios pressed the point that, in
Paris, the Powers had made the mistake of treating the issue
a one between Turkey and Greece, whereas the real issue at
stake was the position of the Greeks in Turkey. To his mind,
28/ AV21b Letter, 173/-/--.4.22, Papoulas to Siotis.
29/ Tharros, 13.4.22.
30/ FO E 2924/10/44, 3.5.22, Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)
to Lord Curzon.
31/ FO E 2894/10/44, 18.4.22, Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)
to Lord Curzon, communicating Memorandum on Conversation
between Mr. Ryan and the Patriarch.
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gxdntees for their protection would erv 	 they
flrld availed nothing in Cilicia, where the opulUt 	 had
fled. The same thing, he forecast, would in Ash 'iflOr.
"If the Greek army left, the Christi.a poption oii1d be
ftund trooping after them to the coast...Pheir hOiC iay not
hetwen life arid death, hut betwc'ri dfetcrit k.r.dS of drith"
3'. Tn line with t c r'oirts iiud by t'ie Pt ir'h, a litt Le
b"th.re the resignation o1 Papoults, tci' Ayn '-ado a formal
application to the Nigh Commissioner scVing i, prmsslorl to
procure arms and arm a civil guaxi 33/.
At this point, aneher plan emerged. raLs tune, it was
sponsored by Athens and, at first sight it seemed to present a
lot of simiiirities with that of the Amyna. The plan entailed
the effort t create an autonomous state in Asia Minor with
Smyrna as its ccntre, governed by a Christian ruler under the
suzerainty of the Sultan and, in general terms, presented a
number of similarities with Venizelos' suggestions put to the
Patriarch a few months earlier 34/. In Stergiadis' mind, this
state thould be created by the Allies, within boundaries wdi
enough to make it self-supporting. It should comprise the
whole of the Mediterranean sea-board of Asia Minor with the
exception of Constantinople and the Arab districts. A
permanent administration and gendarmerie force could be built
up by employing local elements of all nationalities, "who
would come forward if they were persuaded that the settlement
was permanent" 35/. Its character would be exclusively that of
Asia Minor without any Christian or Greek tendencies and it
was to comprise a zone wider that the one envisaged by the
Treaty of Sèvres. In contrast to the Asia Minor Defence plans,
this autonomous state would base its existence on the support
of the Allies and would not be intended as a means to preserve
the Hel]enic character of lonia. The scheme encountered
initial success in the form of securing the recommendation of
the British Ambassador in Athens to the Foreign Office, that
it should be considered seriously 36/. This was more than.
can be said about the initial British reaction to the Smyrna
Defence which, it was felt, was largely talk, undermined the
confidence of the population and alarmed the Moslem community
37/. Once again, however, the weak point was the military
32/ ibid.
33/ MOFA 136b, Memorandum n.n./n.d.
34/ AV3a2 Letter,	 n.n./31.3.22,	 Venizelos to Patriarch
Meletios.
35/ DBFP, vol. xvii, no. 681.
36/ ibid. Osborne commented on 15.3.22: "I do not like the
Greek anxiety to pre-warn us of impending developments; it
indicates the belief, which Mr. Lindley is anxious to dispel,
that an anti-monarchist coup d' état would change our policy".
37/ DBFP, vol. xvii, no. 552. Sir H. Lamb commented that, in
the light of previous experience, this element of alarm was
at the root of most excesses.
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support of the state by volunteer•s from the regular Greek army
who would be requested to remain after the evacuation.
In a long memorandum presenting the advantages of the
autonomy plans as seen by the Greek side, we read:
"It is now clear that immediate action has to be
undertaken to resolve the stalemate reached tn Asia
Minor bec'd se the aimless pxhausticn of both reek
army and the Greek finances does not permit any irther
prolongation of the situation. Some Greek circles
propose immediate evacuation. However, should the Greek
forces be withdrawn, massacres and persecutions against
the Christians will surely follow...One million five
hundred thousand refugees will flood Smyrna and, when
transported to Pireaus, will cause anarchy to erupt.
Therefore, the Greek army can neither leave Smyrna nor
stay forever. Europe has decided that we should go but
she neither wants us to go now nor can she compel us to
evacuate. It is therefore imperative that we should act
ourselves and the first task in that direction is to
make sure that we will not need financial aid from
Europe. Two solutions are apparent. Annexation and
Autonomy.	 Annexation	 is	 impossible in view of
internation&! considerations and also because the
creation of a strong Turkish state as a neighbour will
prolong the need for a strong Greek military
presence...Greece will say to Europe: 'Since you do not
want us to stay in Asia Minor and you do not want to
implement the Treaty of Sèvres, you cannot refuse the
right of the local population to defend themselves from
the new Turkish slavery, massacre and annihilation'.
Greece, guided by elementary humanitarian concepts and
by a liberal tradition of 3000 years, cannot abandon
the populations she has liberated to destruction and
sees as her duty to organize Asia Minor into an
Autonomous State which will become emancipated when it
will become capable of defending itself and living on
its own...To this end, it is vital that the Greek
occupation expands towards Ismid on one side, and
towards Adalia on the other. The presently occupied
zone does not have natural boundaries...The line Ismid
- Adalia has the advantage that it should cut the
present front by 100 kilometres and that...it composes
a self-supporting entity as it comprises the whole of
western Asia Minor coastline and islands, with most
Greek	 communities,	 and	 other	 non-Turkish
minorities...There is no doubt that the European
nations and America will hail with joy this noble act
of the small Greek state and that the League of Nations
will want to place the new State under its protection"
38/.
38/ MOFA 48b, Memorandum, undated and unsigned.
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It was further put forward that the nationalists
based their strength mainly on the fatigue of the Greek army.
Once, however, they were convinced that the Greek forces were
there to stay, their troops would soon show signs of fatigue
themselves. In order to sustain the difficult months ahead, it
was proposed to impose a miltary tax of 25% over all existing
taxes and to stop payments to the Ottoman Debt "which the
- } High Commission pays regularly while Kemal pays nothing"
39/.
Stergiadis seemed quite confident that if any plan
hi any chances of success, then it had to be the plan for
i'-onomy. In the middle of July 1922, he went to Athens to
iiscuss the details for the implementation of the scheme with
the government and, a while before his return, the rumours for
the declaration of autonomy reached Smyrna. After his arrival,
it was expected that he would announce the change of the
regime immediately. As the days passed with no announcement,
the air was tense with apprehension. Finally, on 28 July, the
Turkish primates were invited to the Smyrna Town Hall where
All Naip Zade, head of the Department of Moslem Affairs at the
High Commission, briefed them on the details of the scheme and
asked them to urge their communities to participate in a rally
organized for the following Sunday, 31 July, during which
autonomy would be declared. Shops and offices were to remain
closed and would be decorated with Ottoman flags. The primates
reluctantly accepted to convey the information to their
communities but commented that they could not guarantee the
participation of the Turkish population in a mass rally
organized by the Greek administration. In the meantime, two
Turkish officers of the gendarmerie were given leave by the
Greek authorities in order to visit the Turkish quarters of
the city and engage in propaganda for the autonomy plans among
their co-nationals 40/.
According to intelligence reports, the French Consulate
had received instructions from Constantinople to report all
reactions against autonomy to the French press in an effort to
convince public opinion that an important part of the
population was opposed to the scheme. Further unconfirmed
information indicated that the Consulate was also instructed
to fabricate incidents and evidence to this effect and, for
this reason, its Information Office had employed the services
of a former lieutenant of the French army, specialized in
intelligence work 41/. In contrast to what could have been
expected, the Italian authorities did not show any interest in
participating or organizing anti-autonomy propaganda.
Nonetheless, Dr. A. Brounetti, one of their known agents,
attempted to incite the Turkish primates to draw up a
memorandum of protest and submit it to the Italian and French
39/ GAK 17n3 Unsigned Intelligence Report, 2645/9.8.22.
40/ GAK 17h2 Unsigned Intelligence report, 2646/9.8.22.
41/ GAK 17th Unsigned Intelligence Report, -/3.8.22. GAK 17n1
Unsigned Intelligence Report, 2648/9.8.22.
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Consulates. Also, he urged the primates to take action and
"perform their patriotic duties" as it was their actions which
would precipitate the Greek evacuation 42/. In the meantime, a
confidential circular of the Greek High Commission, informed
its Representatives that the autonomous regime would be
implemented in all th areas occupied by the Greek army with
the exception of the '.'layet r>f Brusa and the sancak of
r bkj Sehir, Kiutahia iid kfic KtLahr. 'lie reason given for
postponing the implementation of auto'oniy in these areas was
the lack of competent personr1 and the need for a further
study of the special conditions prevailing therein,together
with "the creation of the appropriate circurrtstances" 
.4V.
The intentions of the High Commissioner with reference
to the administrative reforms which would determine the
character of the new autonomous state are preserved in some
explanatory notes in the handwriting of P. Gounarakis, the
General Secretary. These notes elaborate on the Autonomy
Decree which is characterized as the framework of the new
administrative machinery. The Autonomy Decree was .to be
expanded and improved upon by a new Department within the
Administration of Smyrna which would prepare the drafts of
laws and decrees needed to explore all the suggestions
included in it.
As the Autonomy Decree provided for the fusion of
certain kazas, a fact likely to alienate the local
populations, it was suggested to have explained to them that
the existing boundaries and local authorities would be
preserved "for the time being", until the roadworks and other
public works necessitated by the fusion could be planned and
carried out. It was also suggested that the following points
should be fully exalted by the Representatives in their
speeches upon the proclamation of autonomy:
a. The population would be asked to participate in the
central government of the state.
b. The police and gendarmerie would be composed of both
Greeks and Turks.
c. The self governing bodies would continue to receive
their tax percentages, to which new ones would be added.
d. The communal organizations and local authorities would
be preserved intact 44/.
In Smyrna, the autonomy of the State of Asia Minor was
proclaimed during a rally in front of the Government House on
31 July 1922. A conservative estimate counted 300 participants
most of whom were employees of the High Commission. Some
Turkish, Armenian, Kurdish and Jewish primates were also
present and delivered short speeches after Stergiadis had
42/ ibid.
43/ GAK 17e Circular
Representatives.
44/ MOFA 23e Notes
unsigned.
No. 2613/9.8.22, Secretary General to
in Gounarakis' handwriting, undated and
237
declared the zone autonomous 45/. The proclamations read on
behalf of the Greek government and the High Commission
stressed the multiracial character of the new administration
and gave details of the reorganization of the present state
machinery in which all would be called to participate
regardless of their creed or religion Stergiadis' proclamation
announr'ed that he was authorized by the Greek government to
inform all populations of the occupied countries about the
.3ecision arrived at concerning the future organization of
Western Asia Minor. In general terms, far from proposing
autonomy, he spoke about administrative rearrangements and
riot for the creation of an lonian, Hellenic state of
Venizelist character 46/. To those who came to congratulate
him, Stergiadis was quoted to have said: "You are all children
of the same motherland. Religious and political adventures
have divided you on many occasions and caused you to jump at
each other's throats. Let the sufferings of the past become
lessons for the future" 47/. One of his staunchest critics,
commented that with these few words and because he did not
speak anymore about Asia Minor Greeks but about the people of
Asia Minor, Stergiadis had written off the three thousand year
old history of Greek Asia Minor together with all that was the
ideal of the Greek race 48/.
The mass demonstration certainly lacked in
participation and spontaneity. The disbelief of the Moslem
population in conjunction with the displeasure of the local
Defence indicated that the popular approval was very
restricted. An advocate of the Defence wrote subsequently that
the autonomy, under the shape it was going to take, was an act
of desperation that did not permit any hope. During the
demonstration, he notes,everyone had the feeling that Greek
Asia Minor was being interned 49/. Although at the beginning
the French alone raised some objections, fifteen days later,
the Entente representatives handed a note in Athens declaring
their refusal to accept the autonomy and stressing that
although Greece was free to administer areas under her
military occupation as she pleased, the fate of western Asia
Minor would only be determined by the Peace Conference 50/.
Soon after, events at the front and the Greek debacle made the
whole scheme redundant and decided the fate of western
Asia Minor and its inhabitants once and for all.
45/ Anadolou, 10.8.22. Anadolou was a newspaper published
in Adalia.
46/ Text of Proclamation in Rodas, op.cit., pp. 324-325.
47/ Angelomatis, op.cit., p. 168.
48/ ibid.
49/ ibid., p. 165.
50/ DBFP, vol. xvii, no. 732. FO E 7530/5/44, 30.7.22, Mr.
Bentnick (Athens) to Earl Balfour.
	
FO E 8538/5/44, 15.8.22,
Mr. Bentnick (Athens) to Earl Balfour, informing him that
the Minister of Foreign Affairs replied to the Allied note
with the comment that the object of the proclamation was not
so much for the Christian as for the Moslem population.
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CHAPTER SIX
Conclusions: The End of Smyrna
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As the Greek position deteriorated, that of the
Christian communities of the interior became more precarious
daily and the issue of their protection in the event of a
Greek evacuation assumed paramount urgency, together with the
protection of their brethren of the coastline. Towards the
end of 1921, events in the Pontine region left little doubt as
to the fate of these minorities in the event of •n absolute
Turkish victory. To a vigorous joint teleyram of the Allied
High Commissioners insisting on the cessation of excesses
against the Christians, Yusuf Kernal, the Ankara Representative
in Constantinople retorted with protests against Allied
criticisms against "legal and impartial sentences on Turkish
subjects of the Samsoun region, who plotted the dismemberment
of Turkey" 1/. Yusuf Kemal also indicated to the Allies that
they should not "show leniency towards the Greek crimes and
massacres because the devastations perpetrated by the Greeks
would make it impossible for Turkey to repay the interest on
the Ottoman Debt". As he stated further, the National Assembly
of Ankara would contemplate the linking of the Ottoman Debt
interest with that of the reconstruction of the devastated
regions.
This reply which not only avoided the issue but also
threatened the Allies on a most sensitive point, infuriated
their representatives in Constantinople. Allied protests to
Ankara, it was realized, only provoked counter accusations
against the Greeks. As the communications from Ankara assumed
an ever-increasingly defiant and insolent tone, it was thought
that the best course of action to stop the massacres would be
to give wide publicity to all authentic information regarding
deportations and excesses by either side 2/. The numerous
difficulties encountered during this course of action
underlined the absolute necessity to include strong measures
for the protection of minorities in the forthcoming peace
treaty. Lord Curzon had been pressing for these measures for a
long time but he had not succeeded in convincing the French.
Their reluctance was based on the certainty that such measures
would never be accepted by Kemal, if, as Curzon insisted, the
terms of the clauses were to be stronger than those included
in the European peace treaties with reference to the
protection of the minorities.
During the Paris meeting of March 1922, Lord Curzon,
pressing his point, commented that, when faced with evidence
of massacres, the Turks took up an attitude of innocence and
maintained that these events were due to acts of hostility or
insolence on the part of the victims. This, however, did not
seem to be the case. Colonel Rawlinson, who had been kept in
confinement by the Nationalists for a year and a half, saw
with his own eyes on his return journey "wholesale
deportations of Greeks, the outrage of women and children,
1/ DBFP, vol. XVII, no. 464.
2/ DBFP, vol. XVII, no. 467.
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and men dying of starvation and exposure" 3/. The old
Turkish plan of massacre and deportation, Curzon continued,
was still in full operation and aimed to rid the country of
the minorities. This was a moral responsibility on all the
Allies, and public opinion would not tolerate that they could
not try to secure serious and, so far as possible, adequate
protection for these unhappy communities 4/. None the less,
his strong words did not have any effect and secured only a
vague promise for the protection of the minorities in
cooperation with the League of Nations.
In the meantime, the Nationalist protests against
alleged Greek excesses multiplied. The British High Commission
in Constantinople noted that the new protests were merely an
attempt to forestall protests a9aint the Kemalists and
underlined to the Nationalist Representative that "such
protests did not come well from the Angora government" 5/.
Further evidence received from American sources indicated that
the Turks appeared to be working on a deliberate plan to get
rid of the minorities. "The whole Greek male population from
the age of 15 and upwards of the Trebizond area and its
hinterland is being deported apparently to labour battalion at
Erzerurn,	 Kars and Sari Kamish" 6/. This information, mainly
from American relief workers, seems to have shocked the
British who "having assumed a serious responsibility for the
future protection of the Christian minorities, could not
allow such reports to remain uninvestigated, or such incidents
to continue unchecked" 7/. A British proposal was soon put
forward that each of the four Powers represented in
Constantinople, should at once depute a carefully selected
officer to proceed to Trebizond and to such places in the
interior as may best enable them to conduct the necessary
investigation of the allegations.
It was also suggested that the permission of Ankara
would be sought and facilities would be demanded. If
permission was refused, the British government threatened to
reconsider their entire attitude towards the peace proposals.
The British professed officially that it was
"inconceivable that Europe should agree to hand back to
Turkish rule, without the most stringent guarantees,
communities who would be liable to be treated in the
manner described by competent American witnesses,
whose reports moreover are confirmed by independent
information in our possession" 8/.
Meanwhile, Lord Curzon advised Lloyd George privately that if
3/ DBFP, vol. XVII, no. 561.
4/ The -evidence on Turkish massacres cited by Lord Curzon
during this meeting came from a long memorandum composed at
his request by the Greek desk. FO E 3148/19/44, 20.3.22.
5/ DBFP, vol. XVII, no. 625.




Ankara refused to afford facilities for the roosed mission
of enquiry, Britain	 -
"should then be in a very strong position if we decided
to retire altogether from the peace negotiations which
threaten in any case, largely owing to want of loyal
French and Italian support , to prove abortive. This
breakdown on a point like t his ou1d at least be more
favourable to us arid enlist wider sympathies abroad
than failure to secure acceptance of conditions as
settled by the Paris Conference" 9/.
Clearly, there seemed to exist more than one very good reason
for the British government's insistence that the minorities
should be protected.
A speech made by Chamberlain in the House of Commons,
in which he vividly described the troubles of the Asia Minor
Christians, boosted British backing of the plan for a "mission
of enquiry" into alleged Turkish excesses 10/. The dispatch of
the mission seemed all the more important because, according
to the Foreign Office, there seemed to be a real danger that
Turkish deportations and outrages in Eastern Anatolia might
lead to retaliations in the zone of Greek occupation either at
once or at the event of an evacuation. To avoid any such
danger, the British Ambassadors to the Entente capitals were
instructed to urge the government to which they were
accredited "to instruct their representatives in Athens to
join with their British colleagues in requesting the Greek
government to assent to the despatch of officers also to
regions under Greek occupation" 11/.
This move was dictated by the consideration that such a
procedure would deprive the Nationalists and their sponsors in
the Allied camp of the excuse for rejecting the proposal to
despatch a commission of inquiry to their territory on the
grounds that the Allied powers had taken no notice of the
alleged Greek atrocities 12/. However, despite Greek
acceptance of the plan, the commissions were never to set off
because of persistent French efforts to delay their departure
on various pretexts 13/. While the Allies were engaged in
endless correspondence regarding the expenses of the
commissions, the possible involvement of the Red Cross and the
American participation, the Nationalist sword was soon to cut
the diplomatic knot once and for all 14/.
9/ ibid.
10/ For the text of Chamberlain's speech, see House of
Commons,	 Deb. 5 s., cols 46-50.
11/ DBFP, vol. XVII, no. 640.
12/ DBFP, vol. XVII, no. 633.
13/ For the protracted correspondence between British and
French and the latter's objections and counterproposals which
resulted in delaying the scheme, see DBFP, vol. XVII,
Chapter II.
14/ Temperley, op.cit, p. 37.
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All through the summer of 1922, Turkish military
preparations had continued at full speed. On 4 August 1922,
Lloyd George spoke in the House of Commons in a tone
unfavourable to the Turks and highly eulogistic to the Greek
army. Within little more than a month from this date the
Turks had swept the Greeks out of Asia Minor and captured
Smyrna. On 26 August, the Tutkish army began to move forward
in what has come to be knw!A as the Great Offensive [BUyük
Taaruz]. With a force stretching 100 kilometres from Isnik to
Afion Earahisar,	 they advanced against the enemy, and on the
sime day, important Greek defence positions were overrun while
on 30 August the Greek army suffered a major defeat at
Du r iupinar. M. Kemal issued his famous order: "Armies your
first goal is the Mediterranean. Forward!" 15/.
In early August 1922, following the rebuff of Greek
army units in the area, A. Vacalopoulos, the Representative of
the High Commissioner at Aidin informed Stergiadis that public
order was on the verge of collapse. Turkish irregulars
abducted civilians and released them only if a large sum had
been paid in ransom and the local agricultural population was
afraid to work in their farms outside the town 16/.
Vacalopoulos requested immediate measures to be taken to
reinforce the local gendarmerie with at least 125 men. To
this request the High Commission replied that all possible
measures had already been taken by the military authorities
and that he should reassure the population and forestall their
departure en masse 17/. By now, though, it was too late. The
Turkish units had already began to move down in force against
the Greeks.
By 1 September, the speedy retreat of the Greek army
was accompanied by the exodus of the Christian populations
from the areas captured by the nationalists. On the coast
between Adramyt, Aivali and Dikeli, 60, 000 refugees gathered
and asked for protection and means of transportation. As the
priority of the ships was the transportation of the army units
to mainland Greece and it was clear that it would be sometime
before the population would be transferred, 	 Stergiadis
requested Admiral Kalamidas, in charge of the Greek fleet in
Smyrna, to send a small man-of-war to these ports in order to
encourage the population and to facilitate the embarkation of
the Greek civil authorities on the Aktion which was impeded by
the refugees 18/. Indeed, on 1 September, the Greek civil
authorities of the provinces were asked to pack their archives
and assemble in Smyrna urgently. These orders were leaked to
the population and	 inspired panic in the Christian
15/ Turk Istikl1 Harbi, 11/6 kp. 2, p. 277.
161 GAK 17z, tel. no. 2066/6.8.22, Aidin Representative to the
General Secretary of the High Commission.
17/ GAK 17z tel. no. 2578/7.8.22, General Secretary of the
High Commission to the Aidin Representative.
18/ MOFA 121e tel. no. 15012/25.8.22, General Secretary of the
High Commission to Admiral Kalamidas.
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communities, especially those of the interior which knew they
would not be able to seek refuge on the coastline in time,
due to lack of transportation means 19/. Little did these
wretched communities know that even if they could secure means
of transport and succeeded in arriving in mainland Greece, the
chances were that they would not be allowed to disembark. A
Law was passed on 20 July 1922 "Regarding the illegal
trinsportation of persons arriving at Greek ports from abroad
in groups", the first article of which prohibited the
disembarkation in Greece of groups arriving from abroad, if
each member of the group did not have a valid passport. The
Law also provided for measures against those shipowners or
cthjpcaptains who chose to carry such passengers 20/.
Metropolitan Chrysostomos thought that there was still
time to avoid the catastrophe if oriiy Constantine would
abdicate, Venizelos would assume the premiership, the army
leadership was entrusted to the Amyna and Stergiadis and
Hadjianestis were removed from Smyrna 21/. Venizelos' reply to
Chrysostomos's pleas was quite categorical:
"In the face of the national disaster, unfortunately I
am unable to take any action. Please send me your
suggestions as to whatever you may think I should beg
the Allies for. Keep in mind that they will never agree
to a military intervention which would be the only
possible way out" 22/.
Meanwhile, large groups of panic stricken refugees
gathered in the towns with a railway station, wandering in the
streets and begging for trains to come and transport them to
what they thought was the security of Smyrna. In Odemish
alone, their number swelled to 10,000 within a few days from
the start of the Turkish offensive 23/. The Smyrna High
Command asked the High Commission to take the measures needed
for the protection of these refugees and to provide means for
their transportation. It was now clear that the military
authorities would barely be able to cater for the
transportation and the protection of the army units 24/. The
Smyrna High Command was very anxious to be briefed on the
measures that had been taken by the High Commission,
especially after the disquieting reports received from Baindir
and Odemish and the leakage of the orders given to the civil
19/ MOFA 122 b4 document no. 145/20.8.22, Commander of Baindir
to High Command Representative in Odemish.
20/ Law 2870/20.7.22.
21/ AV 4c Letters addressed by Metropolitan Chrysostomos to
Venizelos and King Constantine and dated 25.8.22 and 21.8.22
respectively.
22/ AV 4, Letter dated 9.9.22, addressed by Venizelos to
Metropolitan Chrysostomos.
23/ MOFA 122 p5 dcc. no. 729/21.8.22, Commander of the Second
Army Corps to Srnyrna High Command.
24/ MOFA 122 bi doc. no. 16187/8549/22.8.22, Smyrna High
Command to the High Commission.
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authorities regarding their departure 25/.
In Aivali, N. Zannis, the Representative of the High
Commission, refused to follow the orders received from Smyrna
regarding his departure and telegraphed to the Minister of
Interior that he could not abandon the 30,000 helpless
refugees gathered in the city without any protection. He
requested the immediate despatch of a man-of-war to encourage
the Christian populations and also transport ships for those
who wanted to leave. Should these ships not arrive, he
concluded, the local Greeks would impede by force the
departure of the civil authorities 26/. The telegram was
immediately transmitted to Stergiadis with the Minister's
comment that he was the only competent person to reply. The
High Commissioner asked Zannis to remain in his position if
the locals considered his presence indispensable and assured
him that he would make every possible effort to send a warship
but that he had no transpot ships available 27/.
The mass exodus of the Christian population from Asia
Minor following the Greek rebuff was by no means surprising
for the Allied representatives. The question as to their fate
first arose during the Paris Conference of March 1922, when
plans for an eventual evacuation of the Greek army from Asia
Minor were discussed 28/. The imperative need for
protective measures was also discussed and it was thought that
their implementation should commence before the evacuation
started 29/. The scheme included the presence of Commissioners
appointed by the League of Nations to supervise the
implementation of the clauses of the future peace treaty with
relation to the minorities. Realizing the gravity of the
situation, the British High Commission in Constantinople
pressed that these Commissioners should be present in Asia
Minor before the commencement of the evacuation, in order to
avert panic 301. London, however, did not seem to share these
preoccupations and commented that it would be up to the Allied
High Commissioners to calm and protect the Christian
communities until the Peace Conference had deliberated on the
rights of the minorities and the Turks had accepted them
formally 31/. The High Commissioners were to work towards this
end with the Allied Generals in Constantinople who were to
7/ MOFA 122 st doc. no. 16145/3/21/21.8.22, Smyrna High
Command to the High Commission. As noted on the document, the
reply to the questions set in it was given verbaly.




21 c2 tel. no. 15007/25.8.22, Stergiadis to N.
Zannis.
?/ DBFP, vol. XVII, nos. 560 to 570.
29/ DBFP, vol. XVII, Annex 2 to No. 562, p. 698.9/ DBFP, vol. XVII, no. 619.
j / DBFP, vol. XVII, no. 631.
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control the evacuation 32/.
In the meantime, the Allied High Commissioners had
appointed a commission to examine the issue of "an eventual
exodus of the Christian population in the event of of Greek
withdrawal from Asia Minor" and to suggest measures to be
taken should the need arise. The first rcCt-oI' of the
commission was to suggest the return o. the occupied
territories to Turkish rule with more favourable conditions
for the Christian element and to proceed with the
establishment of figures and statistics as to the number of
people eventually to be displaced. To this end, General Franks
as Chairman of the commission, held preliminary talks with G.
Zarif is, Representative of the Red Cross in Constantinople.
During these talks Zarif is was adamant that if the Greek army
was evacuated, then a general exodus of the Christian
populations was to be expected as the persecutions of the
years 1914-1918 were still vividly remebered.
As it happened, no plans had been made until late in
the summer of 1922, and the preparations for the evacuation of
the Greek army were only decided upon by the Greek Ministers
who visited Smyrna on 30 August 1922. When in Smyrna, Stratos
cabled the Minister of Marine with orders to commandeer all
ships anchored in Greek ports and send them to Smyrna for the
evacuation of the population. He also cabled Protopapadakis,
advising the immediate evacuation of army and population. It
seems, however, that Gounaris was against the evacuation in
order to avert panic and, once again, no decisions were taken
regarding the issue of the transportation of the population
33/. Surprisingly enough and although events followed rapidly,
most of the Smyrna population and numerous members of the
foreign communities were not willing to leave Smyrna and
considered that their safety was guaranteed as long as they
remained within the city 34/. The presence of 21 Allied ships
in the harbour of Smyrna constituted a guarantee of
protection. At that stage, very few could foresee the extent
of violence and destruction which was to follow the entrance
of the Turkish army to the city and the fire that was to
destroy it. For most of the 600,000 Greeks who either lived in
Smyrna or had sought refuge in the city and its periphery,
there was no question of departure 35/.
It was mainly because of this feeling of security that
by the end of August 1922 the population of Smyrna and its
suberbs had swolen to more than half a million. In view of
the precarious situation on the military front, the Smyrna
Police Prefecture issued directives for measures to be
implemented should disturbances occur in the city. Policemen
32/ FO E 8181/5/44, 21.8.22, Lord Curzon to Sir H. Rumbold
(Constantinople).
33/ Angelomatis, op.cit, p. 207.
34/ Notaras, op.cit, p. 64.
35/ Notaras,	 .cit, p. 66.
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were only to fire in defence of themselves or that of
civilians under threat. Should the alarm signal be given, most
of the police force was to gather in the periphery of the
Metropolis while the rest were to take up positions in front
of banks, post offices and other buildings were large sums of
money and valuables were kept. In collaboration with the
gendarmerie and one army unit, the men of the 4th Police
Station were to stop any Turks intending to leave the Turkish
quarter and proceed towards the Greek and Armenian parts of
the city. The men attached to the Army High Command were to
take up positions near the Italian base and impede anyone from
entering or leaving. Another fifty five men were allocated for
the protection of the High Commission and the residence of the
High Commissioner 36/.
The sands, however, seemed to have run out for good and
no measure could forestall the impending catastrophe. With a
carefully planned offensive, the Nationalist forces managed to
drive the Greek army from its positions in the depths of
Anatolia to the Aegean shores bag and baggage, accompanied by
frantic groups of Christians who knew only too well the fate
that awaited them should they be left behind. The events to
fol1ot could be clearly read between the lines of two
communications of the Ankara National Assembly addressed to
the League of Nations and the Allies respectively, where,
without producing any evidence or particulars, the Greek army
was accused of "innumerable atrocities against the peaceful
and defenceless Moslem population, whom the Greeks violated,
massacred, pillaged and left in ruins. Turkey declines any
responsibility of the consequences that these terrible
provocations might have" 37/. Five days before the fire
erupted, as if Ankara had the power to foresee the destruction
that was to befall Smyrna, the Grand National assembly shook
of f any responsibility regarding its fate: "The army of the
eitemy...has destroyed all the monuments of art which have a
historical value...The Grand National Assembly proclaims its
profound sorrow and, in order to prevent similar vandalism in
the cities of Brusa and Smyrna which possess works of art of
immense value and whose occupation by our troops is imminent,
the Grand National Assembly has asked its president to protest
in its name to the civilized world against the excesses of the
Greek government and to make clear that our people will never
forgive such crimes" 38/.
The scene was now set for the first act of the drama.
On 2 September, only six days from the start of the Turkish
36/ GAK,	 circular n.n./14.8.22,	 Lieutenant Colonel	 N.
Nikiforakis,	 Commander of the Police Force.
37/ ASMAE, Pacco 1676/7812, Note no. 82127/5.9.22, on paper
headed "Delegation de Turquie (Angora)-Rome".
38/ ASMAE, Pacco 1676/7812, Report no. 10596/820/21.9.22, the
Italian High Commission in Constantinople transmitting Note
signed by Dr. Adnan, Vice President of the Grand National
Assembly and dated 7 September 1922.
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offensive, the Greeks accepted their defeat and their Charge
d' Affaires in London communicated to the Foreign Office their
request for an armistice. On 5 September, most of the Greek
employees left Srnyrna aboard the Yperochi and the Atromitos.
Atromitos also carried the archives of the Smyrna High
Commission which constituted the only proof that Greece had
been to Asia Minor. The remaining civil authorities had
gathered in Brousa and Panderma and were to follow the Third
Army Corps on its evacuation to Old Grece. Some thirty higher
officials of the High Commission, including the General
Secretary, left Smyrna on 8 September 1922 for Syros, where
they awaited transportation for Pireaus 39/. With the Army
High Command aboard the ships and ready to leave as from 7
September, Stergiadis was the last Greek official to leave the
city. On 8 September, he went by launch to the Iron Duke, the
British flag ship, where he met with Gounarakis for the last
time 40/. He was soon transported to Constantinople where he
was to board a Rournanian ship bound for Konstanza. According
to information confirmed by D. Papamichalopoulos, the Greek
member of the interallied port authority, upon arrival in
Constantinople, it was made clear to him that, should he
disembark, the mob would lynch him. At the insistence of
Papamichalopoulos, Stergiadis remained aboard the Iron Duke
until the arrival of the Roumanian ship 41/.
On 8 September 1922, the ships carrying Greek army units
gathered in Smyrna, sailed towards Chios, Mytilini or Chesme
where the remaining forces were waiting to be evacuated. With
the civil authorities already departed, the last vestige of
Greek authority in Asia Minor ceased to exist. As from the
afternoon of Friday, 8 September 1922, Smyrna was left without
any sort of authority to take charge of the situation and
avert panic. The Allied Representatives had refused to
undertake this responsibility until the arrival of the Turkish
forces. Instead, a few days earlier, they had asked the
Commander in Chief of the Greek army to reassure them that the
Greek forces would refrain from acts of violence during their
retreat 42/. With every authority gone, the Greeks and
Armenians swarmed to their churches and besought the clergy
for reassurance. Not knowing what else they could do, the two
Archbishops addressed an appeal to the Archbishop of
Canterbury requesting his intervention with the British
government so that an armistice would be arranged as soon as
possible .4./.
In the meantime, two American destroyers were added to
39/ MOFA 121 gi tel. n.n./n.d., General Secretary to Ministry
of Interior through the Nomarch of Cyclades.
40/ ibid.
41/ Interview with D. Papamichalopoulos, Athens,' 14.9.80.
Stergiadis'	 last concern was to arrange for the safe
transportation of the remaining public funds to Athens.
42/ Housepian, op.cit, p. 110.
43/ Housepian, op.cit, p. 112.
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the 21 men-of-war in the harbour with orders not to enter into
open cooperation with the Allied contingents who were at war
with Turkey but, simply, to coordinate their work with them
"only in defence of American lives and property" 44/. A force
of 55 men was landed and distributed among American
institutions throughout the city. The British landed another
200 marines who were posted at the Consulate, the British Post
Office, major British firms such as the Oriental Carpet
Company, and, as the insurance companies underwritting most
businesses and properties in Smyrna were British, the fire
station. The French also landed a small number of marines to
guard their Consulate and the Credit Lyonnais and the Italians
were preparing to cooperate with the Turks in the patrolling
of the city.
At nine in the morning of Saturday 9 September 1922,
the Turkish army reached the outskirts of Smyrna. Two hours
later, the Fourth Cavalry Regiment entered the city. The
Regiment was the advance guard of the Turkish forces, which,
under the command of M. Kemal, were sweeping forward. An
American eyewitness tells of the entrance of the Turkish
troops:
"The first that entered were dressed in black with
black fezzes with their red crescent and red star,
riding magnificent horses, carrying long curved swords,
proudly they rode into the city. With one hand raised
they called out to the terrified inhabitants 'Fear not!
Fear not!', but the inhabitants of Smyrna were filled
with terror. All morning long the Turkish army marched
into the city and about three o' clock that Saturday
afternoon, they started the most terrible looting,
raping and killing that is possible to describe in
words. The city was systematically looted and things
were carried in carts down to the Turkish quarters. The
American teachers in our American Girls' School watched
the soldiers kill civilians in the street in front of
the school, enter homes and kill families and throw
them into the street, and then take cartloads of goods
along with them. When the sun set that evening, dead
bodies were lying all over the streets of that doomed
city" 45/.
The first cavalry company to enter Smyrna was headed by
Cherefeddin Bey who was suddenly hit on the cheek by a
grenade. The grenade did not explode but seven or eight
civilians among the crowds were killed on the spot in
retaliation. A little later, the company reached the Konak
where the Allied representatives hurried to congratulate
Cherefeddin on the Turkish victory. The Bey informed them that
on his way through the outskirts of the city he had received
three bombs thrown by Armenians. Two years later, when he gave
44/ Housepian, op.cit, p. 113.
45/ Bierstadt, E. H. The Great Betrayal, p. 25. Account by
Mrs. A.	 G. Birge, wife of an American missionary.
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a sworn statement during a trial for insurance claims,
Cherefeddin declared that there was only one bomb, which was
not thrown by an Armenian but by a Greek soldier in uniform
46/. Before dusk of 9 September, the main body of troops had
come up and the city was fully occupied. The Turkish military
authorities issued a proclamation which appeared on the walls
of Smyrna that same evening and bore the signature of M.
Keinal. The proclamation informed the public that the killing
of Christians would be met with capital punishment. Two days
later, the phrase "capital punishment" was replaced with the
word "punishment" 47/. The correspondent of the Morning Post
telegraphed that the military authorities did not make any
-ffort to restrain their men or the irregulars that soon
filled the city. During the same evening, looting and killing
of Christians started sporadically, to become systematic by
the next morning. Panic stricken groups of Greeks and
Armenians took to the streets and plagued the gates of
American and other foreign institutions begging to be let in.
What made these scenes all the more frightful was the
impotence displayed by the Allied Representatives, military
and civilian. This impotence seemed to be dictated by
political expediency and while the Allied marines stood idle,
Turkish regulars and irregulars chased their victims into the
sea to shoot at them as they swam. Clearly, the foreign
representatives were adhering to their orders not to interfere
with the course of events but to confine themselves to the
protection of their co-nationals' lives and property.
While Kemal and his entourage had halted at the hills
of Nif outside the city, his forces in Srnyrna were cooperating
with Italian cavalry officers who were now patrolling with
Turkish units the Armenian quarter, "ostensibly to search out
for assasins and trouble makers" 48/. The Italians had also
organized a militia composed of Jews of Italian citizenship,
whose members escorted Jews from isolated areas to the safety
of the Beth Israel Temple in Salahane, a prosperous Jewish
community at the city's edge. These obviously precautionary
measures caused a resurgence of panic among the minorities
49/. On Sunday noon, a day as beautiful as that of the Greek
landing three years earlier, M. Kemal appeared at the balcony
of the Konak and saluted the crowds who had come to greet him
with acclamations of "Ghazi", the conqueror. During a
conference in the Konak, Kemal entrusted the control of the
city to Nouredin Pasha, commander of the Nationalist First
Army Corps, well-known to the Greeks for his ruthlessness and
ambition since his tenure of the post of Vali
jj Housepian, op.cit, p. 118. Transcript of the Trial from
the Papers of Admiral Bristol.
47/ Dourmoussis, op.cit, p. 72. Puaux, R. La mort de Smyrne
p . 9.
48/ Housepian, op.cit, p. 121.jj ibid, quoting interview with member of militia.
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of Smyrna 50/. According to Count Senni, the Italian Consul,
during the same meeting, the destruction of the Armenian
community was discussed and, by Monday morning, the Armenian
quarter was surrounded by Turkish soldiers while a public
crier roamed the sokaks calling the Moslems to leave the area.
On Monday afternoon, a new proclamation appeared announcing
that whoever concealed an Armenian in his home would be liable
for prosecution by the court martial 51/.
On Tuesday, 12 September Metropolitan Chrysostomos,
the last protector of the Greeks in the city, was summoned to
the Konak where, according to the legend, Nouredin Pasha
called him to settle their personal accounts, outstanding
since .1918. Chrysostomos' last moments have been preserved by
the legend in various versions. A French eyewitness quoted in
one of the sources claimed to have heard Nouredin deliver the
Metropolitan to the mob outside the Konak with the words "If
he has wronged you, you do him wrong as well!". Thereafter,
the Metropolitan was led to a barber shop which belonged to a
Turk under Italian protection, and was lynched in the presence
of a French marine detachment, which, conforming to orders,
did not make any attempt to save him. A Turcocretan gendarme
whom Chrysostomos had helped in the past, is said to have
fired four times on the Metropolitan to save him from the
ordeal of slow death. His mutilated body is said to have been
buried by Greek soldiers hiding in the area within the
compound of the "Apollon" Athletic Association 52/. A little
later, as the witness followed the French marines towards the
European quarter, he saw a car at the rear of which one of the
three primates who had escorted Chrysostomos to the Konak was
tied by the legs, his lifeless head dragging on the cobble-
stoned street 53/.
In the early afternoon of the following day, fire broke
out near the Basmahane Train Station in the Armenian quarter.
It spread rapidly "through gasoline soaked buildings" and by
five in the afternoon, a number of other fires were raging.
50/ For account of Nouredin's career and persecution of
Greeks,see Solomonidis, V."O Ephessou Chrysostomos gia tin
Katastrophi tis Smyrnis" [Chrysostom, Bishop of Ephessus on
the Destruction of Smyrna], note 11, in DKMS, 1984.
51/ Horton, op.cit, p. 141.
52/ For a description of Metropolitan Chrysostom's martyrdom,
see	 Stavritsis,	 A.	 "I Katastrophi tis Smyrnis" (The
Destruction of	 Smyrna] in Mikrasiatika Chronika, vol. VII,
quoting evidence supplied by Abba E. Soulier to the French
Parliament. Also,	 Angelomatis, op.cit, p. 236, refers to the
burial of	 Chrysostomos and cites evidence supplied by
Kyrillos Psyllas,
	 protosyngellos of the Metropolitan of
Ephessus.
53/ Dourmoussis,	 qp.cit,	 p.	 82.	 Solomonidis,	 V. "0
Ephessou...",
	
note 8. Angelomatis, op.cit, p. 230.
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With the wind blowing from the south the flames soon reached
the European quarter. In a few hours, the non-Turkish quarters
of the city were in flames. Despite the hard work of the
Smyrna fire brigade, a mixed company of Greeks and Turks
organized and supported by the British insurance firms
operating in Smyrna, there was no keeping up with the fire as
there was neither enough water nor enough manpower to contain
it 54/. The direction of the wind was such that only the
Turkish and the adjacent Jewish quarter remained unscathed. As
the fire began to spread, refugees and locals crowded the
quay. By nightfall, thousands and thousands stood between the
burning city and the waterfront. Clearly, the time had come to
evacuate the city. The fire raged throughout the night. In the
morning, the prosperous European quarter, together with the
Armenian and the Greek, had been reduced to ashes. An official
communiqué issued on 14 September from Ankara announced that
"the fire of Smyrna was put out today by our forces" 55/. Not
everyone, however, seemed to agree with this version of
events: "it is the opinion of many prominent Britishers that
burning was resorted to cover the traces of wholesale
butcheries in the Armenian quarter" 56/.
According to information collected by Ch. Solomonidis,
4,000,000 sq. m. were destroyed by the fire. This area
contained 5,000 shops and businesses together with 55,000
houses, 43,000 of which were Greek, 10,000 Armenian and 2,000
belonged to the European community. Most orthodox churches
were burnt to the ground together with 117 schools and the
Greek, Dutch and Catholic hospitals, including the patients
who were not able to walk out.
An American eye witness noted: "From the bridge of the
Armenian, anchored 400 yards away until the captain, owing to
the ashes and smoke had to move further, I could see all the
unfortunate wretches, thirteen to fourteen deep, swaying in
the sweltering heat. At either end there were Turks posted
with machine guns, while the approaches to the burning city
were likewise guarded. With the very parcels under their arms
actually on fire, demented men, women and children struggled
to get free, throwing themselves where possible in the water,
swaying this way and that, more dead than alive. There is
direct evidence of the Turks barricading houses before firing
them and also of their spreading kerosene about the Armenian
quarter" 57/. By ten o' clock of Thursday morning, every
available vessel was filled but most of the population was
still on the Quay where fires still burnt until the afternoon
when the wind shifted and blew the flames inland. On Friday,
15 September 1922, as the fires were beginning to burn
themselves out with nothing left to ignite, the American
Winona was the first ship to arrive in Pireaus full of
54/ Housepian, op.cit, p. 156.
55/ Housepian, op.cit, p. 168.
56/ Bierstadt, op.cit, p. 214.
57/ ibid, p.214, testimony of Mr. Roy Treloar.
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refugees 58/.
	 The second act of their drama was just
beginning.
Numerous eye witnesses interviewed by foreign
correspondents verified that the fire was a result of arson by
the Turks. Among them, Minnie Mills, principal of the American
Intercollegiate Institute testified that she saw men of the
regular Turkish forces setting fire to Armenian buildings near
the school. Soon, the European press was filled with reports
that the Turkish authorities made no serious attempts to
contain the fire and that the next day groups of Turkish
soldiers were seen to set light to buildings that were still
standing. "Shooting and looting became general and by 15
September, the whole town was in a state of confusion, Turkish
regular soldiers joining with irregulars and with the Turkish
inhabitants in wholesale robbery and murder" 59/. The
Daily Telegraph reported: "Except for the squalid Turkish
quarter, Smyrna has ceased to exist...The problem of
minorities is here solved for all time. The refugees are
being removed to other lands as fast as possible...No doubt
remains as to the origin of the fire. On the sworn testimony
of the American staff of the Collegiate Institute, the torch
was applied by Turkish regular soldiers" 60/. To complete the
picture, the Times commented: " It now appears probable that
the reason why the Turks were inactive during the first two
days of their occupation of Smyrna was the direction of the
wind which would have involved the Turkish quarter, but on the
third day the conflagration was deliberately kindled. The
testimony of Miss Mills is confirmed by other Americans today,
who declare that they themselves saw Turkish regulars entering
many previously looted and deserted houses with rags soaked
with benzine, and an outbreak of flames was seen afterwards"
61/. Minnie Mills' testimony received extensive publicity. She
subsequently stressed her view that even if the origin of the
fire was thought to be uncertain, there should be little doubt
that the Turkish authorities could have prevented its spread
to the European quarters and that Turkish soldiers acting
deliberately were the prime cause of the terrible extent of
the disaster 62/.
Reuters' reported that French and Italian warships
refused to take on board persons failing to produce
certificates of nationality while British vessels took
refugees on board though they naturally gave the first place
to British citizens. However, not all accounts seem to agree
with Reuters' report. A summary of most available sources
58/ Housepiari, op.cit, p. 174.
59/ Daily News, 20.9.22.
60/ Daily Telegraph, 16.9.22.
61/ Times, 18.9.22.
62/ Minnie Mills later headed The Orlinda-Childs-Pierce
College for Girls, instituted in Athens as a substitute for
the loss of the Smyrna Intercollegiate Institute and still
operating today as Deree-Pierce College.
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suggests that Italian ships took up everyone fortunate enough
to swim or float within their reach and the French ships took
off boatloads from the shore as their consular officials
offered passes to anyone lucky enough to be able to say in
French "I am French". Only the British and American ships
stood by impotent. The British Admiral had to give Nourec3in
assurances of neutrality, if not assurances of friendship. The
1mcrican contingent had ieceived the strictest orders from
Admiral Bristol, American High Commissioner in Constantinople,
not to intervene in favour of the Christians and his
representative in Smyrna Admiral Brock argued for several
hours with his officers before he was convinced of the need to
cooperate and save as many Christian lives as possible 63/.
During the daily meetings of the Allied representatives it was
clear that they were not willing to act in unison or
individually in order to save what remained of the Christian
populations of Asia Minor: the French were evidently perturbed
by the possibility of Kemal's marching against the neutral
zone of Constantinople, where they would be expected to help
the British in stopping him. Therefore, their priority was to
dissuade him from such a move and not to mediate with him for
the salvation of the refugees. The Americans seemed determined
not to allow themselves to be lumbered with the expense of the
whole operation or to assume the burden of settling the
refugees once they were taken away 64/. One of Admiral
Bristol's major preoccupations was to discourage the notion
that the Turks had deliberately burnt Smyrna. "Foresight
required that the disaster be minimized and the Turkish hand
played down, not merely to accommodate the Turks but in
anticipation of insurance claims for the loss of American
property. The insurers, as it happened, were British" 65/.
Among the numerous testimonies and eye witness accounts
published at the time, that of Reverend Charles Dobson, the
British Chaplain of Smyrna is of particular interest because,
as it claims, it is stripped of all hysteria, human tendency
to exaggerate and disproportion caused by personal loss:
"I was astonished when in Italy and again here in
France	 to find how unwilling some circles were to
believe the	 culpability of the Turkish troops in
the burning of
	 Smyrna. It seems to me that the
firing of the city by
	
the fanatic element of the
Turkish army was the natural 	 culmination of the
breakdown of restraints imposed by 	 military
necessities, and of the unbridled indulgence of
xenophobia. I have not yet met anybody who was in a
position to know the circumstances, who does not
contemptuously discredit the assertion that the
63/ Daily Telegraph, 18.9.22. "It is said that the regular
Turkish	 population of Smyrna and even servants emloyed by
the High	 Commission, took active part in the massacres".
Housepian,	 op.cit, p. 171.
64/ Housepian, op.cit, p. 186.
65/ ibid.
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Armenians fired the city. During a month living in
Lazaretto of Malta as a refugee, I and my fellow
refugees have compared experiences and as a body when
we	 heard of the statement that the Turks were not
guilty of	 firing the city, asked the Bishop of
Gibraltar who was	 visiting us to ask the people
of England to suspend	 judgement until the truth
could be known. The Bishop 	 invited us to make a
statement to him. We met him at the	 house of the
Lieutenant Governor. We were Herbert Whitall
senior, Robert Hadkinson with his son and J. Epstein
and the three British Chaplains respectively of Smyrna,
Burnabat and Buca" 66/.
It is significant to note that the fire broke out in
several places at very short intervals and pointed to a
systematic incendiarism such as only a well coordinated plan
could have effected. The fact that the fires started
immediately after the change of the wind which, during the
previous three days, had been blowing in the direction of the
Turkish quarter, also points at Turkish culpability. Any fire
started previously to the change of the wind would have swept
the Turkish quarter. Further, the destruction of the city
should not be attributed to any breakdown of public order. The
available evidence seems to point in two directions: Smyrna
was destroyed firstly because all traces of Christian presence
had to be effaced if Turkey was to belong to the Turks, and
secondly because the products of the looting of this
"entrepot of trade between East and West" were the only
compensation Kemal could afford for his loyal irregulars 67/.
Also, Christian Smyrna had to be destroyed because past
experience proved that as long as their homes and churches
were standing, the Greeks would find a way to return.
The account of the events by Turkish sources paints a
very different picture: Thousands of Greek soldiers and
peasants flooded into Smyrna from all over Anatolia "and were
loaded on Allied transport ships for shipment back to Greece.
Civil government in Izmir was now back in Turkish hands, and
desperate efforts were made to keep order and prevent looting.
On September 13 a fire broke out in the Armenian quarter of
the city. It spread rapidly through gasoline soaked buildings
while the Turkish army's efforts to extinguish it were stymied
by the discovery that all the city's fire hoses had been cut
and the fire cisterns emptied. In a single day as many as
25,000 buildings were burned and half the great city
destroyed. Perhaps the last atrocity of the war was the
suggestion, quickly taken up by the Western press, that the
66/ Bierstadt, op.cit, pp. 224-28, quoting the testimony of
Rev.	 Ch. Dobson.
67/ Temperley, op.cit, vol. VI, p. 21. Housepian, op.c,
p. 189,	 comments: "Observers agreed that license to rob and
rape, loot and scourge were part of the scheme to reward the
victorious Turkish troops".
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victorious Turkish army was responsible for burning the
conquered second city of the old empire. Actual
culpability has never been proved" 68/. Although this version
seems to be the official Turkish view of the events, other
Turkish apologists tend to put the blame for the atrocities
and the fire on the shoulders of the irregular forces. Even if
one is prepared to accept this argument, "and there is enough
evidence to sink it", the direct responsibility for what
happened in Smyrna remains with the military authorities in
command of the city at the time, in the same way that the
responsibility for the atrocities committed following the
Greek landing was attributed to the Greek military. " The
failure of the Turkish authorities to maintain order in Smyrna
was undoubtedly one of the contributing causes for the extent
of the disaster" 69/. British Admiral Hepburn commented that
his observation on the discipline of the Turkish troops in
Smyrna led him to disbelieve that any revolt would have
followed stern, repressive measures and that, if they wanted
to, the Turks could establish order within two hours 70/.
Although it is highly unlikely that the Allied
governments did not know the truth about the culprits of the
destruction of Smyrna, it is indicative that they allowed
public opinion in their countries to remain in doubt as to who
had set fire to the city and concentrated their efforts to
minimize the full extent of the atrocities that took place.
"The first attempt was to belittle the whole matter; it was
denied in the French Chamber of Deputies that there had been
any massacre, and the responsibility for the fire was placed
upon the Greeks and Armenians...Eye-witnesses who knew the
truth were warned both in France and Italy that their best
policy was silence. Every effort was made to hide from the
world the truth of what had happened. And why ? Because the
governments of the Powers knew well that the forces behind
them, the economic interests, could best be served by keeping
on friendly terms with Turkey at any price; and because they
knew too that if the great public whom they were supposed to
represent once knew the truth, and the whole truth, they would
be forced to act...Theref ore it paid to be friendly. The price
of friendship between Turk and Christian was the obliteration
of the Christian civilization of Asia Minor, the massacre of
100,000 innocent people, the exile and deportation of
1,150,000 more, the enslaving of 160,000 men, the burning of
Smyrna, the betrayal of Greece, the sacrifice of the American
philanthropic investment in Asia Minor, and an indelible stain
upon the honour of the nations. That price was paid" 71/.
On the basis of European efforts to minimize the
proportions and consequences of the drama, M. Kemal's view of
68/ Shaw, op.cit, p.363. TUrk Istik1l Harbi, 11/6, kp. 3,
p. 156.
69/ Bierstadt, op.cit, p. 27, quoting letter of American
Secretary of State G. Hughes to Republican Senator Lodge.
70/ Housepian, op.cit, p. 189.
71/ Bierstadt, op.cit, p. 47. For the upheaval created by the
publication of this book, see Housepian, op.cit.
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the burning of Smyrna should not come as a surprise. It was a
disagreable incident, he said, but essentially an episode of
secondary importance 72/.
Nouredin Pasha himself reportedly attributed his
inability to forestall the destruction of the city t his
concern for the military situation and the priority given to
the persecution of the Greek army 73/. However, the
unsatisfactory and lame stories related by the Turks to
independent witnesses who visited Smyrna after the fire, tend
to confirm their guilt in this matter. The testimony of Alfred
Brady, member of the American Smyrna Disaster Committee, is
one of the many striking examples. Brady states that during
his two weeks in Smyrna, he found the Turks opposing the
Committee's efforts to aid the panic stricken Christian
population.
"Although the majority of Greek and Armenian civilians
have been deported to Ankara into what is tantamount to
slavery, and the majority of women and children are
exiled, the Turkish campaign of massacre and terror
continues as the last surviving Christian communities
are being wiped out one by one. I made my headquarters
in Mytilini, while a fleet of seventeen vessels flying
British and American flags took off the refugees from
the coast villages. On 2 October, I was informed that
10,000 refugees, women and children, had been
concentrated by the Turks at Aivali Bay. I proceeded
there on an American destroyer. Arriving outside the
port, we went to the beach in a shoreboat flying the
American flag. Turkish troops turned a machine gun on
the boat and bullets snapped off the flagstaff. When we
landed the Turks denied there were any refugees there.
Later we found higher officials who told us we could
take off refugees. Before the refugees were put into
the small craft all were passed through lines of
Turkish troops in the Customs House.These troops
supposedly searched them for arms and ammunition but in
reality systematically looted them of every bit of
money and jewelry the old men and women
possessed...Hearing that there were refugees on the
beaches of Fovies, Asia Minor, I went there aboard the
British steamer Pavia. The Turks opened fire with
machine guns from two sides of the quay when we
attempted to land, despite the fact that the ship was
flying the British flag. The ship made six attempts to
enter the harbour, being turned back by machine gun
fire each time. At the seventh attempt we landed and
the Turks said: 'There are no refugees here. Further,
you are not wanted 1'. The refugees had obviously been
herded out of sight for the deserted streets were full
72/ Kinross,	 opcit, p. 372.
73/ MOFA 28a tel. no. 19169/14.9.22, C. Panagopoulos, Nomarch
of Chios to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, quoting French
businessman A. Gireau who arrived from Smyrna on 13.9.22.
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of refugee baggage. Soldiers with fixed bayonets
prevented us from entering the town to investigate"
74/.
From none of the accounts is it possible to come to any
exact figures as to the number of the victims that perished
1uring the first week of T.irkish oceuaion of Smyrna, but it
is feared that they came to over 100,000 75/. Also, it is not
possible to have an accurate figure of those who perished
during the fire because during the two weeks preceeding the
arrival of the Turkish troops, panic-stricken Armenians,
Greeks and Turks had poured in from the surrounding country
side and the population of Smyrna doubled and trebled. It is
safe to say that on 9 September, the major part of the entire
Christian population of Asia Minor had sought refuge in Smyrna
where they thought they would find a real haven of salvation
76/. The declaration of the Greek Commander in Chief to the
Smyrniot press that the Turks "will enter Smyrna not in ten
days but not even in ten months", strengthened this conviction
77/. Less than a month later, the Turkish authorities of
Smyrna stated explicitly that those Greeks who were allowed to
leave should do so by 1 October 1922, otherwise they would be
transported to the interior to serve in the labour battalions.
As the Allied representatives conferred continuously in an
effort to settle their policy differences which forbade them
to come in aid of the refugees, Italian Admiral Pepe
commented: "There will be no refugee problem by the time we
get through con-conferring" 78/.
The evacuation of those gathered along the Asia Minor
coastline officially started on 24 September 1922. Dr. Esther
Lovejoy, who arrived in Smyrna on that day testified about the
conditions under which the evacuation was effected:
"The quay was wide and the unfortunates squatted as
closely as they could, and held their places because it
was presumably the place of greatest safety. At night
it was possible for the warships in the harbour to
throw on this group their searchlights when the women
screamed for protection, as they did night after
night...One could constantly hear the screams and moans
and shrieks of these poor women and girls moving up and
down that quay...There was no retreat from that
position. If they had tried to go back to the ruins of
the city they probably would have lost their lives. The
quay became a reeking sewer and at last the evacuation
started on September 24....There were eight refugee
74/ Manchester Guardian, 14.10.22.
75/ Daily Telegraph, 18.9.22.
76/ Angelomatis, op.cit, p. 192.
77/ Tharros, 22.8.22.
78/ Housepian, op.cit, p.181, 197. For the extraordinary story
of how a substantial number of refugees were transported to
Greece	 through the efforts of a minor American missionary,
see	 Housepian, op.cit, pp. 192-200.
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ships on September 24. On September 25, one ship came
in and loaded and went away. On September 26, at night,
19 ships came in for refugees, and from that time a
large number of ships came every day until the end of
the week...The Turkish airplanes...dropped down a
proclamation saying that all were to be deported on
September 30 to the interior, riless of age and
sex, women and children as well as men. All the men
between 18 and 45 were deported to the interior,
anyway. And they all looked upon deportation to the
interior as nothing less than a sentence of death. It
is in fact worse than death, because it is preceeded by
slavery on the part of the men and even worse on the
part of the girls and women...On September 26, the 19
ships began to evacuate the people of the city, the
sight was indiscribable. The great mass of miserable
people pushed on down toward the quay and the long
railroad pier in order to get aboard the rescuing
ships. Practically all of them had on their backs all
their earthly possessions at that time. Many of them
carried their sick and their infants on their back. And
many of these people had lived in that city for years
and their families had lived in that city since Saint
Paul was a missionary in that country, long before the
coming of the Turks from Asia.."79/.
As mentioned in the above testimony, all males between
the age of 15 and 50, Greek and Armenian, were to be deported
into the interior to serve in the labour battalions. This was
announced on 16 September in a circular signed by Nouredin,
in which it was stated that
" A. All Greeks and Armenians between 18 and 45 years
of age who are now in the areas liberated by our army,
together with those Greeks and Armenians transported by
the Greek troops to the coast and abandoned there in
view of the tremendous pursuit of our army, must
surrender immediately. They will be kept hostage until
the end of the hostilities. This measure is taken
against them because they officially took up arms
against the Motherland, because they enlisted in the
enemy's army, because even lately they set fire to
towns and villages and committed unheard of excesses
against the peaceful population and so that, if set
free, they will not come to the aid of the enemy's
army.
B. All those not included in the first article and all
the Smyrniot families or the Greek and Armenian
refugees, can emigrate until the 30th of September
1338 [1922]. Those who will remain after the lapse of
79/ Dr. E. Lovejoy was a pioneer of the American Women's
Hospitals. For her relief work in Asia Minor and Greece see
Housepian, op.cit. Her testimony is published in Bierstadt,
op.cit, Appendices B and C, pages 215 and 224, also pp.39-
43.
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the deadline will be driven outside the war zone and
will be suspected of constituting a threat against the
security of the army and public order in general.
C. Because the Grand National Assembly has taken all
appropriate measures to clear up the area from the
remnants of the Greek army and secure the annihilation
of the destructive enemy organizations,
	
all	 the
inhabitants, irrespective of race or creed, must return
to their homes and to their peaceful tasks" 80/.
Although the circular seemed to ignore the fact that the
bulk of the Greek army had departed eight days before it was
issued and that the war zone did not exist any more as there
was no enemy to fight against, its impact was to intensify the
looting, the massacres and atrocities against the unfortunate
minorities. Eventually, the time limit was extended to 8
October and another proclamation was issued to the effect that
all Christians should leave Anatolia within thirty days. The
last boatload of refugees left Smyrna only six hours before
the lapse of the deadline. The total number of those removed
from the coastline until that date is estimated within the
region of 250,000. As it were, this act of the refugee drama
was concluded only two years later with the exchange of
populations, following the signature of the Treaty of
Lausanne. With this exchange, the fateful circle of history
which opened in the 10th century B.C., when the Greeks first
settled in Asia Minor, came to its close on 17 December 1924
when the last boatload of Greeks about to be "exchanged" left
the port of Mersina in Cilicia for Pireaus 81/.
In Europe, the story was already undergoing
considerable revision. Among those who worked towards this end
were the missionaries who had discredited their own
eyewitness' testimonies "and Arnold Toynbee...who expressed
the opinion that although the truth about the burning of
Smyrna could never be known, the Armenians shared the
responsibility for it" 82/.
It is quite probable that most of the massacres could
have been averted if the 21 Allied warships present in the
Smyrna harbour had turned their cannons towards the Turkish
quarter and threatened to bombard it. However, it seems clear
that no deus ex machina could have changed the ultimate fate
of Hellenism in Asia Minor, which was decided as soon as
nationalism became a determining factor in the policies
adopted by the Turkish governments. Panturkism, the new
1ideology, was prominent in the 1909 Armenian massacre in
80/ For the full text of the proclamation, lEE, op.cit, p.
237. The term "destructive enemy organizations" probably
refers to to the Asia Minor Defence.
.j../ Pallis, A.A.Statistike Meleteperi Fyletikon Metanastefseon
(Statistical Studies on Racial Migration). Athens 1925.
82/ Housepian, op.cit, pp. 233-4. Toynbee, A. "The East after
Lausanne". Foreign Affairs, 15.9.23, p.96.
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Cilicia, where the religious fanaticism characterizing the
1896 persecutions had obviously given way to nationalism. And
again in 1914, when the deportations of Greeks and Armenians
started, it was evident that the underlying current was not
religious fervour dictating the expulsion of infidels but
national fanatism. In 1909, with the advent of the Young
Turks, Turkey had decided to clean up its territory from
elements alien to Panturkisrn. The first targets were the
Armenians and the Greeks. Then came the turn of the Arabs,
even though they were Moslem, and the Kurds whose ousting has
not been completed todate. Clearly, the new Turkey was for the
Turks and the non-Turkish components of the old Ottoman Empire
were not to be trusted.
A large percentage of public opinion in Greece still
maintains that if the country had not embarked on the
implementation of the Megali Idea and the policy which
indirectly involved the ultimate settlement of accounts
between Greece and Turkey, Hellenism in Thrace, Pontus and
Asia Minor would have remained secure in its cradle. This,
though, seems hardly to have been the case as, after the
establishment of the Young Turkish regime, the struggle
between the two nations had developed to an open war of
extermination against the Ottoman Greeks. Their existence
within the new Turkish state became problematic and the final
battle had to be fought to determine whether they would be
able to remain in their homes. The fate that befell the Greek
community of Constantinople a few decades later in spite of
the strong terms of the Treaty of Lausanne regarding its
protection, indicates what would have happened in Asia Minor,
Pontus and Thrace regardless of whether or not the Greek
venture in Asia Minor had taken place 83/. Hellenism in Turkey
was not protected either by the Treaty of Lausanne or by the
agreements of Ankara and Athens or the improvement in the
relations between the two countries. The measures taken
against the minority in terms of taxation, financial boycot,
special conditions of military service and exercise of
profession soon led the Greeks to leave Turkey and opt for
self-exile. In this they were by no means alone. Jews and
Armenians followed in their steps 84/. With hindsight, it
seems highly unlikely that Hellenism in Turkey could have been
spared if it were not for Greek involvement in the Great War
and Asia Minor expedition. Neither could it be spared if its
fate had been left in the hands of the Allies. This would only
be the case if Turkish nationalism came only as a result of
the Greek landing in Smyrna; Turkish nationalism, however, was
the product of 19th century historical evolution and it was
manifest not only in Asia Minor but also in Cilicia, Sokia and
Mosul,	 under French,	 Italian and British occupation
respectively. The victorious Entente powers were unable to
83/ For a comprehensive treatment of the Greek minority in
Constantinople, see Alexandris, A. The Greek Minority of
Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations. Athens, 1983.
84/ Lewis, B. op.cit, p.p. 118-9.
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	 ov-r t	 rnia
	
and the Creeks
bu also over their OWh citizeis,. mst of whom were forced by
the circumstances to leave Turkey.
Therefore, toqether with that of the other minorities,
the sate of Helleism in 'uxLey was deci3e by the flaring
rIsh nationalism. At. the time, :t was el.eved that if th.
tomañ Greeks were to survive, .they either had to gaiZt
utro,i of the territories they inhabited or, at least, to
eee the unlimited and active support of an outside power
r q t impose at any given moment respect towards the
•ce md autonomy of the Gek community. 'Tn retrospect,is quite apparent that neit	 f these options
niuc)	 hance of succcss, }e1est
	
r Asj	 r'jnor, arxd
i7ce fct that ,natter,, did nt have th rorres to fight
the battle on its o. W)at was ivor, 	 bseqtent events
clearly showed that no power as ready t.o
	
crifice the
interests of its respective financial circlet 	 order to
safeguard the Christian minorities in Turkey. Tii was evident
long before the Greek elections of ovemrer 1920, whose
outcome provided the pretext for the de lure abandonmeht of
the minorities to their fate and brought home the truth of the
matter: the Greek army would have to carr	 it the AEia Minor
campaign on its own and at its owr. risk.
Inevitably, the issue of a)1atng responsibilities
for the catastrophe is extremely corpiicated, Although on
airerous occasions in Greek histor t1 optIon of blaming thc
freign powers is all too LightheartUy employed, the case o
ts Anatolian campaign pre5nt the researcher with a'
exception, the Allied share in the respotEibility for the
d1aster being so clear. Nonetheless, this allocation of
responsibilities should not be the main .ssue at hand. This
snoulã mainly revolve around he guestlor4 as to wnat could the
western civilized world have done for the protection of
populations doomed to be exterminated and what in actual fact
it did.
On the basis of the above considerations, it would seem
unnecessary to ponder on political, strategic and diplomatic
errors committed subsequently to the decision for the Greek
landing in Anatolia, which can only assume secondary
importance. Indeed, what can be the purpose of elaborating on
mistakes or even blunders committed by Stergiadis,
Paraskevopoulos, Papoulas or Gnunaris, when it is clear that
these blunders were not in e$serze responibIe for the
disaster and that the fail ire o Creecs Asiatic venture was
a foregone conclusion from its outset? On the hills of Af ion
Karahisar 1 wrote Karolidis, the Greek army was not defeated by
Kemal but by the French and Italian polces which completed
the uprooting of the Greek populations of Asia Minor, an
uprooting initiated by Liman von Sanders some fifteen years
eari jer. In Toynbee's words, "there is nb doubt that the Big
Three were morally as well as technically responsible foi the
consequences of [their decision to send the Greek army to
Smyrna 3".
One of the open-ended arguments regarding the Asia
Minor issue is the question as to when did the Allies,
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separately or collectic, 	 eaHze the Ir.tractability of the
sltuation. created by ths , r isior.. Although most secondary
ources suggest that the c •O5 of regime in Greece marked the
change in Creek fortunes, appears that the magnitude of
tese consequences had been real'zec ever, before the Greek
linding that perpetrated theme A fe rnorths later, Admiral
British High Commiss.kor4er atnterin in ontantinol,
roe to Crowe: "The worst day's work which Venizelos ever did
ws when he induced the Supreme Council to allow the Greek
troops into Smyrna...Apart from turning the whole district
into shambles, which never wou'd have occured if the All.es
had been left to control it, it has sown the seed of still
more bitter animosity between reece and Tux4 ey than existed
before" 851. in view of evets in rrerici oced Cilicia, the
conviction that	 cuiditions would b ettr	 the area was
1t	 in 7ilec3 control i
	
ruest.orb	 owever,	 the
unc5eretirpation of this hitter amity and the
overestimation of the ability of both peos to forget the
past and live in peace, seems to have been cne of the most
vital znisjuc3gements of Venizelos, especially in the light of
the 1908-1918 events in Anatolia and the rise of Turkish
nationalism. On the French side, Poincaré wrote a few years
after the disaster that "Lloyd George in close collaboraticr
with Venizelos, dragged Greece in.to an adventure whose main
task was the successful implementation of the , policies of
Eritish imperialism in Asia Minor, and which was was to fail
from the outset" 86/. In view of French participation in the
Supreme Council meetings and Clènenceau's unr'sered approval
of the scheme Poincaré's	 attempt to U
	
rnce of a
responsibility cannot be accepted.
!onetheless, Venzelcs	 imseif ipçcared	 have ha
second thoughts and to recognize the danaer lc'oming ahead, in
3uly 1919, he wrote to Diomidis that those who opposed his
Asia Minor policy might have been right, and that there was a
strong possibility that the Greeks "might be thrown out of
Smyrna bag and baggage, degraded and humiliated" 87/, General
Metaxas, among those opposing his expansionist policy on
purely strategic terms, had foreseen in his memoranda of 27
and 31 January 1915, a repetition of Napoleon's war in Russia.
His gloomy prophecy was soon fulfilled and the result was a
national disaster of the first magnitude 88/. But did
Venizelos fall to the charms of lonia blindly or did he take
the risks with his eyes open? On the basis of his previous and
subsequent brilliant and lasting achievements, it seems quite
unlikely that the first couad have been the case. More likely
than not, his policy seems to have been decided partly by some
force rnajeure and partly by the expectation that the dangers
would be discounted by the inability of the Allies to
undertake military operations in Asia Minor and	 their
FO 608/91-20692, Webb to Crowe, letter 17.8.19. DBFP, IV,
486.
Metaxas, op.cit, p.p. 370-71.
Petsalis, p.cit., p. 225.





consequent deIegtion of the war for tlir rilfields of the N'ear
and Middle cast to Greece.
The	 force znajeure clearly wa 	 a result	 of	 his
jrecarious political pQitIofl at home: in 1915, "Venjzelos- was
incuced to accept Smyrna a q int his better judgernent perhaps.
Iaving onfe accepted, n die not €uin hdck. Je had told th
4eE- people that they would get Smyrna [in exchange for their
paJ.cipation in the War on the Allied side)" 89/. 1r3 1917,
the National Schism had taken its toll, he was brought
to power by foreign bayonets. The Greek army first
in 1916 on the demand of the /llies, then
kv4.%lized in 1917, was rushed to the 4a.edonian front and,
aftr defeatina the Bulgarian arny, was sent to the Ukraine,
time when the A1led powers were 3esnoblizlng rapidly. To
have gone through the vcis1tie of the last five years onli
to be told at the end that the nitial conception of the plan
iad been wrong, would be sure to prcipitate a violent
reaction in internal Greek politics. Clearly, Venizelos could
not g back on his promise because a polit5cally irreversible
steF had been taken in 1915 90/. If the venture was
successful, he might prolong his tenure of office for an
irdef.tr 'e period "and devote all his abilities to warding ofl
the dat4u i which the necessities of the moment bade hn
incur" 91 g . Not everyone seemed to agree with this turn of
thought. On ¶4 April 1919, a whole month before the Greer.
landing, Ncolson noted in his diary: "We shall be unable to
put the Greeks into Smyrna -]: mean keep t r e!T there. They can't
hold it without Allied support..,?t,	 f the .io not get
Smyrna, Venizelos will fall from pr'
	
It was this
araument which turned the sca's In favour of the Greeh
iarding, inspite of allthe m.sgivings 	 prsed in Greece anc
he. West.
Thus, in 1919, in spite of warnings from friends and
toes, more or less disregarding the consequences, and not
withstanding the contrary opinions of the highest military
authorities, both Allied and Greek, Venizelos launched the
Anatolian campaign, before the peace terms had been finally
settled. There seems to be little doubt that this was a fatal
error which, nonetheless, might still have been partially
repaired if, in 1920, after having obtained the recognition of
Greek claims to Western and Eastern Thrace and the Dodecanese,
"Venizelos had availed himself of this excuse in order to.
abandon Smyrna" 93/. Once this cnance wa lost, and the
elections were lost, no subsequent ooverr1ment could order the
evacuation of Asia Minor, as such a decision would be sure to
lead to a political crisis at home, signaling the downfall of
the cabinet responsible for taking it. Indeed, this argument
was taken up by Venizelos in March 1920, when France announced
its intention to propose a revision of the Peace Treaty at the
89/ Pallis, op.cit., p. 197.
/ Campbell-Sherard, op.cit, p. 123.
91/ Toynbee, op.cit, p. 69.
92/ Nicolson, op.cit, p. 312.
93/ Pallis,op.cit, conclusions.
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Supreme Councti. M.eind waS immediately informed that
French hostility to Ue Gree3: c)aiis would tantamount to the
downfall of the Venizeli 	 regime, tc te great detriment of
French interests 94/. Although this argument tipped the
balance yet again in favour of Venizelos, his insistence on
retjnjnq
 Western Asia Minor cannot be defended, especially
ftrr Ma'ch 1°20, when the inability of the Lll:ies to render
'	 1'tuv	 assistance to Greece in order to Impose	 the'
cct tance of the Peace-Treaty on Turkey had been made clear
to	 by Churchill and eLcI('wilson	 /.
At this point, Venizelos	 cnci o be putting
x ,t:e	 olncarès xtom that the art r p7iitCE is to oheise
two inconvenient options, onl !v s 'rns to have chosøn
l'he wrong one 961. As t1&ifl	 turne out,
	 f Venizelos ha
named in power after Novemb r-r 120. :i .oud have been
fdced with precisely the same diiemma as his suc'cesors:
should the Greek forces advance or evacuate? The Alliea
aments on the Venizelist loss of the elections did not last
long. Constantine's return presented a plausible excuse for
the West to evade its obligations towards its former Ally,
"There was no need any more to pursue an anti-Turkish policy"
97/. In February 1921, Nicolson wrote in a memorandum: tI
will oe Irportant to maintain the fiction that the Greeks are
actIng as Allies" 98/. If the Greece of Venizelos had beer
treated like a poor relative, the Greece of Constantine was tc
be treated as an impostor, despite the fact that +he
retaliatory measures adopted after his restoration made it
more difficult for Greece to carry on the struagle in Anatofla
21/.
Nonetheless, Gounaris and the Rova.ist party leaders
cannot be absolved from all responsibility in the disaster.
Despite their opposition to Venizelos's expansionist policy,
they did not possess the moral courage to evacuate the Sniyrna
enclave as soon as they came to power. However, in taking this
stance, they were prompted by Lloyd George who repeatedly
aroused false hopes of eventual British support and deterred
them from evacuating Asia Minor, What was more, evacuation was
an action as politicaily difficult for them as it had been for
Venize].os l0O/.f&axt-from 'a legitimate anxiety for the fate
of the Christian minorities following the departure of the
Greek forces, there was a dread for the reaction of public
941 Frangoulis, op.cit, TI, p. 136 Practically speaking,
Franôe had invested sums totalling more ttan 2 billion francs
in the Ottoman Empire. In the absence of substantial French
forces, how could the sizeable capital investment of France be
safeguarded and what provisions would be made with regard to
the enormous Ottoman Debt? Gidney, 3.B. A Mandate for Armenia
pp. 98-99.
95/ Churchill, op.cit, p. 383.
96/ Poincaré, R Au service de la France, ix, p. 177.
97/ Churchill, op.cit, p. 388.
/ DBFP, XVII, no 41.
99/ DBFP, VIII, no 100.
100/ Campbell-Sherard, op.cit, 125.
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opinion and a fear lest the 	 opposition exploit the
nove.
The evacuation of
	 n the rrr-er o 1921, gave an
insight to the future Smyrra Events: "Greeks evacuated Ismid
ast night...lndiscribable panic in the district. Practically
afl Greek inhabitants are reported to have been evacuated with
forces but Armenians nd rieutra
	
Turks are terror
*i.ken nd are attempting to flee...i thousands" jQiJ. This
po•phecy of impending disaster was dramatically fulfilled a
year later, with the final and absolute Turkish victory. This
rictory. This victory was not only due to the successfu
national movement but also to a remarkably effective
diplomatic campaign, by which the srios differences among
the Allies were xploitd and separate treaties were
concluded with each cf them to the detrment and isolation of
Greece. To top it all, w&to th TL&aty of rendship and
Mutual Cooperation conclud€d or 16 March 192L a Turco-Soviet
united front juxtaposed the hopelessly divided All.ed camp.
After the Greek debacle, the Conference opened at
I'udanya on 3 October 1922. Significantly, the first session
was underway before the Greek delegates arrived. In the event,
because of lack of space, they were not invited to the table
of negotiations 102/. The tragedy moved to its close with the
execution of the Six, the banishment of Constantine and the
exodus from the two sides of the Aegean which had started in
1908 and was completed in 1925.
On the basis o the above, wculd seem that the
Anatolian Venture could not come to a different conclusion.
However, with hindsight it appears that Greece had one more
option open to her, if her leaders had been brave enough to
take it. "Indeed, both belligerents had, they recognized their
true interests, they would have made up their minds to enter
into direct negotiations with one another than allow the
Western Powers to exploit them any longer;.,..our interest in
stopping the Greco-Turkish war was not so immediate as that of
th combatants" 103/. On the contrary, it appears that the
Great Powers preferred to see an Ally destroyed rather than
proceed to separate negotiations with the nationalists,
something they had themselves already done, only to secure
commercial interests in the Near East and not minorities
doomed to be exterminated 104/. After timid Greek efforts to
open direct channels of communication with Ankara became
known, the british position was summed up in the following
Foreign Office memorandum:
"It may be said that further political course of events
depends almost entirely on the issue of the hostilities
in Anatolia. On a review of the situation I venture to
think that a complete Greek victory would be less
disastrous than a complete nationalist victory. The best
result to hope for is a stalemate, which will leave
both sides exhausted" 105/.
101/ DBFP, XVII, no. 267.
102/ }iousepian, op.cit, p. 211. Kinross, op.cit, p. 384.
103/ Toynbee, op.cit, p. 101.
104/. DBFP, XVII, no 697.
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irieea, the most qrave error ommittd by the Royalists
seetrs to lie in the fact that the p stponed all decisive
acton, expecting the Allies to cr ritheir minds, when it
was quite r ear that there coul be no change in Allied
policies. Pezhap a 3ash for Constantinople could have brought
axout a solution to the Greek stalemdte. It was probably to
+ a reat detriment of Greece that the army leaders in Thrace
.ii riot take the situation in their own hands arid advance to
Constantinople. respite Allied threats and serious
consideration of employing Turkish troops to repel such an
offensive, it seems highly unlikely that the Powers would have
actually fought aga4nst Greece.	 i.ch a move would have
defeated the whole purpose of having sent. Greece to Asia Minor
at first place, 4 .e. to	 chi. pv the oal	 set by their
-espective Near East policies wiL) r t 'ulied miljtar
resources. In the meantime, the Greeks could be expected to
cnter Constantinople as it was defended Lv a handful of troops
only. The Greek forces would have the extreme advantage of
heading eis tin Polin, a fact that was sure to boost their
moral and give them the upper hand in any encounter with
Allied detachments, which would only be fighting for
financial concessions. Such a success would have aiven Greece
1-ne chance to negotiate from a stronger position. But, more
ignicantly, the Greek occupation of Constantinople even for
a few days would have been enough to justify to the Greek
eoe the sufferings of the past decade.
Howevcr, the project to occupy Ccnstantnople toucneci
upon utopia	 Any such effort against 1ie Ail.hed wishes would
contradict tne very existence of Greece	 dcfine by the 182
and 1832 Treaties of Paris and Lon5On, whac clearly speciUed
1-he subservient role of the country within the western
iropean community The factors determinin g Allied reluctance
to accept the Greek presence in Anatolia before August 1920,
did not cease to exist after the signature of the Treaty of
Sévres and were still there after the change of regime in
November 1920. Allied interrelations, their bearing on Greek
aspirations and the fact that Greece had virtually no options
after she landed in Asia Minor, were never made clear to the
Greek people which was led to believe that the expedition had
the unconditional backing of Europe. Instead of explaining the
situation and fachis responsibilities, in 1920 Venizelos
chose to leave Ath&n for the second time within six years. He
further chose to advise the royalist cabinets to implement
measures he could have never put to practice for fear of
public opinion. Was there any way out of this vicious circle?
Had the royalist aovernments o penly explained the situation to
the people and insisted on evacuating immediately, could they
have compelled at least the British to take some helpful
measures? It would be extremely difficult to give a positive
answer. Any proud stance on the part of the Greek governments
of the day would also be touching upon utopia in the face of
their subservient policies and their inability to separate
personal political gains from the welfare of the country.
Clearly, the pondering on the errors of secondary importance
committed after the Greek landing at Smyrna, brings us back
full circle to the realization that once the Allies arid
Venizelos had decided on the Anatolian Venture, no force could
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Adalya, 1919].
21. A Politiki Italoi en Mikra Asia - Promitheia oplon eis
Tourkous Mikras Asias, 	 1920. (1st Political Directorate,
Italians in Asia Minor - Procurement of Italian War Material
to the Turks, 1920].
22. A Politiki Smyrni, (Doc. nos. 10,001 - end, 1920). [1st
Political Directorate, Smyrna, 1920].
23. A Politiki Schedia pen Dioikitikis Organoseos M.Asias, 1921.
[1st Political Directorate, Plans for the Administrational
Organisation of Asia Minor, 1921).
24. A	 Politiki Pen M.Asias, A/5/VI, 1921. list Political
Directorate, Asia Minor, A/5/VI, 1921].
25. B Politiki Pen Prosfygon Smyrnis, B/59, 1922. [2nd Political
Directorate, Refugees from Asia Minor, B/59, 1922].
26. A	 Politiki Mikrasiatika,	 A/5,6, 1919. [1st Political
Directorate, Asia Minor Issues, A/5, 6, 1919).
27. A Politiki Ellinoitalika Epeisodia en Mikra Asia, A/5/VI,
1920. [1st Political Directorate, Greco-Italian Incidents in
Asia Minor, A/5/VI, 1920].
28. A Politiki Tourkikai Omotites en M.Asia, A/5/VI (5), 1921-
1922. [1st Political Directorate, Turkish Massacres in Asia
Minor, A/5/VI (5), 1921-1922].
29. A Politiki Mikra Asia - Konstantinoupolis, A/5/VI, 1921. [1st
Political Directorate, Asia Minor-Constantinople, A/5/VI,
1921].
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30. A	 Politiki Pen M.Asias,	 A/5,	 1921.	 [1st Political
Directorate, Asia Minor, A/5, 1921].
31. A Politiki Politikai Pliroforiai Ypatis Armosteias
Konstantinoupoleos,	 1921.	 List	 Political	 Directorate,
Political	 Information from the Constantinople High
Commission, 1921].
32. A Politiki Mikra Asia, A/lB 1921. [1st Political Directorate,
Asia Minor, A/18, 1921].
33. A Politiki Axiomatikoi Amynis en Konstantinoupoli, A/18,
1921. [1st Political Directorate, "National Defence" Officers
in Constantinople, A/18, 1921].
34. A Politiki Pen Ypatis Armosteias (Pliroforiail, 1922. [1st
Political Directorate, 	 Information Regarding the High
Commission of Smyrna, 1922).
35. A Politiki Fakellos A/18-AI5IV: 1. Diavatiria Axiomatikon
Amynis Konstantinoupoleos. 2. Ellines Aeroporoi eis Cheiras I
3. Mikra Asia, 1921-1922. [1st Political Directorate, File
A[18-A/5/V:1.Passports of "National Defence" Officers in
Constantinople. 2.Greek Pilots in the Hands of the Italians.
3. Asia Minor, 1921-1922].
36. A Politiki Pen Ekkenoseos Mikras Asias ke Synomologiseos
Anakochis, A/5/VI, 1922. [1st Political Directorate, File
Regarding the Evacuation of Asia Minor and the conclusion of
the Armistice, A/5/VI, 1922].
37. A Politiki Diafora apo 2.1-7.9.22, A/5/I, A/I, A/5/VI, 1922.
[1st Political Directorate, Miscelaneous, 2.1-7.9.22, A/5/I,
A/I, A/5/VI, 1922].
38. B Politiki Mikra Asia Deltia Pliroforion pen Katastaseos
Tourkikou Stratou, 1922. [2nd Political Directorate, Asia
Minor, Information on the Circumstances of the Turkish Army,
1922].
39. B Politiki Syllalitiria ke Psifismata yper Aftonomias Mikras
Asias 1922.	 [2nd Political Directorate, Demonstrations and
Proclamations in favour of Asia Minor Autonomy, 1922].
40. Archeio Gounani Deltia Typou Diaforon Presveion pen
Ekkenoseos Mikras Asias, pen Politikis tis Agglias Gallias
kip. 1922. (Gounanis Archive, Press Releases of Various
Embassies Regarding the Evacuation of Asia Minor, 	 the
policies of Britain, France, etc., 1922].
41. Archeio Gounari Antigrafa Katigoriai Enantion tis Eli iki
Katochis Smyrnis Tilegrafimata Venizelou Anaforai Dip
Prosopon dia Mikrasiatikon kip., 	 1922. (Gounanis Archive,
Copies, Criticisms Against the Greek Occupation of Smyrna,
Venizelos' Telegrams, Reports of Diplomats Regarding the Asia
Minor Question etc., 1922].
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42. Archeio Gounari Antigrafa Anaforon pros ton Prothypourgo.
Anafora Papoula gia tin Proelasi pros Angyra, 1921. [Gounaris
Archive, Copies of Reports to the Prime Minister. Report of
General Papoulas Regarding the Greek Advance to Ankara,
1921].
43. Archeio Gounari Deltia Pliroforion pen tis Drastiriotitos
ton Amyniton els Konstantinoupolin, 1921. [Reports Regarding
the Activities of the "National Defence" Officers in Consta-
ntinople, 1921].
44. A Politiki Ekthesi gia tin Katastasi sto Esoteriko tis Mikras
Asias, A.A.K., 1919. [1st Political Directorate, Report on
the Situation in the Interior of Asia Minor, nc/nfl 1919].
45. B Politiki, Meleti gia tin Oikonomiki Georgiki Emboriki ke
Viomichaniki Katastasi tis Periochis Smyrnis, 4. 7. 19. [2nd
Political Directorate, Study for the Economic, Agricultural,
Commercial and Industrial Situation in the Smyrna Region,
4.7.19].
46. Archeio Gounari Anaforai Tileqrafimata




Ia Mikrasiatika Themata,	 1921. List
Reports and Telegrams to the Prime
Asia Minor Question, 1921].
47. Archeio Gounari Scheseis Kemal meta Bolsevikon, 1921.
(Gounaris Archive, Relations between Kemal and the
Bolsheviks, 1921].
48. Archeio Gounari Antigrafa ke Protoypa Kryptografimata pros
to Ypourgeion Exoterikon Anaferomena eis Mikrasiatiko, 1921.
[Gounaris Archive, Copies and Original Cyphred Telegrams
Addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding the
Asia Minor	 Question, 1921].
49. A Politiki Allilograf Ia Venizelou me Kyvernisi ke YAS gia
Themata Thrakis ke Mikras Asias, A.A.K., 1920. [1st Political
Directorate,	 Correspondance between Venizelos and the
Government and the Smyrna High Commission, nc/nfl, 1920].
50. Archeio Gounari Dimosievmata Xenou Typou pen Mikras Asias,
1921. [Gounaris Archive, Articles Regarding Asia Minor in the
Foreign Press, •
 1921].
51. A Politiki Politikes ke Stratiotikes Plirofories. Stasi
Symmachon apenanti stin Elliniki Katochi Smyrnis, 1919-1920,
N/6. List Political Directorate, Political and Military
Information. Allied Stance towards the Greek Occupation of
Smyrna, N/6, 1919-1920].
52. Archeio Gounari Antigraf a Anaforon Diplomatikon Ekprosopon
pen ton Diekdikiseon tis Ellados eis Mikra Asia, 	 1920.
[Gounaris Archive, Reports of Diplomatic Representatives
Regarding Greek Vindications in Asia Minor, 1920].
53. YAK Vivilon Fakellon Archeiou, 1918-1921. [CHC Registry of
Files in the Archive of the High Commission, 1918-1921].
272
54. YAK Zitimata tis Smyrnis, E/lb, 1920. (CHC Issues Regarding
Smyrna, E[lb, 1920].
55. YAK Stratiotiki ke Naftiki Apostoli, A/2, 1920. (CHC Military
and Naval Mission, A/2, 1920].
c6. YAK Ethimotypia-Prosopiko Ellinikis Armosteias, Al, 1920.
'CUC Protocol-Personnel of the Greek High Commission, Al,
1920].
57. YAK Xene Ethnikotites en Tourkia. Armeno-Tourkikos Polemos,
B/S, 1920. [dC Foreign Nationalities in Turkey. Armeno-
Turkish War, B/5, 1920].
58. YAK Diafora Simiomata Anaforai Ypomnimata pros ton Ypato
Armosti E.Kanellopoulo Paradothenta kata tin Anachorisin tou
ek Konstantinoupoleos, 1919. (CHC Various Notes, Reports and
Petitions Addressed to the High Commissioner E. Kanellopoulos




Occupation of Smyrna and
Military	 Operations, Eli,
Smyrnis ke Perifereias Deltia
Eli, 1919. ICHC Special File:
its Hinterland.	 Bulletins of
1919].
59. YAK Eidikos F
Stratiotikon
60. YAK Diafora Simiomata Paradothenta ypo tou k.E.Kanellopoulou
kata tin ek Konstantinoupoleos Anachorisin tou, 1919-1921.
[CHC Various Notes Handed to the Archive on the Departure of
Mr. E. Kanellopoulos, 1919-1921].
61. YAK Diassymachiki Anakritiki Epitropi meta tin Katalipsi
tis Srnyrnis.Energeie Antiprosopon Eli
Syntagmatarchou Mazaraki, E/i, 1919. [CHC Interallied Comzni-
ssion of Inquiry after the Occupation of Smyrna. Activities
of the Greek Government and Colonel Mazarakis, Eli, 1919].
62. YAK Stasis ke Politeia Dynameon en Tourkia. Diomologiseis,
E/2, 1919. (CHC Stance and Policies of the Powers in Turkey.
Capitulations, E/2, 19191.
63. YAK Eidikos Fakellos:Kinima Anatolis M.Kemal.Sfagai els Varos
ton Ellinon, B/i, 1919. [CHC Special File:Anatolian Movement
of M.Kemal. Massacres against the Greeks, B/i, 1919].
64. YAK Kryptografika Lexika, Z/2, 1919. (CHC Cyphres, Z/2,
1919).
65. YAK Diafora 2751 - 4699, z/1, 1919. (CHC Miscelaneous Docu-
ments, nos. 2751-4699, z/1, 1919].
66. YAK Diafora 1001 - 2750, Z/l, 1919. (CHC Miscelaneous 	 Docu-
ments, nos. 1001-2750, Z/1, 1919].
67. YAK Diafora 4700 -_7000, Z/1, 1919. tCHC Miscelaneous Docu-
ments, nos. 4700-7000, Z/i, 1919).
68. YAK Politikai Stratiotikai ke Naftikai Ektheseis, B/i, 1919.
[CHC Political, Military and Naval Reports, B/i, 1919].
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69. YAK Xenai Organoseis ke Propagandai en Tourkia, B/6, 1919.
[CHC Foreign Organisations and Propaganda in Turkey, B/6,
1919].
70. YAK Deltia Typou, 1920. [CHC Press Releases, 1920].
71. YAK Themata Xenon Ypikoon, la bis, 1920. [CHC Issues Rega-
rding Foreign Nationals, la bis, 1920].
72. YAK Eklogai tis 1. 11. 20 - IDimopsifisma dia tin Epanaforan
tis A. .M. tou Vassileos Konstantinou,	 A/ia,	 1920.	 [CiC
Elections	 of 1.11.20-Plebiscite for the Return of H.R,Ø.
King Constantine, A/la, 1920].
73. YAK Epitheorisi Topikou Typou - Deltia Typou, B/3, 1919.
[CHC Review of Local Press-Press Releases, B/3, 1919].
74. YAK Xenai Armosteiai Konstantinoupoleos ke to_Prosopikon
Af ton,	 A/lb,	 1920.	 [CHC Foreign High Commissions in
Constantinople and their Personnel, A/lb 1 1920).
75. YAK	 Politikai Pliroforial,	 B/i,	 1920. [CHC Political
Inforamation, B/i, 1920].
76. A Politiki Tourkia arithm. 10.000 - telos, A/5/VI, 1920.
[1st Political Directorate, Turkey Documents nos. 10,000 to
end, A/5/VI, 1920].
77a.YAK	 Efarmogi Synthikis Sevron,	 E/12,	 1920.	 [CHC
Implementation of the Treaty of Sêvres, E/12, 1920].
77. A Politiki Tourkia Fakellos B',	 1920.	 [1st Political
Directorate, Turkey, File B', 19203.
78. YAK Organosis tou Ellinismou en Tourkia, B/4, 1920. (CHC
Organisation of Hellenism in Turkey, B/4, 1920].
79. YAK Somateia,Syllogoi Ke Organoseis tou Ellinismou en Tourkia
B/4, 1920. [CHC Societies, Associations and Organisations of
Hellenism in Turkey, B/4, 1920].
80. YAK	 Embisteftikon Protokollon,	 1921. [CHC Confidential
Registry, 1921].
81. YAK Pliroforiai-Deltia Pliroforion, 1921. [CHC Information-
Intelligence Reports,1921].
82. YAK Proxenika, z/4, 1920. (CHC Consular Documents, Z/4,
1920].
83. YAK Typos en genei, B/3, 1921. [CHC Press in General, B/3,
1 921 1.
84. YAK Xenai Organoseis ke Propaganda, B/6, 1921. (CHC Foreign
Organisations and Propaganda, B/6, 1921].
85. YAK Eidikos Fakellos Eklogis Patriarchou, C/la. [CHC Special
File on the Election of the Patriarch, C/la, 1921].
274
86. YAK Stratiotiki ke Naftiki Apostoli, A/2, 1921. [CHC Military
and Naval Mission, A/2, 1921].
87. YAK Zitimata tis Smyrnis - Apostoli Anakritikis Epitropis dia
Omotitas, E 1/b, 1922. [CHC Issues Regarding Smyrna-Despatch
of Inquiry Commission on Excesses, E 1/b, 1922].
68. YAK Fakellos Antikemalikon Organoseon ke Somateion.Anatolitai
Kourdoi, 1922. [CHC File on Antikemalist Organisations and
Associations. Anatolians-Kurds, 1922].
89. YAK Kourdikon, 192. [CHC Kurdish Question, 1922].
90. YAK Diaforoi Pliroforiai pen tis Drastiriotitos ton Mousoul-
manon Kommouniston, 1922. (CHC Miscellaneous Information on
the Activities of the Muslim Communists, 1922].
91. YAK Deltia Pliroforion pen ton Kiniseon ton Kemalikon ke ton
antidrastikon tis Ypsilis Pylis eis tin Ellinikin Stratiotikin
Katochin, 1922. (CHC Intelligence Reports on the Movements of
the Kemalists and the Reactionaries of the Sublime Porte
within the Greek Military Occupation, 1922].
92. YAK Xenai Organoseis ke Propaganda, B/6, 1922. [CHC Foreign
Organisations and Propaganda, B/6, 1922].
93. YAK Xenai Ethnikotites en Tourkia. Evraikon Nekrotafeion eis
Panormon, B/S, 1922. (CHC Foreign Nationalities in Turkey,
Jewish Cemetery in Bandirma, B/5, 1922].
94. YAK Epitheorisis Egchoriou Typou-Typos en Genei, B/3, 1922.
(CHC Review of Local Press, Press in General, B/3, 1922].
95. YAK Xenai Organoseis ke Propaganda, B/6, 1920. [CHC Foreign
Organisations and Propaganda, B16, 1920].
96. YAK Eidikos Fakellos-Sfagai Ellinon, 3/1/1919. (CHC Special
File: Massacres against the Greeks, B/1/1919].
1G. M I S S I N G
97. YAK Proxenika, Z/4, 1920. [CHC Consular Documents, Z/4,
1920].
98. YAK	 Anagnorisis Oikoumenikou Patriarchou Meletiou, 	 G/la,
1922.	 [CHC Recognition of the Oecoumenical Patriarch
Meletios, G/la, 1922].
99. YAS Fonol Ellinon-Elliniki Katochi Smyrnis, 1919. [SHC Greeks
Murdered-Greek Occupation of Smyrna, 1919].
100,YAS Gallikai Energeiai kata tis Ellinikis Katochis, A/VIII,
1919. [SHC French Activities against the Greek Occupation,
A/VIII, 1919].
101 .YAS Dimotikoi Ypalliloi Smyrnis.Symperifora Katoikon Smyrnis,
1919. [SHC Employees of the Smyrna Municipality.Behaviour of
the Inhabitants of Smyrna [towards the SHC], 1919].
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102.YAS Itaiikai Energeiai enantion tis Ellinikis Katochis, A/V1
1919. (SHC Italian Activities against the Greek Occupation,
A/V, 1919].
103.YAS Stoicheia pen ton Sfagon Nazi! ke Aidiniou, 1920. [SHC
Information Regarding the Massacres at Aidin and Nazili,
19203.
104.YAS Afoplismos ke Exoplismos Katoikon Mikras Asias, 	 3/1,
1920. [SHC Disarmament and Armament of the Inhabitants of
Asia Minor, 3/1, 1920].
105.YAK Ekdiloseis epi ti Apovivasi tou Ellinikou Stratou, 1919.
[Manifestations on the Occasion of the Landing of the Greek
Army, 1919].
106.YAS Dioikitika, 5/1, 1920. [SHC Administrative Issues, 5/1,
1920).
107.YAS Antidrasis Tourkikon Archon ke Antarton kata tou Stratou
is. I Drasi
Anzavour, 4/1, 1920. [SHC Reaction of the Turkisk Authorities
and the Guerrillas against the Occupation Army within the
Greek Zone and beyond it. Activities of Anzavour, 4/1, 1920].
108.YAS Antidrastikai Energeiai ton Agglon kata tis Ellinikis
Katochis Mikras Asias, 8/1, 1920. [CRC British Activities
Against the Greek Occupation of Asia Minor, 8/1, 1920].
109.YAS Antidrastikal Energeiai Symmachon Armoston Konstantinou-
poleos ke Anamixeis Af ton eis tin Ellinikin Dioikisi, 8/A,
1920, [SHC Activities of the Allied High Commissioners in
Constantinople Against and their Interference with the
Greek Administration, 8/A, 1920].
110.YAS Politica Themata Mikras Asias, 6/8, 1920. [SHC Political
Issues Regarding Asia Minor, 6/8, 1920].
111.YAS Anachoriseis Epanodoi ke Periodiai Ypatou Armostou k. A.
Stergiadi, 3/4, 1921. [SHC Departures, Arrivals and Tours of
High Commissioner Stergiadis, 3/6, 1921].
112, YAS
Greek Individuals and
the Regime, 3/6, 1921].
113.YAS Drastiriotis Italon Ypikoon.I Mikrasiatiki Ainyna.Paraiti-
sis tis Kyverniseos,	 1922.	 [SHC Activities of Italian
Citizens. The Asia Minor Defence. Resignation of the Cabinet,
1922].
114.YAS I Apofasis Apovivaseos Ellinikou Stratou eis Smyrnin ke
i en Synecheia Proelasis ton eis Mikra Asia, zf1, 1921. [SHC
The Decision to Land Greek Troops to Smyrna and the
Subsequent Advance in Asia Minor, Z/1, 1921].
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115.YAS Logokrisia epi tou Typou-Diafora peri Typou, 1/13, 1921.
[dC Press Censorship-Miscellaneous Information on Press,
1/13, 1921).
116.YAS Ekthesis Pepragmenon Ellinikis Dioikiseos Smyrnis:Koino-
niki Antilipsis,Sidirodromi,Perithalpsis Prosfygon kip., 1/9,
1921.	 (SHC Report on the Activities of
	
the	 Greek
Administration: Social Welfare, Railways, Rehabilitation of
Refugees etc, 1/9, 1921].
117.YAS Meleti Karatheodori dia tin Idrysin ke Organosin Panepi-
stimiou,	 1922.	 [SHC Karatheodori's	 Report	 on	 the
Establishment and the Organisation of the 	 tlonian]
University, 1922].
118,YAs Kentriki ke Topikai Organosis entos tis Synthikis Sevron,
1922. [SHC Central and Local [Governmental) Organisation
within the Treaty of Sèvres f Zone), 1922].
119.YAS Tourkoi Dimosioi Ypalliloi, 1922. ISHC Turkish Civil
Servants, 1922].
120..YAS Egkyklioi tis Ypatis Armosteias pen Rossikis Paroikias,
Armenion Prosfygon,klp.,Koinopoiithisai eis A Politikin Diefthi-
nsin, 1922. [SHC Circulars Issued by the High Commission
Regarding the Russian Community, the Armenian Refugees etc.,
and Communicated to the 1st Political Directorate, 1922].
121 .YAS I Apochorisis ton Dimosion Ypallilon apo tin Mikra Asia,
[SHC The Departure of the Civil Employees from Asia Minor,
1922].
122.YAS Diafora pros Energeian.Panikos_ton Ellinikon Plythismon,
[SHC Miscelaneous Pending Issues.Panic Among the Greek
Population, 1922].
123.YAS Antapokrisis Dimosiofrafou Gibbons, 	 Z/12, 1922. [SHC
Article by Correspondent Gibbons, Z/12, 1922].
124.YAS Syllipsis Ypopton dia Schediazomenin Dolofonian A.M.Vasi-
leos, 1/8, 1922. [SHC Individuals Arrested as Suspects for
the Plot against H.M. the King, 1/8, 1922].
125.YAS Aftodioikisis Mikras Asias Allilograf Ia Ypatou Armostou
A.Stergiadi meta tis Kyverniseos-Chorofylaki, 1/4, 1922. [SHC
Autonomy of Asia Minor, Correspondence between High
Commissioner Stergiadis and the Government-Gendarmerie, 1/4,
1922].
126.YAS Synerasia ton Kirkasion meta ton Ellinikon Archon Mikras
Asias, Z/5, 1922. (SHC Collaboration between the Circassians
and the Greek Authorities in Asia Minor, Z/5, 1922].
127,YAS Typos Apagorefsis Kykloforias Rizospasti eis tin Stratian
Mikras Asias-Dimosievmata tou Typou, 5/1, 1922. [SHC Press.
Rizospastis's Circulation Prohibited in the Asia Minor Army.
Press Publications, 5/1, 1922].
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1 28.YAS Dorritos-Kataskopeia-TourkoiSynergatai tou Ellinikou
Str	 -Tourkoi Katas
Thyron, Z/11, 1920-1922. (SHC Top Secret-Intelligence-Turks
Cooperating with the Greek Army-Kemalist Spies-Kaimakam of







on-Metra dia tin Embedosi




in Kilikian, 1922. [SHC Occupation of the
Ottomans Murdered and their Murderers Executed-
the Establishment of the Greek Administration in
Sokia-French Occupation of Cilicia, 1922].
130.YAS Eidikos Fakellos Ekiogis Patriarchou, B/35, 1918-1920.
[SHC Special File on the Election of the Patriarch, 1918-
1920].
131.YAS Alvanikon Stoicheion Mikras Asias, 	 9/3,	 1922.	 [SHC
Albanian Communities in Asia Minor, 9/3, 1922].
132.YAS Kourdikon Zitima-Voitheia eis tin Epanastasin ton Kourdon
Z/6, 1922. [SHC Kurdish Question-Assistance to the Kurdish
Revolution, Z/6, 1922].
133.YAS Themata Kirkassiort, 1922. [SHC Issues Regarding the
Circassians, 1922].
134.AAK Statistiki 1920.Pinax Statistikis ton Pathonton Chorion
en Mikra Asia kata tous Teleftaious Diogmous ypo ton Kemaliko
(Ypo Patriarchikis Kentrikis Epitropisj, 1920. [NC/NN 1920,
Statistics. Statistis Regarding the Villages which Suffered
during the Last Kemalist Persecutions (Conducted by the
Central Committee of the Patriarchate], 1922].
135.A Politiki Entypa, A/5/VI, 1919.(lst Political Directorate,
Printed Material,	 A/5/VI,	 1919]. Includes "Rponse du
Patriarcat Oecumenique au Mmoire remis le 12 F&vrier 1919
par la Sublime Porte aux Hauts Commissaires des Grands
Puissances de 1' Entente a Constantinople", 12.2.19.
136.AAK Entypa 1919-1920. [NC/NN, Printed Material, 1919-1920].
Includes "Mémoire aux Membres du Congrés de la Paix de
Paris".
137.AAK Koinonia ton Ethnon-Entypa,	 1919.	 tNC/NN League of
Nations, Printed Material, 1919).
138.1 Politiki Tourkikes Omotites eis tin Thrakin ke Mikra Asia,
1919-1920. (3rd Political Directorate, Turkish Massacres in
Thraceand Asia Minor, 1919-1920].
139.AAK Elliniki Katochi Smyrnis, (Antigrafa), 1919. (NC/NN,Greek
Occupation of Smyrna, Copies, 19193.
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140.A Politiki Fakellos Smyrnis:1.Proetoimasiai dia tin Apoviva-
sin tou Ellinikou Stratou.2,Therna Afixeos A.Stergiadi.3.Tile-
grafimata E.Mavroudi, 1919. (1st Political Directorate,
Smyrna File:1.Preparations for the Landing of the Greek
Army.2.Delayed Arrival of A.Stergiadis. 3.Telegrams by E.
Mavroudis, 1919].
141 .A Politiki Fakellos Smyrnis:Italoellinika Episodeia,Zitima
Diorismou Neou Vali, 1919. [1st Political Directorate, Smyrna
File:Italo-Greek Incidents, Appointment of new Vali, 1919].
142.A Politiki Fakellos Smyrnis:Apozimioseis 2 Maiou 1919,1919.
list	 Political	 Directorate,	 Smyrna	 File,
Reparations/Indemnities for Events of 2/15 May 1919, 1919].
143.A Politiki Fakellos Smyrnis,Diafora Ergou Ellinikis Dioiki-
seos Smyrnis, 1919. [1st Political Directorate, Smyrna File,
Documents Related to the Greek Administration of Smyrna,1919J.
144."Le Rqime d' Occupation Hellénique en Tu
officiels et des_preuves irrefutables", Pub
Permanent du Congrês Turc de Lausanne, 1921.
ie. Des Documents
lie par le Bureau
145.A Politiki Diogmoi Ellinon en Tourkia, A/5, 15, 18, 1915.
[1st Political Directorate, Persecution of Greeks in Turkey,
A/5, 15, 18, 1915].
146.B Politiki Diogmoi Ellinon en Tourkia, B/45, 1915. (2nd Poli-
tical Directorate, Persecution of Greeks in Turkey, B/45,
1915].
147.A Politiki Epitropi Antallagis Plythismon, A/21, 1914. (1st
Political Directorate,	 Committee on the Exchange of
Population, A/21, 1914).
148.B Po].itiki Stratologia Ellinon en Tourkia, B/41, 1915. [2nd
Political Direotorate, Conscription of Greeks in Turkey,
B/41, 1915].
149.B Politiki Diogmol Ellinon eis Thrakin ke Mikra Asia, B/45,
1915. (2nd Political Directorate, Persecution of Greeks in
Thrace and Asia Minor, B/45, 1915].
150.A Politiki, Fakellos Antiprosopeias Parision, N/6, 1919. list
Political Directorate, Paris Legation File, N/6, 1919].
151.A Politiki Fakellos Antiprosopeias Parision, A/12, 1919. [1st
Political Directorate, Paris Legation Files, A/12, 1919].
152.A Politiki Italikai Drastiriotites ke Diatheseis pro ke meta
tin Eisodon tis Italias eis ton Polemon, A15, 1915. (Italian
Activities and Disposition before and after Italy's Entry to
the War, A15, 1915].
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B.General State Archives, Athens (GAS)
1. YAS Anef Diakriseos eis Kladous,Fakelloi 1-7, 1919-1920.
[HCS Files 1-7, No Classification, 1919-1920].
2. YAS Anef Diakriseos eis Kladous,Fakelloi 8-10, 1919-1920.
[HCS Files 8-10, No Classification, 1919-1920].
3. YAS Anef Diakriseos eis Kladous,Fakelloi 11-14, 1919-1920.
[HCS Files 11-14, No Classification, 1919-1920].
4. YAS Geniki Grammateia Tmima Politikon A ke B,Fakelloi 15-17,
1920-1921. (HCS General Secretariat, A and B Political
Sections, Files 15-17, 1920-1921).
5. YAS Geniki Grammateia Tmima Politikon A ke B,Fakelloi 18-20,
1920-1921. (HCS General Secretariat, A and B Political
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